Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Because in the preceding matters it was often presupposed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and this involves a certain difficulty: so that this sort of difficulty may be removed, St. Thomas intends to show the truth ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows what is proposed; second, he resolves the reasons of the adversaries in the following chapter.

As to the first, he proves what is proposed in two ways: namely, by authorities; and by reasons ².

I. First, then, it is proved from the authority of the Apostle in Rom. 8. For there the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son. But the Holy Spirit cannot be called the Spirit of the Son of God according to any other relation except according to some origin, since this distinction alone is found in the divine persons. Therefore etc.

If it be said that the Spirit who proceeds from the Father is one, and the Spirit who is of the Son is another: — this is shown to be false from the preceding words of the Apostle, by which he said, If the Spirit of God dwells in you.

If it be also said that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ inasmuch as he had him as man, according to that text of Luke 4, Jesus, full etc.: — the argument is made against this. The Holy Spirit does not make sons of God except inasmuch as he is the Spirit of the Son of God: as is clear in Gal. 4, when it is said, Because you are etc. But we are made adoptive sons of God through assimilation to the natural Son of God: according to that text of Rom. 8, Whom he foreknew etc. Therefore the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ inasmuch as he is the natural Son of God: — supply, Therefore not inasmuch as he is man.

II. Second, it is proved from the fact that in John 15 the Holy Spirit is said to be sent by the Son. For the one sending has some authority over the one sent. Therefore the Son has some authority with respect to the Holy Spirit. But not of dominion or greaterness. Therefore according to origin alone. Therefore etc.

If it be said that this reason is not valid, because the Son also is sent by the Holy Spirit, as is shown in Luke 4: — this does not stand in the way. For the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit according to the assumed human nature. But this cannot be said of the Holy Spirit, who did not assume a created nature.

2. It should be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 43, the last article, that not only can it be said that the Son of God was sent by the Holy Spirit according to his human nature to preach, but it can also in some way be conceded that the very person of the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit: if, I say, the sending person is understood to be the principle of the effect according to which the mission is measured. For in this way the whole Trinity sends the person sent: inasmuch as the whole Trinity is the cause of that effect according to which the mission is measured. But then it is not necessary that the sender have authority over the person sent, but it suffices that he have authority over the effect according to which he is said to be sent.

3. It should be noted secondly that, if authority is taken properly, the notion of a principle not from a principle is imported by the name itself: for that is called an author which is the principle of some thing and does not have this from another. Nevertheless, by an extension of the word, every relation of a producing principle can be called authority. When therefore it is said that the sender has some authority over the one sent, authority is taken in the second way, but not in the first way. For the Son, although he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless has this from the Father: whence he cannot properly be called the author of the Holy Spirit. But the Father can well be called his author: because the fact that he is his principle, he has from himself, and not from another. — It is also understood concerning the sender as to its primary signified, but not as to its secondary: according to those things which were said in the preceding chapter ³.

III. Third, it is proved, because in John 16 the Son says of the Holy Spirit, He shall glorify me etc.

If it be said that the Holy Spirit receives that which is of the Son, for instance the essence, yet not from him, but from the Father: — against this is what is added, All things that the Father has are mine etc. For if all things that the Father has are the Son's, the authority of the Father according to which he is the principle of the Holy Spirit will also be his.

2. But this reply seems not to be sufficient. For just as All things that the Father has are the Son's, Therefore the relation of paternity, which is the Father's, is also the Son's is not valid: so Therefore the authority of the Father is also the Son's is not valid. For that proposition is understood of absolutes.

He answers, according to the things said in the preceding matters ⁴, that the proposition of Christ is to be understood of those things that belong to the Father not inasmuch as he is relatively opposed to the Son. For since there is no distinction between the Father and the Son except that which relative opposition makes, it is necessary that all things be common to them except those in which they are relatively opposed. But since the Father is opposed to the Son by paternity, not by the relation of principle to the Holy Spirit, it follows well from the fact that all things that are the Father's are also the Son's, that authority with respect to the Holy Spirit belongs to the Son, but not paternity.

IV. Fourth, it is proved from the authority of the doctors of the Church, including the Greeks. For Athanasius says that he proceeds from the Father and the Son; Cyril says that he flows forth from the Truth, just as also from God the Father; Didymus also concedes that he is from the Son, and flows forth from him.

But because someone could say that Cyril and Didymus concede that he is from the Son and flows forth, but not that he proceeds, St. Thomas added that among all things pertaining to origin, the word procession is found to be more common. And therefore in the origin of the divine persons it is especially to be observed ⁵: because divine realities are designated more through common terms than through special ones. Whence, if it be conceded that the Holy Spirit is or flows forth from the Son, it follows that he proceeds from him.

It should be noted that St. Thomas relies on the authorities of the Greek doctors for this reason, because the Greeks denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Against whom he disputed more at length in the treatise that is entitled Against the Errors of the Greeks ⁶.

Fifth, it is proved, because in the determination of the Fifth Council, namely of Constantinople, as is found in De Potentia Dei, q. 10, a. 4, ad 13, it is said: We follow in all things the holy fathers and doctors of the Church, Athanasius, etc. Moreover, from many authorities of Augustine, especially in the book De Trinitate, and on John, it is manifest that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

V. In the second place, it is argued by reasons ⁷. These indeed do not demonstrate simpliciter, but show that it is necessary that the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son, presupposing the trinity of divine persons.

The first reason is this. It is necessary that the distinction of divine persons occur through some opposition. But the divine persons cannot be distinguished through any other opposition than through the relative opposition of origin. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son, it is necessary that he be from him: since it cannot be said that the Son is from the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit is said to be of the Son, and to be given by the Son.

The major is proved. Because, removing material distinction, which cannot have a place in the divine persons, no things are found to be distinguished except through some opposition: for those things that have no opposition can be together, as is clear in the white and the triangular.

The minor is proved thus. The distinction of the divine persons does not occur through the opposition of affirmation and negation. Because in this way beings are distinguished from non-beings. — Nor through the opposition of privation and habitus. Because in this way the perfect are distinguished from the imperfect. — Nor through the opposition of contrariety. Because that, according to the Philosopher ⁸, is a difference according to form, which difference does not belong to the divine persons. — Nor through the relative opposition that is founded on quantity: Because not through that which is founded on diversity of quantity, because the equality of the persons would be taken away; neither through that which is founded on unity, because relations of this kind do not cause distinction, even if perhaps some of them presuppose distinction; nor through the relative opposition that is founded on action and passion, namely one other than the opposition of origin, because in these one is always as subject and unequal according to power, except in the relations of origin, in which no diminution is designated, since something is found to produce what is similar to itself and equal according to power. Therefore etc.

VI. Concerning that proposition, No things are found to be distinguished except through some opposition, it should be noted that it is understood not of the distinction of accidental forms and natures, because there are some distinct forms and natures that have no opposition to one another, as triangle and whiteness: but it is understood of the formal distinction of subsisting substances. For such substances are not distinguished except through some opposition: that is, the principles by which they are formally distinguished from one another must be opposed, taking opposition in a broad way, so that namely even things distinct through the perfect and the imperfect are called opposed. For thus St. Thomas explains in I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 2. For as is said here, if some forms are not opposed, they can be together in the same thing. And if they can be together in the same thing, they cannot be the formal reason of distinction of a subsisting thing: for it is not necessary that any things be distinguished through those forms which do not require a distinct subject, but can be in the same thing.

2. Concerning that proposition, Through the opposition of negation and affirmation beings are distinguished from non-beings, it should be noted that non-being can be taken in two ways: namely simpliciter; and in a genus, which namely is a non-being of such a kind. If it is taken in the first way, thus the proposition is to be understood of contradictory opposition simpliciter and absolutely, but not of it contracted to some matter. For when we say, this is white, this is not white, it is not necessary that white and non-white be distinct as being and non-being simpliciter: since what is not white can be a being, for instance a man. On the contrary, as is said in De Pot., q. 10, art. 5, the truth of any negative is founded upon the truth of an affirmative, just as the truth of this negative, An Ethiopian is not white, is founded upon the truth of this, An Ethiopian is black. And therefore (as is said in the same place) it is necessary that every difference that is through the opposition of affirmation and negation, namely concerning some being, be reduced to the difference of some affirmative opposition.

If, however, non-being is taken in the second way, thus the proposition is to be understood of the opposition of affirmation and negation determined to some genus. For through this affirmation and negation, Snow is white, A crow is not white, this being that is snow is distinguished from this non-being that is non-snow, namely from a crow, or white from non-white.

In both ways the proposition has truth in the matter at hand. Because since the Holy Spirit is not simpliciter a non-being, there cannot be between the Son and the Holy Spirit a distinction through the opposition of affirmation and negation simpliciter. — Likewise, since we are not inquiring concerning the distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit that is through having and not having the same form, for instance through this, which is to be the Son and not to be the Son; but concerning the positive formal principles by which they are distinguished from one another: it must not be said that they are distinguished through the opposition of affirmation and negation determined to a certain genus or to a certain form, since in this way only a being is distinguished from a non-being, that is, one having some determined form from one not having that form, but things are not distinguished by positive formal principles.

3. Concerning that which St. Thomas says of relations that are founded upon unity, that they seem rather to pertain to agreement, even if perhaps some of them presuppose distinction, it should be noted that some relations of this kind, namely likeness and equality, properly speaking, presuppose distinction, because the same thing is not said to be like and equal to itself: identity, however, does not presuppose distinction, because the same supposit is the same as itself. On account of this St. Thomas adds, even if perhaps some of them presuppose distinction. But he speaks hesitantly, because there are some who hold that relations of this kind, even if they are real, require indeed a distinction of supposits, but not of foundations. He himself holds, however, that they also require a distinction of foundations: nevertheless, because he does not wish to dispute concerning this now, he does not posit this assertively, but hesitantly.

VII. The second reason is this ⁹. In the Father there are two relations: namely paternity and spiration, one of which is referred to the Son, the other to the Holy Spirit, since the Son and the Holy Spirit are from the Father. Similarly there are two relations on the part of the Son and the Holy Spirit: namely filiation and procession, by one of which the Son is referred to the Father, and by the other the Holy Spirit. But the first two do not constitute two persons, that is, they do not make a duality of persons or a distinction, but pertain to the one person of the Father: because they are not opposed. Therefore the other two also would pertain to one person unless they had an opposition to one another. But it is not possible to give any other opposition than according to origin. Therefore etc.

Note that St. Thomas, speaking of the relation of the Father to the Holy Spirit, says, let it be called spiration, and of the relation of the Holy Spirit to him, let it be called procession: because, as was said above ¹⁰, names have not been assigned to the origin of love as they have to generation, and similarly to the relations following an origin of this kind. But St. Thomas, so that he may be able to explain them by some names, imposes on them the names of spiration and procession, although those are names of origin rather than of relation. For the poverty of vocabulary brings it about that by the same name both the origin itself, and the relation that follows it, are named.

VIII. But against the foundation of the said reasons it is argued by Scotus and Aureoli. For Scotus argues first, I Sent., d. 11, q. 2 ¹¹, proving that, even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he could still be personally distinguished from him. And first, thus. By whatever a thing is formally constituted in being, by the same it is distinguished from anything whatsoever by a distinction suitable to such an entity. But the Son is constituted in personal being by filiation. Therefore he is also distinguished by it from every other person. Therefore, by impossible or possible supposition, setting aside everything else, especially what is posterior to filiation, the Son will remain personally distinct by filiation from any person whatsoever. Therefore etc.

Second ¹². If the Father, per impossibile, did not spirate, but the Son did, the Father would still be distinguished by paternity from the Son and the Holy Spirit, just as he is constituted in personal being by paternity. Therefore etc.

Third ¹³. Generation is distinguished from spiration, setting aside, per impossibile, everything other than the formal notion of generation and spiration, or at least setting aside the fact that active spiration is from the Son: so long as the distinction of the principles of generating and spirating stands. Therefore, with any such thing set aside, the distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit would stand. The consequence is proved: because it is impossible for one person to receive being by two total productions.

Fourth ¹⁴. Whatever has some being is distinguished, by a distinction suitable to such being, from anything else by something that is of its formal notion inasmuch as it has such being. Therefore the Son is distinguished personally by something that is of his formal notion inasmuch as he is a person. Active spiration is not of this kind. Therefore etc.

Lastly ¹⁵, from the response that he gives to the authority of Boethius saying that relation multiplies the trinity ¹⁶, it can be argued against the foundation of the said reasons, namely that the divine persons cannot be distinguished except through relative opposition. Disparate formal notions of receiving nature not only have distinction, but also incompossibility, or an incompossible formal notion, in the same supposit: because a person who would receive nature in disparate ways would not have nature in a single way. Therefore the divine persons cannot be distinguished through relative opposition alone.

2. Aureoli ¹⁷ also argues from this foundation, that to be generated and to be spirated are incompossible; and such incompossibility of passive generation and passive spiration is primarily from their formal notions, and not from the fact that to be generated is conjoined to to spirate; or because to spirate in any genus of cause is the cause of this incompossibility. From these things he says in reply to the reasons of St. Thomas, that it is false that every distinction in divine realities is through opposed relations: but it is quite true that it is through incompossible relations.

IX. For the clarification of this matter, it must be considered first that, when we speak of the distinction of two positives, and of their positive distinction, asking why they are distinguished, it does not suffice to posit something in one that is not found in the other, because in this way a being can also be distinguished from a non-being; and such a distinction is negative, or privative, rather than a positive distinction. For the fact that Socrates is white and Plato is not does not make their positive distinction: for just as Plato is not white, so also a chimera is not white, and thus Socrates, by the fact that he is white, is also distinguished from a chimera, which is a non-being, as one having whiteness from one not having whiteness. And also the distinction of white Socrates from non-white Plato is a privative, or negative, distinction: because there is not considered in each of the distinct things something positive through which one is distinguished from the other, but only that one has something that the other does not have. It is necessary therefore in each of the extremes that are positively distinguished that there be something positive, through which it is distinguished from the other: so, namely, that there are some positive things in them which, on account of their incompossibility in the same subject, cause the distinction of those things in which they are found.

In the matter at hand, therefore, although the Son in divine realities is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by filiation as one having filiation from one not having it; when we ask, however, concerning their positive and formal distinction, asking by what one is distinguished from the other, as by a formal positive principle; it does not suffice to say that they are distinguished because the Son has filiation, but not the Holy Spirit; but it is necessary in each of them to assign something positive through which it is distinguished from the other, and which, on account of its incompossibility in the same person with the principle of the other, formally causes personal distinction.

2. It must be considered secondly that one must speak in one way of persons in human nature, and in another way in divine realities. For any human person is something absolute, and is constituted in its personal being through absolutes, and is distinguished through absolutes from every other human person, whence the distinction of two men is entirely on the absolute side. But a divine person is something relative, indeed is subsisting relation itself, and is constituted in personal being through relation, and is distinguished through relation from every other person in the divine nature, and thus the distinction of two divine persons is entirely relative. When therefore the positive principles by which persons are distinguished personally are investigated, such principles must be investigated as are formal principles of relative distinction between them. And because relations alone are such principles, therefore relations that place a relative distinction between the divine persons themselves must be investigated.

3. It must be considered thirdly that the absolute differs from the relative in this: that the absolute is said in relation to itself, whereas the relative is said in relation to another. And just as the absolute taken generally is said to be that which is something in itself, and not from an order to another; while this specific absolute is said to be that which is in itself this determinate thing, for example, white: so the relative taken generally is said to be toward something; while this relative is said to be that which implies an order toward this determinate thing, as toward its proper correlative; for a father is spoken of in relation to a son and not to something else, and double in relation to half, and so of the others. Because, therefore, every constitutive and distinctive principle of anything has the power to constitute and distinguish according to the mode of its own definition and nature, a form that is absolute has the property of distinguishing by an absolute distinction. And because the absolute distinction of things contained under one genus is through opposite forms belonging to that genus, since a genus is divided by opposite differences; by that very absolute form through which a thing is constituted in being, the thing has the property of being distinguished from all species of its genus by a positive distinction, though not from all other things, as is the mind of St. Thomas in Quodlib. IV, q. IV, a. 2 ¹⁸. But a relation has the property of distinguishing by a relative distinction. And because a relation is said in relation to another, and a determinate relation is said in relation to a determinate correlative, by the relation through which something is constituted in being toward another, a thing has the property of being distinguished from its own proper correlative, but not from every other thing. For a thing thus constituted, insofar as it is of this kind, is not distinguished from another relatively because it is such in itself absolutely, but because it implies a respect toward another and toward this determinate thing. And therefore, since it is spoken of only in relation to its correlative, it is relatively distinguished from that correlative alone. Whence if any relations that are not relatively opposite are incompossible in the same subject, as the relation of double and quadruple with respect to the same thing, and the relation of likeness and unlikeness; from their incompossibility there is not derived a relative distinction of things, but some other distinction, which also arises from absolute forms, for instance, a disparate or contrary distinction.

Since, therefore, the distinction of the divine persons is only a relative distinction; and a relative distinction exists only between opposite relations: it follows excellently that the divine persons must be distinguished by relative opposition alone, which is the foundation of St. Thomas in this matter. From which it follows that, since only the opposition of relations of origin is in the divine; and the Son does not originate from the Holy Spirit: if the Holy Spirit did not originate from the Son, he could not be personally distinguished from him.

X. These things having been laid down, it is easy to satisfy the objections ¹⁹. For to the first of Scotus it can be answered in two ways. First, according to the things that have been said, that the assumption is false, speaking of relative distinction and of that which is constitutive in relative being, in which way something is said to constitute and distinguish the divine persons. For not by whatever something is constituted in relative being is it distinguished from every other thing relatively: but only from its correlative, or from that to which it is relatively opposed. For not by the relation of double, by which something is constituted in the being of double, is double distinguished from every other thing relatively, for instance, from triple or quadruple, but only from subdouble: because double is not referred to triple or quadruple, but to subdouble; for double is the double of subdouble, but not of triple or quadruple. And similarly it is said that by filiation the Son is distinguished only from the Father, but not from the Holy Spirit: because by filiation he is referred to the Father, but not to the Holy Spirit.

Secondly it can be answered, as Capreolus answers ²⁰, and it is of the mind of St. Thomas in the Quodlibet cited, that that assumption is true of distinction according to affirmation and negation, which is through having and not having the same form; but not of positive distinction, which is according to the opposition of form to form, such as is the distinction that we are investigating among the divine persons.

If, however, it be urged that everything is distinguished by its form from all things that are of its genus by a positive distinction; but the divine persons are as it were species of one genus; and thus it seems that each person is distinguished by its constitutive property from all other persons: — it is said that the major is not true of those things contained under one genus that are only relatively distinguished. For since one relative is referred to only one correlative, by its form through which it is constituted in relative being it has the property of being distinguished from its correlative alone, but not from others.

2. To the second, the assumed conditional is denied, speaking of the proper distinction of the persons. For if the Father in no way spirated or produced the Holy Spirit, by no relation of origin would he be referred to the Holy Spirit. And since he is not even spoken of relatively to him by paternity, in no way could he be relatively distinguished from him, which is the proper distinction of the divine persons. But it would follow that he would be essentially distinguished from the Holy Spirit: and thus the Holy Spirit would not be God. For since the Holy Spirit could not be the same as the Father, otherwise he would beget the Son just as the Father does; nor would he be relatively distinguished from him: it follows that they would be distinct by absolutes.

3. To the third, the assumption is also denied, speaking of real distinction. For in the Father to beget and to spirate are distinguished only by reason, just as neither are paternity and spiration: because they do not have an opposition that is in any way relative. Nor does the distinction of principles, namely intellect and will, suffice, as St. Thomas says ²¹: because neither are those distinguished except by reason. In the same way, to be begotten and to be spirated would be distinguished by reason alone if the Son did not spirate. And consequently the Son and the Holy Spirit would be distinct by reason alone.

4. To the fourth, the assumption is also denied, concerning relative distinction. For it is not necessary that from whatever a thing having personal being is personally relatively distinguished, it be distinguished by something that belongs to its essence insofar as it has personal being: but it can be personally distinguished by some other relation joined to the person.

It should be noted, however, that the Son is said to be personally distinguished from the Father by filiation in one way; and to be personally distinguished from the Holy Spirit by spiration in another way. For by filiation he is distinguished from the Father as by the primary constitutive principle of the person, and the primary formal distinctive principle from the Father: but by spiration he is personally distinguished from the Holy Spirit not as by a constitutive principle, but only as by a distinctive principle of the person constituted by filiation from the person who is constituted by the opposite relation. For because a real relation distinguishes from its opposite relatively in a real manner, if that to which it is understood to supervene is a person, and through the opposite relation another person is constituted: it must make a personal distinction, not indeed as constituting a person, but as relatively distinguishing a person already constituted from a person constituted in personal being through its opposite.

If someone, however, should prove Scotus's proposition inductively: because, namely, nothing is quantitatively distinguished except by something that pertains to the notion of the quantum; and nothing is qualitatively distinguished except by something that pertains to the notion of the quale; and nothing is personally distinguished among men except by something that pertains to the notion of person, and so of the others: — it is said that the ratio of the distinction of these things is not the same as that of the distinction of the divine persons. Because the former, since they are absolutely distinguished, are distinguished from all other things of their genus by that principle by which they are constituted in some being: but one divine person, because it is not distinguished from another except relatively, is not distinguished by its principle by which it is constituted in personal being from all other persons, but only from that person to whom it is relatively opposed by such a principle. Therefore, if it is distinguished from another to whom it is not relatively opposed, this is not on account of something that belongs to its essential notion, but through another relation that is understood to supervene upon the constituted supposit.

5. To the last it is said that, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be two persons, nor would there be two really distinct or disparate processions: but, just as one person could by some reason be called Son and by some reason Holy Spirit, so the same production could by some reason be called generation and by some reason spiration. And thus it does not follow that one person would receive the nature in disparate and incompossible really distinct modes: but in only one real mode, although perhaps in several modes according to reason.

If it is urged that Anselm, in De Processione Spiritus Sancti, chapter 1 ²², says that, although it is not yet established that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it is nevertheless established that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished, because the latter is from God by being born, the former by proceeding: — it is answered, from St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. x, a. 5, ad 2, that Anselm does not say this assertively, as if, with relative opposition removed, the Son and the Holy Spirit could be really distinguished from a diverse mode of proceeding: but he takes it as conceded by his adversaries, wishing from it to convince them that the Son produces the Holy Spirit. For if they are distinguished because the one is from God by being born, but the other by proceeding; and they cannot have these diverse modes of proceeding unless the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son: it follows that it is necessary for them to concede that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

6. Through these points the answer to the foundation of Aureoli is also evident ²³. For it is said that the incompossibility of passive spiration and generation does not arise from their formal notions precisely in order to intellect and will, but from the origin of one person from another. For if it were posited that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, but both proceeded from the Father alone; those processions would not be incompossible, but there would be, as was said ²⁴, one procession really; just as the Son and the Holy Spirit would be one real person, although they would be distinguished by reason.

On this matter see Capreolus in First, d. XI ²⁵.

XI. From what has been said, moreover, it is clear that that proposition so often assumed by St. Thomas, namely that relative opposition alone makes a real distinction between relations and between divine persons, is not to be understood as if it were necessary that all really distinct divine relations should be relatively opposed from their formal notions, that is, mutually referred to each other: — for it is clear that filiation and likewise paternity are really distinguished from procession, and yet do not have relative opposition to it from their proper notions, — but that it is necessary that they either be relatively opposed from their proper notions, or that in one of them, as in a subsisting supposit, an opposite relation be present. For in the first way, paternity is distinguished from filiation: but in the second way, paternity and filiation are distinguished from procession. For in filiation, which is a subsisting and incommunicable relation, spiration is present, which has relative opposition to procession: and unless spiration belonged to it, it would in no way be really distinguished from procession. Whence it can be said that filiation, although from itself it is not formally relatively opposed to procession, is nevertheless subjectively relatively opposed to it: insofar, namely, as it underlies spiration, which is relatively opposed to procession.

In the same sense is understood what St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. xxx, a. 2: when, I say, he says that it is necessary that two opposite relations belong to two persons: but if any relations are not opposite, they must belong to the same person. For it is understood that relations opposed in either of those ways; whether formally and from their own proper notions, as paternity and filiation are opposed; or subjectively, as filiation and procession are opposed: belong to diverse persons. But those that are opposed in neither of these ways, as filiation and spiration, must belong to the same person: for filiation and spiration belong to the person of the Son, but spiration and paternity to the person of the Father. And if filiation and procession were opposed in neither of the said ways, they would not be really distinct, but only according to reason.

XII. The third argument is this ²⁶. The Son and the Holy Spirit agree in this, which is to be from another, because each is from the Father: according to which the Father fittingly differs from both, inasmuch as he is innascible. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son, it must be through differences per se dividing this, which is to be from another ²⁷. But these cannot be other than differences of the same genus, namely belonging to origin, so that one of them is from the other. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because whatever things agree in something common, if they are distinguished from one another, they must be distinguished according to some per se differences. This is illustrated in man and horse, which have agreement in animal.

It must be observed that innascibility, according to which St. Thomas says the Father is fittingly distinguished from the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. XXXIII, a. 4; and in I Sent., d. XXVIII, q. 1, a. 1, denotes either the negation of passive generation, in the genus of a principle personally spoken of in the divine, in which way it does not belong to the Son, to whom passive generation belongs, nor to the Holy Spirit, to whom it does not belong to be the principle of another divine person; or altogether the negation of being from another, in which way also it belongs neither to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit, since they are from another, but to the Father alone. Here, therefore, St. Thomas seems to take innascibility in the second signification: because he posits innascible as the opposite of this common notion, which is to be from another; and according to this he says that the Father is fittingly distinguished from the Son and the Holy Spirit.

XIII. But to this argument someone could respond that indeed the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by per se differences of this, which is to be from another: not, however, by the fact that one is from the other, but by the fact that one is from the Father by being born, whereas the other is by proceeding; so, namely, that they are distinguished by a diverse origin from the Father.

But St. Thomas attacks this response by the following argument, which is the fourth ²⁸, thus. Either these origins are distinguished by their term; or by their principle; or by their subject. Not by their subject: since the divine persons are entirely immaterial. Not by their term, so to speak ²⁹: because the one and the same nature that the Son receives by being born, the Holy Spirit receives by proceeding. Nor also by their principle: because, if the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, the Father alone will be the principle of the Son and the principle of the Holy Spirit. Therefore etc.

2. If it be said that they differ according to their principle, inasmuch as the Father produces the Son by way of intellect, as the Word; but the Holy Spirit by way of will, as Love: — it is argued against this in the first place ³⁰, because it will be necessary to say that according to the difference of will and intellect in God the Father two processions and two proceeding persons are distinguished. But these in God the Father are not distinguished in reality, but only in reason. Therefore it will be necessary to say that the two processions and the two proceeding persons differ by reason alone. But this is false: because then it would be true to say that the Holy Spirit is the Son, just as it is true to say that the will of God is his intellect; which is of Sabellian impiety. Therefore it does not suffice to say that the Son proceeds by way of intellect and the Holy Spirit by way of will, unless along with this it is said that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

3. It must be observed that, wishing to show that there is no distinction of the divine processions on the part of the term, St. Thomas uses this manner of speaking, likewise also on the part of the term, so to speak: because according to the truth of the thing, the person produced is not properly the term of the production, since the production itself does not properly have the character of a way or flux, for this implies some imperfection and potentiality; but we use these names in the divine so that according to our mode of understanding and naming we may explain divine realities, conceiving the production by mode of a certain way and flux, but the produced person itself by mode of a term.

XIV. But to this argument it can be answered from the statements of Aureoli, in Capreolus, First, d. XIII ³¹, that that division is insufficient. For neither are these processions distinguished by their term, nor by their principle, nor by their subject: but primarily and formally by themselves. Both because in us it is so. — And because no thing is formally distinguished by anything extrinsic to it: since every thing is distinguished from every other thing by its own proper reality.

These are confirmed from the statements of Scotus in I Sent., d. XIII ³². Because generation is formally by itself generation, and spiration is formally by itself spiration. And thus there is no need to ask by what they are distinguished: because the whole formal notion of the one is not the same as the whole formal notion of the other.

XV. For the explanation of this, it must be considered that it is one thing to be the essential difference of something, by which it intrinsically differs from another; and another thing to be that from which the difference is taken. The first must be intrinsic to the thing, because the essence of a thing is not constituted from extrinsics: but the second can be extrinsic. For when something has an order to another from its formal notion, it is not unfitting that its species and difference be taken from that other: for this is nothing other than to say that the thing is of such a nature and species precisely because it is ordered to this. For example, vision is on that account vision, that is, an act of such a species, because it terminates in color; and audition has such a species, because it is ordered to sound; and vision differs from audition because by it color is comprehended, but by the latter sound is comprehended; not that color and sound are the formal and intrinsic differences of vision and audition, but because their intrinsic differences are taken from them as from extrinsic forms.

In the present case, therefore, generation and spiration have from themselves an order to the terms produced through them, and to the principles from which they are understood to be elicited: since they are acts of the producer, and are understood to be elicited by the producer for this purpose, that the nature of the producer may be communicated to the terms. On that account, their specification, and their formal distinction, must primarily be taken from the principles or terms: although proximately they are distinguished by their formal intrinsic differences; in that way, I say, in which a constitutive difference and species can be posited in divine actions.

The argument of St. Thomas, therefore, proceeds concerning the primary distinctive principles of generation and spiration. And concerning these it is true to say that their distinction is taken either from their principles or from their terms. For actions and passions, or motions, receive distinction from this kind of thing, as is clear through Aristotle, V Phys. ³³: not because they are forms of the same notion flowing along with the terminating forms, as Scotus says in the place cited above ³⁴. For it is clear that, as to what is formal, the notion of motion and action is one thing, and the notion of the term another: although as to what is material of motion and action, the notion of them and of the term is the same, namely because from what is intrinsic they have an order to terms and to principles.

2. To the first point of Aureoli, therefore, by which he proves that generation and spiration in the divine are distinguished primarily and formally by themselves: it is said that in us also the action of the intellect and the action of the will are distinguished from their principles and terms, but not primarily and formally by themselves.

To the second it is said that it is not unfitting for some thing to be distinguished primarily through an extrinsic principle from something intrinsic to itself that has an order to something extrinsic: although proximately it is distinguished through its own proper reality and intrinsic difference or notion.

To the confirmation from the words of Scotus, it is answered in the same way. For generation is proximately by itself generation, and similarly spiration. But primarily it has this from its principle and term. For because the Son is produced by way of intellect and nature, on that account his production has the property of being generation; and because the Holy Spirit is produced by way of will, on that account his production has the property of being spiration; although proximately the production of the Son has the property that it is generation, and the production of the Holy Spirit that it is spiration, because the former is from itself a production of a likeness, but the latter is not, but of a certain inclination and of an impelling force into the thing loved.

See the rest of what pertains to this matter in Capreolus, in the place cited above ³⁵.

XVI. But a doubt arises concerning the aforesaid reason ³⁶. For St. Thomas argues that the divine processions cannot be really distinguished by the fact that one is by way of intellect and the other by way of will, because they would be distinguished by reason alone, just as intellect and will are. For this consequence seems not to hold. For it is not unfitting that certain things be distinguished by reason alone and yet be the cause of a real distinction. For the created intellect and will are really distinguished from the distinction of their objects, namely from the distinction of the intelligible and the volible, or from the distinction of being and the good: and yet these are distinguished by reason alone. Therefore, although the divine intellect and will are distinguished by reason alone, a real distinction of the processions can be taken from their distinction.

It can be answered to this that one must speak in one way concerning a distinctive principle by way of final cause, and in another way concerning a distinctive principle by way of a productive or elicitive principle. For because an end is not a cause except insofar as it is in the intention; and for the diversity of ends, insofar as they are such, the diversity of the rational aspects intended by the agent even in the same thing suffices: it is not unfitting for an agent acting for an end to order things really diverse to ends distinguished by reason alone, and therefore to cause such diversity because it intends diverse ends; for if there are diverse rational aspects intended by the agent, there will be diverse ends absolutely. — But a productive or elicitive principle of an operation, especially one acting naturally, is a cause according as it has being. Therefore, properly speaking, they are not called diverse productive or elicitive principles of operations really and specifically distinct, so far as comes from the principles themselves, unless they have diverse acts of being, and consequently are really distinct. For according to one and the same act of being, specifically and really distinct actions are not primarily produced, unless something else concurs.

Diverse potencies, therefore, such as intellect and will, are really distinguished from the distinction of reason of their objects: because they depend on their objects as on final causes, as St. Thomas says in De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2. But the divine productions cannot be really distinguished from the mere distinction of reason of the intellect and the will: because they depend on them as on their elicitive principles. Hence the proposition of St. Thomas which he assumes to prove the aforesaid consequence, in I Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, namely, A principle is not weaker than that which proceeds from the principle, is properly to be understood of a productive and elicitive principle of an operation, but not of a final principle.

XVII. Secondly, it is argued against the given response ³⁷. The Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will, and the Son by way of intellect. Therefore it follows that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. The consequence is proved. Because love proceeds from a word: since we can love nothing unless we conceive it by a word of the heart.

2. But against that reason it can be objected, first: for it does not hold, We cannot understand without sense, therefore intellection is from sense as from a productive principle. Therefore neither does it hold, We can love nothing unless we conceive it in the mind, therefore love is produced by a word.

Secondly, it can be objected: In us it is not true that love proceeds effectively from the conception of the good: since according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, as was shown in the preceding sections ³⁸, the good does not move the will effectively, but only by way of an end. Therefore, from the fact that we can love nothing unless we conceive it by a word, it does not follow that Love in God proceeds from the Word as from a productive principle.

3. To the first of these it can be answered in two ways. First, that St. Thomas presupposes that the good is a motive of the will, as is manifest from the above ³⁹. Therefore it follows very well, if the good cannot move the will to love unless it is conceived by a word, that the word itself is productive of love. Therefore the objection is of no force.

Secondly, it can be answered that that consequence is also good: We cannot understand without sense, namely as the origin of intellection, therefore intellection is produced by sense: either, I say, mediately or immediately.

4. To the second it is answered, in accordance with what we determined in the preceding sections ⁴⁰, that St. Thomas, from that which is found in us according to our mode, argues proportionally that it is so in God according to his mode. But in us love proceeds from the good, or from the conception of the good, really. Therefore he argues that in God also Love proceeds really from the Word: presupposing, however, from faith, the real distinction of the persons. But in us the origin of love from a word is in the genus of formal and final cause alone ⁴¹: whereas in God it is also under the aspect of a productive principle alone, because in the divine there cannot be another aspect of a principle really distinct from that which is from a principle, except the aspect of a productive principle.

XVIII. The fifth reason is ⁴². In immaterial substances there cannot be distinction except according to order: namely, insofar as one is above another. It is explained: because there seems to be a certain order and grade in diverse species, even according to Plato. But in the divine persons, which are immaterial, there cannot be another order than the order of origin. Therefore there are not two persons proceeding from one unless one of them proceeds from the other. Therefore etc.

It must be noted that in the divine persons there is said to be only an order of origin, because there is not an order according to grades there, such that one person is more perfect than another, nor any other order that implies any imperfection, but only the order that is implied in what is called he from whom another is and he who is from another, which by us is called the order of origin: for this order implies no imperfection.

Nor does it stand in the way that God can produce all things immediately, and thus an order does not seem to be required among produced species. For it is said that, if all things are posited to be produced immediately by God, the order of causality among them is indeed removed, but the order of grade and perfection is not removed: for if they are distinguished in species, it is necessary that one be more perfect than another.

XIX. The sixth reason is. To be the principle of the Holy Spirit is outside the notion of paternity and filiation. Therefore it is common to the Father and the Son. — The consequence is proved. Because, since the Father and the Son do not differ except in the fact that this one is the Father and this one is the Son, whatever is outside this is common to the Father and the Son.

To this reason Aureoli says, in Capreolus, distinction 11 ⁴³, that it could be denied that the Father and the Son differ solely in the fact that this one is the Father, and this one the Son. For it could be said that they differ because in the Father there is active spiration, to which filiation is opposed in this manner: that generation and spiration are simultaneous productions, and therefore it is repugnant to the one spirated that he generate, and to the one begotten that he spirate.

But this response is frivolous. For although those productions are simultaneous according to duration, it is not thereby precluded from being common to the Father and the Son to spirate, and that to the Son there belongs the relation of a producer to the Holy Spirit: just as, although the Father and the Son are coeternal, it is nevertheless not precluded that the Father is the principle of the Son.

XX. The last reason is. To be the principle of the Holy Spirit is not against the notion of the Son: neither insofar as he is God, because this belongs to the Father, who is God; nor insofar as he is the Son, because the procession of the Holy Spirit is one thing and that of the Son another, and it is not unfitting for that which is from a principle according to one procession to be the principle of another procession. Therefore it is not impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. Therefore this can be. Therefore it is so. — The first consequence is proved. Because whatever is not against the notion of something, it is not impossible to belong to it. — But the second: because what is not impossible, can be. — And the third: because in the divine, to be and to be able do not differ.

To that reason Aureoli says ⁴⁴ that by it one could argue with equal reason that the Holy Spirit generates the Son: because this is not repugnant to him insofar as he is produced, since in creatures we see that a produced thing can generate.

But this response too is of no force. For although it is not repugnant to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is produced that he generate the Son, it is nevertheless repugnant to him insofar as he is produced as love by way of will. For love presupposes a word, as was clear above ⁴⁵. But it is repugnant to anything that it be the productive principle of that which it presupposes.