Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

It remains in the last place to be shown that the effects through which we are moved toward God are fittingly attributed to the Holy Spirit ¹.

I. And first, St. Thomas shows that through the Holy Spirit we are constituted contemplators of God. It is proved. Because the Holy Spirit makes us lovers of God. Now it seems to be especially proper to friendship to dwell together with a friend. But man's dwelling with God is through contemplation of Him: as in Phil. 3, Our conversation is in heaven. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, 2 Cor. 3, But we etc.

Secondly, he shows that through the Holy Spirit we have joy in God, and consolation against all the adversities and assaults of the world: on which account the Lord calls Him the Paraclete, that is, the Consoler, John 14. It is proved. Because it is proper to friendship that one delight in the presence of a friend, and rejoice in his words and deeds, and find in him consolation against all anxieties; whence in sorrows we flee to friends for the sake of consolation. But the Holy Spirit constitutes us friends of God, and makes Him dwell in us and us in Him. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, Restore to me etc.; Rom. 14, The kingdom of God etc.; Acts 9, The Church had peace etc.

II. Thirdly, he shows that through the Holy Spirit we are in a certain way driven to fulfill the precepts of God: according to that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 8, Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God etc. It is proved. Because, since it is proper to friendship to agree with a friend in those things which he wills, but the will of God is set forth through precepts: it belongs to the love by which we love God to fulfill His commandments, according to that saying of John 14, If you love etc. But through the Holy Spirit we are constituted lovers of God.

2. But because someone could say: If we are driven by the Holy Spirit to the observance of the commandments of God, therefore we act well under coercion, because to be driven belongs to those things which are moved by another: — removing this, St. Thomas says that the sons of God are driven by the Holy Spirit, not as slaves, but as free men. For the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as He constitutes us lovers of God, so inclines us to act that He makes us act voluntarily, and not servilely out of fear: according to that saying of Rom. 8, You have not received etc. For we act freely when we act of ourselves, that is, not coerced by another: but this is what we do from the will. But we act servilely when we act against the will: whether through absolute violence, or through violence mixed with the voluntary.

3. For the clarification of this, it must be considered first, that something is said to be driven to something when it is moved by another to do something. And if indeed the action is determined for it by another entirely, so that it is not indifferent to acting, but acts precisely according to the inclination determined for it by another to one thing, it is said in this way to be driven simpliciter: just as brutes are said to be driven, inasmuch as their operations are determined to one thing by nature. If, however, the action is not determined for it by another, but it is indeed so moved by another, or inclined to act, that it is nevertheless in its own power to act and not to act, or to act in this way or in that; such a thing is said to be driven not simpliciter, but secundum quid, because the action is not determined for it to one thing from without, but it determines itself, although it is nevertheless in some way inclined to act from without. Therefore, because the Holy Spirit so inclines us to act that we nevertheless operate freely and from our own free choice, as having it in our power to follow or not to follow the inclination and motion of the Holy Spirit, we are on that account said to be driven by Him not simpliciter, but secundum quid. For this reason St. Thomas said that through the Holy Spirit we are in a certain way driven to fulfill the precepts of God.

It must be considered secondly, that something is said to be done against the will through absolute violence, not because violence and coercion can be inflicted absolutely upon the elicited act of the will, since the act of the will is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle ²; but because violence of this kind can be inflicted on exterior acts against the will, as St. Thomas says in I-II, q. 6, a. 4. For this reason St. Thomas did not give an example of an interior act of the will, but of an exterior motion to which one is impelled by another through force, namely, while one impels another to motion through violence.

It must be considered thirdly that, since the violent is that whose principle is outside, with the one suffering the force contributing nothing, it is called violence simpliciter when the whole principle of the motion is entirely extrinsic, and the passive subject contributes nothing of itself to the motion: that is, it has neither an active principle nor a passive principle naturally inclined to such motion. But it is called violence secundum quid, which is here called violence mixed with the voluntary, when the principle of the motion is not entirely extrinsic, but is partly extrinsic and partly intrinsic: that is, such a motion is not entirely according to the inclination of the intrinsic principle, but is in some way according to its inclination and in some way against it. Just as the jettison of merchandise into the sea for the sake of safety is indeed against the inclination of the will, inasmuch as the merchant, speaking absolutely, would will the preservation of the merchandise; but in the circumstances it is according to the will, inasmuch as by that very jettison of merchandise a greater evil is avoided, namely the loss of life. Whence this is in some way from an extrinsic principle, namely from the storm of the sea and the fear of a greater evil, in some way compelling and forcing him to that which is against his inclination if the thing is considered absolutely: although, all things considered, it is willed simpliciter and absolutely, as is held in I-II, in the same question, art. 6. And therefore St. Thomas says that there is violence mixed with the voluntary when someone wills to do or suffer what is less contrary to the will in order to escape what is more contrary to the will.

III. Fourthly, he shows that it is fittingly said by the Apostle, 2 Cor. 3, Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; and in Gal. 5, If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law.

Now for the proof of this, he premises that, since the will is ordered toward that which is truly good, if through passion or an evil habit or disposition a man is turned away from that which is truly good, he indeed acts servilely inasmuch as he is inclined by something foreign, if the natural order of the will itself is considered; but if the act of the will is considered as already inclined toward an apparent good, he acts freely when he follows passion or a corrupt habit; but when, with such a will remaining, he abstains from what he wills on account of fear of the law posited against it, he acts servilely.

This having been posited, he proves the proposition thus. The Holy Spirit through love inclines the will toward the true good, toward which the will is naturally inclined; and He removes the servitude by which, having been made a slave of passion and sin, it acts against the order of the will, and also the servitude by which man, against the movement of his own will, acts according to the law, as a slave of the law, not a friend. Therefore etc.

It follows from the same reasoning that the Holy Spirit is fittingly said to mortify the deeds of the flesh, Rom. 8: namely, because through the passion of the flesh we are not turned away from the true good, toward which the Holy Spirit through love orders us.

IV. For the clarification of what is said, it must be noted that St. Thomas intends a twofold order of the will, according to its twofold consideration. For the will can be considered in two ways: namely, according to its nature absolutely; and according as it is inclined in a man by some evil habit or evil disposition. Likewise twofold is its order, or inclination: one, namely, natural, that is, belonging to the will according to its nature considered absolutely; the other according to the inclination of the evil habit or disposition existing in the man, that is, which belongs to the will according as it is inclined toward something from habit or from passion and the like.

Therefore St. Thomas means that according to each consideration of the will a man can act both freely and servilely. — According to the absolute consideration indeed, man acts freely when he is borne toward that which is truly and simpliciter good: because that is according to the complete and natural inclination of the will as it is moved by its proper principle, namely by the right judgment of reason. — But he acts servilely when he is borne toward that which is not truly good, but only an apparent good, which namely has some likeness of the good and yet is not truly good: because he is not borne toward it according to the natural inclination of the will, but against its natural inclination, while against its order he is inclined toward something not by right reason, which is its proper moving principle, but by something foreign perverting the judgment of reason, namely by passion or by an evil habit or evil disposition, which are foreign to its proper moving principle. Therefore St. Thomas says that a man, according as he is turned away from the true good through passion or an evil habit or an evil disposition, acts servilely, inasmuch as he is inclined by something foreign, if the natural order of the will itself is considered. — According to the other consideration also, a man indeed acts freely when he follows passion or a corrupt habit: for just as the will considered absolutely acts freely when it does something according to right reason, which is its proper motive, so the will, as inclined and moved by passion and a corrupt habit, acts freely when it does something from passion and a corrupt habit, because its proper motive, inasmuch as it is such, is passion or a corrupt habit, or the judgment that proceeds from these. — But it acts servilely when, with such a will remaining, namely inclined as was said, a man abstains from what he wills on account of fear of the punishment imposed by the law: as when someone has a will inclined toward theft, but nevertheless abstains from theft on account of fear of death, which he knows is decreed by laws for thieves. But he is said to act servilely in this way because he acts not only not according to the proper motive of the will thus considered, which is concupiscence and the love of another's property, but according to a foreign principle, namely fear, and against the inclination of a will of this kind.

The Holy Spirit is therefore said to cause liberty in us: both because He inclines the will through love toward the true good, according as the liberty of the will considered in the first way is understood; — and because He removes both that servitude by which man through passion and sin acts against the will considered absolutely, and that by which man, against the movement of his own will, acts according to the law; namely, while man acts from the love of the good, and not from the fear of punishment.

V. From these things it is clear that the words of the Apostle are not to be understood in such a way, as some have evilly interpreted them, as though the just, who are led by the Spirit of God, are not subject to the divine law. For this cannot be, as St. Thomas explains on 2 Cor. 3 ³: since the precepts of God are the rule of the human will, and there is no created will which ought not to be regulated and directed by the divine rule. But it is understood, as is said here, and on Gal. 5 ⁴, by St. Thomas, that the just, or those who are led by the Holy Spirit, are not under the divine law as coerced, that is, as operating those things which belong to the law out of fear or coercion against their will: since they do those things which belong to the law entirely voluntarily and from the love of virtue. But they are indeed under the law inasmuch as they are obligated to those things which belong to the law: and thus they are under the law as obliging, but not as compelling. Thus also the just are said to be free from the law, as is said in I-II, q. 93, a. 6, ad 1, inasmuch as they observe what belongs to the law freely and entirely voluntarily ⁵: and not coerced by fear of punishment and by the command of a superior, like the wicked, who would not observe what belongs to the law unless there were a divine precept, and unless they feared to be punished for transgression of the law.

VI. But against what has been said seems to be that the Apostle, Rom. 8 ⁶, attributes servile fear to the Holy Spirit, just as also adoption, when he says: For you have not received the Spirit of servitude again in fear, but the Spirit of adoption of sons.

It is answered, from the teaching of St. Thomas on Rom. 8 ⁷, where he explains the aforesaid words, that in servile fear, by which one does good out of fear of punishment to be inflicted by God, there are two things: namely, the fear of God as punisher, inasmuch namely as one fears God; and the flight of the evil of punishment only, and not the evil of fault, inasmuch as one does not shrink from the evil of fault, but only from punishment, for he has a will inclined toward evil, but abstains through fear of punishment. As to the first, such fear is from the Holy Spirit, because as such it is praiseworthy: and in this sense the words of the Apostle are to be understood. As to the second, it is not from the Holy Spirit, but from man's fault: just as also unformed faith, as to that which belongs to faith, is from the Holy Spirit, but not its formlessness. And as to this, the Holy Spirit, indwelling the mind through charity, excludes fear and servitude. And in this sense St. Thomas speaks here. For although the Holy Spirit in some way causes servile fear, nevertheless indwelling through charity He does not cause it, but rather excludes it.