Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas has shown that the Holy Spirit both is God and is a subsisting person really distinct from the Father and the Son, in order that this truth may be defended against unbelievers, he shows how this ought to be understood ¹. And first, he premises certain things necessary for the proposal; second, he declares his intention ².

I. The first thing that he premises ³ is that in every intelligent being a will must be found. It is proved. Just as a natural thing becomes actual in its natural being through its own form, so the intellect becomes in act, inasmuch as it is understanding, through an intellectual form. But a natural thing through its own form has an inclination toward its proper operations and toward its proper end, which it attains through them: because each thing acts according to what kind of thing it is, and tends toward what is suitable to itself. Therefore, also in an intelligent being, from the intelligible form there follows an inclination toward proper operations and a proper end.

Now, this we call the will: for in us the will is the principle of those operations that are in us, that is, in our power, by which the intellect operates for the sake of an end, since the end and the good are the object of the will. Therefore, etc.

2. It must be noted first that the intellect is both a property of an intelligible nature as an accidental form naturally accompanying it, and is such a property through which an intelligible nature understands. Therefore, it can be said to become in act in two ways: in one way, inasmuch as it is a natural property; in another way, inasmuch as it is ordered to understanding. In the first way, it becomes in act inasmuch as it inheres in an intelligible nature, just as any other accidental form is in act through the fact that it inheres in its subject. But in the second way, it becomes in act through the fact that it is informed by the species of the intelligible thing. Therefore, so that St. Thomas might show concerning which mode of actuality of the intellect he was understanding it, he did not say absolutely that it becomes in act through an intelligible form, but added, inasmuch as it is understanding, giving it to be understood that he intends concerning its actuality according as it is constituted in the act of understanding.

3. It must be noted secondly that, since potencies are given for this purpose, that nature through them may tend toward its proper objects, and the object of the will is the end and the good, it belongs to the will to be the principle of those operations by which an intelligible nature tends toward the end and the good. That which St. Thomas adds, therefore, for the end and the good is the object of the will, is posited as the reason for what was said, namely, that the will is the principle of operations by which the intellect, that is, an intelligible nature, operates for the sake of an end. For if the object of the will is the end, it is necessary that through the will itself the intelligible nature should tend toward the end, and thus that it be the principle of operations which are ordered by an intelligible nature to the end.

II. But concerning the reason by which it is proved that the will is in an intelligible nature—namely, from the condition of a natural form—a doubt is raised. For from this it does not seem to be concluded that the will is in an intelligible nature as a particular potency distinct from the intellectual form and the intellect, which St. Thomas seems to intend. For since the inclination following upon a natural form is not some form distinct from the natural form, but is the form itself with a relation to the end, in the same way it can be said that an inclination toward the good of the intelligent being and toward its proper operation indeed follows the intelligible form, but such an inclination is not something distinct from the intelligible form itself. And thus it does not follow that the will is in an intelligible nature as a potency per se distinct from the others.

2. For the evidence of this, it must be considered first that by that comparison St. Thomas does not intend to posit an all-inclusive similitude between the inclination following upon a natural form and the inclination following upon an intelligible form, but intends to argue according to a certain proportionality: namely, that just as an inclination toward proper operations and a proper end follows upon a natural form in its own mode, so according to a mode suitable to an intelligible nature, an inclination toward proper operations and the proper end of intelligence follows upon an intelligible form.

It must be considered secondly, from the doctrine handed down in De Veritate, q. XXII, a. 3, that the proper mode of animate beings is that special potencies are assigned to those works that are proper to them, in which they differ from inanimate things. Therefore, wherever some operation is found that in some mode is proper to animate beings, although it may also belong in some mode to inanimate things, it is necessary to adapt a special potency to it: just as, because being moved locally by itself is proper to animals, a special potency is given for the local motion of animals, which is called the motive power. But to desire belongs in a special mode to animals, inasmuch as in them there is found an appetite and a mover of the appetite: for the apprehended good, and consequently existing in the one desiring, moves the appetite ⁴. Therefore, a special potency, which is called the appetite, is ordered to this act. In an intellectual nature, however, there is a still higher mode: because not only is there in it an appetite and a mover of the appetite, namely, the good apprehended through the intellect, but also the very act of desiring is free, inasmuch as it is in the power of the one desiring to desire the good apprehended through the intellect, and not to desire it. Therefore, it is necessary that the appetite of an intelligible nature, which is called the will, should also be a special potency distinct from the others.

3. Therefore, the reason of St. Thomas is efficacious, because it is sufficient for him to prove that in an intelligible nature there is an inclination toward its proper operation and toward its good in its own mode. For it is evident that its proper mode is such that the inclination, if it is found in an intelligible nature following upon the understood form, has a special potency distinct from the others, just as also the act of desiring belongs to it in a particular mode.

III. The second thing that St. Thomas premises ⁵ is that love is the principle and common root of all acts of the will. It is proved in two ways. First by reason, thus: A natural inclination arises from the fact that a natural thing has an affinity and conformity according to form, which is the principle of inclination, with that toward which it is moved, as is evident in a heavy body. Therefore, every inclination of the will also arises from the fact that through an intelligible form something is apprehended as suitable or affecting. But to be affected toward something, inasmuch as it is such, is to love it. Therefore, etc.

Secondly, it is proved inductively: because, namely, from the fact that we love something, we desire it if it is absent, we rejoice when it is present, we are sorrowful when we are hindered from it, and we hate the things that hinder us from it, and we are angry against them.

2. For the evidence of the reason, it must be considered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Iª IIᵃᵉ, q. XXV, a. 2; q. XXVI, a. 1; and q. XXVIII, a. 1, that love is nothing other than the aptitude, or proportion and complacency, of the appetite toward the good: for one is said to love a certain good inasmuch as one is affected by it, and takes pleasure in it as in something suitable and proportioned to oneself. Therefore, St. Thomas, wishing to show that love is the common root of all acts of the will, assumes that every inclination of the will arises from the fact that something is apprehended as suitable and affecting, that is, as perfective of the one desiring and drawing him to itself. For he intends to maintain that from this apprehension the first inclination of the will is complacency in such a good and affection toward it, in which the ratio of love consists. And therefore, just as that apprehension is the origin simpliciter of all acts of the will, so love, which is the first act of the will accompanying that apprehension, is the first among all acts of the will, and the principle and origin of all other acts.

IV. The third thing that St. Thomas premises is that that which is loved is both in the intellect of the lover and in the will, but in different ways: because in the intellect it is according to the likeness of its species, as fire begotten is in fire begetting; but in the will of the lover as the terminus of motion is in the motive principle, through the conformity and proportion which it has to it, as the place above is in a certain way in a heavy body.

It must be observed that just as an understood thing is said to be in the one understanding through the likeness of its form—not because the thing itself according to its natural being informs the intellect, but because in the intellect there is a certain intelligible form that is the likeness of the understood thing, so that for an understood thing to be in the intellect is nothing other than for its likeness to be in the intellect—so for the beloved thing to be in the lover as the terminus of motion is in the motive principle through conformity and proportion is not for the beloved thing to inhere in the lover according to its essence or according to its likeness, but for there to be in the lover some complacency and proportion and affection through which he is inclined toward the beloved thing itself; for through such connaturality and affection or complacency, which is love, the lover is in a certain way the beloved thing; just as one thing that is proportioned to another, and is a motive principle toward it, is in a certain way that thing itself. Moreover, the beloved is said to be in the will of the lover as in a motive principle because, existing in the will, it causes the desire of the beloved thing if it is absent, and is the cause and principle of every other motion by which the lover is moved toward the beloved thing. — Concerning this you also have St. Thomas in Iª IIᵃᵉ, q. XXVIII, a. 2.

Hence the error of Aureolus, in Capreolus on the First Book, d. x ⁶, is evident, who thinks that the beloved cannot be in the lover unless it is in him through essence or through likeness. For it is said that there is another mode, namely, through affection and complacency, or through a certain habitual inclination left in the will from the frequent repetition of the act of loving.

V. From these things St. Thomas, in order to show his thesis ⁷, infers first that In God there is a will, since He is intelligent: not indeed that it is something superadded to His essence, but it is the very substance of God, just as is the intellect. And since the intellect of God is also His substance, it follows that the intellect and the will in God are one thing.

It must be observed that in absolutes this consequence is indeed valid: This is the divine substance; and that is the divine substance; therefore this and that are one thing: because, since the one is nothing other than the divine substance, and similarly the other, there does not appear in them that by which they should be really distinguished. But in those things that are relatively opposed, such a consequence does not hold, on account of the relative opposition itself, which requires a real distinction between those things that are relatively opposed. For this is not valid: The Father is the essence of God; and the Son is the essence of God; therefore the Father and the Son are one thing: because, although they are the divine essence, they nonetheless have opposed relations, of which one is not the other, although they themselves are not distinguished from the divine essence. Although these too can be called one thing if the name of thing is taken for an absolute. But concerning these there will be a broader discussion below.

2. He infers secondly that In God there is love. Because the will in God is according to act, and not according to potency or habit; that is, it is always in the act of willing, since the operation of God is His essence, and His essence is His will. But every act of the will is rooted in love.

He infers thirdly that It is necessary that God be in His own will as the beloved in the lover. Because, since the proper object of the divine will is His goodness, it is necessary that God should love Himself and His goodness primarily and principally. But it has been shown that it is necessary that the beloved be in some way in the will of the lover.

He infers fourthly that God, according as He is considered as existing in His own will, is truly and substantially God. It is proved. The beloved is in the lover according as it is loved. To love is a certain willing: because, namely, to love is to will the good. The willing of God is His being, just as is His will. Therefore, the being of God in the will is not an accidental being, as in us, but essential. Therefore, etc.

It must be observed that for God, according as He is in His will, to be truly and substantially God is nothing other than for the love by which God loves Himself to be substantially God. For it was said above ⁸ that for the beloved to be in the will of the lover is nothing other than for affection and complacency, or love, toward it to be in the will. And therefore, if the being of the love of God, which is the divine willing through which it is produced—just as the being of the Word is to be understood, and consequently to understand, as was said above ⁹—is the same as the divine being, it follows that God, according as He is in His will, is also substantially God.

3. He infers fifthly that The love by which God is in the divine will as the beloved in the lover proceeds both from the Word of God and from God whose Word it is. It is proved. Because for the beloved to be in the will of the lover has a certain order both to the conception by which it is conceived by the intellect, because it would not be loved unless it were in some way known, and to the thing itself whose intellectual conception is called the word, because not only is the knowledge of the beloved loved, but also the thing itself according as it is good in itself.

It must be observed that St. Thomas, aiming at brevity, immediately concludes from the fact that the beloved has a certain order to the conception of the intellect that it proceeds from the Word of God, although many things are implied in that consequence. For he presupposes that in divine reality there is no other real order than the order of origin: whence, if the beloved has an order to the conception of the intellect, it must be an order of origin. But it is clear that this is not an order by which the conception proceeds from love, since love presupposes the conception of the intellect. Therefore, if there is an order between them, it is necessary that the order of love to the word and to the conception of the intellect be an order as to that from which it originates and proceeds.

It must also be noted that from this reason of St. Thomas it cannot be maintained that the understood good is in us the formal effective cause of volition, as some of the Thomists have maintained, just as the Word in God is productive of love. Because that this should be in God is because there cannot be there any other real order than the order of origin after the manner of an efficient cause, according as one person proceeds from another; and therefore, since love has a real order to the Word, it is necessary that in God that order be such an order of origin. But this is not known naturally, but believed. In us, however, there can be the order of a final and formal cause; and that is found between the word of our intellect and love, as was shown in the preceding sections ¹⁰; but not an order of origin effectively, because the word of our intellect has, from the imperfect character of its activity, that it is only the cause of love formally with respect to its specification, but not elicitively with respect to its exercise. Whence the order which in us is of one ratio, in God is of another ratio.

VI. He infers sixthly that God proceeding by way of love does not proceed as begotten, and consequently cannot be called the Son. It is proved. Because the beloved is not in the lover according to the likeness of species. But everything that proceeds from another by way of the begotten proceeds according to the likeness of species from the one begetting.

For the evidence of this, it must be considered that we can compare love to three things: namely, to the beloved thing, by which it is caused in some way, namely, by way of end and specifying form, as was shown above ¹¹; to the will itself precisely taken; and to both together as to the total cause, inasmuch as the beloved thing, as known, is for the will the ratio of acting by way of specifying the act. But compared to none of these does love proceed under the ratio of likeness according to the same ratio of species. For if we compare love to the will itself alone: thus it is clear that the produced love and the will are not similar according to the ratio of species. If we also compare it to the beloved thing: thus it does not proceed according to the ratio of likeness, because the produced love is not the likeness of the beloved thing, but an affection and impulse toward it. If finally we compare it to both together as to the complete cause, thus also it is manifest that it does not proceed according to the ratio of likeness, since it is not the likeness of the form which is the ratio of acting, as has been said; for something is properly said to be produced similar to the agent when it is assimilated to the agent according to the form which is its ratio of acting. But because the proper comparison of an effect to its cause is the comparison to the total cause itself, and according to such a comparison that which proceeds by way of love does not proceed according to the ratio of likeness, that is, as similar to the producer, therefore St. Thomas says absolutely that a production of this kind is not according to the ratio of likeness, because love is not produced similar to the beloved thing, which, I say, according as it is known, is for the will the ratio of loving.

2. But if it is argued that every agent, especially a natural one, produces what is similar to itself according to the form through which it acts: — it is answered first that likeness is twofold: one, according to conformity in form; the other, according to proportion. The first likeness is not required between every agent and its effect. But the second is indeed required, which consists in this, that the agent has a power proportioned to producing such an effect, just as there is a likeness between the motive power and motion or place. And in this way it is conceded that there is a likeness between the will and love. But this does not suffice for the ratio of generation.

It is answered secondly that, although every agent acts in some way like itself, it is nevertheless not necessary that every agent act like itself according to the same ratio of species, which is required for the ratio of true generation, and concerning which St. Thomas intends when he says that love does not proceed under the ratio of likeness. For it is evident in equivocal productions—for instance, when something is produced by the sun in these lower regions—that there is no likeness according to the same ratio of species between the producer and the product.

3. From these things it is clear that procession by way of love differs from the procession of the Word. Because in the procession of the Word, the Word itself is not only similar to the understood thing, since it is its express likeness and of the same ratio with it, but is also similar to the total agent, namely, the aggregate of the intellect and the intelligible species, which is for it the ratio of acting as the elicitive form of intellection. And therefore it is not surprising that the procession according to the intellect has the ratio of generation, to which it belongs that something similar to the begetter be produced, but not the procession according to the will.

4. It must be observed, however, that here St. Thomas speaks absolutely of the procession of love inasmuch as it is such, but not of such a procession in a determinate nature. Because in the divine nature that which proceeds as love is similar to the producer; but this does not belong to it inasmuch as it is the procession of love absolutely, but inasmuch as it is the procession of divine love; for in divine reality it is necessary that everything proceeding be consubstantial with the producer, and of the same nature with it.

VII. He infers seventhly that It is fitting for God proceeding by way of love to be called Spirit, His spiration being as it were a kind of aspiration ¹². It is proved. Because the beloved is in the lover as inclining and in a certain way impelling the lover into the beloved thing itself. But the impulse of a living thing from within belongs to the spirit. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, in Rom. 8 and 2 Cor. 5, attributing a certain impulse to the spirit and to love.

Observe that St. Thomas adds that the one proceeding by way of love is called Spirit, His spiration being as it were a kind of aspiration: that is, being as it were a kind of vital motion and impulsion, or a kind of drawing in or emission of air. Because, as is said below, ch. 23 ¹³, the name of spirit is taken from the respiration of animals, in which air is drawn in and sent out with a certain motion.

He infers lastly that Fittingly God proceeding by way of love is called the Holy Spirit. It is proved. Because every intelligible motion is named from its terminus. But the aforesaid love is that by which God is loved. (Supply) Therefore it is named from God. Therefore it is fittingly called the Holy Spirit: because, (supply) since God is holy, those things that are dedicated to God are accustomed to be called holy. That is, this designation, so as to be called holy, is attributed to those things that are ordered to God and are dedicated to Him.

VIII. It must be noted that St. Thomas leaves from what has been said, as manifest, that which he intended to declare, namely that the Holy Spirit is God, and is personally distinct from the Father and the Son. For from this line of reasoning it is established that the Holy Spirit is the same as divine Love. Moreover, it has been shown that divine Love is truly and substantially God; and that it proceeds from the Word of God, and from God whose Word it is, that is, from the Father and the Son; and consequently that it is personally distinguished from them. Therefore it remains that the Holy Spirit is both truly God, and is personally distinct from the Father and the Son.

IX. But a doubt remains. For St. Thomas seems to intend from this line of reasoning that the Holy Spirit is the very act of love, which seems to be the opinion of Scotus in the sixth and tenth distinctions of the First Book;¹⁴ indeed even of St. Thomas himself in I Sent., d. xxxii, q. 1, a. 1; and not that he is something produced through the act of the will. For here he seems always to speak of love as it is an act of the will: especially when he proves that God is truly and substantially God according as he is considered as existing in his will, because to love is a kind of willing, and the willing of God is his being, etc.¹⁵ But this seems to conflict with what is said in the Prima Pars, q. xxxvii, a. 1, where St. Thomas says that, just as from the fact that someone understands a thing, there proceeds a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood, which is called a word; so from the fact that someone loves a thing, there proceeds a certain impression of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; and this impression he calls the Holy Spirit.

2. It is answered that the Holy Spirit is indeed something produced through an act, as is manifestly clear in the cited place.¹⁶ And this is also what St. Thomas holds in this place,¹⁷ when he says that the love by which God is in the divine will as the loved in the lover proceeds from the Word, and from God whose Word it is; and when he says that this is the love by which God is loved;¹⁸ for by the name love he understands not the very act of love, but that which is produced through such an act of love. For because those things that pertain to the will do not have proper names in the same way as those that pertain to the intellect, we therefore sometimes use one name to signify both that which is produced through the act of loving and the very act of loving itself. On account of which St. Thomas sometimes says that the Holy Spirit is the very act of love, as is clear in I Sent.,¹⁹ intending that he is something produced by an act of love, but signified by the name of the act itself.

3. Moreover, what is specifically adduced from the words of St. Thomas is no obstacle. For he does not mean by those words that God, as existing in the will, is formally the very divine loving and the very divine willing: but he wishes to argue just as was argued above²⁰ concerning the divine Word that he was God, because his being is being-understood itself, which is the same in reality as the divine understanding, and God's understanding is his being. St. Thomas therefore wishes to argue thus. The loved is in the lover according as it is loved: that is, through an affection produced by the act of loving whereby the lover is inclined and in a certain way impelled toward the loved. But the being of this affection is to be loved, that is, the act of love signified in the mode of passive production, and to be loved is the very act that is called loving on the part of the will, and being loved on the part of the produced affection. Therefore the being of the loved, according as it is in the lover, is loving itself. — Then further. Loving itself is willing. Therefore the being of that affection according to which it is in the will is willing. But God's willing is his being. Therefore the being of that affection according to which God is in the will is the being of God: which is substantial being, not accidental being, as happens in us. Therefore the affection itself, or the produced love, according to which God is said to be in the will, is truly and substantially God: because divine being belongs only to that which is truly God.

X. But against this determination the words of St. Thomas in De Verit., q. iv, a. 2, ad 7 seem to stand. For he posits there a difference between the intellect and the will, because the intellect has something in itself proceeding by way of operation, and something by way of a product; but the will does not have something in itself proceeding by way of a product, but only by way of operation. And thus it seems that the Holy Spirit, who is produced through the will, is not something proceeding through the act of the will, but the very operation of the will.

2. To this it is answered first, that St. Thomas does not intend in the same place to exclude every product or thing produced from the act of the will, but only a product that is a likeness of the thing willed. For the intellect and the will differ, because the intellect through its act produces in itself a likeness of the thing understood, for the conception of the intellect is an expressed likeness of the thing understood: but the will does not produce in itself through the act of loving a likeness of the thing loved, although it produces a certain form through which it is inclined toward the thing loved, just as a heavy body is inclined by gravity to a place below. And this response can be obtained both from the things that are said in this place, and from those that are found in De Verit., q. x, a. 9, ad 7.²¹

3. Secondly, it can be answered that, because those things that pertain to the will are not as well known, nor do they have as proper names as those that pertain to the intellect; therefore to the person produced by way of the will there is not assigned a proper name such that it is spoken only personally, and that it is the proper name of the thing produced through the act of the will, as this name, Word, is assigned to that which is produced within through an act of the intellect, but it is signified by the name of the operation itself, namely by the name Love. From which it follows that the term produced through the act of the will is not signified by way of a term, but by way of an operation: since love signifies an operation prior to signifying the term of the operation. From this it also follows very well that the name love can be taken both essentially, if it is taken as the name of the operation absolutely; and personally, if it is taken as the name of a person. When, therefore, St. Thomas says that the will does not have something in itself proceeding by way of a product, it is understood as to the mode of signifying and as to the propriety of the name. For the sense is that in the will there is not something that has a proper and distinct name signifying by way of a product: but that which is truly a product has a name signifying it by way of an operation, namely the name Love.

This response can be manifestly obtained from what St. Thomas says in the Prima Pars, q. xxxvii, a. 1.²² Nevertheless, the first response is better. Because the reason for this difference which is adduced in the cited authority²³ between the intellect and the will is assigned by St. Thomas from the fact that the operation of the will terminates at things, in which are good and evil; but the operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which are the true and the false; and he makes no mention there of the propriety of naming.

4. But nonetheless, neither does that response seem to suffice for the intention of St. Thomas. For in that response he posits that love is not said personally, but Word is, because in the will there is no procession except by way of operation, and not by way of a product, whereas in the intellect there is a procession by way of a product. But through the fact that there does not proceed in the will something by way of a likeness, it is not removed that love can be said personally, provided that something is produced in the will by way of a product.

On account of which it can be answered thirdly, adding to the response that in the will there is not something produced by way of a product, namely that it is an object of the will by way of the willed, whereas in the intellect a product is produced that is the object of the intellect. For through the very act of understanding the object of the intellect is produced intrinsically in actual intelligible being: but the willed is not produced through an act of the will in actual willed being in the will itself. Yet along with this it stands that there is produced in the will a certain impression and inclination of the will toward the thing willed.

Moreover, it is clear that this is the mind of St. Thomas in that place,²⁴ both from the diverse comparison of the intellect to the thing understood, and of the will to the thing willed, which he posits there; and from the application of the response to the argument. For from the fact that the object of the intellect according to a certain intelligible being is manifestly produced in our intellect, we therefore have a proper name of the produced thing and product in the intellect, namely the name word, and from this the name Word has it that it is said personally. But because the willed is not produced in the will through an act of the will, we therefore have no name of an object produced in the will that has it, so far as it is from itself, to be said personally in divine reality. And because it also does not appear so manifestly that something else is produced in the will through an act of the will, although something is produced, we have no proper name to signify any such product that would be said personally in divine reality. And therefore the name of love, which among us according to common usage is the name of an operation, and not of a product, does not have it that it is said personally in the way that the name Word is: although according to a certain accommodation it is also said personally.