Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas determined what is to be held concerning the divine generation, consequently, because the truth excludes all falsehood and dissolves doubt, he wishes to answer the arguments made to the contrary in chapter 10¹.

I. To the first² indeed, he says that generation in material things is a change opposed to corruption; but not intelligible generation, even in us, such as the generation of the Son in the divine nature has been said to be³.

2. Concerning this response there is a doubt: because it seems that intelligible conception also, at least in us, is a change; because the conceiving intellect passes from potency to act, while previously it was able to conceive the word, and afterwards it actually conceives it.

For the evident understanding of this, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. 3, a. 2, that in every change properly so called, it is required that there be some subject common to both terms of the change; and in generation and corruption it is required that such a subject be a being in potency, which is disposed differently now and previously. Hence, in order that the production of something be a change, it is required either that it be a composite of form, which is the formal term of the production, and matter, which is the potency to that form; or that it be the act of a recipient as existing in potency, but not as existing in act. The word, however, is not something composed of form and matter, since it is something simple. Nor is it the act of the intellect as existing in potency, but as existing in act, since it does not come to the intellect except insofar as it is in act through the intelligible species, and also through the act of understanding by which the word itself is produced. Therefore, the production of the word, even in our intellect, does not have the character of a change.

3. But when it is said that the intellect, by conceiving the word, passes from potency to act: — I deny it, speaking of passive potency. Rather, it passes from one act to another act, without the loss of the other act.

When it is proved, however, because previously it was able to conceive the word, and afterwards it actually conceives it: — it is said first, that that ability is not understood according to passive potency, but according to a quasi-active potency; as when it is said that fire can heat.

It is said secondly, in conformity with the response to be given immediately to the second argument, that the word does not arise from the intellect according as it is in potency to the act of understanding, but according as it is actually understanding.

4. If it be urged that, although the word of our intellect proceeds from the intellect insofar as it is in act, nevertheless it is received in it insofar as it is in passive potency, because to receive belongs to passive potency; and thus it seems that the intellect passes from passive potency to act while it conceives the word, and consequently that it is changed: — it is said that in order for some act to have the character of a change, it does not suffice that the recipient of the term of that act be related in some way to it as a receptive potency, but it is required that it be a receptive potency only, and in no way active of that act while it receives it; as matter, which receives a form through generation, is in no way active of that form, or of that action by which the form is produced. But the intellect is receptive of the word by producing it, because it simultaneously receives and produces it. Therefore, neither by receiving the word does it pass from a purely passive potency to act, nor is it properly said to be changed, just as a subject is not properly said to be changed while it undergoes a passion of which it is in some way active.

II. To the second⁴, he says first, that in us the word does not go forth from potency to act except insofar as the intellect proceeds from potency to act; nor, however, does it arise from the intellect except as it exists in act.

He says secondly that, because the divine intellect is never in potency, but only in act, the generation of its Word is not according to a going forth from potency to act, but as act arises from act, as brightness from light, and the understood concept from the intellect in act.

He says thirdly, that it does not follow that the Son of God is not true God, or is not eternal. Rather, it is necessary that he be coeternal with God, whose Word he is: because the intellect in act is never without the word.

2. It should be observed that the response of St. Thomas tends to this: that, although in some way and secundum quid it can be conceded that the word of the human mind goes forth from potency to act, insofar as our intellect proceeds from potency to act, or from habit to the act by which the word is produced (which nevertheless is not true simpliciter, because the word does not arise from the intellect while it is in potency, but while it is in the act of understanding); nevertheless, it must in no way be conceded that the divine Word goes forth from potency to act, because the divine intellect is never potentially understanding, but always in act, and consequently does not proceed from potency to act. But it is said to arise as act from act, because it arises from the intellect always existing in act, and never existing in potency. From this, moreover, it is clear that it does not follow, if the Son is produced by intelligible generation, that he is mutable, or that he is not eternal.

3. It must also be noted that a form is properly said to proceed from potency to act when it is produced in something that is compared to it as an entirely passive potency to act, as being entirely devoid of that form in itself. But this does not apply to the word in relation to the intellect, even our own, actuated by an intelligible species: because the intellect thus actuated is productive of the word, not only receptive; and it has in itself the form in which the word is virtually contained. Much less also is it related purely passively to the word when it is under the actual intellection by which the word itself is produced, since it is then in the ultimate of its actuality, which is in a certain way the word itself; for the word is the intrinsic term of intellection, which is the ultimate actuality of the intellect. Most excellently, therefore, St. Thomas shows that the word of our intellect does not properly go forth from potency to act when it is produced, because it does not arise from the intellect except as it exists in act, namely both second and first. For what arises from something from passive potency to act, arises from it according as it is in passive potency to it and lacks it, as the form of fire arises from wood; but not according as it is in act, and in some way actually has the form.

III. To the third⁵, he says first, that it is foolishly doubted whether the Father gave the whole nature to the Son, or only a part: because the generation of the Son is intelligible. For it is manifest that, if God understands himself, his whole fullness is contained in the Word.

He says secondly, that on this account the substance given to the Son does not cease to be in the Father. Because neither even with us does the proper nature cease to be in the thing that is understood, from the fact that the word of our intellect has it from the understood thing itself to contain intelligibly the numerically same nature.

2. Concerning the first statement, it must be considered, as is evident from what was said above⁶, that the Word is expressive and representative of the understood thing to the intellect, and intellection extends as far as the representation of the Word extends. Therefore, if God understands himself, namely perfectly and completely, it is necessary that he have the whole nature of the Father. And this is what St. Thomas intimates, since from the fact that God understands himself, namely perfectly, it is necessary that the whole fullness of God be contained in the Word.

3. Concerning the second statement, it must be considered first, from those things that were explained above⁷, that the word and conception of our intellect is of the same nature as the thing by which a conception of this kind was caused, differing from it according to the mode of being. For the concept of a stone in the intellect, and of a stone outside the intellect, is of the same nature, but in the intellect it has immaterial being, whereas outside the intellect it has material being. Now, that the word is of such a nature, it has from the thing itself: for that the conception of a stone is the understood stone arises from the fact that it is caused by the material stone, and is its expressed and adequate likeness. This, moreover, happens without the understood thing, which gives to the word to be of such a nature intelligibly, losing its proper nature. In the same way, that the divine Word intelligibly contains the numerically same nature that the Father has, from whom he proceeds, is without this nature ceasing to be in the Father. And because understanding and being in God are the same, without the nature ceasing to be in the Father, it can be wholly in the Son, not only intelligibly, but also according to natural being, and according to the same mode of being. And this is the foundation of this response.

It must be considered secondly, that a nature can be said to be one in number in two ways. In one way, materially: insofar namely as it is limited to one individual through some individuating principles contained under it; as the humanity of Socrates is one in number, and the humanity of Plato is another in number, and so of others. In another way, formally: insofar namely as it is considered in itself as a kind of one, and undivided according to formal difference, but divided from any other nature whatsoever; and thus humanity, considered in itself and absolutely, is one in number, because it is constituted through one indivisible difference. When, therefore, it is said here that the word of our intellect intelligibly contains the numerically same nature that the understood thing has, it is not understood of material unity, as if the word and the understood thing were one individual and singular contained under the same species: — for it is evident that the thing primarily understood by our intellect is not a singular nature, but a universal nature; likewise the word does not represent to the intellect a singular nature, but a universal one — but it is understood of formal identity. For the word of any understood thing is not another nature, insofar as it is a word, than the nature of the understood thing according as it has intelligible being in act: for the concept that the intellect forms of man is nothing other than man himself, who existing outside the intellect has material being, but in the intellect has immaterial and intelligible being; and man himself existing outside the intellect causes in the intellect the concept itself intelligibly containing the same nature that is formally indivisible as he himself has.

IV. To the fourth⁸, he says first, that in material generations indeed, the recipient is one thing and the received nature another, insofar as the matter of what is generated receives the form of the generator. In intelligible generation, however, it is not so: because the word has its origin totally from the intellect; just as in us one word arises totally from another, as a conclusion from principles. But where something arises totally from another, there is no assigning of recipient and received, but the whole that arises from it is from that from which it arises.

2. Concerning that proposition, Where something arises totally from another, there is no assigning of recipient and received, it must be noted that it can be understood of a recipient presupposed to the thing which is an intrinsic part of the produced thing, and is other than the producer, as matter is a part of the composite of matter and form, and is other than the generator; but not of that recipient which is simultaneously both producing and receiving that which is totally produced. For our intellect receives the word totally produced by itself, since it is not subsistent, but inheres in the intellect. And thus in the production of the word by our intellect there is something receiving, namely the intellect, and something received, namely the word; but nevertheless that recipient is not a part of the produced word, on account of which it could be said that it in some way pre-existed according to its potential part, but rather it is that according to which it can be said that it pre-existed in its productive potency.

Secondly, it can be understood of the production of a subsistent thing, of which kind the divine Word is. For if there were in such a production the assigning of some pre-existing recipient and something received, then such a thing would necessarily pre-exist according to something of itself. Because, since a subsistent thing is not suited by nature to be received in another according to its whole self, it would be necessary that such a recipient that was presupposed should be a part of the produced thing; and thus it would have pre-existed according to some part of itself, and consequently would not have totally arisen from another. If, therefore, something totally arises from another, there is no positing of something receiving and something received there.

V. To the fifth⁹, he says first, that although the divine essence is subsistent, it cannot nevertheless be separated from the relation of the Word and of the one speaking: because both the Word and God speaking is the divine essence, and numerically one.

He says secondly, that relations of this kind are not accidents in God, but subsistent things. And therefore they are several subsistent things, if the relations are considered; but there is one subsistent thing, if the essence is considered. On account of the one subsistent essence, we say that there is one God; but on account of the distinction of subsistent relations, that there are several persons. Because also in human affairs, the distinction of persons is not attended to according to the essence of the species, but according to those things that are adjoined to the species.

2. Note that the response tends to this: that when it is argued: The Father and the Son agree in one subsistent thing. Therefore also in person: — if by a subsistent thing an absolute thing is understood, which is the essence, the antecedent is conceded; but the consequence is denied. And when it is proved because in intellectual natures a subsistent thing is called a person: it is said that that is true insofar as the subsistent thing is an individual substance; for, as is said here, the distinction of persons in men is according to those things that are adjoined to the nature of the species, namely on account of individuating principles. The divine essence, however, although it is subsistent, is nevertheless not related as an individual substance. — But if by a subsistent thing a subsistent relation is understood: thus, the antecedent is denied. For although the Father and the Son agree in one subsistent essence, they do not nevertheless agree in one subsistent relation constituting the person of the Father or of the Son, but paternity belongs to the Father, while filiation belongs to the Son.

It should further be noted that, as is clear from the above¹⁰, the word implies a relation to the speaker, for it is the word that is uttered by the speaker; while the speaker implies a relation to the word, since to speak is nothing other than to utter a word. And therefore, since both the Word and God speaking is the divine essence, it is well said here that the divine essence cannot be separated from the relation of the Word and of the speaker: just as, namely, it cannot be separated from the Word and from God speaking.

It should also be noted, when it is said that in human affairs the distinction of persons is not attended to according to the essence of the species, that this is not to be understood as if the nature of the species were in no way multiplied in diverse persons: — for this is false, since in several men there are several numerically distinct humanities — but because according to the concept of the species considered absolutely, insofar namely as to those things alone that belong to the concept of the species, persons are not distinguished, since the nature thus considered is one in all men; but they are distinguished through incommunicable principles added to the nature of the species, by which it is limited and becomes this and individual; for such principles are diverse in diverse men.

VI. To the sixth¹¹, he says that it does not follow that that which is as it were the principle of individuation is in another. For neither is the divine essence in another God, nor is paternity in the Son.

For the evident understanding of this response, it must be considered that, since the Father is both God and a relative supposit, we can assign something in him as a principle of individuation in two ways. In one way, insofar as he is God: so that, namely, that individuating principle of his be called that through which he is one God and undivided. And thus the divine essence can be called the principle of individuation of the Father: for through it, since it is an immaterial form, and not through anything else, the Father has both that he is God, and that he is one God; for it is not suited by nature to belong to anyone who is another God from the Father. — In another way, insofar as he is a relative supposit: so that, namely, his individuating principle be called that through which he is one such supposit undivided in itself and divided from any other relative supposit whatsoever. And thus paternity is his individuating principle.

St. Thomas wishes to respond, therefore, that if we speak of the principle of individuation of the Father in the first way, the whole is conceded, except the ultimate consequence. For it is conceded that the divine essence is not in another supposit who is another God from the Father; but that consequence is denied, Therefore it is not in the Son. For the Son is not another God from the Father, but they are one subsistent God on account of the unity of essence, as was said in the response to the fifth argument¹². — But if we speak of the principle of individuation in the second way, thus it is manifest that it must be conceded that it is not in the Son: for paternity is not in the Son. And thus it does not follow, as the argument supposes, if generation in the divine nature is posited, that the principle of individuation of the Father, in the way in which such a principle is attributed to him, is in another, namely a relative supposit.

VII. To the seventh¹³, by admitting the response given there and explaining it, he says first that, although the two persons of the Father and of the Son are not distinguished by essence, but by relation, the relation is not nevertheless other than the essence in reality: since a relation in God cannot be an accident, as is clear from those things that were determined in the first book concerning the perfections of all beings. For just as those in God are according to the unity of simple essence, and are not accidents in him, but the divine essence itself; so the relation of paternity and filiation, although in men it is an accident, nevertheless in God is the divine essence.

He says secondly that, since the divine essence is the very relation of paternity and filiation, it is necessary that whatever is proper to paternity should belong to God. And therefore, since it is proper to paternity that it be distinguished from filiation, since father is spoken of in relation to son as to another: although God the Father is the divine essence, and likewise God the Son, nevertheless from the fact that he is Father, he is distinguished from the Son.

From these things St. Thomas wishes to hold that it does not follow that the person of the Father is composite, although in him there is some distinguishing principle besides the essence: because such a principle is really the same as the essence, although it is distinguished according to the concept of relation from it. Which concept, as the response was saying, adds nothing, as such, to the reality that is the essence, but only expresses a respect to another.

2. To the impugnation of the given response¹⁴, however, he says first, that certainly a relation in the divine nature is not without an absolute.

He says secondly, that such a relation is not compared to the absolute as an accident to a subject, as happens in created things, but by way of identity.

He says thirdly that, although the same subject cannot have opposite relations in itself, nothing nevertheless prevents the divine essence, being one, just as on account of its all-inclusive perfection it is the same as wisdom and justice and other such things that are contained in diverse genera, so also from being the same as paternity and filiation, and the Father and the Son from being one God.

3. It must be noted first, when it is said that in creatures a relation is compared to an absolute as an accident to a subject, that by absolute St. Thomas does not understand the foundation of the relation, but the subject, which namely is denominated such relatively. Therefore from these words it cannot be held that universally, with him, a relation is distinguished from its foundation. It is well held that no relation that is immediately founded upon substance is the same as its foundation: since relation is an accident, whereas created substance is identified with no accident.

It must be noted secondly, when it is said that the same subject cannot have opposite relations in itself, that St. Thomas is speaking of the relative opposition of relations, but not of the contrary opposition of formal concepts, according as concepts including opposites in some way are called opposite. For likeness and unlikeness in some way imply opposite concepts, namely agreement and disagreement in quality; yet they are not relatively opposite relations, of which, that is, the one is said relatively to the other in the concrete. Therefore they can belong together to one subject in respect to diverse things, or even in respect to the same thing according to diverse aspects. Paternity and filiation, however, are relatively opposed. Therefore the same thing cannot be father and son in respect to the same thing. Nor can a father and a son, who are relatively opposed, be one man, as in the divine the Father and the Son are one God, because the divine essence identifies both relations with itself, but is not compared to them as a subject to accidents.

VIII. To the eighth reason¹⁵ St. Thomas says first that relations are in God according to reality, and not in intellect alone. Because the relation of the Word to the speaker whose Word it is, is posited in God from the fact that God understands Himself, which operation is indeed in God, indeed is God Himself. Now every relation that follows upon the proper operation of a thing, or upon a potency or quantity or something of this sort, exists in it really; for otherwise it would be in it by intellect alone. This is explained in science and the knowable, and in the right and the left. — How the knowable is said relatively to science from the fact that science is referred to it was explained in what precedes¹⁶.

2. But a twofold doubt arises. The first is because someone could say that, although the relation of God speaking to the Word follows upon the action of God understanding Himself, and on account of this such a relation is real, nevertheless the relation of the divine Word to God speaking does not follow upon any action of the Word terminated at the Father. And therefore from the fact that the action of understanding is in God Himself, it does not follow that the Word has a real relation to the Father, but rather that the speaker has a real relation to the Word.

The second doubt¹⁷ is because, if a relation that follows upon the proper operation of a thing is real, it follows that God is referred to the creature by the real relation of creation: for to create is the proper operation of God, since it belongs to no other. But this is well known to be against the teaching of St. Thomas¹⁸. Therefore, etc.

3. To the first doubt it is answered that, although the relation of the Word to God speaking does not follow upon any action of the Word terminated at the speaker as at something produced through that action, it nevertheless follows upon the action of God understanding Himself, which is God Himself, just as the relation of God speaking to the Word itself also follows upon the same action. For God by understanding Himself produces the Word; and thus upon such intellection there follows both the relation of the speaker to the produced Word, and the relation of the Word to the speaker.

But on the contrary: for by the same reason it could be said that the relation of the knowable is real, because it follows upon the action of the knower terminated at it; for from the fact that the knower understands something, there follows the relation of the knower to the known, and of the known to the knower.

It is answered that it is not the same reason regarding the relation of the Word and regarding the relation of the knowable. Because the knowable, insofar as it is such, receives no real being from the very act of understanding; wherefore St. Thomas says in this place that the knowable is related in the same way, as far as it is in itself, both when it is understood and when it is not understood; that is, it undergoes no variation from the fact that it is understood. The Word of the intellect, however, receives being through the act of understanding. Whence it can be said to be the same action of the speaker and of the Word: of the speaker indeed as giving being to the Word, but of the Word as receiving being through it; just as the action of the agent and of the patient taken materially is the same, upon which opposite relations follow.

4. To the second doubt¹⁹ it is answered first, that St. Thomas does not say that every relation that follows upon any operation whatsoever is something real in it, but that relation which follows upon the proper operation of the thing. Now a proper operation is called in this place not every operation that belongs to the thing alone, but that which follows upon its nature: just as in material things, in which there is univocal generation, to generate what is like itself in species is the proper operation of the thing; likewise in cognitive beings to apprehend a thing as it is, is the proper operation of the knower, insofar as it is a knower in complete act. Therefore the divine understanding by which God understands Himself, insofar as it is such, is an operation that naturally follows upon the divine nature; but not to create, which is voluntary. Therefore it does not follow, if the relation following upon the act of speaking is real, that the relation following upon the act of creating is likewise real. — St. Thomas seems to favor this interpretation in the First Part, q. xxviii, a. 1, where he proves that the relations following upon the divine processions are real, because the processions in the divine are in the identity of nature. Now when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, it is necessary that the proceeding and that from which it proceeds agree in the same order, and thus have relations to one another. Now, it is clear that the operation by which something proceeds from a principle of the same nature is an operation that follows upon nature. And thus St. Thomas seems to intend that the operation which he here calls the proper operation of the thing is an operation following upon the nature of the thing.

Secondly it is answered and said first, that by a proper operation St. Thomas understands an operation that is not extraneous, but which is elicited by the thing itself. And he intends that when a relation arises and comes to a thing from something belonging to the nature of the thing, or from something real that belongs to the thing, then such a relation is real. — It is said secondly, that a relation is then said to follow upon the proper operation of a thing, or upon some form of it, when the thing, from the nature and entity of such an operation, is inclined and ordered per se to another by a certain necessity; but not when it is ordered to another from the apprehension of reason alone. — It is said thirdly, that by no divine operation is God ordered or inclined to a creature, since His operation is His substance, which is inclined by no natural necessity to any created thing, but is conceived relatively from the fact that the creature terminating such an operation is ordered and inclined to God as to its perfective principle; just as the knowable has of itself no order to science, but is said relatively because science is ordered to it and has a relation to it, as is said here, and in V Metaphysics²⁰. — From these things it is clear that the inference drawn is false, and its foundation is nil: namely that God from the action of creating has an order and inclination to the creature as to that toward which He has a dependence. — This answer is clear from the teaching of St. Thomas in I Sentences, d. xxvi²¹; De Potentia, q. vii, a. 10; and in other places where he speaks of this matter.

5. If it is urged that the speculative intellection of God by which He understands created or creatable things is a natural operation of God, since God cannot not understand them; and thus it seems that God, from the nature of such cognition, has an order to them, and consequently that He is really referred: — it is answered that, although God naturally knows things other than Himself speculatively, it nevertheless does not follow that He has a natural order and inclination to them: because He does not know them except by understanding His essence, which is the primary object of divine cognition, and in which all things are represented; now science has a natural order only to its primary and per se object, but not to those things that are known in such an object. Nor yet does it follow that the science of God has a real relation to the essence itself. For one condition required for a real relation is lacking, namely that it be between those things that are really distinct: for the science of God is not distinguished from the divine essence.

IX. To the ninth²² he says first, that in us relations have a dependent being, because their being is other than the being of substance; and they have a proper mode of being; and they are caused by substance, just as every other accidental form is caused by the principles of substance.

He says secondly that, because the being of each accidental form is so much prior or posterior as the accidental form according to its proper concept is closer to substance, or more perfect; relation, because it not only pre-requires the being of substance, but also the being of the other accidents from which it is caused; and its being depends not only on the being of substance, but also on the being of something exterior, namely the term, since the proper concept of relation consists in this, that it is being-toward-another; has the last and most imperfect being.

He says thirdly²³, that relation in God does not have being that depends either on substance or on anything exterior; because in God the being of relation is the very being of substance, just as also the being of wisdom. But indeed in God there is a certain relation, in which the concept of relation consists: just as wisdom is posited in God, not because there is in Him some accidental being, but because in Him there is a certain perfection in which the concept of wisdom consists.

From which he infers as a corollary that it does not follow from the imperfection of created relations that the divine persons themselves, who are distinguished by relations, are imperfect: but only that their distinction is minimal²⁴.

2. It must be observed, however, that although the being of relation depends on the being of substance and on the being of the term, this nevertheless is not in the same way in all respects. For it depends on both insofar as for the being of relation it is required that there be a substance and that there be a term; but on substance it depends effectively and subjectively, insofar as every accident is caused by the principles of some substance and is in substance as in a subject; but on the formal term as on a cause without which not. — Moreover, what was said, that every accidental form is caused by the principles of substance, must be understood of accidents that are produced into being through created action, but not of those that are produced through divine action: for in those it is not universally true that they are caused by the principles of substance. Whence in De Potentia, q. iii, a. 3, ad 3, St. Thomas says that the relation of creation is indeed an accident, yet it is not such an accident as is caused by the principles of the subject. The same must be said of grace, and other like things.

X. But concerning the first and second points of this response a twofold doubt arises. The first is because St. Thomas seems to intend that no relation is immediately founded on substance, since he says that the being of relation pre-requires the being of other accidents in the substance. But the opposite of this seems to be the case concerning the relation of creation in the creature, and concerning the relation of specific identity of substances. For these seem to be founded immediately on substance, and not to pre-require the being of other accidents in it.

The second doubt is because St. Thomas in this place seems to intend that a relation differs really from its foundation, since he says that the being of relation presupposes the being of the other accidents from which it is caused. But many Thomists seem to hold the opposite of this. The question therefore is, what was the mind of St. Thomas on this matter.

XI. To the first doubt it is answered that it must certainly be held that some relations, as to their being, are immediately founded on substance: as is clear regarding the relation of passive creation, and regarding the relation of specific identity. Wherefore St. Thomas says, De Potentia, q. VII, a. 9, ad 4, that a creature is referred to God according to its substance as according to the cause of the relation, just as something is called like according to quality causally.

Now to that which is said here, an answer can be given in a twofold way. First, according to those holding that a relation immediately founded on substance is not in a genus but is a transcendental relation, that the statement of St. Thomas is understood of relations that are in a genus, but not of transcendental relations.

Secondly, by holding that such relations are of the genus of relation, that it is understood of quantity, potency, and the like, either according to reality or according to mode. For relation has so weak a being that it does not come to substance unless there pre-exist in substance the being of another accident by which it is caused, or substance itself takes on the mode of another accident. And thus it is said that a relation immediately founded on substance pre-requires in substance the being of another accident as to mode, though not as to reality. For identity is founded on substance insofar as it takes on the mode of unity: for the one in substance makes the same. Likewise the relation of creation is founded on it insofar as it takes on the mode of passive potency. And so of the others. Whence St. Thomas, in the article cited above, in the body, says that through substance and quality something is not ordered to another except according as quality, or substantial form, or matter, has the concept of an active or passive virtue, and according as in them some concept of quantity is considered.

XII. To the second doubt²⁵, omitting many reasons that can be brought forward for either side, and which could perhaps be seemingly solved, I will say what seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, always saving a better judgment.

One thing seems to me clear in his teaching, as far as can be had from his words. The other seems in some way to be doubtful²⁶.

It seems clear to me that no relation in creatures is a substance: and consequently that no relation immediately founded on substance is really the same as its foundation. This is had first, from I Sentences, d. IV²⁷, a. 1, ad 3, where it is said that no relation is a substance in creatures. — It is had secondly from De Potentia, q. VIII, a. 2, ad 1, where it is said that no substance in a genus can be a relation. — It is had thirdly from IV Contra Gentiles, c. XIV²⁸; and I Sentences, d. XX, a. 1; d. XXI²⁹; and XXXIII, a. 1; likewise the First Part, q. XXVIII, a. 2, where St. Thomas expressly holds that the being of relation is distinguished from the being of substance, and is superadded to it.

2. Now to these statements of St. Thomas an answer could be given in a twofold way. First, that they intend that relation is not formally the same as substance, and likewise the being of relation with the being of substance, for the concept of substance is one and the concept of relation another; but not that they are not one reality.

Secondly, that they are understood of a relation that is immediately founded on an accident, as likeness, equality, and the like. For it is certain that in these a relation is not the same as substance, according to the mind of St. Thomas: just as neither equality, nor quantity, nor action and passion, upon which it is founded, is identified with substance.

3. But that neither of these responses is according to the mind of St. Thomas can easily be shown. For that the first is not according to his mind is shown first, because in the First Book, d. IV, in the place cited, he expressly says that no relation in creatures is a substance according to reality. — Secondly, because he immediately adds in the same place that therefore it is necessary that every generated being be composite in creatures; and in dist. XXXIII³⁰, he infers that, because the being of relations is distinguished from the being of substance, they are therefore said to inhere, and according as they inhere, they cause composition. Now it is clear that from a formal distinction alone such a composition would not be inferred. — Thirdly, because he said those things in order to show the difference between created relations and divine relations: namely, because divine relations are the same as the divine substance, but created relations are not the same as substance. Now it is manifest that there would be no difference between such relations if this alone were intended, that created substance cannot be a relation formally: for the divine essence also is not formally the divine relation itself, since they have diverse concepts, and also have diverse modes of predicating, as St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. XXVIII, a. 2, ad 1³¹.

4. That the second response also is not according to the mind of St. Thomas is argued first because, speaking of the relation that is creation, St. Thomas in De Potentia, q. III, a. 3, ad 3, says that it is an accident, and considered according to its being, as it inheres in a subject, it is posterior to the created thing. The same is had in Quodlibet VII, a. 10, ad 4. But it is clear that such a relation is not founded immediately on an accident, but on substance. — Secondly, because in the place cited above, De Potentia, q. VIII³², he assigns the reason why a substance in a genus is not a relation, since, I say, it is determined to one genus, and consequently is excluded from another genus. But not only a relation immediately founded on an accident is in a different genus from the genus of substance, but also one that is immediately founded on substance. For St. Thomas says in the place cited above, De Potentia, q. III³³, in the body, that creation is in the genus of relation. Therefore, etc.

XIII. But what is doubtful to me in this matter³⁴, following the teaching of St. Thomas, is whether other relations, which are immediately founded on other genera of accidents, are really distinct from their foundations: whether, namely, likeness is really distinguished from quality, and equality from quantity, and so of the others. For this is doubtful on account of various statements of St. Thomas, in which he sometimes seems to intend that they are the same, but sometimes that they are distinct. Nevertheless, to one diligently considering his words, it seems to me to be of his mind that every relation, even one founded on an accident, is really distinguished from its foundation.

2. Now I am not moved to this on account of what is said in the First Part, q. XXVIII, a. 2, ad 2, that in created things, in that which is said relatively, besides the relation there is also an absolute, which is another reality from that which is contained under the signification of the relative name. For those who hold that the opposite is the mind of St. Thomas would say, and truly, that by that absolute distinct from the relation St. Thomas does not understand the foundation of the relation, which is an accident, but the subject, which is substance. For the foundation of such relations, if it is the same as the relation, is not something outside the significate of the relative name; but the subject, which is substance, is indeed other both from the relation itself and from the foundation of the relation.

Nor am I moved on account of the reason assigned in the Questions De Potentia³⁵, why a substance that is in a genus cannot be a relation: namely, because it is determined to one genus, and consequently is excluded from another genus. For if it is understood in this sense, as if St. Thomas universally intended that no reality that is in one genus can in any way be in another genus, it will be against what he says in XI Metaphysics, lect. 9, at the end, where he expressly holds that the same reality can be in diverse predicaments on account of a diverse mode of predicating. Whence it could be answered that the mind of St. Thomas is that, because substance is defined to one genus, namely of substance, co-divided against all genera of accident really, therefore that which is in the genus of substance cannot be in any of the other genera, because substance cannot be really the same as an accident. But if one accident is in one predicament, it cannot be argued that it is not in another: because it is not unfitting for one accident to be in diverse predicaments of accidents, when nevertheless in its concept it includes something real that the other does not include; for if one included nothing real other than the other, they could not belong to two genera. And in this sense can be understood what St. Thomas says in I Sentences, d. XXXIII, a. 3, ad 4: that, I say, there is not found in creatures any of diverse genera that agree in identity of reality: — understand, entirely: for action and passion, although they agree in the same entity of motion, nevertheless include in their concepts really distinct relations.

3. But I am moved by two sayings of St. Thomas, which seem to me to favor this proposal in the highest degree. The first saying is in XII Metaph., in the exposition of text 19³⁶, where it is said that things that are relative seem to be more remote from substance than other genera by reason of the fact that they have a weaker being: wherefore they also inhere in substance through the mediation of other genera. For if relative things are more remote from substance than other genera according to their being; and other genera mediate between substance and relation: it clearly remains that relation is really distinguished from the other genera in which it is founded, and the being of relation from the being of the other genera; for the same thing is not near and remote, mediate and immediate, with respect to the same thing.

The second saying is in IV Contra, ch. xiv³⁷. For there, after St. Thomas said that the being of relation is superadded to the being of substance, he adds that relation supervening upon substance has the last being, because it pre-requires not only the being of substance, but also the being of the other accidents by which it is caused. For from these words it is most clearly evident that relation presupposes in substance the being of other accidents as distinct from itself, inasmuch as they are its causes, and whose being is prior and more perfect than the being of relation.

4. To these authorities, if someone wished not to follow the mind of St. Thomas, but to draw him into his own opinion, he could indeed say that relation is in substance through the mediation of other accidents, not by a real mediation, as if they were some intermediate reality distinct from the substance and from the relation; but by a formal mediation, because, namely, the absolute rationale of that reality which is a relation is prior to its relative rationale, and on that account it is said to mediate between the substance and the relation.

But that this response is not according to the mind of St. Thomas is clear, first, because he is manifestly speaking not of the rationales of the relation and the foundation, but of their being, which they add above substantial being. — Second, because he holds that it happens on account of the weakness and imperfection of the being of relation, by which it inheres in substance, that the being of the other accidents mediates between the being of substance and of relation, as the being of those things which are the cause of its being in substance. But he would not posit this if he understood the one to be more immediate to substance only according to its rationale: for not everything that presupposes another rationale according to its rationale is more imperfect than it according to its being.

Therefore it seems must be concluded that this was the mind of St. Thomas: that every relation is really distinguished from its foundation.

XIV. But concerning this determination there are certain things that bring difficulty: namely, certain sayings of St. Thomas, and certain arguments. The first saying of St. Thomas is in V Phys., lect. 3³⁸, where he says that when someone begins to be equal to another through the mutation of the latter, nothing accrues to him anew. But this would not be true if relation were an entity really distinct from its foundation.

The second is because in De Potentia, q. vii, a. 8, he holds that relation does not compound with that of which it is. But it is clear that it would compound if it were an entity really distinct from its foundation.

The third is because in De Potentia, q. viii, a. 2, he calls science a relation.

The fourth is, (1) because in IV Metaph., lect. 2, he presses against Avicenna from the fact that that which is determined to one genus cannot follow upon all beings as their accident. For from this it is argued thus: What is in one determinate genus cannot be an accident of all genera. But relation is in one determinate genus. Therefore it is not an accident of all genera. Therefore, since it belongs to all beings, it will not be distinct from the other genera.

2. But the first argument is³⁹ that the agent, insofar as it is an agent, would be mutated. For it would cause in itself the entity of the relation of itself to the patient by causing its effect.

The second is: Local distance is a relation. And this is not distinguished from its foundation. Therefore etc.⁴⁰ — The antecedent is proved. If it is such a distinct entity, it is acquired either in time or in an instant. If in time: then, after something has lost a part of its continuity, it will be contiguous, or will have contiguity, and will not be contiguous. — If in an instant, either a mediate or an immediate one. Not an immediate one: because an instant is not immediate to an instant. Nor also a mediate one: both because, since time mediates between two instants, that thing would be distant without distance; and because no extended form is acquired in an instant.

The third is: Duplicity is not distinguished from its foundation. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. If it is distinguished from quantity, say of a two-cubit body, which is double to a body of one cubit: it is either in every part of it, or whole in the whole and part in the part. Not the first: because then every part of it would be double. — Nor also the second. Because the parts of the duplicity would either be of the same ratio with the whole, or not. If the first, it will still follow that every part is double. If the second, to the contrary: what does not have extension and divisibility of itself but from the continuous is not divisible in another way than the continuous, as is clear concerning whiteness and other things. But quantity is not divisible except into parts of the same ratio. Therefore etc.

XV. For the response to the sayings of St. Thomas, it must be noted that relation can have being in three ways. In one way, fundamental only: as when the foundation of the relation is in the thing, with no term existing. For then the relation is virtually and in inchoation, insofar as the foundation is in the thing whence the relation is suited to follow by a natural consequence, the term being posited. — In another way, actually according to its proper and distinct being in order to its formal term, which, namely, it primarily and per se regards. — In a third way, actually according to its proper being in order also to this determinate material term. — For, when Socrates has an only son, the relation of paternity is in him in act both according to actual being and according to fundamental being in order to the formal term, namely a son absolutely; and in order to this material term, namely this son whom he has. But in order to a son whom he does not yet have, it is not in act: but, after that one is born later, it comes to be in act also in order to this second son himself, to whom he previously did not have an actual order.

It must be noted secondly that something is said to be mutated when it receives a form that it did not previously have through an action terminated at itself. But when it receives a form or some entity resulting by a natural consequence from something pre-existing in itself, then it is not properly said to be mutated: because mutation is materially action and passion. For if, whether per impossibile or per possibile, the soul were impeded from having its potencies flow and originate from itself, and afterwards, the impediment being removed, they were to follow from it: the human being would not properly be said to be mutated through the reception of those potencies, because he would not receive them through some intermediate action or passion, but through a natural resultant from the essence of the soul; although he could improperly be said to be mutated, because he would have some entity in complete act which he previously had only incompletely and radically. In this way therefore, because—according as every reception of anything can be called a mutation in a broad sense—a relation is suited to follow from the foundation, the term being posited, by a natural consequence and concomitance, but not through an intermediate action: therefore, while someone previously having the foundation only, afterwards has the relation itself according to complete act, that which is related is not properly said to be mutated through its reception; and on that account the Philosopher in V Phys.⁴¹ says that there is not motion to it primarily, and that it supervenes without mutation, namely with the foundation pre-existing.

XVI. To the first saying of St. Thomas⁴² therefore it can be answered in two ways. First, that the mind of St. Thomas is that nothing then accrues to the subject anew through any mutation made in itself. For a relation is then said to accrue anew to something through its mutation when it accrues totally: namely, both as to its being and as to its foundation. For then the subject is said to be transmuted through the action of the agent, which is primarily terminated at the foundation, which is an absolute form, but secondarily at the relation. But it is not his mind that no entity in any way accrues to it anew. — Moreover, this sense can be had from the very words of St. Thomas: for it is clear that he is speaking when someone, not being mutated himself, begins to be equal to another through the mutation of that other.

Secondly, it can be answered that he is speaking when someone has the relation of equality in act with respect to some things having the same quantity, but not with respect to someone not having the same quantity. For if that other person afterwards receives the same quantity, then he begins to be equal to him, not because the entity of the relation or any other entity accrues to him anew: but because the equality which was previously in him is determined to this one, to whom it was not previously determined. — This sense can be had from the words of St. Thomas when he says⁴³: When therefore someone receives that quantity, that common root, namely the quantity pre-existing in me, is determined to him.

And thus it is clear that this saying does not prejudice our determination.

2. To the second it is said, first, that St. Thomas is speaking of the subject, not of the foundation: namely, that relation does not compound with that which is said relatively.

It is said, secondly, that he is speaking of relation according to its proper rationale, which is to be toward another, but not as to its being. For it compounds with its subject insofar as it inheres in it: but insofar as it is said toward another, it does not compound, because insofar as it expresses an order to another, it does not have the character of expressing something real, as will be made clear below⁴⁴.

3. To the third it is said that St. Thomas takes the abstract for the concrete. For science can be taken absolutely, as, namely, it is precisely a quality. It can also be taken relatively, namely as it connotes a relation to the knowable. And in this way science is said as a relation, that is, as a relative.

4. To the fourth it is said that, although we posit that every real relation is really distinct from its foundation, yet we do not say that it is an accident of all genera as something that is convertible with being, as Avicenna said of the one⁴⁵. For it is clear that it is not an accident of the genus of relation itself, since a relation, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, is not related by another relation distinct from itself. It is also clear that it is not an accident founded upon when and where, and the like, as is clear from Aristotle, V Metaph., and from St. Thomas in the chapter on relative⁴⁶. Therefore it is false that it belongs to all beings as foundations.

It is said, secondly, that granted that it is founded upon all other genera, it still would not follow all beings as a property convertible with being, as Avicenna said of the one. For from the common principles of being insofar as it is being, as St. Thomas says in the cited place⁴⁷, no sufficient particular being is caused.

If, however, it is pressed that from the argument of St. Thomas it can be had not only that a particular being cannot be caused from the common principles of being, but also that it cannot be caused from several principles of diverse genera, because those would not cause except through something that was common to all those genera; and thus, since relation is founded upon several genera, it follows that it is not caused by them as their accident: — it is answered that from the argument of St. Thomas it is had that some being of one determinate subalternate genus and determinate species, of which sort is unity in the genus of quantity, cannot be an accident caused by several principles of diverse genera as if it were a proper accident of something common to them; but it is not had that one predicament cannot, according to its diverse genera and its diverse species, originate from diverse predicaments.

XVII. To the first argument⁴⁸, the consequence is denied. — To the proof it is said that the agent does not cause a relation in itself through an action terminated at the agent itself, but through an action terminated at the term of the relation: which being posited in act, the relation arises by a natural consequence from the pre-existing foundation. Therefore there is no mutation of the agent there.

2. To the second, the minor premise is denied. — To the proof it is said that such distance is acquired in a mediate instant. And when it is argued to the contrary, first, that in the intermediate time it will be distant without distance, etc.: — the consequence is denied. Because there will not be a first relation of distance to be given, just as there is not a first where, but before any distance there was another, and before that another, and so on to infinity. — When it is argued secondly, because no extended form is acquired in an instant: — it is denied. For some extended heat is acquired in an instant in water, or in some part of water.

But against this response, insofar as it posits that a first distance is not given, but that there is another before any whatever, someone argues: Either that distance is founded in the quantity of the body which through its motion is continuously distant from another; or in the place of the same mobile; or in the where, which is continuously one and another. Not the first: because, the same foundation remaining, a relation cannot be multiplied, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas. — Not the second: because the relation is in the mobile itself; but place is not in the thing located, but in the locating. Now, it is necessary for the foundation and the relation to be in the same thing. — Nor also the third: because where is posterior to predicamental relation; and perhaps it is rather founded upon it than conversely.

It can be answered to this by maintaining the response given, which is that of Capreolus in dist. xxx of the First Book⁴⁹, that such a relation is founded in the where. And thus it is varied at the variation of the wheres themselves. — And when it is urged that where is posterior to predicamental relation: — it is said that local distance is not of the predicament of relation, but of the predicament of where. Nor is it unsuitable for one relation of this predicament to be founded on another of the same predicament: just as it is not unsuitable for one quality to be in a substance through the mediation of another, as science is in the soul through the mediation of the intellect.

Secondly, someone to whom the response of Capreolus was not pleasing could say that this relation is founded upon the quantity of the mobile, but its motion is for it the rationale of founding. And therefore it is always the same distance numerically, and a first distance is given: but because this distance is continuously greater on account of the extensive increase of the motion, therefore a first smallness of this relation is not given, but, any smallness of distance being given, before it there was a greater smallness, and so on to infinity. Therefore it does not follow that in any time a body is distant without distance.

3. To the third, the assumption is denied. — To the proof it is said that it is whole in the whole, and part in the part. — When it is urged that it is either of the same ratio with the whole or not: it is said that it is not of the same ratio. — When it is argued that it has divisibility just as quantity: it is said that two-cubit quantity can be considered in two ways: in one way, in the ratio of continuous quantity, say of a line or a surface; in another way, as it takes on the mode of discrete quantity, as, namely, it is signified by the name two-cubit. What has extension and divisibility from quantity as it has the ratio of the continuous is divided into parts of the same ratio, just as quantity itself is: for a line is divided into lines, and a surface into surfaces; and similarly whiteness, which has divisibility from quantity in this way, is divided into whitenesses. But what has divisibility from quantity as it takes on the mode of the discrete is not divided into parts of the same ratio, because neither is quantity divided in this way: for a two-cubit is not divided into two-cubits. Because therefore duplicity receives division from the continuous insofar as it takes on the ratio of the discrete, therefore it is not necessary that it be divided into parts every one of which is a duplicity: but every one of which is a part of duplicity.

XVIII. Concerning the third saying⁵⁰, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. xxviii, a. 1; I Sent., d. xxxiii⁵¹; and De Potentia, q. vii⁵², that relation differs from other genera of accidents in this: that all other genera, according to their proper rationales, express something inhering in something: for quantity is the measure of substance, and quality the disposition of substance. But relation, according to its proper rationale, expresses only a respect to another: for relative things are said to be those whose being is to be related to another. On account of this St. Thomas says⁵³ that from the fact that relation is posited in God, it does not follow that there is something dependent in God, but only that in God there is some respect, that is, a habitude and order to some term, in which the rationale of relation consists: because, namely, the rationale of relation, according to which it is distinguished from other genera, is to respect and be ordered to something as to a term.

2. But then a twofold doubt occurs. The first is from Aureoli, in Capreolus, dist. XXXIII of the First Book⁵⁴. The proper mode of a predicament of accident does not remove the common mode of accident; rather, it includes it. Therefore the proper mode of relation does not remove the order to a subject.

The second is⁵⁵: it seems an implication of contradiction that there is a real respect in God, and that the relation existing in God does not have dependent being. For a real respect cannot be when the term which it respects does not exist: and thus it seems to be of the rationale of a real respect that it depends on the term.

3. For the evidence of the first doubt, it must be considered that the proper rationale of relation, which is to be toward another, can be taken in two ways. In one way, in general and without limit: insofar, namely, as it absolutely imports being said toward another. In another way, in special and with limit: insofar, namely, as it imports being said toward another from the nature of the thing, or, having a foundation in the thing. Taken in both ways it is the proper rationale of the predicament of relative, but nevertheless in one way and another. For taken absolutely and without limit, it is its proper rationale insofar as the proper rationale of something can be said to be that which belongs to it alone among certain things. For this rationale belongs to the predicament of relative, but does not belong to the other predicaments: and therefore it can be called proper to it in order to the other predicaments, insofar, namely, as relative itself is absolutely, while the others are not relative. But it cannot be called a proper rationale as expressing the ultimate completive of the predicament of relative, or of a predicamental relation. For since it is common both to a real relation which is in the predicament, and to that which is not in the predicament, and also to a relation of reason, it cannot be the ultimate completive of the predicament which is a real accident. — But taken with this limitation, having a foundation in the thing, or, proceeding from the nature of the thing, it is its proper rationale as expressing the ultimate completive of the predicament. For since in its total rationale it is included that it is an accident, and that it is said relatively toward another as toward an opposite from the nature of the thing: insofar as it includes the rationale of accident, it makes relation differ from the predicament of substance; but insofar as it imports an order to another proceeding from the nature of the thing, it makes it ultimately differ from the other predicaments of accidents.

Hence, when St. Thomas says that relation according to the proper rationale of its genus does not express something inhering⁵⁶, it is not understood of its total rationale: because, since that includes the rationale of accident, it is necessary that it express an order to that in which it is. — Nor is it understood of the rationale which ultimately completes the rationale of the predicament: because, since that includes having a foundation in the thing, it must posit something in that of which it is said. — But it is understood of the proper rationale taken in the first way: namely, as it absolutely and without limit expresses an order to another. For since that rationale is common to a real relation and to a relation of reason, it is clear that it abstracts from both; and consequently from that rationale taken absolutely and without limit nothing real is posited in that which is said relatively.

To the doubt therefore it is said, first, that the proper mode of relation, which is to be said toward another absolutely—which is the mode belonging to relation insofar as it is absolutely relation—does not exclude the mode of accident; nor yet does it include it; but it abstracts from the mode of substance and of accident, indeed from real being and from being of reason, just as animal from rational and irrational.

Secondly, it is said that the proper mode ultimately constitutive of the category of relation does not exclude the mode of accident; rather, it expresses a certain determination of it, just as the other categories of accidents do. For it expresses the mode of an accident which is to inhere in a substance by way of referring it to another, founded in the nature of the thing. Nor does St. Thomas hold the opposite of this, as has been shown; rather, it is said here that they have their own proper mode of being according to their proper ratio. But Aureoli argues as if we were saying that relation, according to its proper ratio ultimately completing the category, posits nothing in reality. Which we do not say; but we say that, according to the proper ratio that belongs to it absolutely inasmuch as it is a relation, and not inasmuch as it is a categorial relation, it does not have that it posits something in the reality of which it is predicated.

4. To the second doubt ⁵⁷ it is answered that it is one thing to say that the esse of a relation does not depend on another, and another that the relation itself does not depend on another under the ratio of relation. For it is true that divine paternity, under the ratio of paternity, depends on another, because the Son is included in its ratio, and thus the one can neither be nor be understood without the other. Yet the esse itself of paternity does not depend on the esse of the other, since there is one esse in number of both relatives, which is the esse of the divine essence; for the same esse does not really depend on itself.

When, however, it is said that it is of the ratio of a relation to depend on its term according to esse, it is said that this is true where the relatives have distinct esse, but not where there is one and the same esse of both relatives, as is the case in the divine, where whatever pertains to the ratio of relation is indeed present, namely, order and respect, but the esse of the relation is the esse of the divine essence, which is one.

5. Finally, it must be considered that the imperfection of a created relation consists in this, as is clear from what has been said, that its esse depends on a subject, on a foundation, and on a term. Which belongs to it inasmuch as its esse is accidental, and the last, and distinct from the esse of the substance and from the esse of other accidents. Therefore, where a relation, as it is in God, is the same as the substance whose esse depends on nothing, it follows that such a relation does not have an imperfect esse. And therefore the divine persons, who are distinguished by such relations, derive no imperfection from them.⁵⁸ But because there remains only the order of one to the other, in which is imported only distinction according to opposed respects, which is the minimal distinction, therefore it is also well said to follow that the distinction, or difference,⁵⁹ of the divine persons is minimal.

XIX. To the tenth⁶⁰ he answers and says first that, although God is substantially predicated of the Father and the Son, it does not therefore follow, if there are several persons,⁶¹ that there are several gods: for they are several persons on account of the plurality of subsisting relations; but one God on account of the unity of the subsisting essence. In human beings, however, it does not happen that some are one man, because the essence of humanity is not one in number in both; nor is it subsisting, so as to be a man.

For the evidence of this response, it must be considered that the divine persons are the subsisting relations themselves; which are indeed several on account of the plurality of respects, but not on account of a plurality of esse or of essence, since they are one essence in number, and have one esse. Therefore, just as with their plurality with respect to respects there stands their unity according to essence and according to esse, so with the plurality of persons there stands that the persons themselves are one God. Whence that proposition,⁶² "It is impossible for plurality to be found on the part of the subjects when unity is on the part of the substantial predicate," is false, if taken universally.

Secondly, it must be noted that St. Thomas seems to intend that two things are required for some things to be called one such thing essentially and in the concrete: namely, both that there be one essence in number in them, and that that essence be subsisting, so that the abstract and the concrete are the same. For this reason, speaking of God, he says that the Father and the Son are one God on account of the unity of the subsisting essence. But speaking of man, he says that it does not happen that some are one man, because the essence of humanity is neither one in number in both, nor is it subsisting, so that humanity is a man.

The reason for this is that, since the concrete includes something that the abstract does not include, just as man implicitly includes accidents which humanity does not include; for some things to be called one such thing in the concrete, it is not only required that the essence be one in number in them (granting that it could be one in number without such accidents limiting it), but it is also required that the same accidents be in both. For in order that some should be one man, it would not only be required that they have the same humanity in number, but it would also be necessary that they have the same accidents, by which this man has it that he is this man. Whence, since St. Thomas has as a rule⁶³ that a substantive noun is said singularly or plurally from the unity or plurality of form, by unity of form he understands not only the substance itself of the form, which is one, but also the accidents by which that form is one and individual, where the form is not individual of itself, but is individuated through designated matter. Whence also when he says in the Tertia, q. III, a. 6,⁶⁴ that, if several divine persons were to assume one humanity in number, they would be called one man, he calls one humanity the essence of humanity itself with the accidents by which it becomes this and singular; for otherwise humanity is not one in number.

XX. To the last⁶⁵ St. Thomas answers that, since in God there is unity of essence and distinction of relations, nothing prevents those opposites being found in the one God which follow upon the distinction of relation, such as begetting and begotten, which are relatively opposed; and begotten and unbegotten, which are opposed as affirmation and negation, which opposition is found wherever there is any distinction.

From these things he intends to hold that opposed predicates of God certainly show plurality, but they show a plurality of relations only, and not of essence.

2. Concerning this response a twofold doubt occurs. The first is: if affirmation and negation, which is contradictory opposition, is found wherever there is any distinction, and is therefore found in the divine, it follows that the distinction between the divine persons is greatest, because contradiction is the greatest opposition and the greatest distance, on the ground that the extremes agree in nothing. But St. Thomas said the opposite of this above, saying that the distinction of the divine persons is minimal.⁶⁶

The second doubt is: because St. Thomas here seems to mean that the opposition of affirmation and negation is included in relative opposition. Yet he seems to hold the opposite of this in De Potentia, q. VII, a. 8,⁶⁷ where he intends that negation and affirmation are included in all other oppositions, but not in relative opposition.

3. To the first, it is said that contradiction, if taken formally and precisely as it prescinds from all other opposition, is the greatest opposition, and imports the greatest distance. But if it is taken as it is contracted and limited in another opposition in which it is included, thus it is not the greatest, but is greater or lesser according to the condition of that opposition in which it is included. For every other opposition includes the opposition of affirmation and negation, and adds something above it; but that addition does not increase the opposition, but diminishes it, as St. Thomas says in the Treatise on the Four Opposites.⁶⁸ Therefore, the affirmation and negation that accompany the distinction of the divine persons do not make that distinction greatest, but minimal, because it is not affirmation and negation simpliciter, but limited to relative opposition, which is minimal and requires minimal distinction; for it expresses, for example, paternity and non-paternity, but affirmation in the Father, and negation in the Son.

4. For the evidence of the second doubt, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Book, d. XXVI, q. II, a. 2, that relative opposition differs from the opposition of contrariety and the opposition of privation and habit, because in those one is as perfect and the other is as imperfect, and one includes the privation of the other; but in relation it is not so. For although one relation includes the negation of the other opposed relation in the same supposit, nevertheless that negation does not have the ratio of privation, because privation is only according as something lacks that which ought to be in it; but relation does not posit something in that which is relatively expressed, inasmuch as it is a relation, but expresses toward something, or a respect to a correlative. Therefore the negation included in relation does not negate something in the subject inasmuch as it is such, but only toward something. And on that account it does not have the ratio of privation.

Therefore it is said to the doubt that relative opposition includes the opposition of affirmation and negation, as is said in the First Book, d. V, a. 1,⁶⁹ and is in this place according to the mind of St. Thomas. But it does not include it as importing privation and imperfection in one of the extremes, as other oppositions do. And this is what he meant in the cited place of De Potentia, etc.