Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas showed that there is generation in the divine persons ¹ and that it is to be understood intelligibly ², he now intends to show that there cannot be several Sons in the divine persons ³. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows what was proposed; second, he clarifies the conditions of the divine Word ⁴.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he proves the intended point; second, he resolves certain doubts ⁵.

I. With regard to the first, he lays down this conclusion: There is only one generation in the divine persons, and a single Son alone is begotten by the Father. It is proved. God understands Himself by one simple intuition, since His understanding is His existing. Therefore, the Word of God is only one. Therefore, etc.

He leaves the first consequence manifest, this having been presupposed, namely, that God, by understanding Himself, understands all other things. — But he proves the second consequence: because in the divine persons the generation of the Son is nothing other than the conception of the Word. — The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of John 1.

2. It should be noted that the conclusion can have a twofold sense. The first is that there can be only one Son begotten by the Father: that is, the Father cannot beget anything but a single Son. And the argument can be understood as concluding merely this. For because the Father understands both Himself and all other things by a single act, and not by several intellections, nor can it be otherwise, it follows that He produces only a single Word, and cannot produce another word or another son.

The second sense is that not only can the Father not have several sons, but there cannot even be several sons in such a way, namely, that the Father produces one and the Son another. And to this sense the argument can also be adapted from what is said in De potentia, q. IX, a. 9, ad 1, arguing as follows. If the Son were to produce another Son, it would follow that in the divine persons a word would proceed from the Word. But this is impossible. Therefore, etc. — The impossibility of the consequent is proved. Because for a word to be produced from a word belongs to an intellect that inquires and discourses, but not to one understanding all things by a single intuition. But the divine intellect is not inquisitive, but understands entirely by a single act of understanding. Therefore, etc.

The second sense seems to me to be more in accordance with the mind of St. Thomas: because he does not limit himself to the Father, but speaks of God absolutely.

II. But Scotus argues against the argument in Quodlibet II, q. II ⁶, saying that it seems to proceed from this foundation: Where there can be only a single act of understanding, there can be only a single word, or a single speaking. But this proposition has truth, by reason of the matter, in a created intellect, but not in the divine intellect. Therefore, the argument is null. — The minor is clarified. With respect to the first part indeed, because every understanding in us is expressed through an act of speaking, and through every speaking some understanding is expressed, and through a different speaking a different understanding. Therefore, if there is a single understanding, there is a single speaking. — But with respect to the second part, because not every divine understanding is through some speaking; on the contrary, the paternal understanding is not through any speaking.

Second, in other words he proves that this proposition is not necessary by reason of the form. Because although in one thing there is only one absolute form of the same character, it can nevertheless have several active productions of several terms: just as, although the sun is luminous by one light, it can nevertheless have several acts of illuminating. But understanding is the perfection of the one understanding, and inherent in the operator, and perhaps an absolute form; but speaking is an action productive of a term.

III. To this it can be answered in two ways. First, that this argument is not brought forward by the holy Doctor as demonstrative, but as persuasive, presupposing the truth of faith. For just as it cannot be demonstrated from principles naturally known to us that there are three persons in the divine nature, so neither can it be demonstrated that there cannot be several sons communicating in the numerically same essence. For just as one who denied the plurality of persons in the divine nature would say that nothing is really produced either through the act of the divine intellect or through the act of the will, so one who said that there are several sons would deny that only one word is produced through a single act of understanding when several supposits understand by that one act, as is the case in the divine persons. But although this argument is not demonstrative, nevertheless, once it is presupposed according to faith that it is impossible for there to be several sons in the divine persons, this can be persuaded, according to what appears in our intellect, from the unity of the act of understanding by which the Son is produced, and from the unity of the act of willing by which the Holy Spirit is produced. And therefore it is said in reply to Scotus that this proposition assumed by St. Thomas was by no means assumed by him as necessary in the divine persons, but as true, presupposing faith. Hence it would not be necessary to assume it as necessary against those attacking this conclusion, so that the conclusion, which is of faith, would thus be demonstrated.

Second, it can be answered, maintaining that St. Thomas's argument is brought forward as necessary, that indeed the argument itself proceeds from that proposition, and that that proposition is formally true, and holds truth in every intellect. For since the word is the formal and intrinsic term of the act of understanding, as that by which the thing understood through the act of understanding is understood, if there is a single act of understanding, it is necessary that there be a single word there; because of one thing there is only one intrinsic term on one side.

2. But when it is objected that it does not hold truth in the divine intellect, because not every divine understanding is through some speaking, it is answered that this proposition can have a twofold sense. The first is that not every act of understanding by which God understands, taken according to itself and according to its entity, is a speaking, or a production of the Word. And then it is false. For since the act by which all the divine persons understand is single, and the divine Word is produced through that entity which is the act of understanding, formally taken, it is necessary that all divine understanding be a speaking, if it is taken according to itself.

Another sense can be that not every divine understanding, according as it is compared to each person as the act by which that person understands, is a speaking; or, according to Scotus's way of speaking, not every understanding is expressed through some speaking. And then the proposition is true; and St. Thomas concedes it in De veritate, q. IV, a. 2, ad 5 ⁷ and Prima Pars, q. XXXIV, a. 1, ad 3, holding that the divine understanding, according as it is in the Son, is not a speaking. For in this way only the paternal understanding is a speaking, because according as it is in the Father, it is conjoined with the relation of the producer to the Word itself, but not according as it is in the Son or the Holy Spirit. Hence what Scotus says is false, that the paternal understanding is not through some speaking, unless perhaps he intended that it is not through the speaking of any other person.

Therefore, St. Thomas's argument is founded upon this proposition, "Every divine understanding is a speaking," in the first sense, but not in the second sense, in which Scotus's proposition is true. For understanding is taken for the very act of the divine intellect taken according to itself and its proper entity, but not according as it is compared to each person. Therefore, the argument remains in its strength.

IV. In the second place, St. Thomas resolves certain doubts ⁸. The first is: The Word understands Himself. Therefore, another word is attributed to the Word. And thus there will be a word of the Word, and a son of the Son. — The antecedent is proved. Because, since the Word is true God, it is necessary that all things that belong to God belong to the Word. But God of necessity understands Himself. — But the consequence is proved. Because from the fact that God understands Himself, a Word begotten by Him is posited.

He answers, however, and says first, regarding the foundation of the argument, that although the Word is God, He is not, however, another God from the God whose Word He is. And similarly, it is not another intellect; and consequently, not another understanding; and thus, neither is it another word.

He says second, that the consequence is false, nor does it follow that He is the word of Himself, according as the Word understands Himself. Because the Word is distinguished from the one speaking in this alone, that He is from Him. And therefore all other things are to be attributed in common to God speaking and to the Word; but this alone, that the Word is from Him, is to be ascribed properly to the Father; while this, namely, to be from God speaking, is to be attributed properly to the Son.

2. For the clarity of this answer, it should be considered that the answer rests on this, that if the Word were another God from God speaking, it would indeed follow that the Word, understanding Himself, would produce another word: because just as He would have a numerically different deity, so He would have a different intellect and a different understanding, and consequently a different word; since every understanding, taken according to itself, is terminated at some word produced by it. But because the Word, although He is true God, is not, however, another God from God speaking, but has a numerically single deity with Him, distinct from the one speaking by this alone, that He proceeds from Him; the intellect by which the Word understands is not different from the intellect by which God speaking understands, just as neither is His deity different; and consequently the understanding of the Word is not other than the very understanding of the one speaking the Word; and thus also there is not another word than the very Word produced by God speaking, because of one understanding there is only one conception and a single word. Therefore, this consequence is not valid: From the fact that God understands Himself, a Word begotten by Him is posited in God. Therefore, to the Word also, inasmuch as He understands Himself, another word is attributed. But it rightly follows: Therefore, to the Word, inasmuch as He understands Himself, either another word is attributed (which would indeed belong to Him if He understood through another understanding), or He Himself is the Word produced through the act of the divine intellect. Just as it does not follow: The Word understands Himself. Therefore, an understanding different from that by which He was produced belongs to Him; but it rightly follows: Therefore, there belongs to Him either another understanding, or the very understanding by which He was produced.

It should also be considered that from his answer St. Thomas gives us to understand that this assumed proposition, "All things that belong to God speaking must belong to the Word of God," holds truth concerning all things except the relations by which they are opposed to each other.

V. The second argument that could be made is: If the Son could not beget another son, while the Father begets a Son, it would follow that He is impotent.

St. Thomas answers that that does not follow: because the power of the Father and of the Son is the same, just as the divinity is the same. Hence, since the power to beget in God is like the power to understand Himself; but this is only one in God, from which it is both that the Word is conceived and that the one speaking conceives the Word: similarly, from the same power it is both that the Father begets and that the Son is begotten. And thus the Father has no power that the Son does not have; but the Father has the generative power to beget, while the Son has it to be begotten, which are evident from what has been said to differ by relation alone ⁹.

This answer rests on this, that this consequence is not valid: The Father can beget, but not the Son. Therefore, the Son is impotent, or less powerful than the Father. Because, since someone is called impotent because he lacks power, and less powerful in whom there is less power, the Son cannot be called impotent or less powerful than the Father, since He has the numerically same power that the Father has. But it rightly follows: Therefore, the Son does not have power with that relation which the Father has: for the Father has power with the relation of the producer, or of Him from whom He is; and the Son has the same power with the relation of the one produced, and of Him who is from another.

2. If it is objected: The Father has the power of begetting, but the Son does not. Therefore, the Father has some power that the Son does not have: — it is answered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Prima Pars, q. XLII, a. 6, ad 3, and I Sent., d. XX, a. 1, also De potentia, q. II, a. 5, that this consequence is false. Because the power of begetting expresses something absolute along with the relation that is in the Father, whereas "some power" expresses something absolute without such a relation. Now, it is not valid: In the Son there is not power with such a relation. Therefore, in Him there is not power; just as it is not valid: In the Son there is not deity with the relation of paternity. Therefore, in Him there is not deity.

It is said nevertheless to the antecedent that although in the Son there is not the power of begetting actively, there is nevertheless in Him the power of begetting passively, that is, that He may be begotten; and similarly, impersonally, that is, by which something is begotten by some person.

Now, the reason for this is what St. Thomas touches upon here: because, since the power of begetting as to the absolute that it expresses is nothing other than the divine intellect, on the ground that generation in the divine persons is the intelligible conception of the word; and the divine intellect is numerically one in the Father and the Son, just as there is also one deity, but in the Father with a relation by way of an agent, while in the Son with a relation by way of one produced: the power of begetting actively, that is, to beget, is in the Father; but passively, that is, to be begotten, is in the Son; — that is, the intellect with one relation is in the Father, but with the opposite relation is in the Son, just as also to beget and to be begotten are distinguished by relation alone, for to beget implies the relation of the producer, while to be begotten implies the relation of the one produced.

3. It should be noted, however, from the teaching of St. Thomas in De potentia, q. IX, a. 9, ad 4, that although an operation passing over into external matter requires one principle in the agent, through which it is an agent, and another principle in the patient, through which it is a patient; nevertheless in an immanent operation only one principle of operation is required: because, namely, the productive and receptive principle is the same; for the intellect, which produces intellection and the word, also receives these in itself. Hence, since generation in creatures is a transient action, but in the divine persons an immanent operation in the intellect, in creatures there must be one active power in the begetter and another passive power in the begotten; but in the divine persons there need not be one active power in the Father and another passive power in the Son, but the intellect itself is a quasi-active power in the Father and a quasi-passive power in the Son.

VI. The third doubt ¹⁰ is: Concerning the Son the Apostle says in Heb. 1, upholding all things by the word of his power. Therefore, there is a word of the Word, and a son of the Son.

St. Thomas answers that, just as the name of wisdom is also used of the conception of wisdom, and of the exterior effect proceeding from the conception of wisdom, in the way that an effect assumes for itself the name of the cause; so also that which is effected from the Word has received the name of word; just as also in us the expression of the interior word by voice is called a word. Hence the unfolding of the divine concept through exterior works, that is, the very exterior works unfolding and manifesting the divine concept, is called the word of the Word. And thus it must be understood that the Son upholds all things by the word of His power, just as also that passage of the Psalm, Fire, hail, etc.: because, namely, the effects of the divine conception are unfolded in things through the powers of creatures.

It should be noted that this response aims at this: that by the word by which the Son is said to uphold all things, there is not understood a conception of the intellect produced by the Son in His intellect, but there is understood the power of a creature expressed by the power of the divine Word. Therefore it does not follow that there is a son of the Son.

In his commentary on the Epistles of Paul, however, ¹¹ St. Thomas gives another exposition, in conformity with Augustine's exposition on that passage of John 12 ¹², The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him: that is, I, who am the Word of the Father, will judge him. And by the name of the Word he takes the conception of the divine intellect, not indeed produced by the Word, but which is the very Word produced by the Father. And the sense is that the Son sustains all things in being and operating by Himself, who is the powerful Word.

VII. As to the second main part, he sets down the conditions of this single divine Word ¹³. The first condition is ¹⁴ that the Word conceived by God is one and the same Word ¹⁵ of all things, yet not in the same manner of God and of other things.

The first part is shown, because God, by understanding Himself, understands all other things.

With regard to the second part: because It is the Word of God as proceeding from Him; but of other things not as proceeding from them, but as the perfect ratio of all things, through which He produced things into being. For inasmuch as God produced things into being not by natural necessity, but as it were through intellect and will, He made all things through His Word, which is the ratio of the things made through Him, according to that text of John 1, All things were made by him. With which also accords Moses's manner of speaking in the creation of things, when he says, God said, Let there be light, and there was light, and so concerning the rest; and when it is said in the Psalm, He spoke and they were made: for the sense is that God produces the Word, through which He produced things into being, as through their perfect ratio.

2. For the clarity of this, it should be considered that it belongs to the ratio of a word of the intellect to be representative by way of an intrinsic object of that thing which is understood. For we do not posit a word in the intellect except that it may represent the object to the intellect in intelligible being by an actual and expressed representation, terminating the act of the intellect: just as a species is posited in order that it may represent the object habitually, and constitute the intellect in first act. Therefore, it is necessary that one word be representative of all things that are understood together by the one act of understanding by which such a word is produced. Wherefore St. Thomas very well infers, from the fact that God, by understanding Himself, understands all other things, that there is one and the same Word of God and of all things.

But because practical and speculative science differ in that practical science is not only cognoscitive, but also operative of things, whereas speculative science is cognoscitive only: therefore, the word, inasmuch as it terminates speculative cognition, has only the relation of a representative to the thing understood; but as it terminates practical cognition, it has to the thing understood not only the relation of a representative, but also the relation of an operative principle, by way of a ratio of making. Therefore, St. Thomas well says that the divine Word is the perfect ratio of all things that have been made, through which God produced things into being.

Again, another difference of the word in science and cognition must be considered. For when science is caused by things, as our science is, the word itself is not only caused and produced by the intellect, but also by the thing that is understood, inasmuch as the likeness existing in the intellect, which is caused by things, concurs in the production of the word by way of a form. But when science is not caused by the things understood, as divine science is, the word indeed proceeds from the intellect of the one understanding, but not from the thing understood; rather, the thing understood proceeds from it. Wherefore St. Thomas well says that the Word of God is indeed of God Himself as proceeding from Him: — understand, not only as from the one understanding, but also as from the intelligible object, inasmuch as God is the thing understood and the form by which His intellect understands — but of other things It is not the word as proceeding from them, since God's science is not caused by things; but rather It is the cause of things, although It is produced by that which has the character of an intelligible form of all things.

3. It should be considered second, that from the diverse manner of the divine Word's relation to God speaking and to other things, it is obtained that "Word" is said personally only in the divine persons. This is what St. Thomas held determinately in the Prima Pars, q. XXXIV, a. 1: although he seems to have held the opposite, following the opinions of others, in I Sent., d. XXVII ¹⁶. For since the Word is posited as the Word of God in such a way that It proceeds from Him by a real procession, and not according to reason only; and that which signifies something proceeding really from another is said personally only: it is necessary that "Word" be said personally only.

Although it could also be said, according to the mind of St. Thomas, De Verit., q. 4, a. 2, that since two things belong to the word of our intellect—namely, that it is understood, and that it is expressed by the one understanding and really produced by him through the act of understanding—Word can be taken in two ways in divinity. In one way properly, namely with respect to all that belongs to the ratio of a word in us: and thus it is said personally only, for the reason stated. In another way commonly, namely with respect to the ratio of what is understood only: and thus it can be said essentially, because in saying understood as such, a real procession from another is not imported. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas says in the same place and in I Sent., where cited above, because all the holy doctors use the name Word in divinity as it is said personally, it is rather to be said that it is spoken personally, because names are to be used as the majority use them.¹⁷

4. It should also be noted that since a word imports a relation to that of which it is the word, as representative of it, or even productive, if it is productive of the thing understood; and the Word of God is also the Word of all things understood by God: it is necessary to say that the Word in divinity imports not only a relation to the one speaking, from whom it proceeds, but also a relation to the creature, of which it is representative and productive; but its relation to the one speaking is real, whereas to the creature it is of reason. And this is according to the mind of St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 34, a. 3; and De Verit., in the same question, a. 5. Which indeed is not to be understood as if the Word, by personal property, expresses a relation to creatures, as Aureoli seems to have held, in Capreolus, First Book, d. 27;¹⁸—for this is not true: for by personal property it expresses only a relation to the one speaking, from whom it is personally distinguished by its property—but because, along with the personal relation to the one speaking, it also imports a relation to the creature as to the thing spoken.

VIII. Concerning the aforesaid, however, a threefold doubt occurs. The first is: whether the Word of God is so also the Word of all creatures that, just as it proceeds from the knowledge of the divine essence, so it also proceeds from the knowledge of the creature?

The second is:¹⁹ whether the name Word, which was said to import a relation to the one speaking and to the thing spoken, formally signifies a relation, like this name Son? or whether it signifies an absolute first, and secondarily a relation as a connotate?

The third is:²⁰ because St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 27,²¹ seems to hold that the Word does not always express a relation to the creature.

IX. To the first, St. Thomas seems to mean that the Word of God proceeds from God not only from the knowledge of the divine essence, but also from the knowledge of creatures. For in this place, and in the Prima Pars, in the cited place,²² he assigns the reason why there is only one Word, and why there is one and the same Word of God and of creatures: because, in understanding Himself, He understands all other things; as if it must be that, just as there is one cognition of God and of all other things in God, so the Word is one, as being adequate to the divine cognition. More clearly, however, this is shown in the Prima Pars, in the same question, a. 1, ad 3, where St. Thomas says that the Father, in understanding Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and all other things contained in His knowledge, conceives the Word, so that thus the whole Trinity is spoken by the Word, and also every creature.

I do not, however, understand this as though, according to reason, God the Father understands whatever naturally shines forth in the divine essence prior to producing the Word, in such a way that His actual intellection is terminated to the known thing beforehand. For, in St. Thomas, a word is posited in the intellect to the end that the intellect may be borne toward the thing understood: since through the word itself the thing understood is in complete act with respect to intelligible and objective being. And therefore the very understanding, so as to be terminated to the thing understood, is not prior to the production of the word, otherwise there would be no necessity of positing a word for the sake of intellection; but on the contrary, one must understand that the act of understanding produces the word prior to being terminated to the thing understood as it is in itself, as ultimately terminating the intellection; for the word is that in which the thing understood is seen.

The words and intention of St. Thomas seem to be taken in this sense: namely, that God, by the same act of understanding by which He understands both Himself and all other things, conceives the Word, in which He gazes upon both Himself and all other things; so that first, according to our mode of understanding, the act of the divine intellect is terminated to the Word as its production, before it is terminated to the divine essence and to creatures as to things understood. And therefore, when the divine Word is said to originate from the knowledge of the Father, it is to be understood either by taking the knowledge of the Father after the manner of first act, but not after the manner of second act; or also by taking the second act itself, which is cognition, in this sense: that it proceeds from that cognition by which God the Father knows both Himself and other things, which cognition indeed is terminated according to reason to the Word itself, as to the term produced through it, prior to being terminated to Himself and to creatures as to things understood.

2. Nor do the objections of Scotus, in II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2,²³ by which he proves that the Word does not proceed as the Word of the divine essence and of every intelligible, stand in the way of this determination. For when he argues first that, by like reason, the Holy Spirit would be spirated as the love of God and of every understood lovable thing:—it is said first, that there is no absurdity in the Holy Spirit being spirated as the love of God and the love of every thing loved by God, in the sense expressed above: namely, because by that act by which God loves both Himself and every lovable thing, the Holy Spirit is produced, according as He loves every creature in Himself, as contained in the divine goodness. Yet not in such a way that, just as He loves Himself necessarily and absolutely, so also He necessarily loves every creature: just as by the same act one is borne toward the end and toward that which he wills on account of the end, yet he is not borne toward both with the same necessity, when the end can be had without that which one wills on account of the end.

It is said secondly, that the case is not the same with love and with the Word. Because divine understanding arises from the fact that the thing is in the divine intellect according to its likeness, inasmuch as the divine essence is the natural likeness of all quiddities. For from this it follows that God naturally understands every created quiddity, speaking of the knowledge of simple intelligence; and consequently that the Word naturally proceeding from Him is from the knowledge not only of God, but also of creatures, with respect to their quiddities. But willing is through the fact that the will is inclined toward the willed. And therefore, since the will is borne not naturally, but freely, toward the being of creatures according as they are in themselves, divine love naturally proceeding from God, as such, does not have it that it is the love of creatures, but only the love of God: although, in reality, by the same love God is borne toward Himself and toward the creature.

3. When he argues secondly, because it would follow that the Word proceeds from Himself as known to the Father:—it is said, if it be understood in this way, that the Word proceeds from the very knowledge by which the Father knows the Word, or even from the Word habitually known, inasmuch as the divine essence stands as the intelligible species of every thing understood, that this is no more absurd than that God by the same act understands Himself and His Word: since by that act He conceives the Word, and the divine essence of both is, as it were, habitual cognition. Hence it was said above according to the mind of St. Thomas²⁴ that the Father, in understanding Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, conceives the Word.—If, however, it be understood that the knowledge of the Father is terminated to the Word as to the known, and then from the Word itself as known proceeds the Word itself: the consequence is denied; because we do not say that the Word proceeds in this sense as the Word of every intelligible, as was clear.

4. When he argues thirdly, because then there would be a real relation of God to the creature, since the begotten is really related to that from which it is begotten:—it is evident that the consequence is null. Because we do not say that the Word originates from the known itself as if the thing were known before the Word, in which it is seen, originates: but because by that act by which God knows Himself and the Word and the creature, He produces the Word itself, in which everything known by Him shines forth objectively and terminatively, just as in His essence all things shine forth as in first act, according as it is considered after the manner of an intelligible species.

X. To the second doubt,²⁵ it seems to me that what St. Thomas holds in Quaest. de Verit., in the cited question, a. 5,²⁶ and in I Sent., where cited above,²⁷ should be maintained: namely, that the Word, since it is begotten knowledge, expresses an absolute and a relation; and that it principally expresses an absolute, but secondarily a relation to the one speaking and to those things which are expressed by the Word; of which the relation to the one speaking is real, while the relation of the expressive to the things spoken is a relation of reason. I am moved because a word in us seems to signify principally an absolute, just as knowledge does: since it signifies a conception of the intellect, as St. Thomas posits in countless places. Hence, since from those things that are found in our intellect we use the name Word in divinity, it seems that it signifies the same in God as in our intellect, preserving the difference that must deservedly be posited between divine and human things.

Nor do the words of St. Thomas in the Prima Pars, in the cited question,²⁸ a. 3, ad 4, on which some base the contrary opinion, stand in the way, when he says that the name Word was principally imposed to signify a relation to the one speaking. For it is manifest to anyone considering that response that St. Thomas does not say that by comparing the relation to the one speaking imported by the name Word to the absolute that is imported by the same name, but to the relation which it imports to the creatures represented through the Word. For he means that, although together with the absolute which is primarily signified by the name Word, there is imported a relation to the one speaking and a relation to the things spoken by the Word; nevertheless, that relation which is to the one speaking is imported prior to the relation which is to the creatures spoken and produced by the divine Word, and therefore it is not said plurally in divinity, so as to say many Words; like the name idea, which, together with the absolute that it imports, was principally imposed to signify a relation to the creature, not however a relation to God the producer, and therefore is said plurally, because relations to the creature are multiplied according to the multiplication of the relations of creatures to God.

Nor does it stand in the way that it will not be a personal name. For it is said that for the ratio of a personal name it suffices that it import a relation of origin of one person to another, whether it imports it in its primary significate or in its secondary: as is clear concerning the name mission, in St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 2.

2. If, however, it be further urged that St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 29, a. 4, holds that by the name of a divine person a subsisting relation is formally signified, and thus it seems that a personal name primarily and principally signifies a relation:—it is said that, although by this name divine person a subsisting relation is imported, it is not necessary, however, that every personal name principally import a relation, but it suffices that it import a personal relation whether primarily or secondarily: just as this name God begotten is a personal name, and yet it does not primarily express a relation, but the essence in the concrete, and secondarily a relation as the personal property of the supposit.

3. If it also be urged that it will follow that by the name Word a relation to the creature is imported more principally and prior: because, if it principally imports an absolute, it follows that it principally imports that relation which accompanies the absolute; but such is the relation of the Word to the creature, since it does not belong to the Word by reason of a personal property. This, however, is against what St. Thomas holds in the cited place:²⁹—it is said first, that not every essential in divinity precedes the notional or personal according to the mode of understanding, but only that essential which is said absolutely: for wise, good, just, and the like, are understood prior to notionals; not however to create, to be Lord, and the like, which import an actual relation to the creature. And therefore, although by the name Word the essence, which is something absolute, is primarily imported, it does not follow, however, that the relation to the creature is imported prior to the personal relation.

It is said secondly that, even granting that that essential relation were prior to the personal relation, it would not be necessary, however, that it be imported prior by the name Word. For a name can be imposed to signify more principally that which is posterior, and secondarily that which is prior: just as the concrete of an accident is imposed principally to signify the accident, and secondarily imports the substance, although the accident is posterior to the substance. And thus the name Word can more principally signify the essence with a personal relation, and secondarily signify an essential relation.

4. Nor does it stand in the way that St. Thomas in the Prima Pars, in the aforementioned question,³⁰ a. 2, says that Word signifies a certain emanation of the intellect; and that emanation is the personal property of the Son.—For it is said that the Word is called an emanation terminatively, not however formally. And the sense is that the Word is something emanating through the intellect, just as when in this place³¹ he says that a word is sometimes called the unfolding of the divine concept through exterior works, just as the unfolding of divine wisdom through a work is called wisdom. For it is evident that he does not intend that the unfolding itself taken formally is called Word or wisdom, but that the work itself unfolding and manifesting the Word receives the name of word, and the work by which divine wisdom is manifested is also called wisdom. For he gives this sense to be understood while he says in the same place that the exterior effect proceeding from the conception of wisdom can be called wisdom, after the manner in which an effect takes to itself the name of the cause; and that that which is effected by the Word receives the name of word.

For other matters belonging to this subject, see Capreolus, in I Sent., dist. 27.³²

XI. To the third³³ it can first be answered, as Capreolus³⁴ and other Thomists say, that what St. Thomas said in I Sent., he retracted in the Prima Pars.

Secondly, it can be answered, according to what is said in De Verit., q. 4, a. 5,³⁵ that he does not intend in I Sent. that the Word in no way expresses a relation to creatures: but that it does not express it primarily and principally, but only secondarily and consequently; just as God primarily and principally understands Himself, but secondarily and consequently the creature, namely according to our mode of understanding. And this same thing is intended in the Prima Pars and in this place.

Thirdly, it can be answered that we can speak of the name of the divine Word in two ways: in one way, with respect to its total significate absolutely; in another way, with respect to the partial apprehension of its significate by our intellect. In the first way, it always imports a relation to the creature: because God by His Word speaks Himself and every creature. And thus St. Thomas speaks in the Prima Pars.—In the second way, it is not necessary that it always express a relation to the creature: because we can consider the divine Word precisely as by it God speaks Himself, and then it is not considered with a relation to the creature. And in this sense he spoke in I Sent., as is clear to anyone considering his words in that place. And it is similar to asking whether by the name of divine knowledge a relation to the creature is imported. For it will be said that, taking the name of divine knowledge according to its total significate, a relation to the creature is indeed connoted: because God by His knowledge knows not only Himself, but also the creature. If, however, we consider divine knowledge partially, namely with respect to this alone, that through it God knows Himself, it is evident that, as such, it does not connote any relation to the creature.

XII. The second condition of the divine Word is³⁶ that through it all things are conserved in being. It is proved. Because the cause of their conservation and of their production is the same. But through the Word all things were made.—It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; and Heb. 1: Upholding all things, etc.

Concerning this proposition, The cause of the conservation of things and of their production is the same, it is doubted: because the builder is the cause of the house; and yet he is not the cause of its conservation, since, when his operation ceases, it remains.

It is answered first, that St. Thomas is not speaking of the particular cause of any thing, but of the universal productive cause of all things, such as God and the divine Word are.

Secondly, that even in particular causes it holds true when something is the cause of the production of something with respect to its being, as the sun is the cause of light in the air, because the being of light in the air cannot be continued without the action of the sun: but not when it is a cause with respect to becoming only. The builder, however, is the cause of the house with respect to becoming only, not however with respect to being.

XIII. The third condition of the Word is that not only is something done through it, but it also acts. To prove this, St. Thomas premises that the Word differs from the exemplar of the artifact which is in the mind of the craftsman in this: that it is subsisting, while that is not. And therefore it does not properly belong to that exemplar to act, but to be acted through: since to act belongs to a subsisting thing. But to the Word it belongs to act. From which it is argued thus: The divine Word, which is the exemplar of the things made by God, is God subsisting. Therefore not only is something done through it, but it also acts.—It is confirmed by the authority of Prov. 8: I was with Him forming all things; and John 5: My Father works, and I work.

XIV. The fourth condition is that the things made by God pre-existed in Him immaterially and without composition, and are nothing other in Him than the Word itself, which is life. It is proved, having premised another conclusion, namely that in the Word all things that were made pre-existed even before they were in their own nature. Which is proved: because a thing made through intellect pre-exists in the concept of the intellect, namely as in its exemplar, even before it is in itself; but the Word of God is the exemplar of all those things which were made by God. Then thus: The mode of the Word of God is that it is one, simple, immaterial, not only living, but even life: since it is its own being. Therefore etc.—The consequence is proved. Because what is in something is in it after the mode of that in which it is, and not after its own mode.—It is confirmed by the authority of John 1: What was made was life in Him.

2. It should be noted concerning the premise assumed for the proof of the consequence, that it is not to be understood as if absolutely nothing is in another according to its own mode:—for there are many things that have the same mode in themselves and in another: namely because their own mode is also the mode of those things in which they are; as the material exemplar and the exemplificate, in which the form is according to the same mode of being—but because it is necessary that what is in something either as form in a subject, or as effect in a cause, or as known in the knower, be in it according to the mode of that thing, but it is not necessary that it be in it according to its own mode; just as we see that material things are in the intellect immaterially, and that heat is in the sun not formally as in fire, but according to a certain eminence.—Although it could also be said that a thing is never in another in the stated modes according to its own mode, that is, according to its own being by which it subsists in itself: because in another it does not have its own being, which being belongs to it according to nature, but has a being suitable to that in which it is.—This matter, namely how all things are life in God, St. Thomas treats in Prima Pars, q. 18, a. 4; and De Verit., q. 4, a. 8.

3. It must be noted further that, since something is in another according to the mode of that other, one must see whether the recipient is naturally apt to receive that thing according to some being distinct from its own proper being, or not. For if it is naturally apt to receive it according to another being, that which is received in it will indeed have a mode of being conformed to the mode of the recipient, yet it will not be the same as it: just as a material thing is indeed received in the intellect immaterially, according as the intellect requires, yet it is not the intellect itself. If, however, it is not naturally apt to have something in itself according to another being, not only does that which is in it have the same mode of being that it itself has, but it is also that very thing, just as when an effect is in its cause; for the effect as it is in the cause is not distinguished from the cause itself, but is the cause itself or its power. Therefore, because nothing extraneous or distinct in being can supervene upon the divine Word, because it is God, and whatever is in God is God Himself, it is necessary that everything that is in the Word be the Word itself; and consequently, if the Word is life, it is necessary that what is in it be life.

XV. The fifth condition is: Through the Word of God all intellectual knowledge is caused. It is proved. All intellectual knowledge is derived from the divine intellect, the conception (ratio) of which is the Word. Therefore, etc.

The consequence is proved. For he who teaches another causes knowledge in him through the conception (ratio) which he has in himself, since the knowledge of the disciple is derived from the knowledge of the teacher, as a kind of image of it. — It is confirmed by the authority of John saying, The life was the light of men: because, namely, the Word itself, which is life, manifests the truth to the minds of men as a kind of light.

It must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 117, a. 1, that although both God and man cause knowledge in another, this nevertheless happens differently. For man, directed through his own knowledge as through an exemplar, causes knowledge in another, not indeed by imprinting knowledge itself, nor by causing the intelligible light or intellectual species in the disciple, but only by proposing to him certain less universal propositions which the disciple can judge from things naturally known beforehand; or by proposing to him certain sensible examples, or the order of principles to conclusions, from which the intellect of the learner is guided into the knowledge of the unknown truth. Hence the teaching man is not the principal agent, but is like one assisting the principal agent, namely, the intellect of the learner: just as the physician also is not the principal cause of health, but one assisting nature by applying food and medicines, by which nature is aided toward the intended end. — God, however, beyond these things, is also the cause of the intellectual light and of the natural knowledge of first principles. Hence He is the principal cause of knowledge in us, and not merely an assisting cause.

Moreover, because someone could object that the Word of God is not the cause of knowledge in men as a kind of light that manifests the truth, because not all men attain to the knowledge of truth, but some are in darkness: — St. Thomas removes this, saying that this is not from a defect of the Word, but from the defect of men, who do not turn to the Word, nor are able to grasp it fully: just as, when the light of the bodily sun is diffused throughout the world, darkness exists only for him who has his eyes closed or weak. Hence greater or lesser darkness remains in men according as they turn more or less to the Word and grasp it. Now to signify this, John subjoined to the aforesaid words that the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.