Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Having set forth the arguments by which divine generation can be assailed, St. Thomas proceeds to the determination of the truth¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he explains the mode of generation in the divine; second, he shows that there is only one generation there, and one Son, in chapter xiii.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows what was proposed; second, he clarifies something that he had presupposed, in chapter xii.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that divine generation is to be understood according to an intellectual emanation; second, he clarifies how this is, at the words, Now this can be made clear as follows².

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that the mode of intelligible emanation is distinct from other emanations; second, it is shown that even in intelligible nature itself there are distinct modes of emanation, at the words, But even in the intelligible³.

I. As to the first, he says that the principle of our intention—namely, that by which we intend to show that the truth of the faith concerning the generation of the Son cannot be overcome by reason—must be taken from this: that according to the diversity of natures, a diverse mode of emanation is found in things; and the higher a nature is, the more intimate is that which emanates from it.

This is made clear by running through all the grades of nature. For in inanimate things, which hold the lowest place in things, emanations cannot occur except through the action of one of them upon something else: as is evident when fire is generated from fire. — In plants, in which is the first grade of life, since they move themselves to act, the emanation already proceeds from within: inasmuch as the plant's internal moisture is converted into seed, which, committed to the earth, grows into a plant. But that which emanates is finally found to be wholly extrinsic: for the moisture going forth from the tree becomes a blossom, then becomes fruit, which, when perfected, is entirely separated from the tree, and falling into the earth, by seminal power produces another plant. Yet it is clear that the principle of this emanation is taken from without: because the moisture itself is taken up from the earth through the roots. — But in a further grade of life, which is according to the sensitive soul, proper emanation indeed begins from without, namely from a sensible object impressing its form upon the external senses; but it terminates within. And the further the emanation proceeds, the more it arrives at what is intimate: for from the external senses the sensible form proceeds into the imagination, and further into the storehouse of memory. But in any process of this emanation, the principle and the term belong to diverse things: since the sensitive power is not reflected upon itself. — But in the supreme and perfect grade of life, which is according to the intellect, the intellect is reflected upon itself, and can understand itself. — From these things it is clear that the mode of emanation in intellectual nature is other than the mode of emanation in other natures.

II. But concerning the things that have been said, a twofold doubt arises. The first is⁴, because it does not seem, from what was said, that sensitive emanation should be numbered among vital emanations. For emanation in living things is said to be from within, according as the living thing acts upon itself or upon something internal by producing something. For from this it was shown that emanation in plants, to which the first grade of life belongs, is from within: because the plants themselves move the internal moisture, converting it into seed, from which another plant arises. But in sensitive emanation there is no process from within, but from without, as is said here. Therefore etc.

The doubt is increased. Because if sensitive emanation is a vital emanation for the reason that, although it begins from without, it nevertheless terminates within; it follows that the emanation of inanimate things will also be vital. For when fire emanates from fire, the principle of this emanation is external, namely the generating fire; but the term is internal, namely the form of the generated fire, which is in the matter itself that is transmuted, just as the form caused by the sensible thing is in the sense itself which is immuted.

III. The second doubt is⁵, because it does not seem to be appropriately adduced as the reason why in the process of sensitive emanation the principle and the term belong to diverse things, that namely the sensitive power is not reflected upon itself. For it is clear that here the discussion is about that emanation by which the sensible form emanates from the extrinsic thing itself into the sensitive soul. But to this it matters nothing whether the sensitive power is reflected upon itself or not: because even if it were reflected upon itself, it would be the same. Just as it is evident that the intellect is reflected upon itself; and yet the principle of that emanation by which the intelligible form emanates from an extrinsic thing into the intellect, and the term, belong to diverse things.

If it is said that here the discussion is about sensitive emanation, not as that by which the sensible species is received, but as that by which the act of sensing is produced: because, since the action of the sense terminates not in the sense itself but in the extrinsic sensible, the principle and the term belong to diverse things, which would not be the case if the sense sensed itself: — this does not seem to be true. Because through the act of sensing, especially through the act of the external sense, nothing is produced in the sense itself: but here we are speaking of the act by which one thing emanates and is produced from another.

IV. One can respond to these things in two ways⁶. For the first way, it must first be considered that, when we say that living things are moved by themselves, we do not understand that they are so the principle of the motion by which they are moved to themselves as if their motion in no way had its origin from some extrinsic principle: since in Phys. VIII⁷ Aristotle shows that the motion in animals by which they are moved by themselves has its beginning from some extrinsic motion. Rather, we understand that they are to themselves the immediate elicitive principle of such a motion existing in themselves: although something extrinsic concurs toward that motion, as a remote principle. But this belongs even to animals: for of this action which is to sense, according to which sensitive things, as such, are said to move themselves, the immediate and proximate elicitive principle is the sensitive power itself actuated by the sensible species; but the remote principle is the sensible object itself, impressing its form upon the sense. Hence it is denied that sensitive emanation, namely sensing itself, is not from an internal principle proximately. For St. Thomas does not say this, but that it begins from without: namely as from a remote principle; from which, I say, the sense receives the form by which it causes its operation in itself. — And in this sense, so that we may also explain this in passing, what St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. xxvii, a. 5, is to be understood: that sensing is not entirely removed from the genus of actions that are directed to what is without, because sensing is perfected through the action of the sensible upon the sense. For because the sensible is according to its being extrinsic to the sense; and its action upon the sense must naturally precede sensing itself, which is the action of the sense; from which the sensible object has that it is the remote principle of the act of sensing through the transient action by which it acts upon the sense: therefore sensing is said not to be entirely foreign to the genus of actions that are directed to what is without. — But this does not belong to intellection. Because although some understanding—namely ours—has its origin in some way from the action of the sensible upon the sense, this nevertheless does not belong to intellection according to its whole genus, as it does to sensation: for neither angelic intellection nor divine intellection is caused by sensible things.

2. This can also be understood in another and better way. For it is one thing for an operation to be perfected through the action of the sensible upon the sense, and another to depend on and originate from that action. For for the second it suffices that the action of the sensible upon the sense precede the operation of the sense, and have caused its proximate principle; but for the first it is required that both be simultaneous, and one necessarily accompany the other. It is said, therefore, that for sensing to be perfected through the action of the sensible upon the sense is not only to originate from such an action, but also for its existence and completion to require that that action be simultaneous with sensing itself: for sensing is not in act except while the sense is actually immuted by the sensible. But to intellection it belongs indeed that it originates from the action of the sensible upon the sense, and of the intelligible upon the intellect; but not that it is perfected through such an action; since, even when that action does not exist, there is intellection; for after the intellect has been informed by the species, it understands by itself, with no action of the intelligible upon the intellect concurring.

3. To the confirmation it is said that it proceeds from a false understanding of the words of St. Thomas: as if, namely, sensitive emanation were the production itself of the sensible form into the sense, and the term of this emanation remained in the sense. For St. Thomas does not intend this: but that sensing itself, which is actual sensation and judgment concerning the sensible thing, and is the term of sensitive emanation, begins indeed from without as from a remote principle through its transient action upon the sense, but nevertheless is proximately and immediately produced by the sensitive power made in first act, and remains in it, and is not received in anything existing outside the sense. And this is for sensitive emanation to terminate within. In inanimate things, however, it is not so. For inanimate things are not the proximate productive principle of anything remaining in themselves: but all their action is received in something extrinsic.

V. For the solution of the second doubt⁸, it must be considered that, since every active or productive power of any operation has some object toward which it tends through its operation, and at which its operation terminates; every operation must in some way be a medium between the power which is its productive principle, and the object which is its term. But sometimes the term itself is produced through such an operation, as is apparent in transient actions; but sometimes it is not produced simpliciter according to its real being, although it may perhaps be produced according to some intentional being. Sensing, therefore, is an operation and a certain emanation whose elicitive principle is the sensitive power, while the term is the sensible itself, which according to natural or real being is indeed not produced through the act of sensing, yet according to some aspect can in some way be said to be produced, namely under the aspect of what is sensed in act: for the sensible does not have that it is actually sensed except from the act of sensing by which it is actually sensed, so that the sense is said on this account to constitute its object in the being of the sensed.

These things having been presupposed, it is said that the reason of St. Thomas is excellent. For since the sensitive power is not reflected upon itself—for sight does not see itself, properly speaking—it follows that it is not the term and object of the sensitive emanation which is called sensation. And since it is the principle of such an emanation, it follows that its principle and term belong to diverse things: namely, the principle to the sense, but the term to the sensible itself. — But when it is said that it would be the same even if the sense were reflected upon itself: I deny it. For if it were reflected upon itself by sensing itself, it would be both the principle of sensation, and the object or term; and thus the principle and the term would not belong to diverse things.

2. Therefore the reason given there is admitted. To the disproof of which it is said first, that here St. Thomas is not speaking of emanation according as something is really produced through it; but he is speaking absolutely of the operation itself emanating from some principle, which in living things proceeds from within, and in some way remains in what is within itself. Later, however⁹, he will explain that in that emanation which is from the intellect, there is something really produced.

It is said secondly, that through sensitive emanation something is also produced according to sensed being, as was said, although not according to real being. But this is not properly for something to be produced.

VI. One can respond secondly, and better, to the aforesaid doubts¹⁰. For it is said first, that by the emanation which is according to the sensitive soul, St. Thomas understands not indeed the impression of the sensible species into the sense from the sensible thing, because that emanation is only from without; nor again the operation itself which is sensation, since that does not have any term really produced through it; but that action by which the sensitive soul produces something in itself. But this is inasmuch as one sensitive power acts upon another, as the external sense upon the phantasia, and the phantasia upon the memory. For that emanation occurs from within immediately, inasmuch as the sensitive soul causes the sensible form in itself, by immuting the interior powers through the exterior powers, although it originates remotely from without.

It is said secondly, that for the sensitive power not to be reflected upon itself is for it not to sense itself, nor to cause a likeness of itself in itself. And thus, since the sensitive power is not reflected upon itself by causing a likeness of itself in itself, through which it might sense itself; it follows that in the emanation of the sensitive soul by which something is produced through it, the principle and the term belong to diverse things, namely to diverse powers, although it is the same soul. — And this seems to be more according to the intention of the text, if it is diligently considered. And according to this sense, it is clear that the objections do not proceed.

VII. In the second place St. Thomas shows that several modes are found even in intellectual emanation, and that the emanation of the divine intellect differs from the others¹¹. And he says that diverse grades are found even in intellectual life. The lowest is that of the human intellect, which can indeed know itself, but nevertheless takes the first beginning of its cognition from without, namely from a phantasm. — Above this is the life of the angelic intellect, which knows itself through itself, and not from anything external. Yet, although the understood intention is entirely intrinsic to angels, it is nevertheless not their substance: since in them to understand and to be are not the same. — The ultimate perfection of life is that of the divine intellect, whose understood intention is the divine essence itself: since in it to understand and to be are not different.

Lest, however, there be doubt as to what is understood by the name of understood intention, St. Thomas explains that it is that which the intellect conceives in itself concerning the understood thing, which is a certain likeness conceived by the intellect of the understood thing, which external words signify. Moreover, that this in us is not the understood thing is apparent, because it is one thing to understand the thing, and another to understand the understood intention itself, which takes place through reflection: whence also some sciences are about things, and others about understood intentions. That it is also not the intellect itself in us is evident from the fact that its being consists in being understood itself, but not the being of our intellect. In God, however, it is clear that it is the divine intellect: because in Him to understand and to be are the same. And because the intellect in Him is the understood thing, it remains that in God Himself understanding Himself, the intellect, the thing that is understood, and the understood intention are the same.

2. For the evidence of what is said, that the understood intention is entirely intrinsic to angels, it must be considered that this is not said as if in us the understood intention, according to its entity, were not entirely intrinsic to the intellect: but because in us the entity of the understood intention is indeed intrinsic to the intellect, since it is its accident, but the cause is in some way extrinsic, inasmuch as the beginning of our cognition is from without, that is, from a phantasm. In angels, however, not even as to the cause is it from an extrinsic object: since its cognition does not have its origin from without, inasmuch as intelligible species are connatural to them, and its essence, by which it understands itself, is intrinsic to it.

3. Concerning what is said, that the being of the understood intention consists in being understood itself, it must be considered that the being of the understood intention is said to consist in being understood, not because it does not have some being in reality but only has this being, that it is understood—that is, has only a relation of reason to the one understanding, in the way beings of reason are said to have being in being understood (for, since it is an accident of the intellect, it must have some real being)—but because that real being which it has is the act itself of understanding as passively taken, and is signified by this phrase to be understood; or is something following upon understanding itself, which does not last except as long as actual intellection lasts; for when intellection ceases, the being of the understood intention ceases. And it is similar to our saying that the being of illuminated air, as such, consists in being illuminated itself, because light does not have being in the air except through illumination, and only while the air is illuminated.

VIII. Then, when it is said, Now this can be made clear as follows, St. Thomas proceeds to the clarification of divine generation¹². And he posits four conclusions.

The first is: It is not possible for divine generation to be taken as generation is found in inanimate things. It is proved. The generator in those things impresses its species upon exterior matter. But not in the divine. Therefore etc. — The second part of the antecedent is proved. Because according to the faith the Son begotten of God has true deity, and is true God. But deity is not a form inhering in matter; nor is God existing from matter.

The second conclusion is: Divine generation cannot be taken according to the mode of that which is in plants and animals sharing with plants in nutritive and generative power. It is proved. Something is separated from them for the generation of one similar in species, which at the end of generation is entirely outside the generator. But these things cannot belong to God, as is clear from the things said above. Therefore etc.

The third conclusion is: Divine generation cannot be understood according to the mode of emanation that is found in the sensitive soul. It is proved. Both because, since God is the first agent, He does not receive from without that whence He can flow into another: as, namely, belongs to the sense, according to the aforesaid¹³. — And because the operations of the sensitive soul are not completed without bodily instruments. But it is clear that God is incorporeal.

IX. The fourth conclusion is: Divine generation is to be understood according to intellectual emanation. St. Thomas leaves this proved from the sufficient division set down above.

For its clarification, however, he posits twelve conclusions¹⁴.

The first of which is: In God understanding Himself is the Word of God, as it were God understood. It is proved. Everything understood, inasmuch as it is understood, is in the one understanding. Therefore God, understanding Himself, is in Himself as what is understood in the one understanding. Therefore etc.

The antecedent is proved. Because to understand signifies the apprehension of that which is understood by the intellect. Whence also our intellect, understanding itself, is in itself not only as the same as itself through essence, but also as apprehended by understanding. — But the second consequence is proved. Because what is understood in the one understanding is the understood intention and word. — It is confirmed by the authority of John saying: The Word was with God.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that, although the understood thing is in the one understanding through the intelligible species, it does not from that have the character of what is actually understood. For what is understood in act, as such, designates the term of intellection apprehended through intellection itself: but the intelligible species designates the principle of intellection. Therefore, besides the intelligible species itself, there must be in the intellect actually understanding an understood intention: for what is apprehended is in the one apprehending in some way.

X. The second conclusion is: The Word of God is coeternal with Him, and His Word does not happen to Him from time, as happens to our intellect. It is proved. The divine intellect always understands itself. But from the fact that it understands itself, its Word must be in it. Therefore His Word has always existed in Him. Therefore etc. — The assumption is proved. Because the divine intellect does not go out from potency into act, but is always existing in act. — It is confirmed from what is said: In the beginning was the Word.

XI. The third conclusion is: The Word of God is the very divine esse, and His essence, and true God Himself. As to the first part, it is proved. The substance of the divine intellect is its very understanding, since it is pure act. The esse of the understood Word is its very being-understood. Therefore, the esse of the divine Word and of the divine intellect is the same. — As to the second part, it is proved. Because the esse of the divine intellect is the esse of God, who is His own intellect. But the esse of God is His essence, by which He is God. — As to the third part, it is proved. Because the natural esse of God and His understanding are not different. — It is confirmed from what is said: God was the Word. For, since this is said absolutely, it is shown that the Word of God must be understood to be true God. For the word of man could not be called man simply and absolutely, but only understood man; hence this would be false, man is a word, but this can be true, understood man is a word.

From this St. Thomas infers that when it is said, God was the Word, it is shown that the divine Word is a thing existing and subsisting in nature, because true God is a subsisting thing.

For a greater manifestation of these points, he interposes that these things do not belong to the word of the human intellect understanding itself. For since the esse of the understood intention is its very being-understood, and the esse of the intellect and its understanding are different—for the substance of the intellect was potentially understanding before it understood in act—it follows that the esse of the understood intention is one thing, and the esse of the intellect another. Similarly, it follows that the conceived word is not a true man, having the natural esse of man, but only understood man, as his likeness apprehended by himself.

2. Regarding the proof of the first part of the conclusion, it should be noted that, just as in things that are moved materially the action and passion are the same thing, so in things that operate immaterially in some way, the operation is the same by which both the principle of the operation is denominated after the manner of an agent, and the term of the action is denominated after the manner of a patient: just as by the same vision a thing is said to be seen, and the sight to see. Therefore, since understanding is a certain immaterial operation elicited by the intellect and terminated at the understood intention, the very understanding of the intellect and the very being-understood of the understood intention are the same thing; but they differ according to the diverse connoted relations. For it is called to understand insofar as it is signified with a relation of the intellect as that from which it is; but it is called to be understood insofar as it connotes a relation of the understood as the term. Most excellently, therefore, does St. Thomas conclude that the esse of the divine intellect and of its Word is the same, because the esse of the intellect is its very understanding, and the esse of the Word is its very being-understood. For if to be understood is the esse of the Word, and to be understood is its very understanding, it follows that the esse of the Word is its very understanding. And therefore, if understanding is the esse of the intellect, it follows that the esse of the Word is the very esse of the intellect.

Regarding the proof of the second part of the conclusion, it must be noted that the foundation of this reason is that the divine essence cannot be the act of anything that is not identified with itself. And therefore, if the esse of the Word is the divine essence, the Word must be the same as that essence itself.

Regarding the proof of the third part of the conclusion, it must be considered that the natural esse of a thing follows upon the thing's essence, and is diversified according to the diversity of natures: for just as the nature and essence of a stone is one, and the nature and essence of a man another, so the esse of a stone is one, and the esse of a man another. And therefore the essence and its natural esse accompany each other, so that where one is primarily and per se, the other is also. Therefore, since the divine Word has the natural esse of God, from the fact that His esse is the very understanding which is the natural esse of God, it follows that He has the divine essence. And because every supposit whose nature is the divine essence is true God, it follows that the divine Word Himself is true God. And this argument proceeds according to this foundation.

XII. But regarding the aforesaid, a twofold doubt arises. The first is because it does not seem to be sufficiently concluded that the understood intention and the intellect are the same in God because they have the same esse. For the hand of a man and the foot have the same esse, since they are through the numerically same form; and similarly matter and form; and yet the hand is not the foot, but they are two substances; and similarly matter is not form.

The second is: If, because the esse of the understood intention is to be understood, and the esse of the intellect is to understand, it follows that the esse of the intellect and of the understood intention is the same, and that the understood intention is the intellect, and consequently God—since God understands not only the understood intention existing in Himself, but also all things having esse outside God Himself; and the esse of those things, insofar as they are understood, is to be understood—by the same reason it follows that every creature is the divine intellect, and is God.

2. To the first, it is said first, that St. Thomas's reason does not proceed from this universally, that all things that have the same esse are the same, because that is not true of the parts constituting a whole and existing through the esse of the whole: but from the fact that it must be so in simple natures. For since one thing cannot have the esse of such a nature as a part of it, if it has the esse of that nature, it is necessary that it be a supposit of that nature. And therefore, if the esse of the divine intellect itself is the esse of that which is in it, it is necessary, according to the declaration made above, that their nature be one, and that the one be the other.

3. To the second, it is said that one must speak in one way of the understood intention existing in the intellect, and in another way of the understood thing having esse outside the intellect, insofar as it has esse outside the intellect. For the being-understood of the understood intention expresses its very esse by which it exists in the nature of things: for it does not exist except through the very actual being-understood; whence, this ceasing, the word is not. But the being-understood of an extrinsic thing, insofar as it is extrinsic, does not express its esse, but only a certain relation to the intellect; and it is an extrinsic denomination when it is said to be understood, namely from the act of understanding existing not indeed in the thing itself, but in the intellect. And therefore, although it follows from the fact that the esse of the intellect is its very understanding, and the esse of the understood intention is its very being-understood, that the understood intention and the intellect are the same, it does not nevertheless follow that the understood thing, according as it is outside, is the divine intellect.

When, however, it is argued that their esse, insofar as they are understood, is the very being-understood, it is said that if the phrase insofar as they are understood signifies insofar as they have esse in the intellect through their understood intention, it is in this way entirely true that to be understood is their esse. But from this nothing else is obtained except that the understood intention of them, through which they are in the divine intellect, is the same as the divine intellect. — If, however, it is signified insofar as they terminate the act of the divine intellect according to the esse which they have outside the intellect, in this way it is false that their esse is to be understood, that is, the act of understanding by which they are understood; but it is the very esse outside the intellect, with a relation to the one understanding in act.

XIII. The fourth conclusion is: The Word of God communicates with God in the numerically same nature. It is proved in two ways. First. He has the nature of God just as God's understanding is His very esse. But God's understanding is the divine esse. Therefore, He has the nature of God just as the divine esse is His own esse. But the divine esse is His own esse in such a way that the esse of both is the same. Therefore, He has the divine essence itself, not only the same in species, but the same in number.

It should be noted that the nature of any species cannot be numerically multiplied unless the esse of such a nature is multiplied, because there cannot be one esse of things having numerically diverse complete natures. And therefore, where some things that are numerically distinct have one and the same esse, in them nature is not multiplied according to number, but is one in number. And therefore it is most excellently argued here that the nature of God understanding and of His Word is numerically the same, because they have one and the same esse of divinity.

Second. The divine nature is entirely immaterial. Therefore it cannot be one in species and differing in number. — The consequence is proved. Because a nature that is one according to species is not divided into many according to number except on account of matter.

From this St. Thomas infers that on this account God and His Word are not two gods, but one God. For the fact that two having human nature are two men happens from this: that human nature is numerically divided in the two.

XIV. Concerning this proposition, Two having human nature are two men because human nature is numerically divided in the two, it is doubted. For St. Thomas seems to intend that the plurality of human nature is the reason why some are called several men. But he seems to hold the opposite of this in the Tertia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 2, where he maintains that if one divine person were to assume two humanities, he would not be called two men, but one man, on account of the unity of the supposit.

Because this difficulty arises from this general difficulty, namely, whether for the plurality of a substantive noun the sole plurality of the form signified by the noun suffices, or whether a plurality of supposits is also required, therefore this must be answered first, from which the solution to the raised doubt will afterwards be easy ¹⁵.

2. It should be known, therefore, that a twofold answer can be given in the doctrine of St. Thomas ¹⁶. First, it can be answered that for a noun—not only an adjective, but also a substantive—to be predicated plurally, it does not suffice that the form signified by the noun be plurified in that of which the noun is predicated, but it is also required that the supposits of which the noun is said be many. This is clear from two places of St. Thomas in the Summa. The first is in the Tertia Pars, in the cited place. The second is Prima, q. 36, a. 4, ad 2, where he says that although in the Father there are several properties, one of which is referred to the Son, and the other to the Holy Spirit, He is not nevertheless called several principles, because a plurality of supposits would be implied.

3. But there are two things that seem to stand in the way of this. The first is that St. Thomas lays down a general rule in Prima, q. 39, a. 3; and I Sent., d. 9, a. 2 ¹⁷; likewise III Sent., d. 1, q. 2 ¹⁸; and De Pot., q. 9, a. 6: namely, that substantive nouns receive unity and plurality from the unity and plurality of the signified form, with no mention made of a plurality of supposits.

The second is because St. Thomas, putting this general rule into practice in III Sent., in the cited place ¹⁹, says that if one person were to assume two humanities, he would be called two men on account of the plurality of the signified form, although the supposit were one.

4. To the first ²⁰, it is said that we can speak of the singularity and plurality of nouns in two ways: in one way, as to the ratio and formal cause of their singularity and plurality precisely and absolutely; in another way, as to the cause together with that which always accompanies this cause, which can be called a sine qua non cause. If we speak of this singularity and plurality in the first way, thus the sole plurality of the signified form is required for the plurality of a substantive noun, just as the sole plurality of supposits is required for the plurality of an adjective noun. For because, as St. Thomas says in the aforementioned places, a substantive signifies after the manner of a substance, and substance of itself has unity and plurality, therefore from the unity and plurality of the signified form, as from the ratio and cause of unity and plurality, its singularity and plurality are received; on the contrary, however, because an adjective noun signifies something after the manner of an accident, and accidents receive unity and plurality from the subject, therefore the adjective itself also receives its singularity and plurality from the unity and plurality of the supposits, as from the ratio and cause of its singularity and plurality. — If, however, we speak in the second way, namely as to the cause together with that which accompanies the cause, thus not only the plurality of the signified form concurs toward the plurality of the noun, but also the plurality of supposits: because among us a substantial form is not found multiplied without a multiplication of supposits.

St. Thomas, therefore, where he lays down that general rule, touches only upon that which is the formal ratio and cause of the plurality of the noun, from which primarily and per se a substantive noun differs from an adjective noun as to singularity and plurality. By this, however, he does not exclude a plurality of supposits that may accompany it. — In other places, however, he explains not only the cause, but also that which accompanies the cause. For in the Tertia Pars, he assigns the reason why the person assuming two humanities would not be called two men; because, I say, never among things that are with us is a noun imposed from some form spoken plurally except on account of a plurality of supposits. In this he gives it to be understood that, although the plurality of supposits is not the formal ratio and cause of the plurality of a substantive noun, it nevertheless accompanies that cause; and on this account, considering both as concurring toward a plurality of this kind, the person who would assume two humanities would not be two men, but ²¹ one man. He gives the same to be understood in the Prima Pars in q. 36, when he says that the Father is not called several principles, because a plurality of supposits would be implied: as if to say, although the sole plurality of the signified form is the cause and foundation of the plurality of a substantive noun, nevertheless that does not suffice for plurality: because the plurality of the noun also implies a plurality of supposits as a concomitant cause in all things that are with us. And on this account we do not predicate a substantive noun even in divinis, unless along with the plurality of the form a plurality of supposits also concurs.

5. To the second ²², it is said that St. Thomas in III Sent. spoke as far as the cause of the plurality of a substantive noun requires. For because in that case there would be the true and formal cause of the plurality of the noun, namely the plurality of the signified form, he therefore said that that person would be several men. Nevertheless, it is not repugnant to this that, considering the cause and that which accompanies the cause, it would have to be said that that person would not be two men, but one.

XV. It could be answered secondly to the doubt ²³ that that rule concerning the plurality of substantives is universally true in substantive nouns, that is, insofar as they are such; and that the sole plurality of form is required for its plurality, nor is a plurality of supposits required. — To the objection from the Tertia Pars, however, it could be said that this noun man has something of the condition of a substantive noun, and something of the condition of an adjective noun, as it is said of Christ: just as the humanity in Christ also has indeed the manner of an accidental form, insofar as it comes to the divine supposit after its complete esse, and is not identified with the supposit itself; but it has the manner of a substantial nature, insofar as it is drawn to the esse of the divine supposit, and the divine supposit subsists in it. Insofar as it has the manner of a substantive noun, it is thus said plurally upon the plurification of the signified form: and according to this consideration St. Thomas said in III Sent. ²⁴ that the person assuming two humanities would be two men. Insofar, however, as it has the manner of an adjective noun, it thus receives plurality from the plurality of supposits: and according to this consideration it was said in the Tertia Pars that the person assuming two humanities would not be two men. Whence it is said in the same place that the human nature in Christ in some respect behaves after the manner of a garment: as if intimating that that noun man is taken there as having the manner of an adjective noun. — And perhaps Capreolus understood this answer in the First Book, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1 ²⁵, where he said that St. Thomas in the Tertia Pars, when he said that a noun is never spoken plurally except on account of a plurality of supposits, speaks rather of adjectives than of substantives.

2. But because in the Tertia Pars St. Thomas speaks of this noun man as of a substantive noun, as is clear in the same question, art. 6 ²⁶, where he determines that if several persons were to take one humanity, it would be called one man on account of the unity of the signified form, which belongs to a substantive noun; also in the Prima Pars, speaking of this noun principle, he says that if the Father were said to be several principles, a plurality of supposits would be implied; therefore the first answer seems to me to be better, and more according to the mind of St. Thomas: namely, that toward the plurality of a substantive noun there concur both the plurality of the signified form and the plurality of supposits; the one as the ratio and formal cause of plurality; the other as accompanying the cause, and as a sine qua non cause, in the things that are with us; and consequently also in divinis, in which we use nouns to signify according to the mode found in creatures.

3. From these things the answer to the doubt first raised ²⁷ is clear. For it is said that St. Thomas certainly intends in this place that the reason why some are called several men is the plurality of humanity in them: yet by this he does not exclude the plurality of supposits in the manner stated. Rather, he seems to include it, since he also makes mention of two supposits having humanity. Moreover, as was clear, what is said in the Tertia Pars is not contrary to this.

XVI. The fifth conclusion is: The Word of God proceeds from God according to His very understanding. It is proved by supposing that, although those things that are divided in creatures (namely, which are said formally of God) are simply one in God, nevertheless whatever pertains to their ratio is most truly in God. This is declared in essence, subsistence, and esse. — Then thus: It belongs to the ratio of the interior word, which is the understood intention, that it proceed from the one understanding according to his understanding. Therefore, etc.

The antecedent is proved: because it is as it were the term of the intellectual operation. — The consequence, however, is proved: because, since in God the one understanding, understanding, and the understood intention are the same, it is necessary that in God there be most truly both what pertains to the ratio of the one understanding, and what pertains to the ratio of that which is to understand, and what pertains to the ratio of the understood intention, or word.

2. Here two things must be noted. The first is that this conclusion is posited not as naturally known, but as believed. For the Trinity of persons in divinis cannot be naturally proved in the way in which faith posits it. And therefore the foundation of the conclusion must be believed, namely: it belongs to the ratio of the Word that He proceed from the one understanding according to His understanding. For this is not universally true unless it is supposed, according to faith, that there is a produced Word in divinis. For St. Thomas, supposing from the Sacred Scriptures that there is a Son in divinis, intends to declare the mode of generation. Whence a philosopher denying the Trinity of persons in divinis would deny that there is generation there, and that it belongs to the ratio of the Word that He proceed from the one understanding according to His understanding. Indeed, many deny that even in our intellect a produced word must be posited.

The second is that, when it is said that the word is as it were the term of the intellectual operation, the word as it were is not taken as importing likeness, but as expressive of truth.

XVII. The sixth conclusion is: The Word is distinguished from the one understanding in God by relation alone. — It is proved. The Word of God is compared to God understanding, whose Word He is, as to Him from whom He is: since this belongs to the ratio of a word. And they are not distinguished according to essence. Therefore there remains only the distinction of relation, according as the Word is referred to the one conceiving, from whom He is. — It is confirmed through that which is said: This was in the beginning with God: from which it is given to be understood that the Word, which he had said was God, is in some way distinct from God who speaks. — How the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by relations will be shown below in chapter 24.

The seventh conclusion is: The Word of God is compared to other things understood by God as an exemplar, but to God Himself, whose Word it is, as an image. It is proved. Because, since the internally conceived word is a certain ratio and likeness of the thing understood, if it is related to it as a principle, it has the ratio of an exemplar; but if it is related to it as to a principle, it has the ratio of an image. This is explained in our intellect with respect to artificial things, and with respect to natural things. But the understanding of God understanding is the principle of the things understood by Him; however, to the intelligible which is Himself, it is compared as to a principle, since this intelligible is the same as the intellect understanding. And the same ratio applies to the Word, since it is a certain emanation of the intellect understanding. Therefore, etc. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, in Colossians 1, saying of the Word of God that it is the image of the invisible God.

It should be noted that we can understand a twofold identity of the intelligible with the one understanding. One according to intelligible being, insofar as the intelligible according to its intellectual species is in the intellect, and from them one thing is made for understanding. But another according to natural being and according to proper nature: as, when the intellect understands itself, it is evident that the intelligible and the intellect understanding are the same thing. Here, therefore, when St. Thomas says that the divine intelligible is the same as the intellect understanding, and is thus compared to understanding and to the Word as a principle, it must be understood not of identity in intelligible being—because according to this identity every intelligible is a principle of the word, since the word proceeds from an intellect informed by the species of the intelligible—but of identity according to natural being and according to the property of nature. For when God understands Himself, God Himself who is understood is His very essence and His intellect in reality. And therefore, just as the intellect is compared to the Word produced by itself as a principle, so to it is compared God Himself, whose Word it is, according to the property of His nature.

XVIII. The eighth conclusion is: The Word of God is His image with respect to His essence. It is proved. A word conceived by the intellect is an image or exemplar of the substance of the thing understood. But the Word of God is the image of God. Therefore, it is His image with respect to His essence. — The major is proved from the difference that exists between intellect and sense: namely, because sense apprehends a thing with respect to its exterior accidents, but the intellect enters into the interior of the thing. And therefore, because all cognition is perfected according to the likeness of the knower and the known, in sense there is a likeness of the sensible with respect to its accidents, but in the intellect there is a likeness of the thing understood with respect to its essence. — It is confirmed by the Apostle saying, in Hebrews 1, that it is the figure of His substance.

The ninth conclusion is: The Word of God is the Son. It is proved by premising that there is a certain image that does not share in nature with that of which it is the image, like the statue of a man; but a certain image that shares in nature, like the son of a king. Then it is argued thus. The Word of God is the image of the one speaking with respect to His very essence. And it shares in the same nature with the one speaking, as has been shown²⁸. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that which proceeds from a living being in the likeness of species is called its son. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: The Lord said to me: You are my Son.

XIX. The tenth conclusion is: The Word of God understanding Himself proceeds naturally from Him. It is proved. Both because He is the Son: for the procession of a son from a father is natural. — And because God naturally understands Himself, just as He also naturally is: for His understanding is His being. — This reason is made clear from our intellect, in which the conceptions of those things which it naturally understands are naturally in it, and naturally proceed from it; but the conceptions of those things which it does not understand naturally are not naturally in it.

2. For the clarity of this conclusion, it must be considered first, from the Prima Pars, q. xli, a. 2, and below here²⁹, that to be produced naturally is taken in this place not as it is distinguished from being produced supernaturally, but as it is distinguished from being produced through the will. For that is said to be produced naturally to the production of which the agent is determined by nature, and which cannot not be produced; but that is said to be produced through the will which is so produced that it can also not be produced. Whence, because the divine Word cannot not be produced by the Father, but is necessarily produced by Him, since God also cannot not understand Himself: therefore it is said to proceed naturally from God the Father understanding Himself.

XX. But concerning the second reason³⁰, declared from the things that happen in our intellect, there is a doubt³¹. For it is evident that the conceptions of those things which our intellect naturally understands do not proceed naturally from our intellect in such a way that they cannot not proceed. For since conception and word are not in the intellect except while the intellect actually understands, and our intellect does not always understand in act those naturally known things themselves, as is clear: it is manifest that sometimes they are not produced. And thus from the things found in our intellect it cannot be argued that the divine Word naturally proceeds from God understanding Himself, but rather the opposite.

2. For the clarity of this, it must first be considered that, since in the intellect the relation to its act is twofold—namely, to its exercise, which is to understand in act, and to its specification, which is to understand in such a manner—we can say in a twofold way that the intellect understands something naturally: either, I say, with respect to the exercise of the act, namely because it cannot not go forth into the act of understanding that thing; or, with respect to the specification of the act, namely because, if it goes forth into act concerning such an object, it cannot not understand in such a manner. For example, concerning this principle, Every whole is greater than its part, the intellect can be moved naturally either because it cannot not go forth into the act of consideration of it, or because, if it goes forth into act, it cannot elicit another act concerning it than the act of assent. And because the naturalness of conceptions accompanies the naturalness of intellection, as is clear from what is said here, therefore a certain conception also can be said to be naturally in the intellect either with respect to the being of the conception absolutely, namely because it cannot not be produced by the intellect, or with respect to its species, inasmuch as, if the intellect forms a conception of the thing, it cannot be other than such a conception of assent. Because therefore the intellect does not understand except by forming a conception, intellection and conception follow one another proportionally with respect to naturalness: so that, namely, the conception of that which is naturally understood with respect to the specification of the act is natural with respect to its specification, but the conception of that which is naturally understood with respect to the exercise of the act is natural with respect to its being and its being produced absolutely.

3. Secondly, it must be considered, according to the aforesaid, that concerning the first principles naturally known, we can imagine a twofold mode of necessity and naturalness in the way of St. Thomas. One is that the intellect naturally understands first principles not only as to specification, but also as to the exercise of the act. But if we posit this, it must be understood not absolutely upon positing the intellect, as if the intellect could never cease from that act of understanding, but upon positing the intellect and the other dispositions required for intellectual operation, for instance, the proper use of the sensitive powers and the proper disposition of phantasms. The words of St. Thomas seem to favor this mode of speaking, both here, where he holds that the conceptions of the first intelligibles which the intellect naturally understands are naturally in the intellect and proceed naturally from it, and from this infers that the Word of God naturally understanding Himself proceeds naturally from the Father—where it is manifest that he understands it of divine natural intellection with respect to the exercise of the act; his words also in the Prima Pars, q. XLI, a. 2, ad 4, favor this, where, answering this proposition, Every word proceeds from the speaker through the will, he says that also in intellectual conceptions a reduction is made to the first things that are naturally understood, where it is clear that his intention is concerning natural intellection with respect to the exercise of the act; what is said in the Quaestiones de Potentia, q. II, a. 3, ad 3, also favors this, where St. Thomas says that it is necessary to posit a state in the act of the intellect which naturally follows the intellect, so that it is not commanded by the will: for it is evident that the command of the will concerning the act of another power is understood with respect to its exercise.

Another mode is that the intellect understands first principles naturally and necessarily, not as to the exercise of the act, but only as to specification: inasmuch, namely, as it necessarily assents to them, positing that it elicits an act concerning them. The words of Iª IIae, q. x, a. 2, favor this mode, where he shows that the will is moved by no object of necessity with respect to the exercise of the act, because anyone can not think about any object whatever: from which he seems to hold that no act of the intellect with respect to its exercise is natural and necessary. To this also favors that, where St. Thomas explains the mode of necessity of the intellect toward first principles, he makes mention only of the necessity of specification: as is clear in De Malo, q. III, a. 3, where, after he said that both the intellect and the will tend of necessity into that to which they are naturally ordained, he subjoins concerning the intellect that it assents of necessity to first principles naturally known, nor can it assent to their contraries: for it is clear that this is necessity only with respect to the specification of the act. A similar thing is found in De Veritate, q. XXIV, a. 1, ad 20, and Prima Pars, q. LXII, a. 8, ad 2.

4. Although, however, either way can be sustained, it seems to me nevertheless, always saving better judgment, that it should be said that the naturalness and necessity of the intellect for the knowledge of first principles is only with respect to the specification of the act, inasmuch namely as the intellect is determined to such an act concerning them which is the act of assent, because it cannot not assent to them; but not with respect to exercise, as if it could not not elicit an act concerning them. For by experience we prove that we cease from actual consideration of principles and voluntarily transfer ourselves to the knowledge of other things; and also, ceasing from the consideration of other things, we voluntarily consider the principles themselves.

And if there is brought forward the saying of St. Thomas in the Prima Pars, q. LXXXII, a. 4, ad 3, saying that it is necessary that apprehension precede every motion of the will, yet a motion of the will does not precede every apprehension, from which he seems to hold that there is some act of understanding which with respect to the exercise of the act does not depend on the will, which indeed seems to be true only of the apprehension of those things that are naturally known by the intellect: — it is answered that he is not speaking of the knowledge of first principles, or of first universal terms, but of the knowledge which one first has while one begins to deliberate and consider concerning some matter: for it is necessary, since there is no process to infinity in this, that volition precedes intellection and intellection volition, that there be a state in some knowledge which the will does not command, but which some principle higher than our intellect effects, as is said in the same place.

Nor do the sayings of St. Thomas alleged above³² stand in the way: because, as will be clear³³, for his purpose it suffices that the intellect is naturally and necessarily borne toward first principles with respect to the specification of the act. — And when it is said that the command of the will concerning the act of another power is understood with respect to the exercise of the act: — this is not universally true, because the command of the will is also borne toward the specification of the act; as is clear in those things that are of faith, to which the intellect assents from the command of the will.

5. These things having been premised, we can answer the doubt³⁴ in a twofold way, according to the two modes touched upon above. For according to the first mode, it would be said that it is false that the conceptions of our intellect concerning those things which are naturally understood by it can not proceed from it, once all things on the part of the cognitive powers required for their intellection have been posited. — But when it is proved because our intellect does not always understand them: — it is answered that this is false of the conjoined intellect, upon positing all other dispositions necessary for understanding, although it is true of the intellect taken absolutely. For because the proper disposition of the sensitive powers is not always present, nor the proper disposition of the phantasms, therefore it does not always actually understand the first principles absolutely, but only then when the other dispositions are present.

According to the second mode, however, it is said first that, although conceptions of this kind can not proceed from the intellect with respect to their being absolutely, they nevertheless cannot not be such conceptions as are conceptions of assent, on the supposition that the intellect forms some conceptions concerning the first things naturally known. And thus they cannot not be in the intellect with respect to their specification, on the supposition that they are produced.

When, however, it is inferred that it cannot be concluded from this that the divine Word proceeds naturally from God: — I deny it. For most excellently from that which is found in our intellect does St. Thomas infer his purpose concerning the divine Word. For he intends to hold concerning our intellect that, just as it naturally knows certain things, so naturally are the conceptions of them in it: namely, in that mode of naturalness in which it also naturally knows them, as appears from what was said above. From which it is inferred that similarly in the divine intellect, in the same mode of naturalness, the Word of Himself naturally understood by Himself naturally is and proceeds, in which He also naturally understands Himself. If, moreover, we add to this that God naturally understands Himself both with respect to the specification of the act, because He cannot understand Himself in another mode than He understands, and with respect to the exercise of the act, because He cannot not understand Himself: it follows most excellently that His Word, and His conception by which He understands Himself, proceeds from Him naturally both with respect to its being absolutely, because it cannot not be produced, and with respect to its species, because it cannot be another Word than it is.

XXI. The eleventh conclusion is: The Word of God is truly begotten of God speaking, and His procession can be called generation or nativity. It is proved. The natural process of the divine Word is into the likeness of Him from whom the procession is, with identity of nature. Therefore, etc.

The antecedent is proved. Because the Word is of the same nature with God speaking, and His likeness. — But the consequence is proved. Because in living things this is truly the ratio of generation, that that which is generated proceeds from the generator as His likeness and of the same nature with Him. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: Today, that is, in eternity, have I begotten You.

From the aforesaid conclusion, together with the preceding, St. Thomas infers that it is false that the Father begot the Son by will, as the Arians said: because things that are done voluntarily are not natural³⁵.

2. For the clarity of the conclusion, it must be considered that the Word is said to be truly begotten, that is, properly; and His procession is similarly said to be truly, that is, properly generation (which is also called nativity), to distinguish it from generation commonly so called in all generable and corruptible things, which implies nothing other than a change from non-being to being. For in divine things there is not generation according as it expresses a change from non-being to being: but well that which is the origin of a living being from a conjoined living being, etc., which is also properly called nativity. It is also said to be truly and properly generation: that is, according to the proper ratio of generation, and not metaphorically.

It should be noted secondly, concerning the first reason, that this proposition, The natural procession of the Word is into the likeness of Him from whom the procession is, with identity of nature, is understood as far as belongs to the ratio of the procession itself. For although the Holy Spirit also proceeds Himself into the likeness of Him from whom He is and is of the same nature with Him, His procession is nevertheless not called generation, because this does not belong to it from the ratio of its procession, which is the procession of love; but only insofar as He is the love of God, in whom whatever is of Him is substance; as is clear in the Prima Pars, q. XXVII, a. 4; and De Potentia, q. X, a. 2, ad 22.

XXII. But then a doubt occurs. For just as the likeness of the begotten to the begetter absolutely pertains to the ratio of generation, so to it pertains that such likeness, according to the same specific nature, be according to the same specific natural being. Therefore, by the same ratio by which, in order for any procession to be generation, it is required that it be according to the ratio of likeness—that is, that from its proper ratio it has that the product is like the producer—by the same ratio it is required that all other things required for generation belong to it according to its proper ratio. And by the same ratio by which, on account of the defect of that condition which is to be according to the ratio of likeness—namely, because this does not belong to it from its proper ratio—a certain procession is not generation; by the same ratio, on account of the defect of other things which are of the ratio of generation, a procession will not be generation, because something does not belong to anything formally and essentially unless it belongs to it according to its whole ratio. But it is evident that it does not belong to the procession of the Word from its ratio that the Word be of the same nature with the one producing the Word as having the same natural being that the thing understood has in itself: since we see that the word of the human intellect understanding a stone is not of the same natural being with the stone understood. Therefore it will follow that neither can the procession of the divine Word be called generation, just as neither can the procession of the Holy Spirit.

2. For the clarity of this, it must be considered first that, when we speak of the procession that is according to the ratio of intellect and according to the ratio of will, we do not speak of the procession by which something extrinsic proceeds from these, as a house from the intellect and will of the builder; but we speak of that procession by which something intrinsic to them proceeds, which is the intrinsic term of the operation through which it is completely in act. According to this, therefore, the procession of the intellect differs from the procession of the will, because, since the intellect is ordained to this, that through it the intellectual nature may be the intelligible itself in intellectual being—which happens while the intelligible itself is received in the intellect—the intellect then attains its ultimate actual perfection when it is actually informed by the likeness of the intelligible according to a perfect act. And because through that procession of the intellect by which the word and expressed likeness of the thing understood is produced, it is constituted in such a perfect act; therefore such a procession has from its ratio that it is according to the ratio of likeness; that is, that what proceeds through such an act is the likeness of the thing understood, through which the intellect actually understanding is assimilated to the thing understood, and is the thing understood itself according to intellectual and immaterial being; and consequently that it is also the likeness of the one understanding informed by the species of the object, through which as a form it produces the concept of the thing understood in itself. — But the will is not instituted for this, that it may be the thing willed itself: but that it may be inclined and moved toward the thing willed. Therefore it is not constituted in complete act through this, that it has the likeness of the thing willed in itself, but through this, that it is actually inclined toward the thing willed. And therefore that procession by which it is constituted in complete act is not from its ratio according to the ratio of likeness, as if namely from it there proceeds the likeness of the willed, through which the will is assimilated to it; but it is rather considered according to the ratio of a certain impulse, inasmuch as through it something proceeds by which the will is impelled and inclined toward the thing willed.

From these points it follows that it is not the mind of St. Thomas, when he says in the aforementioned places, speaking absolutely of the intellect, that the procession which is according to the nature of the intellect is according to the nature of likeness, that by such a procession there proceeds something like the producing intellect as to the nature of the intellect itself: but rather something like the thing understood. For that is not what is intended in those places, as is clear from his own words: for he is speaking of likeness to the thing understood, which is the object of the intellect; just as concerning the will he says that its procession, which is measured according to the nature of the will, is considered according to the nature of an impelling and moving force, not indeed toward the will itself, but toward something willed ³⁶.

3. It must be considered secondly that the procession of the divine Word can be considered in two ways: in one way, absolutely, insofar as it is a procession of a word; in another way, insofar as it is such a per se species of the procession of a word that is most perfect. If it is considered absolutely insofar as it is a procession of a word, it does not in this way have from this that it is a generation: since not every procession of a word is a generation, as is apparent in us. If, however, it is considered as it is such a species of the procession of a word, which, I say, is most perfect, as accompanying the most perfect knowledge; in this way it has that it is a generation. For from the common nature of the procession of a word it has that the product is like the producer according to the same concept: for the stone in the soul and the stone outside the soul are of the same concept, indeed the one is the intelligible structure of the other, as was shown in the preceding. But from the fact that it is the most perfect procession, it has that the product also has the same natural esse formally with the producer, namely with the thing understood: for the more perfect the knowledge is, the more intimate and the more united is the word produced by it. — But the procession of divine love neither from the common nature of the procession of love, insofar as it is such, has that what proceeds is like the producer according to the same specific concept; nor from the fact that it is the most perfect procession of love does it have that what proceeds has the same natural esse with the producer: because it is not the case that the more perfect the procession of love is, the more the product through it is in itself, or according to its likeness, intimate to the producer. Rather, it has that it is of the same nature with the producer and of the same esse because it is a thing existing in the divine nature, from which nothing existing in the divine persons can be diverse. Therefore, the concept of generation can in no way belong to it.

4. To the doubt, therefore, it is denied that by the same reasoning it follows that the procession of the divine Word is not a generation.

When it is proved because it does not belong to it from its proper concept that the product through it is of the same natural esse with the producer: — it is answered that, although this does not belong to it insofar as it is absolutely the procession of a word, it nevertheless belongs to it insofar as it is the procession of a word proceeding from the intellect of one understanding himself in the most perfect manner. And thus it belongs to it from the fact that it is the most perfect species of the procession of a word.

If it is urged that by the same reasoning it will be said that to the procession of divine love it belongs that the product through it is like the producer, not indeed insofar as it is absolutely the procession of love, but insofar as it is the procession of the love of God loving himself: — it is answered that this is not true. Because the fact that the Holy Spirit is of altogether the same nature with the producer arises from the fact that he is love existing in God, in whom there is nothing that is not his nature, and not insofar as he proceeds by a procession of love in any way whatsoever: for he does not have this because he proceeds by a procession of love insofar as it is such, nor because he proceeds by the most perfect per se species of such a procession, as has been said. But that the divine Word is of the same nature and has the same esse with the producer happens not only because he is something in the divine nature, but because he proceeds by the most perfect species of the procession of a word, which accompanies the most perfect knowledge. Hence St. Thomas, First Part, q. XXVII, a. 1, ad 2, argues that the divine Word is perfectly one with that from which he proceeds, because the more a thing is understood, the more the intelligible conception is intimate to the one understanding, and the divine act of understanding is the most perfect.

XXIII. Concerning the corollary introduced ³⁷, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part, q. XLI, a. 2, that it is not denied that the Father begot the Son by will as if the divine will had no act concerning the generation of the Son: but because it had indeed a concomitant will, insofar as he willed the generation, just as he willed that we be men; but it did not have the will as a cause or productive principle, in the way in which we say that God produced creatures by will. The reason for this is that what is produced by will as a principle can be and not be: since the will, insofar as it is such, namely as it is distinguished from nature, is not determined to one thing, but is related to opposites. But the Son in the divine reality could not not be.

2. But whether the concomitant will, which is indeed borne toward the generation of the Son as toward an object, precedes according to the intellect the generation of the Son: namely, whether according to the intellect the Father willed to beget the Son prior to begetting him: — is a doubt in the doctrine of St. Thomas.

For a certain author, following the doctrine of Scotus in I Sent., dist. VI ³⁸, holds that it precedes. First, because St. Thomas, First Part, q. XXXIII, a. 3, ad 1, holds that absolute things common to the whole Trinity are prior to notional things. But it is clear that to will the generation of the Son, just as to will the divine essence, is an absolute thing common to the whole Trinity. — Second, because it is clear that the procession of the Holy Spirit is loved prior to arising: for the reason that the Father, by loving himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and the spiration itself, spirates the Holy Spirit. — This opinion could also be confirmed because that which is communicated to the Son by generation from the Father is pre-understood according to reason in the Father before generation. But willing is communicated to the Son by the Father, just as the will also is. Therefore, etc.

Capreolus, however, in I Sent., d. VI ³⁹, holds that, although it accompanies the generation of the Son, it nevertheless does not precede it according to the intellect. Moreover, he shows that this is the mind of St. Thomas from his statements in De Potentia, q. II, a. 3 ⁴⁰, where he expressly seems to hold this, saying that with respect to the generation of the Son there is no will preceding either in time or in the intellect, but only a concomitant will.

3. Although, however, either opinion can be sustained in some way, nevertheless the opinion of Capreolus in my judgment seems to be more according to the mind of St. Thomas, on account of his words cited in the Question On the Power of God, which expressly posit that with respect to the generation of the Son there is no will preceding either in time or in the intellect. — Nor is it valid to say that by a will preceding in time or nature he understands the will as a principle. For understanding it in this way, he would not by that response satisfy the argument proving that the Father produced the Son not only with a concomitant will, but also with the will as a principle, by this reasoning: that although the will does not precede the generation of the Son in time, it nevertheless precedes in the intellect: therefore it can be posited as the principle of the Son. For if the sense of the response were that with respect to the generation of the Son there is no will preceding in time or in the intellect as a principle, the answer would be given to the conclusion, namely by denying that the will can be posited as the principle of generation, but not to the premises: which is the mark of an unlearned man. Hence it must rather be said that, since the argument proves from this that the will can be posited as the principle of the generation of the Son because the will precedes it in the intellect, although it does not precede in time: St. Thomas denies this assumption, saying absolutely that it precedes neither in time nor in the intellect, and therefore what was intended does not follow, namely that it could be a principle.

The proposition is confirmed. Because even according to the intellect, it is not seen how to an act indivisible from the nature of any supposit, proceeding by natural necessity and in no way impedible, another act of the same supposit can be pre-understood to it according to the true order of the intellect: for since nothing is pre-understood to the nature of the supposit itself, no act can be pre-understood to a natural operation of this kind either; but several natural operations of it can well be understood to be simultaneous, and thus one to be a companion to the other. In the proposed matter, however, it should rather be said that the act of the generation of the Son precedes the will in the intellect than conversely, if any order ought to be posited among acts of this kind: because the intellect in itself precedes the will, and, as was shown above ⁴¹, in the order of intellect and will there must be a stop at some act of the intellect which belongs to it naturally, and which is not anticipated by the will, since the will is not borne except toward what is known.

4. Moreover, what is first objected ⁴², that common things are prior to notional things, does not stand in the way. For this is true of common things signifying the essence from their own concept, of which sort is this word God: but not of common things signifying an operation, of which sort is to will. For it is clear that to will to love does not belong to the Son prior according to the intellect to being the Son: since he cannot be understood to operate before he is understood to be. — If it is urged that, although a common operation is not prior to something proper, such as is the constitutive property of a person, nevertheless an operation common to the whole Trinity is prior in one supposit to its proper operation: just as also the common nature is prior according to the intellect to the proper nature in the same supposit: — it is answered that, although perhaps that would be true of a common operation included essentially in a proper one, as to understand is included in that which is to speak (which I do not affirm); it is nevertheless not true of a common operation which is not included essentially in a proper one, of which sort is to will the generation of the Son with respect to that generation itself; for it is enough that such a common operation accompanies the proper operation, so that one is not without the other; and especially when the proper operation is an operation of a power that is prior according to reason, while the common operation is an operation of a posterior power. — If it is again urged that, if it is conceded that the common operation included essentially in the proper one, namely to understand, is prior to generation according to the intellect, namely because we understand the Father to understand absolutely prior to begetting the Son through an act of the intellect; by the same reasoning it seems to follow that he wills to beget prior to begetting, since the will accompanies the intellect: — it is answered that, although in actu signato it would be conceded that to understand taken absolutely precedes according to the intellect to speak itself, which is to beget the Son, because the concept of that common thing is prior to the proper concept and is included in it, just as the concept of animal is prior to the concept of man: it would nevertheless not be conceded in actu exercito concerning understanding with respect to this object, namely in such a way that we understand the Father to understand the generation of the Son prior to speaking the Son; because the Father understands in no other way than by speaking and begetting the Son; and thus, whenever he is apprehended as actually understanding some determinate object, it is necessary that he be apprehended as begetting the Son, in whom he understands both himself and each single thing. Therefore it does not follow that he wills to beget prior according to the intellect to begetting.

Nor does what is introduced in the second place stand in the way. For it is false that the Father loves himself and the Son and also spiration itself, according to the intellect, prior to spirating the Holy Spirit: since the Father's loving itself is to spirate.

To the confirmation, however, it is answered that, although to will as to the entity which it expresses is communicated to the Son by virtue of generation, and is pre-understood to be in the Father; nevertheless as to the relation to the thing willed it is not communicated by virtue of generation, since it is a relation of reason. Therefore neither is it pre-understood in this way in the Father: but it follows, according to our mode of understanding, the act of understanding itself by which the Son is begotten, and accompanies it.

XXIV. The twelfth conclusion is: The Son of God is equal to the Father ⁴³. It is proved first. The Word of God is equal to God: because that which God understands concerning himself is not less than that which is in him; otherwise he would not understand himself perfectly, nor would his understanding be his esse. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the Word himself is the Son of God.

For the evidence of the antecedent of this reason, it must be considered that it belongs to the nature of the intellectual word that it is representative of the thing understood, and that through it the intellect understands. Therefore that the divine Word, insofar as he is Word, is equal to God, is nothing other than to represent whatever is of God. Moreover, this is best shown from the fact that that which God understands concerning himself is not less than that which is in him. For since the representation of the word extends as far as the intellection extends, since intellection does not occur except through the mediation of the representation of the word; it follows best that, if the intellection of God equals God himself, the representation of the Word also equals him.

It must be noted secondly that, although for the Word, insofar as he is Word, to be equal to God is nothing other than for him to represent intelligibly all things that are of God; nevertheless, because the divine Word is of the same nature with God understanding himself, an equality of perfection and of esse accompanies this equality of representation. For since he is equal in representing; and represents God as being of the same nature and essence with him: it is necessary that he be also equal in the perfection of being. Therefore, from the equality of the Word the equality of the Son is fittingly inferred, from the fact that the Word himself is the Son.

2. Secondly. The Son of God has the true species ⁴⁴ and nature of the Father: since he is God. Therefore he is equal to him. — The consequence is proved. First, because to every nature a determinate quantity is due. — Second, because among us a son is brought to the equality of the father at the end of generation and growth, unless there is a defect on the part of the matter, or on the part of the agent power: and that at the beginning he is born smaller than the father is because he proceeds from potency to act and from the imperfect to the perfect. But none of these is in divine generation: since it is not from matter, nor through a passage from potency to act, nor is there a defect on the part of the power.

3. Concerning that proposition, To every nature a determinate quantity is due, it should be observed from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Fourth Book, d. XLIV, q. I, a. 3 ⁴⁵, omitting the long dispute that is customary concerning the maximum and minimum, that its sense is that every specific nature determines for itself a certain latitude of quantity within which it is contained, so that outside that latitude it is not found either lower or higher, and each individual of that nature, according to its individual nature, determines for itself a certain degree of that latitude, to which, unless there is something hindering, it attains: for instance, if we say that human nature determines for itself this latitude of quantity which is from one palm to ten palms inclusive, so that a man having a quantity less than a palm is not found, nor a man having a quantity greater than the quantity of ten palms, and that, if sufficient matter is present and there is no impediment, each man has that degree of quantity which is fitting for his individual nature. And it is also understood that this belongs to any nature from within: that is, that a quantity smaller than that which is posited as the minimum cannot follow such a nature, nor likewise one greater than that which is posited as the maximum.

Moreover, St. Thomas assigns the reason for this in the First Part, q. VII, a. 3, and wherever he speaks of this matter, because determinate accidents follow a determinate form and a determinate nature: that is, accidents both according to species and according to degree that are certain and limited follow a form and nature limited to some degree of beings, and distinct from other natures. For we see that snow determines for itself whiteness among colors; and in the species of whiteness determines for itself a perfect degree, or a degree more intense than the degree of whiteness of many things, up to some determinate limit, whether it be the supreme degree or some degree lower than the supreme. But it is clear that quantity is one of the accidents following the form and essence of a quantified thing. Therefore it is necessary to say that each nature of a quantified thing determines for itself a determinate degree of quantity, both as to smallness and as to greatness. From which it is clear that not only does one individual in number determine for itself quantity, so that from its form there arises a determinate degree of quantity, and a greater or lesser degree cannot arise from it: but also that the specific nature itself determines for itself some latitude of quantity, so that, if any individual of that nature has the highest degree of that latitude, not only can it not be increased by its form to something greater, but neither can another individual of the same nature be greater than it. And this seems to be according to the mind of Aristotle, I Phys., text 36 ⁴⁶; and II De Anima, text 41 ⁴⁷; and of the Commentator ⁴⁸. — What has been said of extensive quantity is to be understood also of intensive quantity and that of perfection.

From this explanation, moreover, it is clear that the force of the reasoning of St. Thomas consists in this: that, since the Son of God has the species and nature of the Father, not only, that is, the same according to species, but also the same in number; and since a determinate quantity follows each nature: it is necessary that the Son also have the same quantity with the Father, and consequently that he be equal to him.

The confirmation indeed from those things which are found in material things ⁴⁹ proceeds according to this foundation: that, just as among us a son attains to the equality of the father unless an impediment is present, insofar as the father—just as he causes in the son his specific nature and his other individual conditions (according to likeness, that is, but not according to numerical identity), unless there is an impediment—so also causes that quantity which belongs to him from his individual nature; so much more in divine matters, where there is nothing that brings an impediment, the Father produces in the Son, together with his nature and substance, also his quantity of virtue, and thus produces the Son equal to himself.

It must be noted, however, when it is said that the Son of God has the species and nature of the Father, that species is not taken there properly, as it expresses something contained under an assigned genus: because, since God is contained in no genus, he is also not determined to any species. But it is taken for the essence by which God is distinguished from every other thing, just as one species in creatures is distinguished from every other species.

4. Thirdly ⁵⁰ it is argued. If the Son were unequal to the Father, the magnitude of the Father and of the Son would be numerically other. This is false: because, since the divine magnitude is the essence of God, the essence of the Father and of the Son would be numerically other. Therefore, etc. — The sequence is proved. Because the numerically same quantity cannot be greater or lesser than itself.

It must be observed that St. Thomas touches implicitly upon this consequence: The Son is not unequal to the Father. Therefore he is equal to him. Which consequence, although it does not hold in things that do not have quantity, or of which one is not quantified; nevertheless in those things each of which is quantified, as in the proposed case is presupposed concerning the Father and the Son as to the quantity of virtue and perfection, it holds. For since equal or unequal is a proper passion of quantity, concerning any two quantified things it is true to say that they are either equal, or they are unequal. And therefore, if they are posited not to be unequal, it follows best: Therefore they are equal.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of John 5, and of the Apostle in Philippians 2.

XXV. For the evidence of this conclusion, however, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. xlii, a. 1⁵¹, and in the First Book, d. xxxi⁵², that this equality which is between the divine persons is not a real relation like the equality that is between two quanta, but is a relation of reason. Because, since in a divine person there is nothing except essence and relation, on the part of the essence equality does not have the character of being a real relation, since there is one essence in number in all the divine persons: but of the same to itself there is no real relation. Nor does it have this on the part of relation: because a relation is not referred to a relation by a real relation, otherwise there would be an infinite regress in relations.

Hence, if it is asked whether the Son is really equal to the Father: it is said that for the Son to be said to be really equal to the Father can be understood in two ways. In one way, on account of a real relation of equality to the Father. And in this way the Son is not said to be really equal to the Father. — Or on account of the unity of essence, which is presupposed to the relation of equality, and on account of the real distinction of the personal relations. And in this way he is said to be really equal: because he really has that same essence and magnitude in number which the Father has, and is distinguished from the Father by a real relation of origin.

2. Against this, however, Scotus argues in the First Book, dist. xxxi⁵³, and Quodlib., qu. vi⁵⁴: because a real relation requires these three things: namely, that the foundation be real; that the extremes be real and really distinct; and that the relation itself belong to the extremes ex natura rei, without any operation of the intellect, or without the operation of an extrinsic power. But these are found in the divine equality, as is evident.

But it is answered that the second condition is lacking: because the extremes are not really distinct according to the foundation of the relation, which is understood in that condition. For the divine essence and magnitude, upon which equality is founded, is not one in one person and another in another, but is one in number in all.

3. But against this answer it is urged ⁵⁵. Paternity and filiation are real relations. And yet they do not have distinct foundations: since they are founded upon the divine essence, which is one. Therefore etc.

It is answered, and it is said first, that the personal relations have no foundation in reality: since they are subsistent. Nor does it follow, however, that they are relations of reason, as not having any foundation in reality. For it is indeed true in relations that are in a genus and are accidents that some foundation is required, and when the foundation does not exist, there is no real relation. But in relations outside a genus and per se subsisting, no foundation is required for their reality, but it suffices that they from their own nature are relations that subsist: for just as they do not require any supposit in which they may be received, but are the supposits themselves, so neither do they require any other foundation.

It is said secondly, that according to our mode of understanding and signifying, these relations are understood to have some foundation. But that is not the essence, as Scotus thinks, but production actively and passively signified: for paternity is founded upon generating, but filiation upon being generated. For although generating and being generated are the same as paternity and filiation in the divine, nevertheless, because they are not signified by mode of relation, but by mode of action and passion, they can be understood, as they are thus signified, as the foundations of the relations.

Capreolus treats this difficulty abundantly in the thirty-first distinction of the First Book ⁵⁶. Therefore there is no need to linger.

XXVI. The thirteenth conclusion is ⁵⁷: The Word of God can rightly be said to be conceived by God. It is proved. The Word of God is so begotten by God that nevertheless it does not depart from him, but remains in him. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because what is generated, as long as it remains in the generator, is said to be conceived. — It is confirmed by the authority of Proverbs viii, when it is said: The depths were not yet, and I was already conceived.

2. For the manifestation of this conclusion, St. Thomas notes first that there is a difference between the conception of the Word of God and the material conception of animals, because the offspring, as long as it is conceived and enclosed in the womb, does not yet have its ultimate perfection, so as to subsist per se as diverse from the generator according to place; and therefore conception is one thing, and birth another. But the Word of God, existing in God the speaker himself, is perfect, subsisting in itself distinct from God the speaker: since they are distinguished by relation alone. Therefore there both conception and birth are the same. Which is signified when in the same authority it is added: Before the hills I was brought forth.

He notes secondly that, because conception and birth in corporeal things are with motion and succession, therefore it is necessary that that which is conceived does not yet exist; and that what is brought forth is not yet distinct from the one bringing forth. But the conception and birth of the intelligible Word is not with motion and succession. Therefore at the same time while it is conceived, it exists: and while it is brought forth, it has distinct being. It is shown in illumination. — Moreover, this belongs to the divine Word also by this particular reason, that its conception and birth are in eternity, in which prior and posterior cannot exist. — It is confirmed by the same authority, when it is said: When he prepared the heavens, I was present.

From these things it is inferred that, since in the carnal generation of animals something is first conceived, then brought forth, then is present to the one bringing forth; in divine generation the Word is simultaneously conceived, brought forth, and present.

He notes thirdly that, just as to intimate the perfect distinction of the Word from the generator the generation of the Word is called birth; so also it is called generation from the womb, according to that saying of the Psalm ⁵⁸: Before the morning star I have begotten you. But to show that such a distinction does not exclude the Word from being in the speaker, it is said in John i that he is in the bosom of the Father.

He notes lastly that in carnal generation there is an active power, from which one is called father, and a passive power, from which one is called mother. Hence certain things belong to the father, such as to give nature and species: but certain things to the mother, such as to conceive and to give birth. But in the generation of the Word the ratio of mother does not apply, but only that of father: since the divine understanding is not through a passive power, but as it were active ⁵⁹, for the reason that the divine intellect is only in act. Therefore all things are attributed to the Father in Sacred Scripture: for he is said both to give life to the Son, and to conceive, and to give birth.

3. It must be noted, when St. Thomas says that the mother in carnal generation is named from the passive power, that this is not to be understood as if with respect to the generation of an animal the mother has only a passive potency, and in no way an active one, as some seem to attribute to St. Thomas: but because with respect to the formation and organization of the body the mother acts only passively, inasmuch as from her blood the body is formed and organized. With this, however, stands that she also acts actively with respect to something. For, as is had from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Third Part, q. xxxii, a. 4, and in the Third Book, d. iii, q. ii, a. 1, since three things are found in the generation of man, namely the formation and organization of the body, which is principal in generation; the preparation of the matter, so that it may be apt for the formation and organization of the human body, which precedes organization and formation; and also the good disposition of the offspring, which accompanies or follows the said formation: as to the first the mother acts only passively, because what she prepared and provided for the formation and organization of the body behaves to the formation itself only materially, for it is that from which as from matter the body is formed. But as to the other two she acts actively: for in the mother there is an active power by which her blood is prepared and disposed so that from it the human body can be formed; likewise in her womb there is a power which provides nourishment and improvement to the conceived offspring, as is according to the mind of Avicenna, in the chapter on the Deluges ⁶⁰.

4. From which it is clear that the reasoning of Scotus, in III Sent., d. iv ⁶¹, against St. Thomas is null, when he argues that since male and female are of the same species, it is necessary that similar powers follow their forms; and thus, since an active vegetative power follows the form of the male, it is necessary that the vegetative power of the female also be active.

What is inferred is indeed conceded, nor is this against the teaching of St. Thomas. For he himself concedes that the generative power is active in the female as well as in the male: but he says that this is perfect in the male and extends itself to the formation of the generated; but in the female it is imperfect, and does not extend itself all the way to the formation of the generated, but only to the preparation of the matter, or also to some improvement of the conceived offspring. Hence, although the generative power of the female is active, it is nevertheless said to concur passively to generation, but not actively, because, although it acts actively with respect to certain things, nevertheless with respect to the formation of the offspring, which is principal in generation, it acts only passively, namely while from the matter prepared by her the offspring is formed.

5. It must be noted, when it is said that the divine understanding is not through any passive power, but as it were active, that there is a difference between the human intellect and the divine intellect, because the human intellect is moved by intelligible things, and therefore is called a passive power, as that which is compared to its object as passive to active, from which it follows that human understanding is through a passive power: but the divine intellect is not moved by its object, but is entirely the same as it. Therefore it is not called a passive power: and consequently divine understanding is not through a passive power. But it is said to be, not through an active power simpliciter, but as it were through an active one: because the divine intellect is not properly a cause and active power with respect to its act, since it is distinguished from it neither according to substance nor according to esse; but it is said to be as it were active, because, if they are distinguished by the work of the intellect, we understand that the act of the intellect itself is not caused in it by an object, but only that the intellect, existing of itself in act, is the productive principle of it.