Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Francesco Silvestri

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles

First published 1918

In Book IV of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) examines Aquinas's treatment of revealed mysteries: the Trinity, the Incarnation, the sacraments, and the resurrection. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XV (1930). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.


Prooemium

Caput I: Quod sit generatio, paternitas et filiatio in divinis

Caput II: Quod filius Dei sit Deus

Caput III: Quid opinatus sit Photinus de filio Dei, et eius improbatio

Caput IV: Opinio Sabellii de filio Dei, et eius improbatio

Caput V: De opinione Arii circa filium Dei

Caput VI: Improbatio opinionis Arii de filio Dei

Caput VII: Solutio ad auctoritates quas Arius pro se inducebat

Having excluded the false positions of the heretics concerning the generation of Christ, St. Thomas turns to the resolution of those things which were brought forward by them for the confirmation of their positions. And first, he resolves the arguments of Arius; second, the arguments of Sabellius and Photinus, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he premises that, when we say the Father and the Son are God, we do not say that there are two Gods, but one: since it has been said that they have the numerically same divine nature. For if there were several gods, it would be necessary for the nature of divinity to be partitioned in each: especially since the divine nature and God Himself are not distinct. From which it is evident that we do not depart from the teaching by which only one God is posited.

It should be noted that this conditional proposition of St. Thomas, If there were several gods, it would be necessary for the nature of divinity to be partitioned in each, is grounded upon this: that a substantive noun is not said plurally of some things except on account of the plurality of the form signified by it being found in them; just as several men are spoken of on account of several humanities existing in them. Moreover, he adds, especially since the divine nature and God Himself are not distinct, because the all-embracing identity between God and deity makes that conditional proposition more manifest. For if God and deity are entirely the same on the part of the thing signified, and there are several gods, it is necessary that there also be several deities.

  1. This being presupposed, to the first argument it is said first that, when the Lord speaks to the Father saying, that they may know Thee the only etc., it is not to be understood that the Father alone is true God and the Son is not true God, but that that which is the only true deity belongs to the Father. Hence He said, that they may know Thee, punctuating here, namely; then He adds, the only true God. Nay rather, because a true Son must be of the same nature with the father, it rather follows that that which is the only true divinity belongs to the Son, than that the Son is excluded from it. Hence in I John, at the end, both of these—namely, that He is true God, and that in Him is eternal life—are attributed to the Son.

It is said secondly that, even if the Son had confessed that the Father alone is true God, the Son is not on this account understood to be excluded: because, since the Father and the Son are one God, whatever is said of the Father by reason of divinity is the same as if it were said of the Son, and conversely. — Which is confirmed from the fact that, when it is said in Matt. 11, No one knows the Son except the Father, nor anyone the Father except the Son, neither the Father is understood to be excluded from knowledge of Himself, nor the Son.

  1. For the clarity of this response, it must be considered that, although this word alone is not properly placed on the part of the predicate, but only on the part of the subject, as is said in the Prima Pars, q. 31, a. 3; nevertheless, on account of some other implication, it can sometimes be placed on the part of the predicate. Hence this proposition, that they may know Thee the only true God, can be resolved thus: that they may know Thee, God, Who is the only true God. And it can also be resolved thus: that they may know Thee, Father, Who alone art true God. For in the first, the term alone is placed on the part of the predicate; but in the second, on the part of the subject. In the first, the sense is that the Father is God, Whose nature—namely God's—alone is true deity; but in the second, the sense is that true deity belongs to the Father alone.

Therefore, St. Thomas, responding in a twofold way, admits both senses of this proposition. And to indicate the first sense, which he takes in the first response, he says that the Evangelist did not say by a certain continuation, that they may know Thee the only true God; but with a certain punctuation interposed, namely, that they may know Thee, then, as if declaring what the Father is, he added, the only true God, in order to show that the Father is God in Whom is found that which alone is true divinity. — But to indicate the second sense, which he takes in the second response, he says, if the Son had nonetheless confessed that the Father alone was true God.

  1. Where it must be noted, from his doctrine in the place cited above, a. 4, and I Sent., d. 21, q. 2, that the word "alone" can exclude another person masculinely, and it can exclude another thing neutrally. If it excludes another person masculinely, the sense is that no other person than the Father is true God. And because the Son is another person from the Father, through this the Son is excluded from true deity. Because this was shown above to be false, in this sense such a proposition is not to be admitted; nor does the Evangelist take it in this sense. — But if it excludes another thing neutrally, the sense is that nothing other than the Father is true God. And because the Son is not another thing from the Father, since theirs is one substance and essence in number, the Son is therefore not excluded through it. And therefore, admitting it in this sense, St. Thomas says that on this account the Son is not excluded from true divinity: because, since the Father and the Son are one God, whatever is said of the Father by reason of divinity is the same as if it were said of the Son, and conversely. The sense is that, because the Father is not another thing from the Son, nor conversely, but rather they are substantially and in deity one, what is said of the one is understood to be said of the other: namely, of those things which pertain to the deity, in which they are one; or of those things which are said of either of them by reason of divinity. For whatever is said of one of those things which are one in something, by reason of that in which they are one, is understood to be said also of the other, since in that they have no distinction: just as, because action and passion are one in motion, whatever is said of action by reason of motion is also said of passion; such as to be an imperfect act, to be the act of a being in potency, and the like.

II. To the second argument it is answered from what has been said. And it is said first, that in those words, whom in His own times He will show, the blessed and only King of Kings etc., the true divinity of the Son is not excluded: because the Father is not named, but that which is common to the Father and the Son, namely blessed. Hence that the Son is the King of Kings etc. is shown in Apoc. 19, He was clothed with a garment etc.

It is said secondly, that neither from those words, who alone has immortality, is the Son excluded: since He also confers immortality on those believing in Him, as is said in John 11. — Similarly also that which is added, whom no man has seen etc., namely according to the deity, is certain to belong to the Son, since it is said in Matt. 11, No one knows the Son except the Father: although according to the flesh He was made visible, as is clear from the Apostle in the same Epistle, when it is said, Manifest etc.

It is said thirdly, that the aforesaid authority does not compel as if it were necessary that one be the one showing and another the one shown, for the Son also shows Himself: as is clear in John 14, He who loves etc.; and it is said to Him, Show Thy face, and we shall be saved.

III. To the third it is said, that the Father is said to be greater than the Son according to that in which the Son is made less. But this is according to the assumption of the form of a servant, yet in such a way that He is equal to God according to the divine form: as is clear from the Apostle, to the Philippians 2, When in the form etc.

It is said secondly, that it is no wonder if the Father is said to be greater than Him on this account: because He is also said to have been made less than the angels, in Heb. 2, Him who for a little etc.

It is said thirdly, that from this it is also clear that the Son according to His humanity is subject to the Father. Which appears from the very context of the text of the Apostle, which shows that this belongs to Christ according as He died and rose again.

IV. To the fourth it is said first, that the Father giving to the Son, from which it follows that the Son receives, does not show any neediness in the Son, but this is required in order that He may be the Son: because He could not be called Son unless He were begotten by the Father. Hence by the fact that the Father is said to give to the Son, nothing else is understood than the generation of the Son, through which the Father gave to the Son His own nature.

It is said secondly, that this can be understood from that which is given. For in John 10 that which is given to the Son is shown to be greater than all things. But this is the divine nature, in which the Son is equal to the Father. — Also in Philippians 2 it is said that He gave Him a name which is above every name etc.: but such is the name of divinity. — Likewise, all things are said to have been given to Him by the Father. But this would not be unless the whole fullness of divinity, which is in the Father, were in the Son. — From which it is clear that by this giving generation itself is understood, according to which the Father gave true deity to the Son.

From this it is inferred that, when Christ asserts that the Father gave to Him, He confesses that He is true Son, against Sabellius; but from the greatness of that which is given, He confesses that He is equal to the Father, against Arius.

It is said thirdly, that from what has been said it is clear that such giving does not signify neediness in the Son. Both because the Son was not before it was given to Him. — And because the fullness of what was given does not allow that he to whom it is established to have been given could be in need.

If it be urged that in the Scriptures the Father is read to have given to the Son in time: just as after the Resurrection the Lord says to the disciples, All power is given to Me etc.; and in Philippians 2 it is said that for this cause God also exalted Him etc.: — it is said that it is the customary manner of Scripture that some things are said to be or to be made when they become known. And thus it is to be understood concerning the power of Christ, which was manifested after the Resurrection through the preaching of the Apostles. This is also shown in John 17, through His own words, Glorify Me, Father etc.

  1. For the clarity of this response, it must be considered that to be in need of some thing presupposes existence: for what does not exist cannot be said to be in need of anything. Likewise, to be in need of something includes the lack of something: for that which lacks no thing, but has every perfection, cannot be in need. On account of the first, therefore, St. Thomas said that the giving by which the Father gives the divine nature to the Son does not show neediness: because before the giving itself the Son was not, so as to be able, namely, to be said to be in need, but just as He was from eternity, so from eternity He received the nature from the Father. On account of the second, he said that the fullness of what was given does not allow him to whom it was given to be in need, even after he exists, namely: because if the fullness of every good has been given to Him, He can no longer be in need of anything.

V. To the fifth it is said first, that by the fact that the Son received the divine nature from the Father, He is said to have heard from the Father and the like, because, since to understand and to be are the same in God, the communication of the divine nature is also the communication of intelligence. But the communication of intelligence can be called demonstration, or speaking, or teaching. Such a thing, however, is not said as if the Son were previously ignorant and afterwards the Father taught Him, since in I Cor. 1 He is called the power and wisdom of God: for wisdom cannot be ignorant, nor power be weak.

It is said secondly that, when the Son is said to be unable to do anything of Himself, it shows no weakness of acting in the Son: but because, since in God acting is not distinct from being, nor is His action distinct from His essence, the Son is said to be unable to act of Himself in the same way that He cannot be of Himself, but only from the Father.

It is said thirdly that, although the Son is not of Himself nor acts of Himself, He is nevertheless per se, and acts per se: because just as He is through His proper nature, which He received from the Father, so also He acts through His proper nature received from the Father.

  1. For the clarity of this, it must be considered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I Sent., dist. 32, q. 2, a. 2, that these prepositions "from" (a) and "through" (per) differ in this: that "from" designates only the relation of a principle by mode of an efficient cause, but "through" designates the relation of a principle according to every genus of cause; hence that which is from something is through it, but not conversely. Therefore, because in the divine persons there cannot be a relation except by mode of an effective or originating principle, and by mode of a formal principle, this preposition through (per) in the divine persons imports only one of those relations. Thus it is well said here that the Son is not from Himself (a se), nor does He act from Himself (a se): because it would then be signified that He had being and operation from Himself, and not from another as from an originating principle; which is false, since He has being and acting from the Father. But He is well said to be per se and to act per se, according as this preposition per is construed in the relation of a formal principle. For He is formally through His own essence, and formally acts by His own power: for per se, as is said in Metaphysics V, signifies what is through the essence of a thing.

VI. To the sixth it is said first, that the Father commanding the Son, and the Son obeying the Father, belong to the Son according as He is subject to the Father, which is not except according to the assumed humanity. Which is shown from the context of the Gospel where it is cited, and also from the Apostle, in Philippians 2.

It is said secondly, that to pray also belongs to Him according to the human nature: as is clear through the Apostle, in Heb. 5.

It is said thirdly, that He is also said to have been sent according to the assumed flesh, according as He was made of a woman, as is shown in Gal. 4. — Although the Son is also said to be sent invisibly by the Father inasmuch as He is God, without prejudice to equality with the Father, as will be shown below.

VII. To the seventh it is similarly said first, that the Son is not said to be glorified by the Father except according to the human nature, inasmuch as His clarity, which was hidden under the weakness of the flesh, was manifested in the faith of believing peoples through the glorification of the flesh and the working of miracles.

It is said secondly, that He was also raised, suffered, and died according to the flesh: as is clear from I Pet. 4.

It is said thirdly, that He was also exalted according as He was humbled, namely according to the flesh: as is clear in Philippians 2.

Hence from the aforesaid the Son is not shown to be less than the Father except according to humanity. For according to the divine nature the Son exalts Himself by His proper power: Psalm, Be Thou exalted etc. He raises Himself up: John 10, I have power etc. He glorifies not only Himself, but also the Father: John 17, Glorify etc.: not indeed by giving clarity to Him, but by manifesting to the world Him Who is hidden by the invisibility of His nature.

VIII. To the eighth it is said first that, when Christ says, To sit however etc., He does not show that the Son does not have the power of distributing the heavenly seats. Both because through a sitting of this kind participation in eternal life is understood, the collation of which He shows to pertain to Himself when He says, John 10, My sheep etc. — And because, as is said in John 5, The Father gave all judgment to the Son: but it pertains to judgment that according to merits some be placed in heavenly glory. — It is also confirmed by the authority of Matt. 25, where it is shown to pertain to the power of the Son to place someone on the right hand or on the left: whether both are referred to a different participation of glory; or one is referred to glory, and the other to punishment.

It is said secondly, that the sense of the aforesaid words is that it was not His to give this inasmuch as He was the Son of the Virgin, by reason of which it pertained to Him according to carnal kinship, but inasmuch as He was the Son of God; and to those for whom it was prepared by the Father through eternal predestination, which predestination is also shown to pertain to the Son in John 14, where it is said, In the house etc. This sense is shown from the fact that, when the mother asked for that with a certain confidence of the carnal kinship which she had with Christ, He answered that it did not pertain to Him to give to them: not, however, that it does not pertain absolutely to His power to give what was asked.

It is said thirdly, that the Son cannot be understood to be ignorant of the hour of His coming, since in Him are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and He also perfectly knows the Father Himself, which is greater: but that He bore Himself in the manner of one who is ignorant, while He did not reveal it to the disciples. For it is the customary manner in the Scriptures that God is said to know something if He causes it to be known: as is clear in Gen. 22, Now I know etc. And thus, conversely, the Son is said not to know what He does not make us know.

It is said fourthly, that sorrow, fear, and the like, pertain to Christ according as He is man.

IX. To the ninth it is said first, that the cited authority can be understood not of that wisdom which is the Son of God, but of that which God bestowed upon creatures, concerning which it is said in Sirach 1, He created her etc.

It is said secondly, that it can also be referred to the created nature assumed: so that the sense is, From the beginning I was created, that is, I was foreseen to be united to a creature.

It is said thirdly, that it can also be understood of the Son, so that through the fact that wisdom is called both created and begotten, the mode of divine generation is intimated to us: so that, namely, from creation the immutability of the Father is taken, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. And thus the Synod explained the meaning of this Scripture, as is clear through Hilary.

  1. It must be noted that, when a name in its signification imports something of perfection and something of imperfection, it is not unfitting for it to be assumed in divine things by reason of the perfection which it imports, although by reason of the imported imperfection it is not assumed: as is most common in the doctrine of St. Thomas. Therefore, because in creation the one creating is not changed, which is of perfection; but the created thing does not receive the nature of the one creating, which is of imperfection; just as conversely in generation that which is begotten receives the nature of the one begetting, but the one begetting is himself changed among us: it is not unfitting for creation to be said of the Son of God, inasmuch as through it the immutability of the producing Father is signified. And thus the Son can be said to be created, inasmuch as in His production the Father was in no way changed. From which sense it appears that on this account the Son of God ought not to be called a creature simpliciter and properly, but only secundum quid and improperly: inasmuch as the name of creation is not attributed to Him by reason of the whole of its signification, but only by reason of a part.

X. To the tenth it is said that from the fact that the Son is called the firstborn of creation, it is not shown that He is in the order of creatures: but that He is and receives from the Father, from Whom creatures are and receive; although He receives the same nature, but creatures do not. On account of which He is also called the only-begotten.

XI. To the eleventh it is said first, that the Son speaks of the union through love, in which way the Father and the Son are one, and the disciples ought to be one.

It is said secondly, that this mode of union, namely between the Father and the Son, does not exclude unity of essence, but rather demonstrates it: since it is said in John 3, The Father loves the Son etc.

Caput VIII: Solutio ad auctoritates Photini et Sabellii

Caput IX: Rationes contra generationem et processionem divinam

Caput X: Quomodo accipienda sit generatio in divinis, et quae de filio Dei dicuntur in Scripturis

Caput XI: Quomodo filius Dei dicatur Dei sapientia

Caput XII: Quod non est nisi unus filius in divinis

Caput XIII: Solutio ad rationes supra inductas contra generationem divinam

Caput XIV: De spiritu sancto, quod sit in divinis

Caput XV: Rationes ex quibus aliqui spiritum sanctum existimaverunt esse creaturam

Caput XVI: Quod spiritus sanctus sit verus Deus

Caput XVII: Quod spiritus sanctus sit subsistens persona

Caput XVIII: Quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de spiritu sancto dicuntur

Caput XIX: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto in Scripturis respectu totius creaturae

Caput XX: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto in sacra Scriptura respectu rationalis creaturae, quantum ad ea quae Deus nobis largitur

Caput XXI: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto secundum quod movet creaturam in Deum

Caput XXII: Solutio rationum supra inductarum contra divinitatem spiritus sancti

Caput XXIII: Quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio

Caput XXIV: Rationes ostendere volentium quod spiritus sanctus non procedat a filio, et solutio ipsarum

Caput XXV: Quod non sunt nisi tres personae in divinis pater, filius et spiritus sanctus

Caput XXVI: De incarnatione verbi secundum traditionem sacrae Scripturae

Caput XXVII: De errore Photini circa incarnationem

Caput XXVIII: De errore Manichaeorum circa incarnationem

Caput XXIX: De errore Valentini circa incarnationem

Caput XXX: De errore Apollinaris circa corpus Christi

Caput XXXI: De errore Arii et Apollinaris circa animam Christi

Caput XXXII: De errore Apollinaris dicentis animam rationalem non fuisse in Christo, et de errore Origenis dicentis animam Christi ante mundum fuisse creatam

Caput XXXIII: De errore Theodori Mopsuesteni et Nestorii circa unionem verbi ad hominem

Caput XXXIV: Contra errorem Eutychetis

Caput XXXV: De errore Macarii Antiocheni ponentis unam tantum voluntatem in Christo

Caput XXXVI: Contra eos qui dixerunt ex anima et corpore non esse aliquid unum constitutum in Christo

Caput XXXVII: Contra eos qui ponunt duo supposita vel duas hypostases in una persona Christi

Caput XXXVIII: Quid Catholica fides sentiat de incarnatione Christi

Caput XXXIX: Obiectiones contra fidem incarnationis

Caput XL: Quomodo oporteat intelligere incarnationem filii Dei

Caput XLI: Quod assumptio humanae naturae maxime competebat verbo Dei

Caput XLII: Quod humana natura assumpta a verbo non praeextitit assumptioni, sed in ipsa conceptione fuit assumpta

Caput XLIII: Quod natura assumpta a verbo in ipsa conceptione fuit perfecta quantum ad animam et corpus

Caput XLIV: Quod Christum decuit nasci ex virgine

Caput XLV: Quod Christus natus est de spiritu sancto

Caput XLVI: Quod Christus non fuit filius spiritus sancti secundum carnem

Caput XLVII: Quod non sit dicendum Christum esse creaturam

Caput XLVIII: Solutio rationum contra incarnationem superius positarum

Caput XLIX: Quod peccatum originale traducatur a primo parente in posteros

Caput L: Obiectiones contra peccatum originale

Caput LI: Solutio obiectionum positarum

Caput LII: Rationes quibus videtur probari quod non fuit conveniens Deum incarnari

Caput LIII: Quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari

Caput LIV: Solutio rationum supra positarum contra convenientiam incarnationis

Caput LV: De necessitate sacramentorum

Caput LVI: De distinctione sacramentorum veteris et novae legis

Caput LVII: De numero sacramentorum novae legis

Caput LVIII: De Baptismo

Caput LIX: De confirmatione

Caput LX: De Eucharistia

Caput LXI: De errore infidelium circa sacramentum Eucharistiae

Caput LXII: Solutio praemissarum difficultatum, et primo quoad conversionem panis in corpus Christi

Caput LXIII: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte loci

Caput LXIV: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte accidentium

Caput LXV: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte actionis et passionis

Caput LXVI: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte fractionis

Caput LXVII: Solutio auctoritatis inductae

Caput LXVIII: Ex quali pane et vino debet confici hoc sacramentum

Caput LXIX: De sacramento poenitentiae. Et primo, quod homines post gratiam sacramentalem acceptam peccare possunt

Caput LXX: Quod homo peccans post sacramentorum gratiam potest converti per gratiam

Caput LXXI: De necessitate poenitentiae et partium eius

Caput LXXII: De sacramento extremae unctionis

Caput LXXIII: De sacramento ordinis

Caput LXXIV: De distinctione ordinum

Caput LXXV: De episcopali potestate: et quod in ea unus sit summus

Caput LXXVI: Quod per malos ministros sacramenta dispensari possunt

Caput LXXVII: De sacramento matrimonii

Caput LXXVIII: Quod per Christum resurrectio corporum sit futura

Caput LXXIX: Obiectiones contra resurrectionem

Caput LXXX: Solutio praemissarum obiectionum

Caput LXXXI: Quod homines resurgent immortales

Caput LXXXII: Quod in resurgentibus non erit usus ciborum neque venereorum

Caput LXXXIII: Quod corpora resurgentium erunt eiusdem naturae

Caput LXXXIV: Quod corpora resurgentium erunt alterius dispositionis

Caput LXXXV: De qualitate corporum glorificatorum

Caput LXXXVI: De loco corporum glorificatorum

Caput LXXXVII: De sexu et aetate resurgentium

Caput LXXXVIII: De qualitate corporum resurgentium in damnatis

Caput LXXXIX: Quomodo substantiae incorporeae patiantur ab igne corporeo

Caput XC: Quod animae statim post separationem a corpore poenam vel praemium consequuntur

Caput XCI: Quod animae sanctorum post mortem habent voluntatem immutabilem in bono

Caput XCII: Quod animae malorum post mortem habent voluntatem immutabilem in malo

Caput XCIII: De immutabilitate voluntatis in animabus in Purgatorio detentis

Caput XCIV: De immutabilitate voluntatis communiter in omnibus animabus post separationem a corpore

Caput XCV: De finali iudicio

Caput XCVI: De statu mundi post iudicium

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