Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Having completed the first three Books Against the Gentiles, we must proceed to the interpretation of the fourth Book.

Now it is divided into two parts: namely, into the prooemium; and the treatise¹.

Concerning the first, St. Thomas does two things: first, he shows what this fourth Book ought to treat; second, he shows how one must proceed in it².

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that man's knowledge of divine things is threefold; second, he infers what is proposed³.

I. As to the first, he sets down four conclusions⁴. The first of these is: The human intellect is not able through itself (that is, by its own power) to attain to gazing upon the divine substance in itself.

It is proved. The human intellect receives knowledge connaturally to itself from sensible things. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the divine substance is elevated disproportionately⁵ above all sensible things, nay rather above all other beings.

2. Concerning this conclusion, it must be noted that St. Thomas presupposes, from what precedes, that distinction concerning knowledge: namely, that something can be known in two ways, in one way in another, in another way in itself. Something is said to be known in another when it is known not through its own and adequate species, but through the species of that in which it is contained: just as Socrates is seen in a mirror. But it is said to be known in itself when it is known through its own and adequate species: just as Socrates is when he is seen in his presence through himself. The human intellect, therefore, is said not to be able by the power of its own nature to be elevated to gazing upon the divine substance in itself, so as to exclude that knowledge by which God is known in known creatures through the likeness of the creatures themselves. For the intellect can do this by its own power.

3. Concerning the proof of the conclusion, however, it must be noted that, since the intellect receives its knowledge by way of the senses, the intellect cannot naturally arrive at any other knowledge than that to which sensible things themselves, and their intellectual likenesses, can lead. Sensible things, however, because they are unequal and disproportionate effects of the divine nature, inasmuch as they are infinitely distant from its perfection, can indeed, insofar as they are divine effects, lead to some knowledge of God; but because they are inadequate and disproportionate effects, they cannot lead to such a knowledge of Him as is perfect, by which, namely, the divine substance is seen in itself; for every likeness impressed upon the intellect from sensible things is adequate to some creature, and none represents the divine substance according to what it is in itself.

II. The second conclusion is: A certain way is given to man through which he can ascend to the knowledge of God. — It is proved. Because otherwise so noble a creature would seem to exist in vain, if it were not able to attain its proper end: for the perfect good of man is that he know God in some way.

It must be noted that St. Thomas calls the perfect good of man the ultimate complement of his natural perfection, which indeed consists in the attainment of the end: for this is to know God in some way. Hence the Philosopher, in Ethics X⁶, places happiness in the knowledge of the highest intelligible. On account of this, he infers that, if there were not given to man some way of arriving at the knowledge of God, he would not be able to attain his end, and thus he would exist in vain.

III. For the explanation of this conclusion, he notes first, that this way is the proceeding of things from God in a certain order, from the lower things of which proceeding man, beginning and ascending step by step, advances to the knowledge of God. Moreover, the identity of this way is shown from bodily motions, in which the way by which one ascends and descends is the same, distinguished by reason of the beginning and the end.

He notes secondly, that the account of the descent of perfections from God is twofold. The first is on the part of the first origin of things: according as divine wisdom produced things in an order, so that the universe of creatures might be completed from the highest and the lowest of things. The second is from the things themselves: insofar as the things first⁷ caused fall short of the first cause, which is God, and they themselves excel their own effects, and so on until one reaches the ultimate of things.

He notes thirdly that, because in God the most perfect unity is found; and each thing, the more it is one, the more virtuous and worthy it is: the farther one recedes from the first principle, so much greater diversity and variation is found in things. And thus according to the diversity of things there appears a diversity of ways, as it were originating from one principle, and terminating at diverse things.

He notes fourthly, that through these ways indeed our intellect can ascend to the knowledge of God, but on account of its weakness we cannot perfectly know even the ways themselves. Both because, since the intellect can scarcely arrive through external accidents at an interior knowledge⁸ even of those things whose accidents it perfectly comprehends by sense, it will be able to comprehend much less the natures of those things of which we grasp few accidents by sense; and still less of those whose accidents cannot be grasped. — And because, even if the natures of things were known, nevertheless their order, according as they are disposed and directed to an end by divine providence, can be only tenuously known to us.

IV. For the evidence of what St. Thomas first notes⁹, it must be considered that, since the proceeding of perfections from God has two terms, namely the first principle itself, which is God, from whom all perfection originates, and the ultimate perfections of things, the human intellect cannot know this proceeding of ordered things and perfections by beginning from the highest peak, God, and descending to lower things, since God escapes all knowledge of sense, from which the knowledge of our intellect has its origin; but it is necessary that it begin from lower perfections, and ascend step by step to the knowledge of higher things, until it reaches the knowledge of God. Because, however, the way of descent and ascent is the same in reality, just as the ladder by which one ascends and descends is the same, distinguished only in reason, — insofar as, when motion on it begins from the highest and terminates at the lowest, it is called the way of descent; but insofar as it begins from the lowest and terminates at the highest, it is called an ascent — therefore it can be said that the way through which the human intellect can ascend to the knowledge of God is the proceeding of perfections from God in a certain order; for just as in a certain order they descend from the highest peak, so through them in a certain order, beginning from lower things, namely from corruptible things, the human intellect ascends to God.

2. Concerning that which is noted secondly, it must be observed that that twofold account of the descent of perfections from God is understood in such a way that the first account is divine wisdom, establishing the order of perfections of this kind in things, namely so that some are supreme, while some are lowest. For divine wisdom itself is called the first origin of things, insofar as the order of all things is established in the divine mind before things are produced into being in a certain order. And thus, while things are produced into being according to that order which divine wisdom established, divine wisdom itself is the first principle whence the order of things originates.

The second, however, is the nature of the produced things themselves. For since all things are caused by God, it is clear that it belongs to them to fall short of God Himself in perfection. But since among the things caused by God one is the cause of another, — understand, not only as one individual is the cause of another individual in the same species, but as one is the cause of another according to its whole species, in the way that heaven is the cause of corruptible species that are entirely material — one must be more excellent and more perfect than the other: for the cause of some whole species is more perfect than that species. And thus, descending even to the lowest species, from the very nature of things, according as certain things are the cause of other things, it is clear that the perfections of creatures descend from God in a certain order: because namely some, according to their nature, are closer to God according to perfection, while some are more remote from Him.

3. Concerning that which is noted thirdly, it must be observed that, since in God there is most perfect unity, by the fact that He is most simple, and has in Himself no multiplicity of things, as was shown above ¹⁰, and since God is both most virtuous and most worthy: since, as is said here, each thing, the more it is one, namely according to its nature, the more virtuous and worthy it is, as participating so much more in the ratio of being; it is necessary that, the more something recedes from God Himself (not indeed according to local distance, but according to perfectional distance), the less one, and the less perfect, and the less worthy it is. For this reason St. Thomas very well infers that the proceedings of perfections from God are multiplied according to the multiplicity of the lowest things. For these are distant from the divine perfection in the highest degree, and therefore in them the greatest multiplicity, variety, and imperfection are found.

4. Concerning that which is noted fourthly, it must be noted that in the proceeding of creatures from God two things can be considered: namely, the things themselves, proceeding from God in a certain order; and the order of the things themselves to one another and to the end appointed for them by divine wisdom. If this proceeding, according to which diverse ways of ascending to God are established, is considered as to the things themselves, in this way St. Thomas says that it is known imperfectly by us: insofar as there are certain things of which we know few accidents by sense, such as heavenly bodies, especially those which are more distant from the lower world; while certain things, such as separated substances, are such that their accidents cannot be grasped by sense, although they are participated through certain deficient effects; for the effects caused in these lower things by separated substances fall short of the representation of them, insofar as these material things, which fall under the sense, are unequal to them. — But if this proceeding is considered as to the order of things itself, in this way St. Thomas adds that the aforesaid ways are also known imperfectly by us: insofar as, even if we knew the things themselves perfectly as to their substance, we nevertheless do not perfectly know the order imposed upon them by divine wisdom; for the reason that we do not know the very ratio of divine wisdom, that is, the very conception of the divine intellect by which He orders and disposes things.

V. The third conclusion is: Through these ways we cannot arrive at knowing perfectly the principle of these ways, namely God. — It is proved first. The ways themselves are imperfectly known by us. Therefore etc. — Secondly. God exceeds the aforesaid ways without proportion. Therefore etc.

Note that from this second reason it is given to be understood that the aforesaid ways, and the aforesaid proceedings of creatures, although they are united in God, nevertheless do not include God Himself as an intrinsic principle of them, but as an extrinsic principle, which is the productive principle of all these ways. For if He pertained intrinsically to these ways, that which is said here, namely that God exceeds the aforesaid ways without proportion, would be false. Hence, when it was said above that the process of emanation from God is united in the principle itself, it must be understood of the extrinsic principle, not of the intrinsic.

VI. The fourth conclusion is: Fittingly God, out of superabundant goodness, revealed certain things about Himself to men. — It is proved. The knowledge of God, to which man was able to attain through the aforesaid ways by a kind of intellectual intuition, as it were, was weak. Therefore it was fitting that God should reveal some things about Himself, so that such knowledge might be firmer.

2. For the evidence of these things, two points must be observed. The first is, that intellectual intuition properly belongs to that knowledge by which a thing is seen in itself through its proper species. Because therefore man cannot know God through Himself and through His proper species in this life, but only through the species of creatures, on that account his knowledge is not properly called intellectual intuition. For this reason St. Thomas called it not simply intellectual intuition, but as it were. For properly indeed, a man ascending to the knowledge of God through the aforesaid ways does not gaze upon God: he can nevertheless be said as it were to gaze upon Him, when he arrives at that knowledge which is the most perfect among the knowledges had of God from creatures; for on account of its excess over other imperfect knowledges, it can be called as it were intuitive knowledge.

The other is that, although God out of His goodness communicates to the creature whatever He communicates to it, He is nevertheless said to communicate some things out of superabundant goodness, insofar as those things are not required for the integrity of the nature to which they are communicated, as if such things were owed to it, on the supposition that God wills to produce that creature; but God, without any debt simply speaking existing on the part of the creature, communicates them to the creature. And these are the things that are superadded to natural perfection. Because therefore it does not belong to the natural perfection of man that he receive from God some knowledge of divine things through revelation, but only that he ascend to God from creatures; therefore it is fittingly said here that God out of superabundant goodness revealed certain things about Himself to men, so that knowledge might be firmer, while namely man knows that divine revelation is infallible.

3. For the manifestation of this conclusion, however, St. Thomas notes that things of this kind, according to man's congruence, are thus first revealed to him in such a way that they are nevertheless not understood, but are only believed as it were by being heard: because, according to this state, the intellect cannot be elevated to gazing upon those things which exceed all proportions of the senses. But when it has been freed from the connection with sensible things, then it will be elevated to gazing upon the things that are revealed.

It must be noted that St. Thomas speaks according to the common and customary mode of divine revelation, which is that in this life divine things revealed to us are believed, rather than seen. But sometimes, beyond the customary mode, God elevates some even to gazing upon the divine essence itself, as is believed of Moses and Paul ¹¹. Although it could also be said that they were in a certain way freed from the connection with sensible things, insofar as they were not then using the senses.

VII. From these things St. Thomas infers that man's knowledge of divine things is threefold: namely natural, which is through creatures; that which is had through revelation, not as though divine truth were demonstrated to be seen, but as though it were uttered in speech to be believed; and that according to which the human mind is elevated to gazing perfectly upon those things which have been revealed.

This principal conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Job 26¹². For he touches upon the first knowledge, saying: Behold, these are spoken in part of His ways. — But the second when he says: and when we have scarcely heard a small drop of His words. For faith is from hearing, as is had in Rom. 10, but hearing through the word of God, concerning which in John 17. — But the third when he says: Who will be able to gaze upon the thunder of His greatness? For because through it the divine majesty will be known clearly and manifestly, as is had in 1 John 3, and Exod. 33, and John 16, the thing known through that knowledge is fittingly called thunder: for thunder is a most manifest thing. How, moreover, that authority suits what is proposed is clearly shown in the text.

2. These things having been premised, St. Thomas infers the principal purpose of this part¹³, saying that, since in the preceding there has been discourse concerning divine things according as natural reason can arrive at them through creatures, imperfectly nevertheless, there remains to be had discourse concerning those things which have been divinely revealed to us as to be believed, exceeding the human intellect.

VIII. As to the second principal point, he shows how one must proceed in this book¹⁴. And he says two things. The first is, that this mode must be observed, that those things which have been handed down in the discourses of Sacred Scripture should be taken as principles; and thus we should strive in whatever way to grasp with the mind the things that are secretly handed down to us in the aforesaid discourses, by defending them from the laceration of unbelievers; the presumption of knowing perfectly being removed, however, because things of this kind must be proved by the authority of Sacred Scripture, but not by natural reason. It must be shown, nevertheless, that they are not opposed to natural reason.

The second is that, since natural reason ascends to the knowledge of God through creatures, while the knowledge of faith conversely descends from God into us by divine revelation; and the way of ascent and descent is the same: one must proceed by the same way in those things which are believed above reason, by which it was proceeded in the above concerning those things which are investigated concerning God by reason; so that namely there are handed down first those things which are proposed to be believed in God Himself, such as the confession of the Trinity; secondly, those things which were done by God above reason, such as the work of the Incarnation; thirdly, those things which are expected above reason in the ultimate end of men, such as the resurrection, etc. The aforesaid authority is also adapted to this process.

For the evidence of this, it must be noted that in the process concerning those things which were investigated concerning God by natural reason, such an order was observed, as was clear in what preceded, that first a consideration was had concerning those things which belong to God according to Himself; secondly, concerning the proceeding of creatures from Him; thirdly, concerning the order of creatures unto Him as unto an end. Because therefore one must proceed by the same way concerning those things which are known concerning God through divine revelation, St. Thomas says that, correspondingly to the aforesaid order, it is necessary to treat first of those things which are proposed to be believed above reason in God Himself; then of those things which were done by God above reason; thirdly, of those things which are expected in the ultimate end.

IX. But a doubt arises. For although the way of ascent and descent is the same materially, they are nevertheless distinguished formally by reason of the beginning and the end, as was said above¹⁵: because namely that which is the beginning in the ascent, is the end in the descent; and that which in the one is the end, in the other is the beginning. Therefore, if natural reason ascends to the knowledge of God through creatures, while divine revelation descends to us from God; although one must proceed through the same steps of knowledge in each process; one must nevertheless not proceed in the same order, but on the contrary. For if the ultimate step of the consideration of divine things that are known by natural reason in ascending was the consideration of the order of creatures unto God as unto an end, the first consideration in the process to those things which have been revealed above reason ought to be concerning those things which are expected in the ultimate end, but not concerning those things which are proposed to be believed in God Himself. And thus from the identity of ascent and descent it seems to be poorly concluded that the process in those things which are known concerning God by natural reason, and in those things which are proposed to be believed above reason, must be the same.

He answers that the reasoning proceeds very well, if its intent is diligently looked into. For St. Thomas considers the ascent and descent in this place according as they are materially the same, but not according as they are formally distinguished: insofar namely as in the knowledge had of God through natural reason, and in the knowledge had through revelation, the same steps are proportionally found. For this standing, he has his intent. For since in the handing down of doctrine, concerning which process St. Thomas is speaking, determination must be made first concerning prior things; and in the very steps of those things which are known of God whether by way of ascent or by way of descent, that is, whether they are known through natural reason or through revelation, there is a certain order according to the nature of things considered absolutely; and this order according to nature is the same in each mode of knowing, for the mode of knowing does not vary the nature of the thing: it is necessary that doctrine be handed down according to the same order in each process. For since according to nature, or according to our mode of understanding, those things which belong to God according to Himself are prior to those things which imply the proceeding of creatures from Him; and these are prior to the order of the creatures themselves to God as to an end: it is fitting that in each process determination be made first concerning those things which belong to God according to Himself; then concerning those things which are done by Him; thereafter concerning those things which pertain to the order of creatures unto the end.