Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Name: Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV
Author: Francesco Silvestri

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles

First published 1918

In Book IV of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) examines Aquinas's treatment of revealed mysteries: the Trinity, the Incarnation, the sacraments, and the resurrection. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XV (1930). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.

Prooemium

Having completed the first three Books Against the Gentiles, we must proceed to the interpretation of the fourth Book.

Now it is divided into two parts: namely, into the prooemium; and the treatise¹.

Concerning the first, St. Thomas does two things: first, he shows what this fourth Book ought to treat; second, he shows how one must proceed in it².

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that man's knowledge of divine things is threefold; second, he infers what is proposed³.

I. As to the first, he sets down four conclusions⁴. The first of these is: The human intellect is not able through itself (that is, by its own power) to attain to gazing upon the divine substance in itself.

It is proved. The human intellect receives knowledge connaturally to itself from sensible things. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the divine substance is elevated disproportionately⁵ above all sensible things, nay rather above all other beings.

Concerning this conclusion, it must be noted that St. Thomas presupposes, from what precedes, that distinction concerning knowledge: namely, that something can be known in two ways, in one way in another, in another way in itself. Something is said to be known in another when it is known not through its own and adequate species, but through the species of that in which it is contained: just as Socrates is seen in a mirror. But it is said to be known in itself when it is known through its own and adequate species: just as Socrates is when he is seen in his presence through himself. The human intellect, therefore, is said not to be able by the power of its own nature to be elevated to gazing upon the divine substance in itself, so as to exclude that knowledge by which God is known in known creatures through the likeness of the creatures themselves. For the intellect can do this by its own power.
Concerning the proof of the conclusion, however, it must be noted that, since the intellect receives its knowledge by way of the senses, the intellect cannot naturally arrive at any other knowledge than that to which sensible things themselves, and their intellectual likenesses, can lead. Sensible things, however, because they are unequal and disproportionate effects of the divine nature, inasmuch as they are infinitely distant from its perfection, can indeed, insofar as they are divine effects, lead to some knowledge of God; but because they are inadequate and disproportionate effects, they cannot lead to such a knowledge of Him as is perfect, by which, namely, the divine substance is seen in itself; for every likeness impressed upon the intellect from sensible things is adequate to some creature, and none represents the divine substance according to what it is in itself.

II. The second conclusion is: A certain way is given to man through which he can ascend to the knowledge of God. — It is proved. Because otherwise so noble a creature would seem to exist in vain, if it were not able to attain its proper end: for the perfect good of man is that he know God in some way.

It must be noted that St. Thomas calls the perfect good of man the ultimate complement of his natural perfection, which indeed consists in the attainment of the end: for this is to know God in some way. Hence the Philosopher, in Ethics X⁶, places happiness in the knowledge of the highest intelligible. On account of this, he infers that, if there were not given to man some way of arriving at the knowledge of God, he would not be able to attain his end, and thus he would exist in vain.

III. For the explanation of this conclusion, he notes first, that this way is the proceeding of things from God in a certain order, from the lower things of which proceeding man, beginning and ascending step by step, advances to the knowledge of God. Moreover, the identity of this way is shown from bodily motions, in which the way by which one ascends and descends is the same, distinguished by reason of the beginning and the end.

He notes secondly, that the account of the descent of perfections from God is twofold. The first is on the part of the first origin of things: according as divine wisdom produced things in an order, so that the universe of creatures might be completed from the highest and the lowest of things. The second is from the things themselves: insofar as the things first⁷ caused fall short of the first cause, which is God, and they themselves excel their own effects, and so on until one reaches the ultimate of things.

He notes thirdly that, because in God the most perfect unity is found; and each thing, the more it is one, the more virtuous and worthy it is: the farther one recedes from the first principle, so much greater diversity and variation is found in things. And thus according to the diversity of things there appears a diversity of ways, as it were originating from one principle, and terminating at diverse things.

He notes fourthly, that through these ways indeed our intellect can ascend to the knowledge of God, but on account of its weakness we cannot perfectly know even the ways themselves. Both because, since the intellect can scarcely arrive through external accidents at an interior knowledge⁸ even of those things whose accidents it perfectly comprehends by sense, it will be able to comprehend much less the natures of those things of which we grasp few accidents by sense; and still less of those whose accidents cannot be grasped. — And because, even if the natures of things were known, nevertheless their order, according as they are disposed and directed to an end by divine providence, can be only tenuously known to us.

IV. For the evidence of what St. Thomas first notes⁹, it must be considered that, since the proceeding of perfections from God has two terms, namely the first principle itself, which is God, from whom all perfection originates, and the ultimate perfections of things, the human intellect cannot know this proceeding of ordered things and perfections by beginning from the highest peak, God, and descending to lower things, since God escapes all knowledge of sense, from which the knowledge of our intellect has its origin; but it is necessary that it begin from lower perfections, and ascend step by step to the knowledge of higher things, until it reaches the knowledge of God. Because, however, the way of descent and ascent is the same in reality, just as the ladder by which one ascends and descends is the same, distinguished only in reason, — insofar as, when motion on it begins from the highest and terminates at the lowest, it is called the way of descent; but insofar as it begins from the lowest and terminates at the highest, it is called an ascent — therefore it can be said that the way through which the human intellect can ascend to the knowledge of God is the proceeding of perfections from God in a certain order; for just as in a certain order they descend from the highest peak, so through them in a certain order, beginning from lower things, namely from corruptible things, the human intellect ascends to God.

Concerning that which is noted secondly, it must be observed that that twofold account of the descent of perfections from God is understood in such a way that the first account is divine wisdom, establishing the order of perfections of this kind in things, namely so that some are supreme, while some are lowest. For divine wisdom itself is called the first origin of things, insofar as the order of all things is established in the divine mind before things are produced into being in a certain order. And thus, while things are produced into being according to that order which divine wisdom established, divine wisdom itself is the first principle whence the order of things originates.

The second, however, is the nature of the produced things themselves. For since all things are caused by God, it is clear that it belongs to them to fall short of God Himself in perfection. But since among the things caused by God one is the cause of another, — understand, not only as one individual is the cause of another individual in the same species, but as one is the cause of another according to its whole species, in the way that heaven is the cause of corruptible species that are entirely material — one must be more excellent and more perfect than the other: for the cause of some whole species is more perfect than that species. And thus, descending even to the lowest species, from the very nature of things, according as certain things are the cause of other things, it is clear that the perfections of creatures descend from God in a certain order: because namely some, according to their nature, are closer to God according to perfection, while some are more remote from Him.

Concerning that which is noted thirdly, it must be observed that, since in God there is most perfect unity, by the fact that He is most simple, and has in Himself no multiplicity of things, as was shown above ¹⁰, and since God is both most virtuous and most worthy: since, as is said here, each thing, the more it is one, namely according to its nature, the more virtuous and worthy it is, as participating so much more in the ratio of being; it is necessary that, the more something recedes from God Himself (not indeed according to local distance, but according to perfectional distance), the less one, and the less perfect, and the less worthy it is. For this reason St. Thomas very well infers that the proceedings of perfections from God are multiplied according to the multiplicity of the lowest things. For these are distant from the divine perfection in the highest degree, and therefore in them the greatest multiplicity, variety, and imperfection are found.
Concerning that which is noted fourthly, it must be noted that in the proceeding of creatures from God two things can be considered: namely, the things themselves, proceeding from God in a certain order; and the order of the things themselves to one another and to the end appointed for them by divine wisdom. If this proceeding, according to which diverse ways of ascending to God are established, is considered as to the things themselves, in this way St. Thomas says that it is known imperfectly by us: insofar as there are certain things of which we know few accidents by sense, such as heavenly bodies, especially those which are more distant from the lower world; while certain things, such as separated substances, are such that their accidents cannot be grasped by sense, although they are participated through certain deficient effects; for the effects caused in these lower things by separated substances fall short of the representation of them, insofar as these material things, which fall under the sense, are unequal to them. — But if this proceeding is considered as to the order of things itself, in this way St. Thomas adds that the aforesaid ways are also known imperfectly by us: insofar as, even if we knew the things themselves perfectly as to their substance, we nevertheless do not perfectly know the order imposed upon them by divine wisdom; for the reason that we do not know the very ratio of divine wisdom, that is, the very conception of the divine intellect by which He orders and disposes things.

V. The third conclusion is: Through these ways we cannot arrive at knowing perfectly the principle of these ways, namely God. — It is proved first. The ways themselves are imperfectly known by us. Therefore etc. — Secondly. God exceeds the aforesaid ways without proportion. Therefore etc.

Note that from this second reason it is given to be understood that the aforesaid ways, and the aforesaid proceedings of creatures, although they are united in God, nevertheless do not include God Himself as an intrinsic principle of them, but as an extrinsic principle, which is the productive principle of all these ways. For if He pertained intrinsically to these ways, that which is said here, namely that God exceeds the aforesaid ways without proportion, would be false. Hence, when it was said above that the process of emanation from God is united in the principle itself, it must be understood of the extrinsic principle, not of the intrinsic.

VI. The fourth conclusion is: Fittingly God, out of superabundant goodness, revealed certain things about Himself to men. — It is proved. The knowledge of God, to which man was able to attain through the aforesaid ways by a kind of intellectual intuition, as it were, was weak. Therefore it was fitting that God should reveal some things about Himself, so that such knowledge might be firmer.

For the evidence of these things, two points must be observed. The first is, that intellectual intuition properly belongs to that knowledge by which a thing is seen in itself through its proper species. Because therefore man cannot know God through Himself and through His proper species in this life, but only through the species of creatures, on that account his knowledge is not properly called intellectual intuition. For this reason St. Thomas called it not simply intellectual intuition, but as it were. For properly indeed, a man ascending to the knowledge of God through the aforesaid ways does not gaze upon God: he can nevertheless be said as it were to gaze upon Him, when he arrives at that knowledge which is the most perfect among the knowledges had of God from creatures; for on account of its excess over other imperfect knowledges, it can be called as it were intuitive knowledge.

The other is that, although God out of His goodness communicates to the creature whatever He communicates to it, He is nevertheless said to communicate some things out of superabundant goodness, insofar as those things are not required for the integrity of the nature to which they are communicated, as if such things were owed to it, on the supposition that God wills to produce that creature; but God, without any debt simply speaking existing on the part of the creature, communicates them to the creature. And these are the things that are superadded to natural perfection. Because therefore it does not belong to the natural perfection of man that he receive from God some knowledge of divine things through revelation, but only that he ascend to God from creatures; therefore it is fittingly said here that God out of superabundant goodness revealed certain things about Himself to men, so that knowledge might be firmer, while namely man knows that divine revelation is infallible.

For the manifestation of this conclusion, however, St. Thomas notes that things of this kind, according to man's congruence, are thus first revealed to him in such a way that they are nevertheless not understood, but are only believed as it were by being heard: because, according to this state, the intellect cannot be elevated to gazing upon those things which exceed all proportions of the senses. But when it has been freed from the connection with sensible things, then it will be elevated to gazing upon the things that are revealed.

It must be noted that St. Thomas speaks according to the common and customary mode of divine revelation, which is that in this life divine things revealed to us are believed, rather than seen. But sometimes, beyond the customary mode, God elevates some even to gazing upon the divine essence itself, as is believed of Moses and Paul ¹¹. Although it could also be said that they were in a certain way freed from the connection with sensible things, insofar as they were not then using the senses.

VII. From these things St. Thomas infers that man's knowledge of divine things is threefold: namely natural, which is through creatures; that which is had through revelation, not as though divine truth were demonstrated to be seen, but as though it were uttered in speech to be believed; and that according to which the human mind is elevated to gazing perfectly upon those things which have been revealed.

This principal conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Job 26¹². For he touches upon the first knowledge, saying: Behold, these are spoken in part of His ways. — But the second when he says: and when we have scarcely heard a small drop of His words. For faith is from hearing, as is had in Rom. 10, but hearing through the word of God, concerning which in John 17. — But the third when he says: Who will be able to gaze upon the thunder of His greatness? For because through it the divine majesty will be known clearly and manifestly, as is had in 1 John 3, and Exod. 33, and John 16, the thing known through that knowledge is fittingly called thunder: for thunder is a most manifest thing. How, moreover, that authority suits what is proposed is clearly shown in the text.

These things having been premised, St. Thomas infers the principal purpose of this part¹³, saying that, since in the preceding there has been discourse concerning divine things according as natural reason can arrive at them through creatures, imperfectly nevertheless, there remains to be had discourse concerning those things which have been divinely revealed to us as to be believed, exceeding the human intellect.

VIII. As to the second principal point, he shows how one must proceed in this book¹⁴. And he says two things. The first is, that this mode must be observed, that those things which have been handed down in the discourses of Sacred Scripture should be taken as principles; and thus we should strive in whatever way to grasp with the mind the things that are secretly handed down to us in the aforesaid discourses, by defending them from the laceration of unbelievers; the presumption of knowing perfectly being removed, however, because things of this kind must be proved by the authority of Sacred Scripture, but not by natural reason. It must be shown, nevertheless, that they are not opposed to natural reason.

The second is that, since natural reason ascends to the knowledge of God through creatures, while the knowledge of faith conversely descends from God into us by divine revelation; and the way of ascent and descent is the same: one must proceed by the same way in those things which are believed above reason, by which it was proceeded in the above concerning those things which are investigated concerning God by reason; so that namely there are handed down first those things which are proposed to be believed in God Himself, such as the confession of the Trinity; secondly, those things which were done by God above reason, such as the work of the Incarnation; thirdly, those things which are expected above reason in the ultimate end of men, such as the resurrection, etc. The aforesaid authority is also adapted to this process.

For the evidence of this, it must be noted that in the process concerning those things which were investigated concerning God by natural reason, such an order was observed, as was clear in what preceded, that first a consideration was had concerning those things which belong to God according to Himself; secondly, concerning the proceeding of creatures from Him; thirdly, concerning the order of creatures unto Him as unto an end. Because therefore one must proceed by the same way concerning those things which are known concerning God through divine revelation, St. Thomas says that, correspondingly to the aforesaid order, it is necessary to treat first of those things which are proposed to be believed above reason in God Himself; then of those things which were done by God above reason; thirdly, of those things which are expected in the ultimate end.

IX. But a doubt arises. For although the way of ascent and descent is the same materially, they are nevertheless distinguished formally by reason of the beginning and the end, as was said above¹⁵: because namely that which is the beginning in the ascent, is the end in the descent; and that which in the one is the end, in the other is the beginning. Therefore, if natural reason ascends to the knowledge of God through creatures, while divine revelation descends to us from God; although one must proceed through the same steps of knowledge in each process; one must nevertheless not proceed in the same order, but on the contrary. For if the ultimate step of the consideration of divine things that are known by natural reason in ascending was the consideration of the order of creatures unto God as unto an end, the first consideration in the process to those things which have been revealed above reason ought to be concerning those things which are expected in the ultimate end, but not concerning those things which are proposed to be believed in God Himself. And thus from the identity of ascent and descent it seems to be poorly concluded that the process in those things which are known concerning God by natural reason, and in those things which are proposed to be believed above reason, must be the same.

He answers that the reasoning proceeds very well, if its intent is diligently looked into. For St. Thomas considers the ascent and descent in this place according as they are materially the same, but not according as they are formally distinguished: insofar namely as in the knowledge had of God through natural reason, and in the knowledge had through revelation, the same steps are proportionally found. For this standing, he has his intent. For since in the handing down of doctrine, concerning which process St. Thomas is speaking, determination must be made first concerning prior things; and in the very steps of those things which are known of God whether by way of ascent or by way of descent, that is, whether they are known through natural reason or through revelation, there is a certain order according to the nature of things considered absolutely; and this order according to nature is the same in each mode of knowing, for the mode of knowing does not vary the nature of the thing: it is necessary that doctrine be handed down according to the same order in each process. For since according to nature, or according to our mode of understanding, those things which belong to God according to Himself are prior to those things which imply the proceeding of creatures from Him; and these are prior to the order of the creatures themselves to God as to an end: it is fitting that in each process determination be made first concerning those things which belong to God according to Himself; then concerning those things which are done by Him; thereafter concerning those things which pertain to the order of creatures unto the end.

Caput I: Quod sit generatio, paternitas et filiatio in divinis

The preface having been laid down, St. Thomas proceeds to the determination of those things that are known by us concerning God through revelation, according to the proposed order:¹ for first, he determines concerning the things pertaining to the Trinity; second, concerning those pertaining to the Incarnation, ch. xxvii; third, concerning those that regard the future resurrection, ch. lxxix.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that in the divine there are generation, paternity, and filiation; second, he shows also that the Holy Spirit is in the divine, ch. xv.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows from the authority of Sacred Scripture that these are in the divine; second, he sets down arguments against divine generation, and resolves them, ch. x ff.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows what has been said; second, he proves in the following chapter that the Son of God is God.

I. As to the first, this conclusion is posited: Sacred Scripture hands down to us in the divine the names of paternity and filiation and generation, bearing witness that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.

Concerning paternity and filiation, it is proved first by the authority of the New Testament: namely, Matt. xi, No one knoweth the Son etc.; Mark i, The beginning of the Gospel etc.; John iii, The Father loveth the Son etc.; John v, As the Father etc.; Paul, Rom. 1, Separated etc.; Heb. 1, In many ways etc.

Second, it is proved by the authority of the Old Testament: namely, Prov. xxx, What is his name etc.; Psalm ii, The Lord hath said to me etc.; and Psalm lxxxviii, He shall cry out to me etc.

If, however, it be said that the first words of the Psalm refer to David, but the last to Solomon:—the first point is indeed evident to be false, because there is added in the same place, This day have I begotten thee, and, I will give thee the gentiles for thine inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession: which the history of the Book of Kings makes clear does not suit David, from which it is apparent that his kingdom was not expanded to the ends of the earth. The second point is also evident to be false, because there is added, I will make his throne as the days of heaven for ever and ever etc.: which cannot suit Solomon. From this St. Thomas infers that, since certain things annexed to the aforesaid words can fit David or Solomon, while certain things by no means can, they are spoken of them, according to the custom of Scripture, as a figure of another in whom all things are fulfilled.

Caput III: Quid opinatus sit Photinus de filio Dei, et eius improbatio

Having set forth the truth of faith concerning the Son of God, St. Thomas intends to refute the positions of the heretics, who presumed to measure the truth of this doctrine—namely, of Sacred Scripture—by their own sense, that is, by their own intellect¹.

Regarding this he does three things: first, he adduces and disproves the false opinions themselves, together with their grounds; second, he responds to their grounds, in chapter ᴠɪɪɪ.

Regarding the first he does three things: first, he deals with the opinion of Photinus; second, with the opinion of Sabellius, in the following chapter; third, with the opinion of Arius, in chapter ᴠɪ.

Regarding the first he does three things: first, he recounts the opinion of Photinus, with its grounds; second, he disproves it²; third, he responds to its grounds in general³.

I. As to the first, he says that Photinus, and before him Paul of Samosata, and Cerinthus and Ebion before Paul of Samosata—considering that it is the custom of Scripture to call those who are justified by divine grace sons of God, as is clear from John ɪ, He gave them, etc.; Romans ᴠɪɪɪ, For the Spirit Himself, etc.; 1 John ɪɪɪ, Behold what manner, etc.; and also that it does not keep silent that they are begotten by God, as is clear from James ɪ, For voluntarily, etc.; 1 John ɪɪɪ, Everyone who is born, etc.; likewise that it attributes the name of divinity to the same, as is clear when the Lord said to Moses, I have appointed you the god of Pharaoh; also in the Psalm, I have said, you are gods, and John 10, He called them gods, etc.—thought that Jesus Christ was a mere man, and had taken His beginning from the Virgin Mary, and through the merit of a blessed life had attained the honor of divinity above all others. They also thought that He in like manner was called the Son of God above other men through the spirit of adoption: namely, through grace, according to which a man is made fit to receive the heavenly inheritance, which does not belong to him by nature. Likewise, they thought that He was begotten by Him through grace, and is called God through a certain assimilation to God, not by nature, but through a certain sharing of the divine goodness; just as it is also said of the saints in 2 Peter 1, That you may be made, etc.

Now they strive to confirm this position, first, because it is said in Matt. ult., All power is given to Me, etc. For this would not be so if He were God before all ages. Secondly, because in Rom. 1 He is said to be made and predestined. But what is predestined and is made does not seem to be eternal. Thirdly, because from what is said in Phil. 2, He became obedient, etc., it seems that on account of the merit of obedience and of the passion He was endowed with divine honor, and exalted above all things. Fourthly, because from what is said in Acts 2, Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly, etc., it seems that Christ was made God in time, not born before all ages. Fifthly, because many things pertaining to defect are said in the Scriptures concerning Christ, which cannot belong to one who exists as God by nature.

II. In the second place, St. Thomas disproves this position⁴, saying that that sense which the aforesaid heretics conceived in their opinion is not contained in the words of Sacred Scripture.

And he argues first. Solomon says, in Proverbs 8: The depths were not yet, and I was already conceived. Therefore the aforesaid generation existed before all bodily things. Therefore the Son begotten by God did not take the beginning of His being from Mary.

If it should be said that this ought to be understood according to predestination alone, because, namely, before the constitution of the world⁵ it was arranged that the Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary: it is evident that this is false from the words that follow. For it is subjoined, When He balanced the foundations of the earth, I was with Him forming all things: from which it is clear that He was also really before Mary, for if He had been only in predestination, He could have accomplished nothing. It is also evident that this is false from the words of John the Evangelist. For when he had premised, In the beginning was the Word, lest it should be taken according to predestination, he subjoins, All things were made by Him, etc.: which would not be true unless He had really existed before the world.

For the evidence of these things, two points are to be noted. The first is, that here predestination is not taken according to its proper signification, insofar as it is the plan of the ordering of a rational creature to eternal life; but it is taken for the preordination of something to be produced by God, namely, according as God preordained from eternity in His mind to effect something.
The second is that, since a thing has being in two ways, namely, in its cause, before it is produced into being; and in itself, when it has already been produced: according as it is in its cause, it is not other than the cause itself, or from its power; but according as it is in itself, it is already other than the cause. Where, therefore, it is implied that something belongs to a thing as it is distinguished from its cause, that must belong to it according as it is in itself, and not according as it is in its cause only.

Therefore, because the Son of God being present to God in the creation of things, and forming all things with Him, and likewise all things being made through Him, belongs to Him as He is distinguished from His principle, which is signified by those prepositions; it cannot be said that this belongs to Him as to a creature existing only in the divine preordination, but also as having a real distinction from His principle, and having being in Himself; although the relation between the Father Himself and the Son is not, properly speaking, the relation between cause and caused; and neither do they have distinct acts of being of existence, but are distinguished only personally, as the principle and that which is from the principle. For this reason St. Thomas well says that the aforesaid words cannot be said of the Son of God unless it is posited that He has being before the Virgin Mary and before the world.

III. Secondly. Concerning the Son of God it is said in John 3, No man has ascended into heaven, etc.; likewise in John 6, I came down from heaven, etc. Therefore it is apparent that He was before He came down from heaven.

If it should be said that from these authorities it is not held that the Son of God was before He came down from heaven, but that He came down from heaven through a new creation of Himself by God, whose power is chiefly manifested in heaven: against this it can be urged, first, because to come down from heaven through a new creation is common not only to all men, but also to all creatures. But Christ spoke those words of Himself as expressing a certain particular descent of His from heaven. Secondly, because concerning the very Son who descended, He said that He is in heaven. For in this it is signified, since He was then simultaneously in heaven and on earth, that through His descent He had not left heaven, namely, as to His divine person; and thus that before He had descended, He had being, and did not begin to be through creation in Mary. It is also confirmed that this must be the sense in the aforesaid words from what is said in John 6⁶: If then you shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before, namely, according to His divinity.

IV. Thirdly. According to the aforesaid position, man advances into God through the merit of his life. But on the contrary the Apostle shows, in Phil. 2, that, since the Son of God was God, He was made man, where he says, Who being in the form of God, etc. Therefore, etc.

Fourthly. By the same reason Moses would be called the son of God by which Christ also is, although Christ was endowed with more abundant grace. This is false. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved: because Moses had the grace of God copiously, as is clear from Exodus 33. But the falsity of the consequent is proved from what is said in Heb. 3, Moses indeed was faithful, etc.

It is confirmed⁷. Because Scripture in a certain singular way names Christ the Son of God above others: sometimes indeed, apart from others, singularly naming Him the Son, as at the baptism, the voice of the Father thundered, etc.; sometimes, however, the Only-begotten, as in John 1, which would not be if He were called Son in a common way as others are; sometimes also the Firstborn, so that a certain derivation of sonship from Him to others might be shown, as in Rom. 8 and Gal. 4.

It is to be observed that, although in Sacred Scripture some are called sons of God in the plural, and the people itself is also called the son of God⁸: nevertheless it is never found in it that any singular person is called the son of God, begotten by God, except when natural sonship, by which God is the Son of God, is treated. Therefore St. Thomas well says that Sacred Scripture in a certain singular way names Christ the Son of God above others. For this is true not only of the New Testament, but also of the Old.

Sixthly. Scripture attributes to Christ the sanctification of souls and the remission of sins: the first indeed in Heb. 2, He that sanctifieth, etc., and ult., Jesus, that He might sanctify, etc.; the second in Matt. 9. But these are so properly attributed to God that they cannot belong to another, as is clear from Lev. 20 and Isa. 43. Therefore Christ is not called God in the way that those are who are sanctified and whose sins are forgiven: but as having the power and nature of divinity.

V. In the third place, a certain general response is given to the authorities by which the aforesaid heretics confirmed their proposition⁹: for below each one will be responded to in particular¹⁰. It is said, therefore, that they do not confirm their proposition: because, since in Christ the Son of God, after the Incarnation, we confess two natures, namely human and divine, there are said of Him both the things that are proper to God, by reason of the divine nature, and the things that seem to pertain to defect, by reason of the human nature.

For the evidence of this, it is to be considered that, since in Christ there is a single supposit subsisting in the divine and in the human nature, therefore the things that are said of the supposit of human nature can also be said of Christ Himself insofar as He subsists in human nature, speaking namely of those things that pertain to human nature. Likewise, it is necessary that there be said of Him the things that are said of the supposit subsisting in the divine nature. On account of this it is well said here that there are said of Christ the things that are proper to God, by reason of the divine nature; and the things that seem to pertain to defect, by reason of the human.

Caput IV: Opinio Sabellii de filio Dei, et eius improbatio

Having rejected the opinion of Photinus, St. Thomas proceeds to the refutation of the opinion of Sabellius¹. And first, he sets forth the opinion itself; secondly, he refutes it²; thirdly, he responds in general to the objections³.

I. As to the first point, he says first that, because all who think rightly about God hold that there can naturally be only one God, certain persons, conceiving from the Scriptures that Christ is truly and naturally God and the Son of God, confessed that Christ the Son of God and God the Father are one God; but that God is not called Son according to his nature or from eternity, but only from the time he was born of the Virgin Mary; and thus they attributed to God the Father all the things that Christ endured according to the flesh. This was the opinion of the Sabellians: who were also called Patripassians, because they said that the Father suffered, asserting that the Father himself is Christ. Moreover, they confirm their position by the authority of Deut.⁴ 6, Hear, O Israel, etc.; and Deut. 32, See, etc.; likewise John 5, The Father in me, etc.; and 14, He that seeth me, etc.

He says secondly that this opinion differs from the aforesaid one regarding the divinity of Christ, but is in agreement with it regarding generation and sonship: because both confess that the sonship and generation by which Christ is called the Son of God did not exist before Mary, referring these only to the human nature. — This position also has this peculiar feature, that when he is called the Son of God, what is designated is not a subsisting person, but a certain property supervening upon the person, inasmuch as the Father himself, according as he took flesh from the Virgin, received the name of Son.

It should be noted that one who posits that the Son is not a person distinct from the Father, but that the Father himself is called Son according as he assumed flesh, does not posit between him who is called Father and him who is called Son any real distinction, but only a distinction of reason, just as Socrates standing is said to be distinguished from Socrates sitting. Hence just as, when Socrates is called sitting, a person other than the person of Socrates standing is not designated, but only an extrinsic disposition supervening upon him; so, when according to this position the Son of God is spoken of, a person other than that which is called God the Father is not designated, but a certain disposition or relation of reason supervening upon him; which relation St. Thomas in this place calls a property.

II. As to the second point, St. Thomas argues against this position⁵.

First, thus. Christ is called the Son of God. Therefore God the Father is not the Son himself. — The consequence is proved. Because the same cannot be the Son of himself: otherwise, since the generator gives being to the generated, the same would be the giver and the receiver of being.

Secondly. The Lord says, John 6, I came down from heaven, etc.; and 17, Father, glorify me, etc. From which it is shown that the Son is other than the Father. Therefore etc.

If it should be said that God according to his divinity is called the father of himself according to his humanity, inasmuch as he created and sanctified the human nature which he assumed: — on the contrary it is argued, because it would follow that Christ is called the Son of God just as other men are: namely, either by reason of creation or by reason of sanctification. But it is clear from the preceding that Christ is called the Son of God for a different reason than other saints are.

Thirdly. Christ speaks of himself and the Father plurally, saying: I and the Father are one. Which does not happen where there is only one supposit. Therefore etc.

Fourthly. It is found from Sacred Scripture that the Son was distinct from the Father before the Incarnation: as in John 1, where it is said, In the beginning, etc.; and Prov. 8, I was with him, etc.; likewise Hosea 1, I will have mercy on the house of Jacob, etc.; likewise Gen. 1, Let us make man, etc.; from which the distinction of the Father and the Son before the Incarnation is shown. Therefore it is false that the Son is distinguished from the Father solely through the mystery of the Incarnation.

For the understanding of this reason⁶, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas on John, in the exposition of that which is said, And the Word was with God⁷, that this preposition with (apud), according as it is properly taken, implies subsistence in that which is said to be with another: for we do not say that whiteness is with a body; but rather, that a man is with a man, and a stone with a stone. It also implies distinction: because one is not properly said to be with oneself. From which it is clear that when the Son of God is said to be with God, it is signified that the Son of God is a certain supposit distinct from God the Father, but having some union with him. Therefore it is well said here that the Word, which was with God, had a certain distinction from him: because the custom of speech has this, that one thing is said to be with another.

Sixthly. Christ is truly the Son of God, as is clear from 1 John the last chapter, That we may be, etc. Therefore he must be distinguished from the Father in supposit. — The consequence is proved. Because, since sonship belongs to the supposit itself, and the names of paternity and sonship require distinction in those of whom they are said (namely, truly and properly): if someone is truly called a son, he must be distinguished in supposit from the father.

Seventhly. Even after the mystery of the Incarnation, the Father testifies concerning the Son, This is my beloved Son, etc. Which demonstration refers to the supposit. Therefore Christ is according to his supposit other than the Father.

III. As to the third point⁸, responding to all the foundations of the Sabellians at once—for below he will respond in detail—St. Thomas says that they do not show their intent. For from the fact that God is one, or that the Father is in the Son and conversely, it does not follow that the Father and the Son are one in supposit: since between two distinct in supposit there can be a certain unity.

Caput V: De opinione Arii circa filium Dei

It remains in the third place that the perverse dogma of Arius be excluded ¹. Concerning this, however, St. Thomas does three things: first, he recounts his opinion; second, he refutes it, in the following chapter; third, he responds to his objections, in chapter VIII.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he sets forth the opinion of Arius with its foundations; second, he shows whence it took its origin ².

I. As to the first, he says that there were certain others, deviating from the aforesaid, who said that the Son of God existed before the mystery of the Incarnation, and even before the creation of the world, but they judged him to be so other than the Father that he was not of the same nature with him. Hence they believed that the nature of the Son did not exist from eternity, although the Son existed before other creatures; and consequently they said that the Son of God was made out of nothing, and is a creature. But they added that he is one with God the Father, not by nature, but by a union of consent, and by participation in the divine likeness above the rest of creatures; and that beyond the other supreme creatures as well, whom we call angels, who are called gods and sons of God in Job XXXVIII, and in the Psalms, God stood, etc., it was fitting for him to be called both God and the Son of God. Likewise, that through him God the Father established every other creature.

II. Moreover, they strove to confirm this position: first, because in John XVII the Father alone is called God. — Second, because in I Tim. the last chapter, the Father alone is called the mighty King of kings, and alone to have immortality, and inaccessible light. — Third, because in John XIV the Father is said to be greater than the Son, and in I Cor. XV the Son is said to be subject to the Father: which would not be the case if the nature of the Father and of the Son were one. — Fourth, because the nature of the Father suffers no need, but rather the nature of the Son does, who receives from the Father, as is clear from Matt. XI and John III. — Fifth, because he is taught and helped by the Father, as is clear from John V and John XV: which belongs to one who is in need. — Sixth, because to receive a command, to obey, to pray, and to be sent seem to belong to an inferior. But these things are read of the Son: as is clear from John XIV, As the Father gave me commandment, etc.; Phil. II, He was made obedient, etc.; John XIV, I will ask, etc.; Gal. IV, When the fullness of time was come, etc. — Seventh, because Christ was glorified by the Father, John XII, Father, glorify, etc.; and raised up by him, Rom. VIII; and exalted, Acts II; from which it seems that he is inferior to the Father. — Eighth, because in the Father there is no defect. But in the Son there is found a defect of power, Matt. XX, To sit, etc.; and a defect of knowledge, Matt. XXIV ³, But of that day, etc.; and a defect of undisturbed affection, since Scripture asserts that there was sadness and anger and the like in him. — Ninth, because it is found in the Scriptures that the Son of God is a creature: as is clear from Sirach XXIV, The Creator said to me, etc.; and, From the beginning, etc. — Tenth, because he is numbered together with creatures: Sirach XXIV, I came out of the mouth, etc.; and in Coloss. I it is said that he is the firstborn of creature. — Eleventh, because Christ willed that his disciples should be one just as the Father and the Son are one, John XVII. But he did not will that the disciples should be one by essence.

III. As to the second ⁴, St. Thomas says that this was the opinion of Arius and Eunomius; and that it arose from the sayings of the Platonists, who posited the supreme God as the father and creator of all things, from whom they said a certain mind flowed forth, in which were the forms of all things, superior to all other things, which they named the paternal intellect; and after this the soul of the world; and then the other creatures.

With this also agrees the position of Avicenna, who posited above the soul of heaven an intelligence moving the first heaven, above which he placed God at the summit.

Caput VI: Improbatio opinionis Arii de filio Dei

Against the aforesaid position of Arius and Eunomius, St. Thomas argues by the authority of Scripture.¹

And first thus. According to the aforesaid position, angels and Christ would be called sons of God in the same sense: because to both, according to a certain likeness of the nature in which they were created, the name of filiation would belong. But this is clearly false: for in Heb. 1 it is said: To which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? — If it be said that that does not follow, because Christ is of a more excellent nature: — this does not stand in the way. Because different orders are also found among the angels; and yet the same character of filiation belongs to all.

Secondly. Christ would not be the only-begotten. The opposite of which is stated in John 1. — The consequence is proved. Because the name of filiation belongs also to all angels and saints by reason of divine creation.

Thirdly. If He were not called Son except by reason of creation, Christ could not truly be called a son. But the opposite of this is said in 1 John ult. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the name of filiation properly and truly follows the generation of living things, in which the begotten proceeds from the substance of the begetter, which does not happen in creation.

Fourthly. Christ would not be true God: because nothing created can be called God except by a certain likeness to God. But this is false: as is clear in 1 John ult., This is the true God etc.

It must be observed concerning this reason and the preceding one, that true can be taken in two ways. In one way, as it is distinguished against false: just as a proposition by which it is signified as it is in reality is called true, while that by which it is signified not as it is in reality is called false. In another way, as it is distinguished against figuratively taken: in which way we say that a living animal is a true animal, but a painted one is not a true animal, but by a certain likeness. When therefore Christ is said to be the true Son of God, and true God, true is taken in the second way: and the sense is that He is Son of God and God according to the proper and essential meaning of these names.

II. Fifthly. In Rom. IX it is said: Who is over all things, God etc.; and in Titus II, Looking for the blessed hope etc.; and in Jer. XXIII, I will raise up to David a just branch, and it is added, and this is the name that they shall call him, The Lord our just one, where in Hebrew is found the tetragrammaton name, which is certain to be said of God alone. Therefore the Son of God is true God.

Sixthly. If Christ is the true Son, namely of God, it is necessary that He be true God: because that which is begotten by another cannot truly be called a son, even if it is born from the substance of the begetter, unless it proceeds into a like species of the begetter. But (supply) He is the true Son of God. Therefore etc. — Concerning the matter of this reason there will be a discussion below.²

Seventhly. Christ has in Himself the whole fullness of divine goodness: as is clear in Coloss. I ³. Therefore etc. — The consequence is clear. Because no creature receives the whole fullness of divine goodness.

Eighthly. The intellect of Christ does not fall short in knowledge from the divine intellect: since it is said in Coloss. II that in him are all the treasures etc. Therefore etc.

It must be observed that St. Thomas is not speaking here of the intellect of Christ's soul, which is a human intellect: for of this it is not true that it equals the knowledge of the divine intellect, as was shown above.⁴ But he speaks of His intellect absolutely: because namely there is in Christ some intellect not falling short in knowledge from the divine intellect: which, since such an intellect cannot be other than the divine intellect, it follows that in Christ there is a divine intellect, and consequently that He is God.

III. Ninthly. All things that the Father hath are the Son's: as is clear in John XVI and XVII. Therefore the essence and nature of the Father and the Son are the same. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because whatever God has in Himself, is His essence.

Tenthly. The Son, before He emptied Himself taking the form of a servant, was in the form of God, as is said in Philip. II. But by the form of God is understood the divine nature, just as by the form of a servant is understood the human nature. Therefore etc.

Eleventhly. The Son is equal to the Father: since, as is clear from the narrative of John the Evangelist, John V, the Jews persecuted Christ because He said He was equal to God. But there is no doubt for a Christian that what Christ said about Himself is true: since the Apostle also says, Philip. II, that he thought it not robbery to be equal with the Father. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because nothing created can be equal to God.

It must be observed, however, that because this disputation is against a Christian who accepts the Gospel, St. Thomas therefore said, There is no doubt for a Christian that what Christ said about Himself is true. For an unbeliever could say that Christ sometimes vainly boasted of Himself: but for a Christian it is unlawful to say this.

IV. Twelfthly. Christ showed a perfect likeness of Himself to the Father also in living, John V: As the Father etc. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because by a perfect likeness no one's likeness to God is read of: as is clear in the Psalms when it is said, Who is like to God etc., and, O God, who shall be like to thee?

Thirteenthly. The Son represents the Father with respect to His essence: for in Coloss. I it is said that he is the image of the invisible God. And that He is a perfect image, representing the essence of God, through which it can be known of God what He is, is shown in Heb. I, when it is said: Being the brightness etc. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because no created substance represents God with respect to His substance.

Concerning this last statement a doubt arises. For every creature represents God: since it is His likeness. But it does not represent Him with respect to any accident of His: since in God there is no accident. Therefore it represents Him with respect to substance. Therefore it is false that no creature represents God with respect to His substance.

It is answered that for one thing to represent another with respect to substance can be understood in two ways: in one way, because it represents the very substance of the thing adequately and perfectly, according as it is signified through a definition; in another way, because it represents the substance of the thing inadequately and imperfectly, and not according to every mode of essential perfection. In this second way every creature represents God with respect to His substance, but not in the first way. But St. Thomas speaks of this mode. Which is evident because he is speaking of that representation of substance through which it can be known of a thing what it is. For that is a representation through a certain adequacy of the representing and the represented.

V. Fourteenthly. The Son of God is the universal cause of creatures: as is clear in John I, Prov. VIII, and Coloss. I. Therefore He is not of the genus of creatures. — The consequence is proved. Because nothing that is in some genus is the universal cause of those things that are in that genus, just as the universal cause of men is not some man: otherwise the same thing would be the cause of itself.

Fifteenthly. Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is the cause of the angels, producing them into being: as is clear from the Apostle saying: Whether thrones or dominations etc. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because angels cannot be made otherwise than through creation: and no created substance can create, as was shown in the Second, but God alone.

VI. Sixteenthly. The proper actions of God belong to the Son: such as to create, as has been shown; to uphold and preserve all things in being, and to purge sins, which is proper to God, as is clear in Coloss. I and Heb. I. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the proper operation of any thing does not belong to anyone to whom the nature of that thing does not belong.

If it be said that the Son does these things, not by His own power, but by the power of the principal agent, whose instrument He is: — it is argued to the contrary. Because in John V, it is said that what things soever he doth, these also the Son doth in like manner. From which two things are held. One is that, just as the Father works per se and by His own power, so also the Son. — The other is that the power and ability of the Son and of the Father are the same. For since the same thing cannot be from two agents in the same way, but dissimilarly; or, if similarly, they must agree in one power; and the Son does all things whatsoever the Father does, and does them similarly, it is necessary that they agree in one power. But this is not as if from many imperfect powers found in them one perfect power were aggregated, just as from the powers of many pulling a ship one perfect power is made: since the power of God the Father is infinite, as was shown in the First. Therefore it is necessary that the power of the Father and the Son be numerically the same. — From which it is also further inferred that the essence of the Father and the Son must be numerically the same: since power follows the nature of a thing. — Which is also clear by this reason: because the divine nature cannot be multiplied, as was shown in the first book.

For the evidence of this matter, it must be considered that of one and the same effect there cannot be two total causes of the same genus and of the same order, as was shown in the preceding chapters.⁵ But there can well be several total causes of the same thing of different genera: for example, one in the genus of efficient cause, the other in the genus of final cause. Likewise there can be several of the same genus but of different orders: for example, in the genus of efficient cause one principal, the other instrumental. There can also be of the same thing several causes of the same order, but particular and imperfect, as it were integrating one total and perfect cause: as is the case with many pulling a ship.

When therefore it is said here that the same thing cannot be wrought by diverse agents in the same way, but dissimilarly etc., the sense is that the same thing cannot be produced by diverse total agents unless they exist in a diverse order, so namely that one is principal, while the other is instrumental: or, if similarly, that is according to the same order, something proceeds from several, they must agree in one power; either aggregated from many imperfect powers, because they are several partial imperfect agents together constituting one perfect agent; or numerically one simply existing in them,⁶ so that they are called not several agents substantively, but one, although they are several supposits acting by that one power. For there is a great difference between some things being several agents, and their being several acting supposits; for in the first, since the term agents is taken substantively, a plurality of power and of active form is signified; but in the second, since it is taken adjectively, a plurality only of the acting supposits is signified.

VII. Seventeenthly. Our beatitude is in the Son of God, namely objectively: as is clear in John XVII, and 1 John ult. — Our hope is also in Him: according to that of Isaiah, introduced by the Apostle, There shall be a root of Jesse etc. — And the honor of latria is to be rendered to Him. In the Psalm, And they shall adore him etc.; and in John V, That all men may honor the Son etc.; and again in the Psalm, Adore him all you his angels, which in Heb. I is introduced concerning Christ. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because those things belong to God alone, as was shown in the Third.

St. Thomas adds finally that toward showing this, those things are also valid which were adduced against Photinus to show that Christ is true God, not made, but begotten.

VIII. From these he infers as a corollary that only the faith of the Catholic Church, which posits the Son coeternal with the Father, and coequal, and true God of the same nature and essence with the Father, begotten, not created nor made, truly confesses generation in God, referring it to this, that the Son received the divine nature from the Father: whereas heretics refer it to an alien nature, Photinus indeed and Sabellius to the human, but Arius to a certain creature more noble than the rest of creatures.

IX. As to the second,⁷ he compares these opinions of the heretics with one another. And he says that as to generation, Arius differs from Sabellius and Photinus, because the former asserts that it was before the world, while the latter deny this. — But as to Christ Himself, they differ because Sabellius confesses Christ to be true and natural God, but not Photinus nor Arius. But Photinus differs from Arius, because Photinus says that He is a mere man, while Arius says that He is, as it were, commingled from a certain most excellent creature, divine namely in some way, and human. — But as to the person of the Son, Sabellius differs from the others, because they posit that the person of the Father and of the Son are different, which Sabellius denies.

The Catholic faith, however, walking the middle way, agrees with Arius and Photinus, positing that the person of the Father is one, that of the Son another, and that the Son is begotten, while the Father is unbegotten. But it agrees with Sabellius, saying that Christ is true and natural God of the same nature with the Father, although not of the same person.

From which St. Thomas infers that from this an indication of Catholic truth can be taken: since, as the Philosopher says, even false things bear witness to the true, while false things also stand at variance with one another.

It must be observed that false things are said to bear witness to the true sometimes, not indeed on that part by which they are false, but insofar as they contain something of truth.

Caput VII: Solutio ad auctoritates quas Arius pro se inducebat

Having excluded the false positions of the heretics concerning the generation of Christ, St. Thomas turns to the resolution of those things which were brought forward by them for the confirmation of their positions¹. And first, he resolves the arguments of Arius²; second, the arguments of Sabellius and Photinus, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he premises that, when we say the Father and the Son are God, we do not say that there are two Gods, but one: since it has been said that they have the numerically same divine nature. For if there were several gods, it would be necessary for the nature of divinity to be partitioned in each: especially since the divine nature and God Himself are not distinct. From which it is evident that we do not depart from the teaching by which only one God is posited.

It should be noted that this conditional proposition of St. Thomas, If there were several gods, it would be necessary for the nature of divinity to be partitioned in each, is grounded upon this: that a substantive noun is not said plurally of some things except on account of the plurality of the form signified by it being found in them; just as several men are spoken of on account of several humanities existing in them. Moreover, he adds, especially since the divine nature and God Himself are not distinct, because the all-embracing identity between God and deity makes that conditional proposition more manifest. For if God and deity are entirely the same on the part of the thing signified, and there are several gods, it is necessary that there also be several deities.

This being presupposed, to the first argument it is said first that, when the Lord speaks to the Father saying, that they may know Thee the only etc., it is not to be understood that the Father alone is true God and the Son is not true God, but that that which is the only true deity belongs to the Father. Hence He said, that they may know Thee, punctuating here, namely; then He adds, the only true God. Nay rather, because a true Son must be of the same nature with the father, it rather follows that that which is the only true divinity belongs to the Son, than that the Son is excluded from it. Hence in I John, at the end, both of these—namely, that He is true God, and that in Him is eternal life—are attributed to the Son.

It is said secondly that, even if the Son had confessed that the Father alone is true God, the Son is not on this account understood to be excluded: because, since the Father and the Son are one God, whatever is said of the Father by reason of divinity is the same as if it were said of the Son, and conversely. — Which is confirmed from the fact that, when it is said in Matt. 11, No one knows the Son except the Father, nor anyone the Father except the Son, neither the Father is understood to be excluded from knowledge of Himself, nor the Son.

For the clarity of this response, it must be considered that, although this word alone is not properly placed on the part of the predicate, but only on the part of the subject, as is said in the Prima Pars, q. 31, a. 3³; nevertheless, on account of some other implication, it can sometimes be placed on the part of the predicate. Hence this proposition, that they may know Thee the only true God, can be resolved thus: that they may know Thee, God, Who is the only true God. And it can also be resolved thus: that they may know Thee, Father, Who alone art true God. For in the first, the term alone is placed on the part of the predicate; but in the second, on the part of the subject. In the first, the sense is that the Father is God, Whose nature—namely God's—alone is true deity; but in the second, the sense is that true deity belongs to the Father alone.

Therefore, St. Thomas, responding in a twofold way, admits both senses of this proposition. And to indicate the first sense, which he takes in the first response, he says that the Evangelist did not say by a certain continuation, that they may know Thee the only true God; but with a certain punctuation interposed, namely, that they may know Thee, then, as if declaring what the Father is, he added, the only true God, in order to show that the Father is God in Whom is found that which alone is true divinity. — But to indicate the second sense, which he takes in the second response, he says, if the Son had nonetheless confessed that the Father alone was true God.

Where it must be noted, from his doctrine in the place cited above, a. 4, and I Sent., d. 21, q. 2⁴, that the word "alone" can exclude another person masculinely, and it can exclude another thing neutrally. If it excludes another person masculinely, the sense is that no other person than the Father is true God. And because the Son is another person from the Father, through this the Son is excluded from true deity. Because this was shown above⁵ to be false, in this sense such a proposition is not to be admitted; nor does the Evangelist take it in this sense. — But if it excludes another thing neutrally, the sense is that nothing other than the Father is true God. And because the Son is not another thing from the Father, since theirs is one substance and essence in number, the Son is therefore not excluded through it. And therefore, admitting it in this sense, St. Thomas says that on this account the Son is not excluded from true divinity: because, since the Father and the Son are one God, whatever is said of the Father by reason of divinity is the same as if it were said of the Son, and conversely. The sense is that, because the Father is not another thing from the Son, nor conversely, but rather they are substantially and in deity one, what is said of the one is understood to be said of the other: namely, of those things which pertain to the deity, in which they are one; or of those things which are said of either of them by reason of divinity. For whatever is said of one of those things which are one in something, by reason of that in which they are one, is understood to be said also of the other, since in that they have no distinction: just as, because action and passion are one in motion, whatever is said of action by reason of motion is also said of passion; such as to be an imperfect act, to be the act of a being in potency, and the like.

II. To the second argument it is answered from what has been said. And it is said first, that in those words, whom in His own times He will show, the blessed and only King of Kings etc., the true divinity of the Son is not excluded: because the Father is not named, but that which is common to the Father and the Son, namely blessed. Hence that the Son is the King of Kings etc. is shown in Apoc. 19, He was clothed with a garment etc.

It is said secondly, that neither from those words, who alone has immortality, is the Son excluded: since He also confers immortality on those believing in Him, as is said in John 11. — Similarly also that which is added, whom no man has seen etc., namely according to the deity, is certain to belong to the Son, since it is said in Matt. 11, No one knows the Son except the Father: although according to the flesh He was made visible, as is clear from the Apostle in the same Epistle⁶, when it is said, Manifest etc.

It is said thirdly, that the aforesaid authority does not compel as if it were necessary that one be the one showing and another the one shown, for the Son also shows Himself: as is clear in John 14, He who loves etc.; and it is said to Him, Show Thy face, and we shall be saved.

III. To the third it is said, that the Father is said to be greater than the Son according to that in which the Son is made less. But this is according to the assumption of the form of a servant, yet in such a way that He is equal to God according to the divine form: as is clear from the Apostle, to the Philippians 2, When in the form etc.

It is said secondly, that it is no wonder if the Father is said to be greater than Him on this account: because He is also said to have been made less than the angels, in Heb. 2, Him who for a little etc.

It is said thirdly, that from this it is also clear that the Son according to His humanity is subject to the Father. Which appears from the very context of the text of the Apostle, which shows that this belongs to Christ according as He died and rose again.

IV. To the fourth it is said first, that the Father giving to the Son, from which it follows that the Son receives, does not show any neediness in the Son, but this is required in order that He may be the Son: because He could not be called Son unless He were begotten by the Father. Hence by the fact that the Father is said to give to the Son, nothing else is understood than the generation of the Son, through which the Father gave to the Son His own nature.

It is said secondly, that this can be understood from that which is given. For in John 10 that which is given to the Son is shown to be greater than all things. But this is the divine nature, in which the Son is equal to the Father. — Also in Philippians 2 it is said that He gave Him a name which is above every name etc.: but such is the name of divinity. — Likewise, all things are said to have been given to Him by the Father. But this would not be unless the whole fullness of divinity, which is in the Father, were in the Son. — From which it is clear that by this giving generation itself is understood, according to which the Father gave true deity to the Son.

From this it is inferred that, when Christ asserts that the Father gave to Him, He confesses that He is true Son, against Sabellius; but from the greatness of that which is given, He confesses that He is equal to the Father, against Arius.

It is said thirdly, that from what has been said it is clear that such giving does not signify neediness in the Son. Both because the Son was not before it was given to Him. — And because the fullness of what was given does not allow that he to whom it is established to have been given could be in need.

If it be urged that in the Scriptures the Father is read to have given to the Son in time: just as after the Resurrection the Lord says to the disciples, All power is given to Me etc.; and in Philippians 2 it is said that for this cause God also exalted Him etc.: — it is said that it is the customary manner of Scripture that some things are said to be or to be made when they become known. And thus it is to be understood concerning the power of Christ, which was manifested after the Resurrection through the preaching of the Apostles. This is also shown in John 17, through His own words, Glorify Me, Father etc.

For the clarity of this response, it must be considered that to be in need of some thing presupposes existence: for what does not exist cannot be said to be in need of anything. Likewise, to be in need of something includes the lack of something: for that which lacks no thing, but has every perfection, cannot be in need. On account of the first, therefore, St. Thomas said that the giving by which the Father gives the divine nature to the Son does not show neediness: because before the giving itself the Son was not, so as to be able, namely, to be said to be in need, but just as He was from eternity, so from eternity He received the nature from the Father. On account of the second, he said that the fullness of what was given does not allow him to whom it was given to be in need, even after he exists, namely: because if the fullness of every good has been given to Him, He can no longer be in need of anything.

V. To the fifth it is said first, that by the fact that the Son received the divine nature from the Father, He is said to have heard from the Father and the like, because, since to understand and to be are the same in God, the communication of the divine nature is also the communication of intelligence. But the communication of intelligence can be called demonstration, or speaking, or teaching. Such a thing, however, is not said as if the Son were previously ignorant and afterwards the Father taught Him, since in I Cor. 1 He is called the power and wisdom of God: for wisdom cannot be ignorant, nor power be weak.

It is said secondly that, when the Son is said to be unable to do anything of Himself, it shows no weakness of acting in the Son: but because, since in God acting is not distinct from being, nor is His action distinct from His essence, the Son is said to be unable to act of Himself in the same way that He cannot be of Himself, but only from the Father.

It is said thirdly that, although the Son is not of Himself nor acts of Himself, He is nevertheless per se, and acts per se: because just as He is through His proper nature, which He received from the Father, so also He acts through His proper nature received from the Father.

For the clarity of this, it must be considered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I Sent., dist. 32, q. 2, a. 2⁷, that these prepositions "from" (a) and "through" (per) differ in this: that "from" designates only the relation of a principle by mode of an efficient cause, but "through" designates the relation of a principle according to every genus of cause; hence that which is from something is through it, but not conversely. Therefore, because in the divine persons there cannot be a relation except by mode of an effective or originating principle, and by mode of a formal principle, this preposition through (per) in the divine persons imports only one of those relations. Thus it is well said here that the Son is not from Himself (a se), nor does He act from Himself (a se): because it would then be signified that He had being and operation from Himself, and not from another as from an originating principle; which is false, since He has being and acting from the Father. But He is well said to be per se and to act per se, according as this preposition per is construed in the relation of a formal principle. For He is formally through His own essence, and formally acts by His own power: for per se, as is said in Metaphysics V⁸, signifies what is through the essence of a thing.

VI. To the sixth it is said first, that the Father commanding the Son, and the Son obeying the Father, belong to the Son according as He is subject to the Father, which is not except according to the assumed humanity. Which is shown from the context of the Gospel where it is cited, and also from the Apostle, in Philippians 2.

It is said secondly, that to pray also belongs to Him according to the human nature: as is clear through the Apostle, in Heb. 5.

It is said thirdly, that He is also said to have been sent according to the assumed flesh, according as He was made of a woman, as is shown in Gal. 4. — Although the Son is also said to be sent invisibly by the Father inasmuch as He is God, without prejudice to equality with the Father, as will be shown below.

VII. To the seventh it is similarly said first, that the Son is not said to be glorified by the Father except according to the human nature, inasmuch as His clarity, which was hidden under the weakness of the flesh, was manifested in the faith of believing peoples through the glorification of the flesh and the working of miracles.

It is said secondly, that He was also raised, suffered, and died according to the flesh: as is clear from I Pet. 4.

It is said thirdly, that He was also exalted according as He was humbled, namely according to the flesh: as is clear in Philippians 2.

Hence from the aforesaid the Son is not shown to be less than the Father except according to humanity. For according to the divine nature the Son exalts Himself by His proper power: Psalm, Be Thou exalted etc. He raises Himself up: John 10, I have power etc. He glorifies not only Himself, but also the Father: John 17, Glorify etc.: not indeed by giving clarity to Him, but by manifesting to the world Him Who is hidden by the invisibility of His nature.

VIII. To the eighth it is said first that, when Christ says, To sit however etc., He does not show that the Son does not have the power of distributing the heavenly seats. Both because through a sitting of this kind participation in eternal life is understood, the collation of which He shows to pertain to Himself when He says, John 10, My sheep etc. — And because, as is said in John 5, The Father gave all judgment to the Son: but it pertains to judgment that according to merits some be placed in heavenly glory. — It is also confirmed by the authority of Matt. 25, where it is shown to pertain to the power of the Son to place someone on the right hand or on the left: whether both are referred to a different participation of glory; or one is referred to glory, and the other to punishment.

It is said secondly, that the sense of the aforesaid words is that it was not His to give this inasmuch as He was the Son of the Virgin, by reason of which it pertained to Him⁹ according to carnal kinship, but inasmuch as He was the Son of God; and to those for whom it was prepared by the Father through eternal predestination, which predestination is also shown to pertain to the Son in John 14, where it is said, In the house etc. This sense is shown from the fact that, when the mother asked for that with a certain confidence of the carnal kinship which she had with Christ, He answered that it did not pertain to Him to give to them: not, however, that it does not pertain absolutely to His power to give what was asked.

It is said thirdly, that the Son cannot be understood to be ignorant of the hour of His coming, since in Him are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and He also perfectly knows the Father Himself, which is greater: but that He bore Himself in the manner of one who is ignorant, while He did not reveal it to the disciples. For it is the customary manner in the Scriptures that God is said to know something if He causes it to be known: as is clear in Gen. 22, Now I know etc. And thus, conversely, the Son is said not to know what He does not make us know.

It is said fourthly, that sorrow, fear, and the like, pertain to Christ according as He is man.

IX. To the ninth it is said first, that the cited authority can be understood not of that wisdom which is the Son of God, but of that which God bestowed upon creatures, concerning which it is said in Sirach 1, He created her etc.

It is said secondly, that it can also be referred to the created nature assumed: so that the sense is, From the beginning I was created, that is, I was foreseen to be united to a creature.

It is said thirdly, that it can also be understood of the Son, so that through the fact that wisdom is called both created and begotten, the mode of divine generation is intimated to us: so that, namely, from creation the immutability of the Father is taken, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. And thus the Synod explained the meaning of this Scripture, as is clear through Hilary.

It must be noted that, when a name in its signification imports something of perfection and something of imperfection, it is not unfitting for it to be assumed in divine things by reason of the perfection which it imports, although by reason of the imported imperfection it is not assumed: as is most common in the doctrine of St. Thomas. ¹⁰ Therefore, because in creation the one creating is not changed, which is of perfection; but the created thing does not receive the nature of the one creating, which is of imperfection; just as conversely in generation that which is begotten receives the nature of the one begetting, but the one begetting is himself changed among us: it is not unfitting for creation to be said of the Son of God, inasmuch as through it the immutability of the producing Father is signified. And thus the Son can be said to be created, inasmuch as in His production the Father was in no way changed. From which sense it appears that on this account the Son of God ought not to be called a creature simpliciter and properly, but only secundum quid and improperly: inasmuch as the name of creation is not attributed to Him by reason of the whole of its signification, but only by reason of a part.

X. To the tenth it is said that from the fact that the Son is called the firstborn of creation, it is not shown that He is in the order of creatures: but that He is and receives from the Father, from Whom creatures are and receive; although He receives the same nature, but creatures do not. On account of which He is also called the only-begotten.

XI. To the eleventh it is said first, that the Son speaks of the union through love, in which way the Father and the Son are one, and the disciples ought to be one.

It is said secondly, that this mode of union, namely between the Father and the Son, does not exclude unity of essence, but rather demonstrates it: since it is said in John 3, The Father loves the Son etc.

Caput VIII: Solutio ad auctoritates Photini et Sabellii

Having shown that the arguments of Arius against the Catholic faith are invalid, St. Thomas wishes to show from what has been said that neither do those passages which Photinus and Sabellius adduced from Sacred Scripture in favor of their opinions confirm their errors ¹. And first, he answers Photinus; second, Sabellius ².

I. As to the first ³, he says regarding the first authority that Christ does not say that power was given to Him as though He then received it anew, but because the power which He had received from eternity began to appear in Him made man through the victory He had had by rising again.

To the second, it is said that the Son of God is said to be made, not simply, but according to the flesh, through the assumption of human nature, in the way it is said, The Word was made flesh, as is clear through the Apostle. — Likewise He is said to be predestined according to human nature, which pertains to the Son; for its union with the Son was not from human merits, but from the grace of God predestining.

To the third, it is said, first, that it must be referred to the human nature, in which was the humility of the passion, that God is said to have exalted Christ through the merit of the passion. — It is said, second, that the Father's having given Him a name which is above every name is to be understood in this way: that the name belonging to the Son from eternal birth was to be manifested in the faith of the peoples as belonging to the incarnate Son.

To the fourth, it is said that Peter understood that God made Jesus Christ and Lord according to the human nature, in which He began to have from time what in the nature of divinity He had from eternity.

II. As to the second ⁴, an answer is given first to the authorities adduced by Sabellius concerning the unity of the deity. And it is said that they do not conflict with the Catholic faith, which posits that the Father and the Son are not two gods but one God, as was said above.

To what Christ says, The Father abiding in me, etc., it is said that it shows the unity of essence, but not the unity of person. For if there were one person of the Father and the Son, it would not fittingly be said that the Father is in the Son and conversely; since the same supposit is not properly said to be in itself, but only by reason of parts, in the way a whole is sometimes said to be in itself because the parts are in the whole; for what belongs to the parts is accustomed to be attributed to the whole. This mode is not fitting in divine things, in which there cannot be parts.

It is said, second, that from the unity of essence it is apparent how the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father. For since the Father is His essence, it remains that in whatever the essence of the Father is, in that is the Father. Hence, since the essence of the Father is in the Son, it follows that the Father is in the Son; and by the same reason the Son is in the Father. And thus by the same word the error both of Sabellius and of Arius is refuted.

III. For the evident understanding of what is said here in the second place, it must be considered, first, that one thing being in another includes both a distinction between them, because the same cannot be in itself; and a certain union between them, for if any things are altogether separated, one of them is not said to be in the other. The Son is therefore said to be in the Father and conversely, inasmuch as, since they are two really distinct supposits, they have one essence in number, which is the same for both supposits. For the unity of essence in both supposits alone is not the reason for this, but this unity together with the all-inclusive identity of the supposit with the essence; as is clear from St. Thomas on John, ch. 14 ⁵; and in this chapter; and also in the First Part, q. 42, a. 5. Hence such a unity of essence, and its identity with the supposit, is the reason that one is said to be in the other. But the distinction between the persons themselves is presupposed for this inexistence.

IV. It must be considered, second, that although whenever one is said to be in another, there must be some distinction between them; yet where one is really in the other, any distinction whatsoever does not suffice, but it is necessary that there be a real distinction between them. And therefore, where one is not really distinguished from the other, it cannot properly be said that one is in the other: although, if they are distinguished according to reason, one can be said to be in the other according to reason, the other requisite conditions being present. On account of this, the divine essence is not said to be really in the Son, if we speak properly, but only according to the mode of understanding and signifying, for it is not really distinguished from the Son: but the Father is well and truly in the Son really, from whom He is distinguished, since He is the same as His essence and does not abandon it, and His essence is in the Son.

From this is clear the solution to the arguments of Aureolus recounted by Capreolus in I Sent., d. 19 ⁶, when he argues that by the same reason it could be concluded that the Son was in the Son, and that the Son was in the essence. For it is clear that it is very well argued that the Father is in the Son because His substance is in Him, because the Father and the Son are really distinguished. But by this reason the same cannot be concluded concerning those things that are adduced: because the Son is really distinguished neither from Himself nor from His essence.

But if it be urged that the reason adduced by St. Thomas does not seem to conclude that the Father is in the Son really, but only according to reason: because the Father does not seem to be in the Son by any other reason than that His essence is in Him, since He is not in the Son except by reason of the essence; but the essence is not in the Son except according to reason, in line with what was said above: — it is answered that, although the essence of the Father, inasmuch as it is also in the Son, is that by reason of which the Father is said to be in the Son, nevertheless it is not required that the essence be in the Son and in the Father in the same mode; because, notwithstanding the numerical unity of the essence of the Father and of the Son, there is between the Father and the Son a real distinction according to relative opposition. And therefore, just as the real distinction of the persons stands together with the numerical unity of the essence, so with the existence of reason of the essence in the Son and in the Father, there stands the real existence of the Father in Him, on account of their real distinction.

Let no one think, however, that I am saying that the divine essence is not in the Son really, as though the reality itself of the essence were not attributed to the Son. For I do not mean this: but that, since by that preposition in a distinction is imported, at least presuppositively, the reality of the essence by which it is really identified with the Son does not have that real distinction which is imported when one is said to be in another really, although the reality of the essence is in the Son, that is, is not extrinsic to the Son.

V. It must be noted, third, that this mode of being in is not properly any of those modes of being in something that are enumerated by the Philosopher in IV Physics ⁷; but nevertheless by a certain remote likeness it can be reduced to some of them. For as is held from the doctrine of St. Thomas in I Sent., d. 19, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1, we can speak of the being of one person in another in two ways: in one way, according to being; in another way, according to intellect ⁸. In the first way, it is reduced to that mode by which a genus is in its species (understand this, as I said, by a remote reduction): because, since on account of the unity of essence the Father is said to be in the Son because His essence is in the Son, it is reduced to that mode to which it would be reduced if the essence were said to be in the Son just as in material things the essence is in the supposit, from which it is in some way really distinguished, as was shown above ⁹. But this mode is reduced to that mode by which a genus is in a species.

In the second way, however, it is reduced to that mode by which something is in its efficient or originating principle, and conversely the originating in the originated, if they are taken relatively: because, namely, one belongs to the intellect and notion of the other, just as one relative enters into the notion of the other. And it is in this sense that what St. Thomas says in the First Part, in the place cited, to the first, is understood ¹⁰.

VI. It is clear then from these things that, properly speaking, the Father's being in the Son according to being, and conversely, is nothing other than the Father, really distinct from the Son, being consubstantial with Him and of the same numerical essence with Him, and conversely.

In Scotus, however, in I Sent., d. 19 ¹¹, the Father's being in the Son is His being present to Him by the presence of a subsistent to a subsistent, with the unity of nature demanding such a presence. Which comes to the same thing as what we have said. — See the rest in Capreolus, in the place cited ¹².

Concerning what is said, that by one word the error of Arius and of Sabellius is refuted, it must be noted that, since, as has been shown, the Father's being in the Son shows both their personal distinction, and the unity of essence in them and their consubstantiality; by the fact that it imports a distinction of persons, the error of Sabellius positing that there is one person of the Father and of the Son is excluded; but by the fact that it imports consubstantiality and unity of essence, the error of Arius saying that the Son is a creature and is not of the same essence with the Father is excluded.

Caput IX: Rationes contra generationem et processionem divinam

After St. Thomas has shown from the authorities of Sacred Scripture that generation, filiation, and paternity are in the divine, he wishes now to investigate the manner of the said generation¹. Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, he introduces arguments against that generation; second, he determines the truth, in the following chapter; third, he answers the objections, in chapter 14.

As to the first, he says that, since it is proposed to us to be believed from the Sacred Scriptures that the Father and the Son, even if they are distinguished in persons, are nevertheless one God and have one essence or nature; and since this seems very remote from the nature of creatures: human reason, proceeding from the properties of creatures, suffers manifold difficulty in this mystery².

And first, because generation known to us is a kind of change, to which corruption is opposed. But God is immutable, incorruptible, and eternal.

Second, because it follows, if the Son of God is begotten, that he is neither eternal—as coming forth from potency into act, since everything that is generated is mutable, and whatever is changed comes forth from potency into act—nor true God, because he has something of potentiality.

Third, because the Son received from the Father neither another nature numerically, but the same specifically, since there cannot be several godheads numerically; nor the same numerically, because he received neither a part of it, since the divine nature is indivisible; nor the whole of it, because thus it would cease to be in the Father, as being poured into the Son, and thus the Father by generating would be corrupted; nor can this be through a kind of exuberance, as the water of a spring flows into a stream and the spring is not emptied, because the divine nature, just as it cannot be divided, so neither can it be increased. But if he received a nature of another genus from the Father, as happens in equivocal generations, it follows that the Son is not true God.

Fourth, because it follows that the Son is not his own essence or nature: because then it would be necessary that the recipient be one thing, and the nature received another.

Fifth, because, if the Son is not other than his essence, since the divine essence is subsisting; and the Father also is his essence; it remains that the Father and the Son agree in the same subsisting thing; and consequently that they agree in person, since in intellectual natures a subsisting thing is called a person. But if the Son is not the divine essence itself, he will not be true God.

Sixth, because, since in the Father there is no other principle of individuation than his essence, from the fact that the Father is the same as God, while the essence of God is that by which God is individuated, as not being a form in matter, his essence can be in no other supposit: for that which is the principle of individuation in each thing, it is impossible to belong to another supposit. And thus it follows either that it is not in the Son, and thus he will not be true God; or that the Son is not distinct in supposit from the Father.

Seventh, because, if the Father and the Son are two supposits and one in essence, there must be in them something besides the essence by which they are distinguished. And thus the person of the Son will be composite, and likewise the person of the Father: and thus neither will be true God.

If it be said that they are distinguished by relation alone, inasmuch as one is the Father and the other is the Son; but those things which are said relatively do not predicate something else³ but toward something else:—this does not seem sufficient. First, because, since a relation cannot exist without something absolute, either that absolute in which the relation of the Father and the Son is founded is only one, or two. Not the first: because in the same thing a twofold relation cannot be founded, unless perhaps a relation of identity, which cannot work a distinction. Therefore the second. Therefore it is necessary that a distinction of absolutes be pre-understood. Therefore etc.—Second, because the relation that distinguishes the Son from the Father, if it is a real thing, since it does not seem to be the divine essence itself, because that is common, there will be in the Son some real thing that is not his essence: and thus he will not be true God. But if it is in the intellect alone, it will not be able personally to distinguish the Son from the Father.—Third, because then neither will be true God. For every relative depends on its correlative: but what depends on another is not true God.

Eighth, because, if the Father is God and likewise the Son, this name God will be predicated substantially of both. But it is impossible that plurality be found on the part of the subjects, when there is unity on the part of the substantial predicate (understand this of numerical unity): because a substantial predicate is that which truly is that very thing of which it is predicated. And thus it seems, if the Father and the Son are two persons, to be impossible that they are one God.

Ninth, because opposite things are predicated of God the Father and of God the Son: for the Father is unbegotten God, but the Son is begotten God. But opposite predicates show plurality in that of which they are predicated.

Lastly, for the solution that follows, St. Thomas adds that, because the truth is strong in itself and is shattered by no attack, it must be shown that the truth of faith cannot be overcome by reason.

Caput X: Quomodo accipienda sit generatio in divinis, et quae de filio Dei dicuntur in Scripturis

Having set forth the arguments by which divine generation can be assailed, St. Thomas proceeds to the determination of the truth¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he explains the mode of generation in the divine; second, he shows that there is only one generation there, and one Son, in chapter xiii.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows what was proposed; second, he clarifies something that he had presupposed, in chapter xii.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that divine generation is to be understood according to an intellectual emanation; second, he clarifies how this is, at the words, Now this can be made clear as follows².

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that the mode of intelligible emanation is distinct from other emanations; second, it is shown that even in intelligible nature itself there are distinct modes of emanation, at the words, But even in the intelligible³.

I. As to the first, he says that the principle of our intention—namely, that by which we intend to show that the truth of the faith concerning the generation of the Son cannot be overcome by reason—must be taken from this: that according to the diversity of natures, a diverse mode of emanation is found in things; and the higher a nature is, the more intimate is that which emanates from it.

This is made clear by running through all the grades of nature. For in inanimate things, which hold the lowest place in things, emanations cannot occur except through the action of one of them upon something else: as is evident when fire is generated from fire. — In plants, in which is the first grade of life, since they move themselves to act, the emanation already proceeds from within: inasmuch as the plant's internal moisture is converted into seed, which, committed to the earth, grows into a plant. But that which emanates is finally found to be wholly extrinsic: for the moisture going forth from the tree becomes a blossom, then becomes fruit, which, when perfected, is entirely separated from the tree, and falling into the earth, by seminal power produces another plant. Yet it is clear that the principle of this emanation is taken from without: because the moisture itself is taken up from the earth through the roots. — But in a further grade of life, which is according to the sensitive soul, proper emanation indeed begins from without, namely from a sensible object impressing its form upon the external senses; but it terminates within. And the further the emanation proceeds, the more it arrives at what is intimate: for from the external senses the sensible form proceeds into the imagination, and further into the storehouse of memory. But in any process of this emanation, the principle and the term belong to diverse things: since the sensitive power is not reflected upon itself. — But in the supreme and perfect grade of life, which is according to the intellect, the intellect is reflected upon itself, and can understand itself. — From these things it is clear that the mode of emanation in intellectual nature is other than the mode of emanation in other natures.

II. But concerning the things that have been said, a twofold doubt arises. The first is⁴, because it does not seem, from what was said, that sensitive emanation should be numbered among vital emanations. For emanation in living things is said to be from within, according as the living thing acts upon itself or upon something internal by producing something. For from this it was shown that emanation in plants, to which the first grade of life belongs, is from within: because the plants themselves move the internal moisture, converting it into seed, from which another plant arises. But in sensitive emanation there is no process from within, but from without, as is said here. Therefore etc.

The doubt is increased. Because if sensitive emanation is a vital emanation for the reason that, although it begins from without, it nevertheless terminates within; it follows that the emanation of inanimate things will also be vital. For when fire emanates from fire, the principle of this emanation is external, namely the generating fire; but the term is internal, namely the form of the generated fire, which is in the matter itself that is transmuted, just as the form caused by the sensible thing is in the sense itself which is immuted.

III. The second doubt is⁵, because it does not seem to be appropriately adduced as the reason why in the process of sensitive emanation the principle and the term belong to diverse things, that namely the sensitive power is not reflected upon itself. For it is clear that here the discussion is about that emanation by which the sensible form emanates from the extrinsic thing itself into the sensitive soul. But to this it matters nothing whether the sensitive power is reflected upon itself or not: because even if it were reflected upon itself, it would be the same. Just as it is evident that the intellect is reflected upon itself; and yet the principle of that emanation by which the intelligible form emanates from an extrinsic thing into the intellect, and the term, belong to diverse things.

If it is said that here the discussion is about sensitive emanation, not as that by which the sensible species is received, but as that by which the act of sensing is produced: because, since the action of the sense terminates not in the sense itself but in the extrinsic sensible, the principle and the term belong to diverse things, which would not be the case if the sense sensed itself: — this does not seem to be true. Because through the act of sensing, especially through the act of the external sense, nothing is produced in the sense itself: but here we are speaking of the act by which one thing emanates and is produced from another.

IV. One can respond to these things in two ways⁶. For the first way, it must first be considered that, when we say that living things are moved by themselves, we do not understand that they are so the principle of the motion by which they are moved to themselves as if their motion in no way had its origin from some extrinsic principle: since in Phys. VIII⁷ Aristotle shows that the motion in animals by which they are moved by themselves has its beginning from some extrinsic motion. Rather, we understand that they are to themselves the immediate elicitive principle of such a motion existing in themselves: although something extrinsic concurs toward that motion, as a remote principle. But this belongs even to animals: for of this action which is to sense, according to which sensitive things, as such, are said to move themselves, the immediate and proximate elicitive principle is the sensitive power itself actuated by the sensible species; but the remote principle is the sensible object itself, impressing its form upon the sense. Hence it is denied that sensitive emanation, namely sensing itself, is not from an internal principle proximately. For St. Thomas does not say this, but that it begins from without: namely as from a remote principle; from which, I say, the sense receives the form by which it causes its operation in itself. — And in this sense, so that we may also explain this in passing, what St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. xxvii, a. 5, is to be understood: that sensing is not entirely removed from the genus of actions that are directed to what is without, because sensing is perfected through the action of the sensible upon the sense. For because the sensible is according to its being extrinsic to the sense; and its action upon the sense must naturally precede sensing itself, which is the action of the sense; from which the sensible object has that it is the remote principle of the act of sensing through the transient action by which it acts upon the sense: therefore sensing is said not to be entirely foreign to the genus of actions that are directed to what is without. — But this does not belong to intellection. Because although some understanding—namely ours—has its origin in some way from the action of the sensible upon the sense, this nevertheless does not belong to intellection according to its whole genus, as it does to sensation: for neither angelic intellection nor divine intellection is caused by sensible things.

This can also be understood in another and better way. For it is one thing for an operation to be perfected through the action of the sensible upon the sense, and another to depend on and originate from that action. For for the second it suffices that the action of the sensible upon the sense precede the operation of the sense, and have caused its proximate principle; but for the first it is required that both be simultaneous, and one necessarily accompany the other. It is said, therefore, that for sensing to be perfected through the action of the sensible upon the sense is not only to originate from such an action, but also for its existence and completion to require that that action be simultaneous with sensing itself: for sensing is not in act except while the sense is actually immuted by the sensible. But to intellection it belongs indeed that it originates from the action of the sensible upon the sense, and of the intelligible upon the intellect; but not that it is perfected through such an action; since, even when that action does not exist, there is intellection; for after the intellect has been informed by the species, it understands by itself, with no action of the intelligible upon the intellect concurring.
To the confirmation it is said that it proceeds from a false understanding of the words of St. Thomas: as if, namely, sensitive emanation were the production itself of the sensible form into the sense, and the term of this emanation remained in the sense. For St. Thomas does not intend this: but that sensing itself, which is actual sensation and judgment concerning the sensible thing, and is the term of sensitive emanation, begins indeed from without as from a remote principle through its transient action upon the sense, but nevertheless is proximately and immediately produced by the sensitive power made in first act, and remains in it, and is not received in anything existing outside the sense. And this is for sensitive emanation to terminate within. In inanimate things, however, it is not so. For inanimate things are not the proximate productive principle of anything remaining in themselves: but all their action is received in something extrinsic.

V. For the solution of the second doubt⁸, it must be considered that, since every active or productive power of any operation has some object toward which it tends through its operation, and at which its operation terminates; every operation must in some way be a medium between the power which is its productive principle, and the object which is its term. But sometimes the term itself is produced through such an operation, as is apparent in transient actions; but sometimes it is not produced simpliciter according to its real being, although it may perhaps be produced according to some intentional being. Sensing, therefore, is an operation and a certain emanation whose elicitive principle is the sensitive power, while the term is the sensible itself, which according to natural or real being is indeed not produced through the act of sensing, yet according to some aspect can in some way be said to be produced, namely under the aspect of what is sensed in act: for the sensible does not have that it is actually sensed except from the act of sensing by which it is actually sensed, so that the sense is said on this account to constitute its object in the being of the sensed.

These things having been presupposed, it is said that the reason of St. Thomas is excellent. For since the sensitive power is not reflected upon itself—for sight does not see itself, properly speaking—it follows that it is not the term and object of the sensitive emanation which is called sensation. And since it is the principle of such an emanation, it follows that its principle and term belong to diverse things: namely, the principle to the sense, but the term to the sensible itself. — But when it is said that it would be the same even if the sense were reflected upon itself: I deny it. For if it were reflected upon itself by sensing itself, it would be both the principle of sensation, and the object or term; and thus the principle and the term would not belong to diverse things.

Therefore the reason given there is admitted. To the disproof of which it is said first, that here St. Thomas is not speaking of emanation according as something is really produced through it; but he is speaking absolutely of the operation itself emanating from some principle, which in living things proceeds from within, and in some way remains in what is within itself. Later, however⁹, he will explain that in that emanation which is from the intellect, there is something really produced.

It is said secondly, that through sensitive emanation something is also produced according to sensed being, as was said, although not according to real being. But this is not properly for something to be produced.

VI. One can respond secondly, and better, to the aforesaid doubts¹⁰. For it is said first, that by the emanation which is according to the sensitive soul, St. Thomas understands not indeed the impression of the sensible species into the sense from the sensible thing, because that emanation is only from without; nor again the operation itself which is sensation, since that does not have any term really produced through it; but that action by which the sensitive soul produces something in itself. But this is inasmuch as one sensitive power acts upon another, as the external sense upon the phantasia, and the phantasia upon the memory. For that emanation occurs from within immediately, inasmuch as the sensitive soul causes the sensible form in itself, by immuting the interior powers through the exterior powers, although it originates remotely from without.

It is said secondly, that for the sensitive power not to be reflected upon itself is for it not to sense itself, nor to cause a likeness of itself in itself. And thus, since the sensitive power is not reflected upon itself by causing a likeness of itself in itself, through which it might sense itself; it follows that in the emanation of the sensitive soul by which something is produced through it, the principle and the term belong to diverse things, namely to diverse powers, although it is the same soul. — And this seems to be more according to the intention of the text, if it is diligently considered. And according to this sense, it is clear that the objections do not proceed.

VII. In the second place St. Thomas shows that several modes are found even in intellectual emanation, and that the emanation of the divine intellect differs from the others¹¹. And he says that diverse grades are found even in intellectual life. The lowest is that of the human intellect, which can indeed know itself, but nevertheless takes the first beginning of its cognition from without, namely from a phantasm. — Above this is the life of the angelic intellect, which knows itself through itself, and not from anything external. Yet, although the understood intention is entirely intrinsic to angels, it is nevertheless not their substance: since in them to understand and to be are not the same. — The ultimate perfection of life is that of the divine intellect, whose understood intention is the divine essence itself: since in it to understand and to be are not different.

Lest, however, there be doubt as to what is understood by the name of understood intention, St. Thomas explains that it is that which the intellect conceives in itself concerning the understood thing, which is a certain likeness conceived by the intellect of the understood thing, which external words signify. Moreover, that this in us is not the understood thing is apparent, because it is one thing to understand the thing, and another to understand the understood intention itself, which takes place through reflection: whence also some sciences are about things, and others about understood intentions. That it is also not the intellect itself in us is evident from the fact that its being consists in being understood itself, but not the being of our intellect. In God, however, it is clear that it is the divine intellect: because in Him to understand and to be are the same. And because the intellect in Him is the understood thing, it remains that in God Himself understanding Himself, the intellect, the thing that is understood, and the understood intention are the same.

For the evidence of what is said, that the understood intention is entirely intrinsic to angels, it must be considered that this is not said as if in us the understood intention, according to its entity, were not entirely intrinsic to the intellect: but because in us the entity of the understood intention is indeed intrinsic to the intellect, since it is its accident, but the cause is in some way extrinsic, inasmuch as the beginning of our cognition is from without, that is, from a phantasm. In angels, however, not even as to the cause is it from an extrinsic object: since its cognition does not have its origin from without, inasmuch as intelligible species are connatural to them, and its essence, by which it understands itself, is intrinsic to it.
Concerning what is said, that the being of the understood intention consists in being understood itself, it must be considered that the being of the understood intention is said to consist in being understood, not because it does not have some being in reality but only has this being, that it is understood—that is, has only a relation of reason to the one understanding, in the way beings of reason are said to have being in being understood (for, since it is an accident of the intellect, it must have some real being)—but because that real being which it has is the act itself of understanding as passively taken, and is signified by this phrase to be understood; or is something following upon understanding itself, which does not last except as long as actual intellection lasts; for when intellection ceases, the being of the understood intention ceases. And it is similar to our saying that the being of illuminated air, as such, consists in being illuminated itself, because light does not have being in the air except through illumination, and only while the air is illuminated.

VIII. Then, when it is said, Now this can be made clear as follows, St. Thomas proceeds to the clarification of divine generation¹². And he posits four conclusions.

The first is: It is not possible for divine generation to be taken as generation is found in inanimate things. It is proved. The generator in those things impresses its species upon exterior matter. But not in the divine. Therefore etc. — The second part of the antecedent is proved. Because according to the faith the Son begotten of God has true deity, and is true God. But deity is not a form inhering in matter; nor is God existing from matter.

The second conclusion is: Divine generation cannot be taken according to the mode of that which is in plants and animals sharing with plants in nutritive and generative power. It is proved. Something is separated from them for the generation of one similar in species, which at the end of generation is entirely outside the generator. But these things cannot belong to God, as is clear from the things said above. Therefore etc.

The third conclusion is: Divine generation cannot be understood according to the mode of emanation that is found in the sensitive soul. It is proved. Both because, since God is the first agent, He does not receive from without that whence He can flow into another: as, namely, belongs to the sense, according to the aforesaid¹³. — And because the operations of the sensitive soul are not completed without bodily instruments. But it is clear that God is incorporeal.

IX. The fourth conclusion is: Divine generation is to be understood according to intellectual emanation. St. Thomas leaves this proved from the sufficient division set down above.

For its clarification, however, he posits twelve conclusions¹⁴.

The first of which is: In God understanding Himself is the Word of God, as it were God understood. It is proved. Everything understood, inasmuch as it is understood, is in the one understanding. Therefore God, understanding Himself, is in Himself as what is understood in the one understanding. Therefore etc.

The antecedent is proved. Because to understand signifies the apprehension of that which is understood by the intellect. Whence also our intellect, understanding itself, is in itself not only as the same as itself through essence, but also as apprehended by understanding. — But the second consequence is proved. Because what is understood in the one understanding is the understood intention and word. — It is confirmed by the authority of John saying: The Word was with God.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that, although the understood thing is in the one understanding through the intelligible species, it does not from that have the character of what is actually understood. For what is understood in act, as such, designates the term of intellection apprehended through intellection itself: but the intelligible species designates the principle of intellection. Therefore, besides the intelligible species itself, there must be in the intellect actually understanding an understood intention: for what is apprehended is in the one apprehending in some way.

X. The second conclusion is: The Word of God is coeternal with Him, and His Word does not happen to Him from time, as happens to our intellect. It is proved. The divine intellect always understands itself. But from the fact that it understands itself, its Word must be in it. Therefore His Word has always existed in Him. Therefore etc. — The assumption is proved. Because the divine intellect does not go out from potency into act, but is always existing in act. — It is confirmed from what is said: In the beginning was the Word.

XI. The third conclusion is: The Word of God is the very divine esse, and His essence, and true God Himself. As to the first part, it is proved. The substance of the divine intellect is its very understanding, since it is pure act. The esse of the understood Word is its very being-understood. Therefore, the esse of the divine Word and of the divine intellect is the same. — As to the second part, it is proved. Because the esse of the divine intellect is the esse of God, who is His own intellect. But the esse of God is His essence, by which He is God. — As to the third part, it is proved. Because the natural esse of God and His understanding are not different. — It is confirmed from what is said: God was the Word. For, since this is said absolutely, it is shown that the Word of God must be understood to be true God. For the word of man could not be called man simply and absolutely, but only understood man; hence this would be false, man is a word, but this can be true, understood man is a word.

From this St. Thomas infers that when it is said, God was the Word, it is shown that the divine Word is a thing existing and subsisting in nature, because true God is a subsisting thing.

For a greater manifestation of these points, he interposes that these things do not belong to the word of the human intellect understanding itself. For since the esse of the understood intention is its very being-understood, and the esse of the intellect and its understanding are different—for the substance of the intellect was potentially understanding before it understood in act—it follows that the esse of the understood intention is one thing, and the esse of the intellect another. Similarly, it follows that the conceived word is not a true man, having the natural esse of man, but only understood man, as his likeness apprehended by himself.

Regarding the proof of the first part of the conclusion, it should be noted that, just as in things that are moved materially the action and passion are the same thing, so in things that operate immaterially in some way, the operation is the same by which both the principle of the operation is denominated after the manner of an agent, and the term of the action is denominated after the manner of a patient: just as by the same vision a thing is said to be seen, and the sight to see. Therefore, since understanding is a certain immaterial operation elicited by the intellect and terminated at the understood intention, the very understanding of the intellect and the very being-understood of the understood intention are the same thing; but they differ according to the diverse connoted relations. For it is called to understand insofar as it is signified with a relation of the intellect as that from which it is; but it is called to be understood insofar as it connotes a relation of the understood as the term. Most excellently, therefore, does St. Thomas conclude that the esse of the divine intellect and of its Word is the same, because the esse of the intellect is its very understanding, and the esse of the Word is its very being-understood. For if to be understood is the esse of the Word, and to be understood is its very understanding, it follows that the esse of the Word is its very understanding. And therefore, if understanding is the esse of the intellect, it follows that the esse of the Word is the very esse of the intellect.

Regarding the proof of the second part of the conclusion, it must be noted that the foundation of this reason is that the divine essence cannot be the act of anything that is not identified with itself. And therefore, if the esse of the Word is the divine essence, the Word must be the same as that essence itself.

Regarding the proof of the third part of the conclusion, it must be considered that the natural esse of a thing follows upon the thing's essence, and is diversified according to the diversity of natures: for just as the nature and essence of a stone is one, and the nature and essence of a man another, so the esse of a stone is one, and the esse of a man another. And therefore the essence and its natural esse accompany each other, so that where one is primarily and per se, the other is also. Therefore, since the divine Word has the natural esse of God, from the fact that His esse is the very understanding which is the natural esse of God, it follows that He has the divine essence. And because every supposit whose nature is the divine essence is true God, it follows that the divine Word Himself is true God. And this argument proceeds according to this foundation.

XII. But regarding the aforesaid, a twofold doubt arises. The first is because it does not seem to be sufficiently concluded that the understood intention and the intellect are the same in God because they have the same esse. For the hand of a man and the foot have the same esse, since they are through the numerically same form; and similarly matter and form; and yet the hand is not the foot, but they are two substances; and similarly matter is not form.

The second is: If, because the esse of the understood intention is to be understood, and the esse of the intellect is to understand, it follows that the esse of the intellect and of the understood intention is the same, and that the understood intention is the intellect, and consequently God—since God understands not only the understood intention existing in Himself, but also all things having esse outside God Himself; and the esse of those things, insofar as they are understood, is to be understood—by the same reason it follows that every creature is the divine intellect, and is God.

To the first, it is said first, that St. Thomas's reason does not proceed from this universally, that all things that have the same esse are the same, because that is not true of the parts constituting a whole and existing through the esse of the whole: but from the fact that it must be so in simple natures. For since one thing cannot have the esse of such a nature as a part of it, if it has the esse of that nature, it is necessary that it be a supposit of that nature. And therefore, if the esse of the divine intellect itself is the esse of that which is in it, it is necessary, according to the declaration made above, that their nature be one, and that the one be the other.
To the second, it is said that one must speak in one way of the understood intention existing in the intellect, and in another way of the understood thing having esse outside the intellect, insofar as it has esse outside the intellect. For the being-understood of the understood intention expresses its very esse by which it exists in the nature of things: for it does not exist except through the very actual being-understood; whence, this ceasing, the word is not. But the being-understood of an extrinsic thing, insofar as it is extrinsic, does not express its esse, but only a certain relation to the intellect; and it is an extrinsic denomination when it is said to be understood, namely from the act of understanding existing not indeed in the thing itself, but in the intellect. And therefore, although it follows from the fact that the esse of the intellect is its very understanding, and the esse of the understood intention is its very being-understood, that the understood intention and the intellect are the same, it does not nevertheless follow that the understood thing, according as it is outside, is the divine intellect.

When, however, it is argued that their esse, insofar as they are understood, is the very being-understood, it is said that if the phrase insofar as they are understood signifies insofar as they have esse in the intellect through their understood intention, it is in this way entirely true that to be understood is their esse. But from this nothing else is obtained except that the understood intention of them, through which they are in the divine intellect, is the same as the divine intellect. — If, however, it is signified insofar as they terminate the act of the divine intellect according to the esse which they have outside the intellect, in this way it is false that their esse is to be understood, that is, the act of understanding by which they are understood; but it is the very esse outside the intellect, with a relation to the one understanding in act.

XIII. The fourth conclusion is: The Word of God communicates with God in the numerically same nature. It is proved in two ways. First. He has the nature of God just as God's understanding is His very esse. But God's understanding is the divine esse. Therefore, He has the nature of God just as the divine esse is His own esse. But the divine esse is His own esse in such a way that the esse of both is the same. Therefore, He has the divine essence itself, not only the same in species, but the same in number.

It should be noted that the nature of any species cannot be numerically multiplied unless the esse of such a nature is multiplied, because there cannot be one esse of things having numerically diverse complete natures. And therefore, where some things that are numerically distinct have one and the same esse, in them nature is not multiplied according to number, but is one in number. And therefore it is most excellently argued here that the nature of God understanding and of His Word is numerically the same, because they have one and the same esse of divinity.

Second. The divine nature is entirely immaterial. Therefore it cannot be one in species and differing in number. — The consequence is proved. Because a nature that is one according to species is not divided into many according to number except on account of matter.

From this St. Thomas infers that on this account God and His Word are not two gods, but one God. For the fact that two having human nature are two men happens from this: that human nature is numerically divided in the two.

XIV. Concerning this proposition, Two having human nature are two men because human nature is numerically divided in the two, it is doubted. For St. Thomas seems to intend that the plurality of human nature is the reason why some are called several men. But he seems to hold the opposite of this in the Tertia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 2, where he maintains that if one divine person were to assume two humanities, he would not be called two men, but one man, on account of the unity of the supposit.

Because this difficulty arises from this general difficulty, namely, whether for the plurality of a substantive noun the sole plurality of the form signified by the noun suffices, or whether a plurality of supposits is also required, therefore this must be answered first, from which the solution to the raised doubt will afterwards be easy ¹⁵.

It should be known, therefore, that a twofold answer can be given in the doctrine of St. Thomas ¹⁶. First, it can be answered that for a noun—not only an adjective, but also a substantive—to be predicated plurally, it does not suffice that the form signified by the noun be plurified in that of which the noun is predicated, but it is also required that the supposits of which the noun is said be many. This is clear from two places of St. Thomas in the Summa. The first is in the Tertia Pars, in the cited place. The second is Prima, q. 36, a. 4, ad 2, where he says that although in the Father there are several properties, one of which is referred to the Son, and the other to the Holy Spirit, He is not nevertheless called several principles, because a plurality of supposits would be implied.
But there are two things that seem to stand in the way of this. The first is that St. Thomas lays down a general rule in Prima, q. 39, a. 3; and I Sent., d. 9, a. 2 ¹⁷; likewise III Sent., d. 1, q. 2 ¹⁸; and De Pot., q. 9, a. 6: namely, that substantive nouns receive unity and plurality from the unity and plurality of the signified form, with no mention made of a plurality of supposits.

The second is because St. Thomas, putting this general rule into practice in III Sent., in the cited place ¹⁹, says that if one person were to assume two humanities, he would be called two men on account of the plurality of the signified form, although the supposit were one.

To the first ²⁰, it is said that we can speak of the singularity and plurality of nouns in two ways: in one way, as to the ratio and formal cause of their singularity and plurality precisely and absolutely; in another way, as to the cause together with that which always accompanies this cause, which can be called a sine qua non cause. If we speak of this singularity and plurality in the first way, thus the sole plurality of the signified form is required for the plurality of a substantive noun, just as the sole plurality of supposits is required for the plurality of an adjective noun. For because, as St. Thomas says in the aforementioned places, a substantive signifies after the manner of a substance, and substance of itself has unity and plurality, therefore from the unity and plurality of the signified form, as from the ratio and cause of unity and plurality, its singularity and plurality are received; on the contrary, however, because an adjective noun signifies something after the manner of an accident, and accidents receive unity and plurality from the subject, therefore the adjective itself also receives its singularity and plurality from the unity and plurality of the supposits, as from the ratio and cause of its singularity and plurality. — If, however, we speak in the second way, namely as to the cause together with that which accompanies the cause, thus not only the plurality of the signified form concurs toward the plurality of the noun, but also the plurality of supposits: because among us a substantial form is not found multiplied without a multiplication of supposits.

St. Thomas, therefore, where he lays down that general rule, touches only upon that which is the formal ratio and cause of the plurality of the noun, from which primarily and per se a substantive noun differs from an adjective noun as to singularity and plurality. By this, however, he does not exclude a plurality of supposits that may accompany it. — In other places, however, he explains not only the cause, but also that which accompanies the cause. For in the Tertia Pars, he assigns the reason why the person assuming two humanities would not be called two men; because, I say, never among things that are with us is a noun imposed from some form spoken plurally except on account of a plurality of supposits. In this he gives it to be understood that, although the plurality of supposits is not the formal ratio and cause of the plurality of a substantive noun, it nevertheless accompanies that cause; and on this account, considering both as concurring toward a plurality of this kind, the person who would assume two humanities would not be two men, but ²¹ one man. He gives the same to be understood in the Prima Pars in q. 36, when he says that the Father is not called several principles, because a plurality of supposits would be implied: as if to say, although the sole plurality of the signified form is the cause and foundation of the plurality of a substantive noun, nevertheless that does not suffice for plurality: because the plurality of the noun also implies a plurality of supposits as a concomitant cause in all things that are with us. And on this account we do not predicate a substantive noun even in divinis, unless along with the plurality of the form a plurality of supposits also concurs.

To the second ²², it is said that St. Thomas in III Sent. spoke as far as the cause of the plurality of a substantive noun requires. For because in that case there would be the true and formal cause of the plurality of the noun, namely the plurality of the signified form, he therefore said that that person would be several men. Nevertheless, it is not repugnant to this that, considering the cause and that which accompanies the cause, it would have to be said that that person would not be two men, but one.

XV. It could be answered secondly to the doubt ²³ that that rule concerning the plurality of substantives is universally true in substantive nouns, that is, insofar as they are such; and that the sole plurality of form is required for its plurality, nor is a plurality of supposits required. — To the objection from the Tertia Pars, however, it could be said that this noun man has something of the condition of a substantive noun, and something of the condition of an adjective noun, as it is said of Christ: just as the humanity in Christ also has indeed the manner of an accidental form, insofar as it comes to the divine supposit after its complete esse, and is not identified with the supposit itself; but it has the manner of a substantial nature, insofar as it is drawn to the esse of the divine supposit, and the divine supposit subsists in it. Insofar as it has the manner of a substantive noun, it is thus said plurally upon the plurification of the signified form: and according to this consideration St. Thomas said in III Sent. ²⁴ that the person assuming two humanities would be two men. Insofar, however, as it has the manner of an adjective noun, it thus receives plurality from the plurality of supposits: and according to this consideration it was said in the Tertia Pars that the person assuming two humanities would not be two men. Whence it is said in the same place that the human nature in Christ in some respect behaves after the manner of a garment: as if intimating that that noun man is taken there as having the manner of an adjective noun. — And perhaps Capreolus understood this answer in the First Book, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1 ²⁵, where he said that St. Thomas in the Tertia Pars, when he said that a noun is never spoken plurally except on account of a plurality of supposits, speaks rather of adjectives than of substantives.

But because in the Tertia Pars St. Thomas speaks of this noun man as of a substantive noun, as is clear in the same question, art. 6 ²⁶, where he determines that if several persons were to take one humanity, it would be called one man on account of the unity of the signified form, which belongs to a substantive noun; also in the Prima Pars, speaking of this noun principle, he says that if the Father were said to be several principles, a plurality of supposits would be implied; therefore the first answer seems to me to be better, and more according to the mind of St. Thomas: namely, that toward the plurality of a substantive noun there concur both the plurality of the signified form and the plurality of supposits; the one as the ratio and formal cause of plurality; the other as accompanying the cause, and as a sine qua non cause, in the things that are with us; and consequently also in divinis, in which we use nouns to signify according to the mode found in creatures.
From these things the answer to the doubt first raised ²⁷ is clear. For it is said that St. Thomas certainly intends in this place that the reason why some are called several men is the plurality of humanity in them: yet by this he does not exclude the plurality of supposits in the manner stated. Rather, he seems to include it, since he also makes mention of two supposits having humanity. Moreover, as was clear, what is said in the Tertia Pars is not contrary to this.

XVI. The fifth conclusion is: The Word of God proceeds from God according to His very understanding. It is proved by supposing that, although those things that are divided in creatures (namely, which are said formally of God) are simply one in God, nevertheless whatever pertains to their ratio is most truly in God. This is declared in essence, subsistence, and esse. — Then thus: It belongs to the ratio of the interior word, which is the understood intention, that it proceed from the one understanding according to his understanding. Therefore, etc.

The antecedent is proved: because it is as it were the term of the intellectual operation. — The consequence, however, is proved: because, since in God the one understanding, understanding, and the understood intention are the same, it is necessary that in God there be most truly both what pertains to the ratio of the one understanding, and what pertains to the ratio of that which is to understand, and what pertains to the ratio of the understood intention, or word.

Here two things must be noted. The first is that this conclusion is posited not as naturally known, but as believed. For the Trinity of persons in divinis cannot be naturally proved in the way in which faith posits it. And therefore the foundation of the conclusion must be believed, namely: it belongs to the ratio of the Word that He proceed from the one understanding according to His understanding. For this is not universally true unless it is supposed, according to faith, that there is a produced Word in divinis. For St. Thomas, supposing from the Sacred Scriptures that there is a Son in divinis, intends to declare the mode of generation. Whence a philosopher denying the Trinity of persons in divinis would deny that there is generation there, and that it belongs to the ratio of the Word that He proceed from the one understanding according to His understanding. Indeed, many deny that even in our intellect a produced word must be posited.

The second is that, when it is said that the word is as it were the term of the intellectual operation, the word as it were is not taken as importing likeness, but as expressive of truth.

XVII. The sixth conclusion is: The Word is distinguished from the one understanding in God by relation alone. — It is proved. The Word of God is compared to God understanding, whose Word He is, as to Him from whom He is: since this belongs to the ratio of a word. And they are not distinguished according to essence. Therefore there remains only the distinction of relation, according as the Word is referred to the one conceiving, from whom He is. — It is confirmed through that which is said: This was in the beginning with God: from which it is given to be understood that the Word, which he had said was God, is in some way distinct from God who speaks. — How the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by relations will be shown below in chapter 24.

The seventh conclusion is: The Word of God is compared to other things understood by God as an exemplar, but to God Himself, whose Word it is, as an image. It is proved. Because, since the internally conceived word is a certain ratio and likeness of the thing understood, if it is related to it as a principle, it has the ratio of an exemplar; but if it is related to it as to a principle, it has the ratio of an image. This is explained in our intellect with respect to artificial things, and with respect to natural things. But the understanding of God understanding is the principle of the things understood by Him; however, to the intelligible which is Himself, it is compared as to a principle, since this intelligible is the same as the intellect understanding. And the same ratio applies to the Word, since it is a certain emanation of the intellect understanding. Therefore, etc. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, in Colossians 1, saying of the Word of God that it is the image of the invisible God.

It should be noted that we can understand a twofold identity of the intelligible with the one understanding. One according to intelligible being, insofar as the intelligible according to its intellectual species is in the intellect, and from them one thing is made for understanding. But another according to natural being and according to proper nature: as, when the intellect understands itself, it is evident that the intelligible and the intellect understanding are the same thing. Here, therefore, when St. Thomas says that the divine intelligible is the same as the intellect understanding, and is thus compared to understanding and to the Word as a principle, it must be understood not of identity in intelligible being—because according to this identity every intelligible is a principle of the word, since the word proceeds from an intellect informed by the species of the intelligible—but of identity according to natural being and according to the property of nature. For when God understands Himself, God Himself who is understood is His very essence and His intellect in reality. And therefore, just as the intellect is compared to the Word produced by itself as a principle, so to it is compared God Himself, whose Word it is, according to the property of His nature.

XVIII. The eighth conclusion is: The Word of God is His image with respect to His essence. It is proved. A word conceived by the intellect is an image or exemplar of the substance of the thing understood. But the Word of God is the image of God. Therefore, it is His image with respect to His essence. — The major is proved from the difference that exists between intellect and sense: namely, because sense apprehends a thing with respect to its exterior accidents, but the intellect enters into the interior of the thing. And therefore, because all cognition is perfected according to the likeness of the knower and the known, in sense there is a likeness of the sensible with respect to its accidents, but in the intellect there is a likeness of the thing understood with respect to its essence. — It is confirmed by the Apostle saying, in Hebrews 1, that it is the figure of His substance.

The ninth conclusion is: The Word of God is the Son. It is proved by premising that there is a certain image that does not share in nature with that of which it is the image, like the statue of a man; but a certain image that shares in nature, like the son of a king. Then it is argued thus. The Word of God is the image of the one speaking with respect to His very essence. And it shares in the same nature with the one speaking, as has been shown²⁸. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that which proceeds from a living being in the likeness of species is called its son. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: The Lord said to me: You are my Son.

XIX. The tenth conclusion is: The Word of God understanding Himself proceeds naturally from Him. It is proved. Both because He is the Son: for the procession of a son from a father is natural. — And because God naturally understands Himself, just as He also naturally is: for His understanding is His being. — This reason is made clear from our intellect, in which the conceptions of those things which it naturally understands are naturally in it, and naturally proceed from it; but the conceptions of those things which it does not understand naturally are not naturally in it.

For the clarity of this conclusion, it must be considered first, from the Prima Pars, q. xli, a. 2, and below here²⁹, that to be produced naturally is taken in this place not as it is distinguished from being produced supernaturally, but as it is distinguished from being produced through the will. For that is said to be produced naturally to the production of which the agent is determined by nature, and which cannot not be produced; but that is said to be produced through the will which is so produced that it can also not be produced. Whence, because the divine Word cannot not be produced by the Father, but is necessarily produced by Him, since God also cannot not understand Himself: therefore it is said to proceed naturally from God the Father understanding Himself.

XX. But concerning the second reason³⁰, declared from the things that happen in our intellect, there is a doubt³¹. For it is evident that the conceptions of those things which our intellect naturally understands do not proceed naturally from our intellect in such a way that they cannot not proceed. For since conception and word are not in the intellect except while the intellect actually understands, and our intellect does not always understand in act those naturally known things themselves, as is clear: it is manifest that sometimes they are not produced. And thus from the things found in our intellect it cannot be argued that the divine Word naturally proceeds from God understanding Himself, but rather the opposite.

For the clarity of this, it must first be considered that, since in the intellect the relation to its act is twofold—namely, to its exercise, which is to understand in act, and to its specification, which is to understand in such a manner—we can say in a twofold way that the intellect understands something naturally: either, I say, with respect to the exercise of the act, namely because it cannot not go forth into the act of understanding that thing; or, with respect to the specification of the act, namely because, if it goes forth into act concerning such an object, it cannot not understand in such a manner. For example, concerning this principle, Every whole is greater than its part, the intellect can be moved naturally either because it cannot not go forth into the act of consideration of it, or because, if it goes forth into act, it cannot elicit another act concerning it than the act of assent. And because the naturalness of conceptions accompanies the naturalness of intellection, as is clear from what is said here, therefore a certain conception also can be said to be naturally in the intellect either with respect to the being of the conception absolutely, namely because it cannot not be produced by the intellect, or with respect to its species, inasmuch as, if the intellect forms a conception of the thing, it cannot be other than such a conception of assent. Because therefore the intellect does not understand except by forming a conception, intellection and conception follow one another proportionally with respect to naturalness: so that, namely, the conception of that which is naturally understood with respect to the specification of the act is natural with respect to its specification, but the conception of that which is naturally understood with respect to the exercise of the act is natural with respect to its being and its being produced absolutely.
Secondly, it must be considered, according to the aforesaid, that concerning the first principles naturally known, we can imagine a twofold mode of necessity and naturalness in the way of St. Thomas. One is that the intellect naturally understands first principles not only as to specification, but also as to the exercise of the act. But if we posit this, it must be understood not absolutely upon positing the intellect, as if the intellect could never cease from that act of understanding, but upon positing the intellect and the other dispositions required for intellectual operation, for instance, the proper use of the sensitive powers and the proper disposition of phantasms. The words of St. Thomas seem to favor this mode of speaking, both here, where he holds that the conceptions of the first intelligibles which the intellect naturally understands are naturally in the intellect and proceed naturally from it, and from this infers that the Word of God naturally understanding Himself proceeds naturally from the Father—where it is manifest that he understands it of divine natural intellection with respect to the exercise of the act; his words also in the Prima Pars, q. XLI, a. 2, ad 4, favor this, where, answering this proposition, Every word proceeds from the speaker through the will, he says that also in intellectual conceptions a reduction is made to the first things that are naturally understood, where it is clear that his intention is concerning natural intellection with respect to the exercise of the act; what is said in the Quaestiones de Potentia, q. II, a. 3, ad 3, also favors this, where St. Thomas says that it is necessary to posit a state in the act of the intellect which naturally follows the intellect, so that it is not commanded by the will: for it is evident that the command of the will concerning the act of another power is understood with respect to its exercise.

Another mode is that the intellect understands first principles naturally and necessarily, not as to the exercise of the act, but only as to specification: inasmuch, namely, as it necessarily assents to them, positing that it elicits an act concerning them. The words of Iª IIae, q. x, a. 2, favor this mode, where he shows that the will is moved by no object of necessity with respect to the exercise of the act, because anyone can not think about any object whatever: from which he seems to hold that no act of the intellect with respect to its exercise is natural and necessary. To this also favors that, where St. Thomas explains the mode of necessity of the intellect toward first principles, he makes mention only of the necessity of specification: as is clear in De Malo, q. III, a. 3, where, after he said that both the intellect and the will tend of necessity into that to which they are naturally ordained, he subjoins concerning the intellect that it assents of necessity to first principles naturally known, nor can it assent to their contraries: for it is clear that this is necessity only with respect to the specification of the act. A similar thing is found in De Veritate, q. XXIV, a. 1, ad 20, and Prima Pars, q. LXII, a. 8, ad 2.

Although, however, either way can be sustained, it seems to me nevertheless, always saving better judgment, that it should be said that the naturalness and necessity of the intellect for the knowledge of first principles is only with respect to the specification of the act, inasmuch namely as the intellect is determined to such an act concerning them which is the act of assent, because it cannot not assent to them; but not with respect to exercise, as if it could not not elicit an act concerning them. For by experience we prove that we cease from actual consideration of principles and voluntarily transfer ourselves to the knowledge of other things; and also, ceasing from the consideration of other things, we voluntarily consider the principles themselves.

And if there is brought forward the saying of St. Thomas in the Prima Pars, q. LXXXII, a. 4, ad 3, saying that it is necessary that apprehension precede every motion of the will, yet a motion of the will does not precede every apprehension, from which he seems to hold that there is some act of understanding which with respect to the exercise of the act does not depend on the will, which indeed seems to be true only of the apprehension of those things that are naturally known by the intellect: — it is answered that he is not speaking of the knowledge of first principles, or of first universal terms, but of the knowledge which one first has while one begins to deliberate and consider concerning some matter: for it is necessary, since there is no process to infinity in this, that volition precedes intellection and intellection volition, that there be a state in some knowledge which the will does not command, but which some principle higher than our intellect effects, as is said in the same place.

Nor do the sayings of St. Thomas alleged above³² stand in the way: because, as will be clear³³, for his purpose it suffices that the intellect is naturally and necessarily borne toward first principles with respect to the specification of the act. — And when it is said that the command of the will concerning the act of another power is understood with respect to the exercise of the act: — this is not universally true, because the command of the will is also borne toward the specification of the act; as is clear in those things that are of faith, to which the intellect assents from the command of the will.

These things having been premised, we can answer the doubt³⁴ in a twofold way, according to the two modes touched upon above. For according to the first mode, it would be said that it is false that the conceptions of our intellect concerning those things which are naturally understood by it can not proceed from it, once all things on the part of the cognitive powers required for their intellection have been posited. — But when it is proved because our intellect does not always understand them: — it is answered that this is false of the conjoined intellect, upon positing all other dispositions necessary for understanding, although it is true of the intellect taken absolutely. For because the proper disposition of the sensitive powers is not always present, nor the proper disposition of the phantasms, therefore it does not always actually understand the first principles absolutely, but only then when the other dispositions are present.

According to the second mode, however, it is said first that, although conceptions of this kind can not proceed from the intellect with respect to their being absolutely, they nevertheless cannot not be such conceptions as are conceptions of assent, on the supposition that the intellect forms some conceptions concerning the first things naturally known. And thus they cannot not be in the intellect with respect to their specification, on the supposition that they are produced.

When, however, it is inferred that it cannot be concluded from this that the divine Word proceeds naturally from God: — I deny it. For most excellently from that which is found in our intellect does St. Thomas infer his purpose concerning the divine Word. For he intends to hold concerning our intellect that, just as it naturally knows certain things, so naturally are the conceptions of them in it: namely, in that mode of naturalness in which it also naturally knows them, as appears from what was said above. From which it is inferred that similarly in the divine intellect, in the same mode of naturalness, the Word of Himself naturally understood by Himself naturally is and proceeds, in which He also naturally understands Himself. If, moreover, we add to this that God naturally understands Himself both with respect to the specification of the act, because He cannot understand Himself in another mode than He understands, and with respect to the exercise of the act, because He cannot not understand Himself: it follows most excellently that His Word, and His conception by which He understands Himself, proceeds from Him naturally both with respect to its being absolutely, because it cannot not be produced, and with respect to its species, because it cannot be another Word than it is.

XXI. The eleventh conclusion is: The Word of God is truly begotten of God speaking, and His procession can be called generation or nativity. It is proved. The natural process of the divine Word is into the likeness of Him from whom the procession is, with identity of nature. Therefore, etc.

The antecedent is proved. Because the Word is of the same nature with God speaking, and His likeness. — But the consequence is proved. Because in living things this is truly the ratio of generation, that that which is generated proceeds from the generator as His likeness and of the same nature with Him. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: Today, that is, in eternity, have I begotten You.

From the aforesaid conclusion, together with the preceding, St. Thomas infers that it is false that the Father begot the Son by will, as the Arians said: because things that are done voluntarily are not natural³⁵.

For the clarity of the conclusion, it must be considered that the Word is said to be truly begotten, that is, properly; and His procession is similarly said to be truly, that is, properly generation (which is also called nativity), to distinguish it from generation commonly so called in all generable and corruptible things, which implies nothing other than a change from non-being to being. For in divine things there is not generation according as it expresses a change from non-being to being: but well that which is the origin of a living being from a conjoined living being, etc., which is also properly called nativity. It is also said to be truly and properly generation: that is, according to the proper ratio of generation, and not metaphorically.

It should be noted secondly, concerning the first reason, that this proposition, The natural procession of the Word is into the likeness of Him from whom the procession is, with identity of nature, is understood as far as belongs to the ratio of the procession itself. For although the Holy Spirit also proceeds Himself into the likeness of Him from whom He is and is of the same nature with Him, His procession is nevertheless not called generation, because this does not belong to it from the ratio of its procession, which is the procession of love; but only insofar as He is the love of God, in whom whatever is of Him is substance; as is clear in the Prima Pars, q. XXVII, a. 4; and De Potentia, q. X, a. 2, ad 22.

XXII. But then a doubt occurs. For just as the likeness of the begotten to the begetter absolutely pertains to the ratio of generation, so to it pertains that such likeness, according to the same specific nature, be according to the same specific natural being. Therefore, by the same ratio by which, in order for any procession to be generation, it is required that it be according to the ratio of likeness—that is, that from its proper ratio it has that the product is like the producer—by the same ratio it is required that all other things required for generation belong to it according to its proper ratio. And by the same ratio by which, on account of the defect of that condition which is to be according to the ratio of likeness—namely, because this does not belong to it from its proper ratio—a certain procession is not generation; by the same ratio, on account of the defect of other things which are of the ratio of generation, a procession will not be generation, because something does not belong to anything formally and essentially unless it belongs to it according to its whole ratio. But it is evident that it does not belong to the procession of the Word from its ratio that the Word be of the same nature with the one producing the Word as having the same natural being that the thing understood has in itself: since we see that the word of the human intellect understanding a stone is not of the same natural being with the stone understood. Therefore it will follow that neither can the procession of the divine Word be called generation, just as neither can the procession of the Holy Spirit.

For the clarity of this, it must be considered first that, when we speak of the procession that is according to the ratio of intellect and according to the ratio of will, we do not speak of the procession by which something extrinsic proceeds from these, as a house from the intellect and will of the builder; but we speak of that procession by which something intrinsic to them proceeds, which is the intrinsic term of the operation through which it is completely in act. According to this, therefore, the procession of the intellect differs from the procession of the will, because, since the intellect is ordained to this, that through it the intellectual nature may be the intelligible itself in intellectual being—which happens while the intelligible itself is received in the intellect—the intellect then attains its ultimate actual perfection when it is actually informed by the likeness of the intelligible according to a perfect act. And because through that procession of the intellect by which the word and expressed likeness of the thing understood is produced, it is constituted in such a perfect act; therefore such a procession has from its ratio that it is according to the ratio of likeness; that is, that what proceeds through such an act is the likeness of the thing understood, through which the intellect actually understanding is assimilated to the thing understood, and is the thing understood itself according to intellectual and immaterial being; and consequently that it is also the likeness of the one understanding informed by the species of the object, through which as a form it produces the concept of the thing understood in itself. — But the will is not instituted for this, that it may be the thing willed itself: but that it may be inclined and moved toward the thing willed. Therefore it is not constituted in complete act through this, that it has the likeness of the thing willed in itself, but through this, that it is actually inclined toward the thing willed. And therefore that procession by which it is constituted in complete act is not from its ratio according to the ratio of likeness, as if namely from it there proceeds the likeness of the willed, through which the will is assimilated to it; but it is rather considered according to the ratio of a certain impulse, inasmuch as through it something proceeds by which the will is impelled and inclined toward the thing willed.

From these points it follows that it is not the mind of St. Thomas, when he says in the aforementioned places, speaking absolutely of the intellect, that the procession which is according to the nature of the intellect is according to the nature of likeness, that by such a procession there proceeds something like the producing intellect as to the nature of the intellect itself: but rather something like the thing understood. For that is not what is intended in those places, as is clear from his own words: for he is speaking of likeness to the thing understood, which is the object of the intellect; just as concerning the will he says that its procession, which is measured according to the nature of the will, is considered according to the nature of an impelling and moving force, not indeed toward the will itself, but toward something willed ³⁶.

It must be considered secondly that the procession of the divine Word can be considered in two ways: in one way, absolutely, insofar as it is a procession of a word; in another way, insofar as it is such a per se species of the procession of a word that is most perfect. If it is considered absolutely insofar as it is a procession of a word, it does not in this way have from this that it is a generation: since not every procession of a word is a generation, as is apparent in us. If, however, it is considered as it is such a species of the procession of a word, which, I say, is most perfect, as accompanying the most perfect knowledge; in this way it has that it is a generation. For from the common nature of the procession of a word it has that the product is like the producer according to the same concept: for the stone in the soul and the stone outside the soul are of the same concept, indeed the one is the intelligible structure of the other, as was shown in the preceding. But from the fact that it is the most perfect procession, it has that the product also has the same natural esse formally with the producer, namely with the thing understood: for the more perfect the knowledge is, the more intimate and the more united is the word produced by it. — But the procession of divine love neither from the common nature of the procession of love, insofar as it is such, has that what proceeds is like the producer according to the same specific concept; nor from the fact that it is the most perfect procession of love does it have that what proceeds has the same natural esse with the producer: because it is not the case that the more perfect the procession of love is, the more the product through it is in itself, or according to its likeness, intimate to the producer. Rather, it has that it is of the same nature with the producer and of the same esse because it is a thing existing in the divine nature, from which nothing existing in the divine persons can be diverse. Therefore, the concept of generation can in no way belong to it.
To the doubt, therefore, it is denied that by the same reasoning it follows that the procession of the divine Word is not a generation.

When it is proved because it does not belong to it from its proper concept that the product through it is of the same natural esse with the producer: — it is answered that, although this does not belong to it insofar as it is absolutely the procession of a word, it nevertheless belongs to it insofar as it is the procession of a word proceeding from the intellect of one understanding himself in the most perfect manner. And thus it belongs to it from the fact that it is the most perfect species of the procession of a word.

If it is urged that by the same reasoning it will be said that to the procession of divine love it belongs that the product through it is like the producer, not indeed insofar as it is absolutely the procession of love, but insofar as it is the procession of the love of God loving himself: — it is answered that this is not true. Because the fact that the Holy Spirit is of altogether the same nature with the producer arises from the fact that he is love existing in God, in whom there is nothing that is not his nature, and not insofar as he proceeds by a procession of love in any way whatsoever: for he does not have this because he proceeds by a procession of love insofar as it is such, nor because he proceeds by the most perfect per se species of such a procession, as has been said. But that the divine Word is of the same nature and has the same esse with the producer happens not only because he is something in the divine nature, but because he proceeds by the most perfect species of the procession of a word, which accompanies the most perfect knowledge. Hence St. Thomas, First Part, q. XXVII, a. 1, ad 2, argues that the divine Word is perfectly one with that from which he proceeds, because the more a thing is understood, the more the intelligible conception is intimate to the one understanding, and the divine act of understanding is the most perfect.

XXIII. Concerning the corollary introduced ³⁷, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part, q. XLI, a. 2, that it is not denied that the Father begot the Son by will as if the divine will had no act concerning the generation of the Son: but because it had indeed a concomitant will, insofar as he willed the generation, just as he willed that we be men; but it did not have the will as a cause or productive principle, in the way in which we say that God produced creatures by will. The reason for this is that what is produced by will as a principle can be and not be: since the will, insofar as it is such, namely as it is distinguished from nature, is not determined to one thing, but is related to opposites. But the Son in the divine reality could not not be.

But whether the concomitant will, which is indeed borne toward the generation of the Son as toward an object, precedes according to the intellect the generation of the Son: namely, whether according to the intellect the Father willed to beget the Son prior to begetting him: — is a doubt in the doctrine of St. Thomas.

For a certain author, following the doctrine of Scotus in I Sent., dist. VI ³⁸, holds that it precedes. First, because St. Thomas, First Part, q. XXXIII, a. 3, ad 1, holds that absolute things common to the whole Trinity are prior to notional things. But it is clear that to will the generation of the Son, just as to will the divine essence, is an absolute thing common to the whole Trinity. — Second, because it is clear that the procession of the Holy Spirit is loved prior to arising: for the reason that the Father, by loving himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and the spiration itself, spirates the Holy Spirit. — This opinion could also be confirmed because that which is communicated to the Son by generation from the Father is pre-understood according to reason in the Father before generation. But willing is communicated to the Son by the Father, just as the will also is. Therefore, etc.

Capreolus, however, in I Sent., d. VI ³⁹, holds that, although it accompanies the generation of the Son, it nevertheless does not precede it according to the intellect. Moreover, he shows that this is the mind of St. Thomas from his statements in De Potentia, q. II, a. 3 ⁴⁰, where he expressly seems to hold this, saying that with respect to the generation of the Son there is no will preceding either in time or in the intellect, but only a concomitant will.

Although, however, either opinion can be sustained in some way, nevertheless the opinion of Capreolus in my judgment seems to be more according to the mind of St. Thomas, on account of his words cited in the Question On the Power of God, which expressly posit that with respect to the generation of the Son there is no will preceding either in time or in the intellect. — Nor is it valid to say that by a will preceding in time or nature he understands the will as a principle. For understanding it in this way, he would not by that response satisfy the argument proving that the Father produced the Son not only with a concomitant will, but also with the will as a principle, by this reasoning: that although the will does not precede the generation of the Son in time, it nevertheless precedes in the intellect: therefore it can be posited as the principle of the Son. For if the sense of the response were that with respect to the generation of the Son there is no will preceding in time or in the intellect as a principle, the answer would be given to the conclusion, namely by denying that the will can be posited as the principle of generation, but not to the premises: which is the mark of an unlearned man. Hence it must rather be said that, since the argument proves from this that the will can be posited as the principle of the generation of the Son because the will precedes it in the intellect, although it does not precede in time: St. Thomas denies this assumption, saying absolutely that it precedes neither in time nor in the intellect, and therefore what was intended does not follow, namely that it could be a principle.

The proposition is confirmed. Because even according to the intellect, it is not seen how to an act indivisible from the nature of any supposit, proceeding by natural necessity and in no way impedible, another act of the same supposit can be pre-understood to it according to the true order of the intellect: for since nothing is pre-understood to the nature of the supposit itself, no act can be pre-understood to a natural operation of this kind either; but several natural operations of it can well be understood to be simultaneous, and thus one to be a companion to the other. In the proposed matter, however, it should rather be said that the act of the generation of the Son precedes the will in the intellect than conversely, if any order ought to be posited among acts of this kind: because the intellect in itself precedes the will, and, as was shown above ⁴¹, in the order of intellect and will there must be a stop at some act of the intellect which belongs to it naturally, and which is not anticipated by the will, since the will is not borne except toward what is known.

Moreover, what is first objected ⁴², that common things are prior to notional things, does not stand in the way. For this is true of common things signifying the essence from their own concept, of which sort is this word God: but not of common things signifying an operation, of which sort is to will. For it is clear that to will to love does not belong to the Son prior according to the intellect to being the Son: since he cannot be understood to operate before he is understood to be. — If it is urged that, although a common operation is not prior to something proper, such as is the constitutive property of a person, nevertheless an operation common to the whole Trinity is prior in one supposit to its proper operation: just as also the common nature is prior according to the intellect to the proper nature in the same supposit: — it is answered that, although perhaps that would be true of a common operation included essentially in a proper one, as to understand is included in that which is to speak (which I do not affirm); it is nevertheless not true of a common operation which is not included essentially in a proper one, of which sort is to will the generation of the Son with respect to that generation itself; for it is enough that such a common operation accompanies the proper operation, so that one is not without the other; and especially when the proper operation is an operation of a power that is prior according to reason, while the common operation is an operation of a posterior power. — If it is again urged that, if it is conceded that the common operation included essentially in the proper one, namely to understand, is prior to generation according to the intellect, namely because we understand the Father to understand absolutely prior to begetting the Son through an act of the intellect; by the same reasoning it seems to follow that he wills to beget prior to begetting, since the will accompanies the intellect: — it is answered that, although in actu signato it would be conceded that to understand taken absolutely precedes according to the intellect to speak itself, which is to beget the Son, because the concept of that common thing is prior to the proper concept and is included in it, just as the concept of animal is prior to the concept of man: it would nevertheless not be conceded in actu exercito concerning understanding with respect to this object, namely in such a way that we understand the Father to understand the generation of the Son prior to speaking the Son; because the Father understands in no other way than by speaking and begetting the Son; and thus, whenever he is apprehended as actually understanding some determinate object, it is necessary that he be apprehended as begetting the Son, in whom he understands both himself and each single thing. Therefore it does not follow that he wills to beget prior according to the intellect to begetting.

Nor does what is introduced in the second place stand in the way. For it is false that the Father loves himself and the Son and also spiration itself, according to the intellect, prior to spirating the Holy Spirit: since the Father's loving itself is to spirate.

To the confirmation, however, it is answered that, although to will as to the entity which it expresses is communicated to the Son by virtue of generation, and is pre-understood to be in the Father; nevertheless as to the relation to the thing willed it is not communicated by virtue of generation, since it is a relation of reason. Therefore neither is it pre-understood in this way in the Father: but it follows, according to our mode of understanding, the act of understanding itself by which the Son is begotten, and accompanies it.

XXIV. The twelfth conclusion is: The Son of God is equal to the Father ⁴³. It is proved first. The Word of God is equal to God: because that which God understands concerning himself is not less than that which is in him; otherwise he would not understand himself perfectly, nor would his understanding be his esse. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the Word himself is the Son of God.

For the evidence of the antecedent of this reason, it must be considered that it belongs to the nature of the intellectual word that it is representative of the thing understood, and that through it the intellect understands. Therefore that the divine Word, insofar as he is Word, is equal to God, is nothing other than to represent whatever is of God. Moreover, this is best shown from the fact that that which God understands concerning himself is not less than that which is in him. For since the representation of the word extends as far as the intellection extends, since intellection does not occur except through the mediation of the representation of the word; it follows best that, if the intellection of God equals God himself, the representation of the Word also equals him.

It must be noted secondly that, although for the Word, insofar as he is Word, to be equal to God is nothing other than for him to represent intelligibly all things that are of God; nevertheless, because the divine Word is of the same nature with God understanding himself, an equality of perfection and of esse accompanies this equality of representation. For since he is equal in representing; and represents God as being of the same nature and essence with him: it is necessary that he be also equal in the perfection of being. Therefore, from the equality of the Word the equality of the Son is fittingly inferred, from the fact that the Word himself is the Son.

Secondly. The Son of God has the true species ⁴⁴ and nature of the Father: since he is God. Therefore he is equal to him. — The consequence is proved. First, because to every nature a determinate quantity is due. — Second, because among us a son is brought to the equality of the father at the end of generation and growth, unless there is a defect on the part of the matter, or on the part of the agent power: and that at the beginning he is born smaller than the father is because he proceeds from potency to act and from the imperfect to the perfect. But none of these is in divine generation: since it is not from matter, nor through a passage from potency to act, nor is there a defect on the part of the power.
Concerning that proposition, To every nature a determinate quantity is due, it should be observed from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Fourth Book, d. XLIV, q. I, a. 3 ⁴⁵, omitting the long dispute that is customary concerning the maximum and minimum, that its sense is that every specific nature determines for itself a certain latitude of quantity within which it is contained, so that outside that latitude it is not found either lower or higher, and each individual of that nature, according to its individual nature, determines for itself a certain degree of that latitude, to which, unless there is something hindering, it attains: for instance, if we say that human nature determines for itself this latitude of quantity which is from one palm to ten palms inclusive, so that a man having a quantity less than a palm is not found, nor a man having a quantity greater than the quantity of ten palms, and that, if sufficient matter is present and there is no impediment, each man has that degree of quantity which is fitting for his individual nature. And it is also understood that this belongs to any nature from within: that is, that a quantity smaller than that which is posited as the minimum cannot follow such a nature, nor likewise one greater than that which is posited as the maximum.

Moreover, St. Thomas assigns the reason for this in the First Part, q. VII, a. 3, and wherever he speaks of this matter, because determinate accidents follow a determinate form and a determinate nature: that is, accidents both according to species and according to degree that are certain and limited follow a form and nature limited to some degree of beings, and distinct from other natures. For we see that snow determines for itself whiteness among colors; and in the species of whiteness determines for itself a perfect degree, or a degree more intense than the degree of whiteness of many things, up to some determinate limit, whether it be the supreme degree or some degree lower than the supreme. But it is clear that quantity is one of the accidents following the form and essence of a quantified thing. Therefore it is necessary to say that each nature of a quantified thing determines for itself a determinate degree of quantity, both as to smallness and as to greatness. From which it is clear that not only does one individual in number determine for itself quantity, so that from its form there arises a determinate degree of quantity, and a greater or lesser degree cannot arise from it: but also that the specific nature itself determines for itself some latitude of quantity, so that, if any individual of that nature has the highest degree of that latitude, not only can it not be increased by its form to something greater, but neither can another individual of the same nature be greater than it. And this seems to be according to the mind of Aristotle, I Phys., text 36 ⁴⁶; and II De Anima, text 41 ⁴⁷; and of the Commentator ⁴⁸. — What has been said of extensive quantity is to be understood also of intensive quantity and that of perfection.

From this explanation, moreover, it is clear that the force of the reasoning of St. Thomas consists in this: that, since the Son of God has the species and nature of the Father, not only, that is, the same according to species, but also the same in number; and since a determinate quantity follows each nature: it is necessary that the Son also have the same quantity with the Father, and consequently that he be equal to him.

The confirmation indeed from those things which are found in material things ⁴⁹ proceeds according to this foundation: that, just as among us a son attains to the equality of the father unless an impediment is present, insofar as the father—just as he causes in the son his specific nature and his other individual conditions (according to likeness, that is, but not according to numerical identity), unless there is an impediment—so also causes that quantity which belongs to him from his individual nature; so much more in divine matters, where there is nothing that brings an impediment, the Father produces in the Son, together with his nature and substance, also his quantity of virtue, and thus produces the Son equal to himself.

It must be noted, however, when it is said that the Son of God has the species and nature of the Father, that species is not taken there properly, as it expresses something contained under an assigned genus: because, since God is contained in no genus, he is also not determined to any species. But it is taken for the essence by which God is distinguished from every other thing, just as one species in creatures is distinguished from every other species.

Thirdly ⁵⁰ it is argued. If the Son were unequal to the Father, the magnitude of the Father and of the Son would be numerically other. This is false: because, since the divine magnitude is the essence of God, the essence of the Father and of the Son would be numerically other. Therefore, etc. — The sequence is proved. Because the numerically same quantity cannot be greater or lesser than itself.

It must be observed that St. Thomas touches implicitly upon this consequence: The Son is not unequal to the Father. Therefore he is equal to him. Which consequence, although it does not hold in things that do not have quantity, or of which one is not quantified; nevertheless in those things each of which is quantified, as in the proposed case is presupposed concerning the Father and the Son as to the quantity of virtue and perfection, it holds. For since equal or unequal is a proper passion of quantity, concerning any two quantified things it is true to say that they are either equal, or they are unequal. And therefore, if they are posited not to be unequal, it follows best: Therefore they are equal.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of John 5, and of the Apostle in Philippians 2.

XXV. For the evidence of this conclusion, however, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. xlii, a. 1⁵¹, and in the First Book, d. xxxi⁵², that this equality which is between the divine persons is not a real relation like the equality that is between two quanta, but is a relation of reason. Because, since in a divine person there is nothing except essence and relation, on the part of the essence equality does not have the character of being a real relation, since there is one essence in number in all the divine persons: but of the same to itself there is no real relation. Nor does it have this on the part of relation: because a relation is not referred to a relation by a real relation, otherwise there would be an infinite regress in relations.

Hence, if it is asked whether the Son is really equal to the Father: it is said that for the Son to be said to be really equal to the Father can be understood in two ways. In one way, on account of a real relation of equality to the Father. And in this way the Son is not said to be really equal to the Father. — Or on account of the unity of essence, which is presupposed to the relation of equality, and on account of the real distinction of the personal relations. And in this way he is said to be really equal: because he really has that same essence and magnitude in number which the Father has, and is distinguished from the Father by a real relation of origin.

Against this, however, Scotus argues in the First Book, dist. xxxi⁵³, and Quodlib., qu. vi⁵⁴: because a real relation requires these three things: namely, that the foundation be real; that the extremes be real and really distinct; and that the relation itself belong to the extremes ex natura rei, without any operation of the intellect, or without the operation of an extrinsic power. But these are found in the divine equality, as is evident.

But it is answered that the second condition is lacking: because the extremes are not really distinct according to the foundation of the relation, which is understood in that condition. For the divine essence and magnitude, upon which equality is founded, is not one in one person and another in another, but is one in number in all.

But against this answer it is urged ⁵⁵. Paternity and filiation are real relations. And yet they do not have distinct foundations: since they are founded upon the divine essence, which is one. Therefore etc.

It is answered, and it is said first, that the personal relations have no foundation in reality: since they are subsistent. Nor does it follow, however, that they are relations of reason, as not having any foundation in reality. For it is indeed true in relations that are in a genus and are accidents that some foundation is required, and when the foundation does not exist, there is no real relation. But in relations outside a genus and per se subsisting, no foundation is required for their reality, but it suffices that they from their own nature are relations that subsist: for just as they do not require any supposit in which they may be received, but are the supposits themselves, so neither do they require any other foundation.

It is said secondly, that according to our mode of understanding and signifying, these relations are understood to have some foundation. But that is not the essence, as Scotus thinks, but production actively and passively signified: for paternity is founded upon generating, but filiation upon being generated. For although generating and being generated are the same as paternity and filiation in the divine, nevertheless, because they are not signified by mode of relation, but by mode of action and passion, they can be understood, as they are thus signified, as the foundations of the relations.

Capreolus treats this difficulty abundantly in the thirty-first distinction of the First Book ⁵⁶. Therefore there is no need to linger.

XXVI. The thirteenth conclusion is ⁵⁷: The Word of God can rightly be said to be conceived by God. It is proved. The Word of God is so begotten by God that nevertheless it does not depart from him, but remains in him. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because what is generated, as long as it remains in the generator, is said to be conceived. — It is confirmed by the authority of Proverbs viii, when it is said: The depths were not yet, and I was already conceived.

For the manifestation of this conclusion, St. Thomas notes first that there is a difference between the conception of the Word of God and the material conception of animals, because the offspring, as long as it is conceived and enclosed in the womb, does not yet have its ultimate perfection, so as to subsist per se as diverse from the generator according to place; and therefore conception is one thing, and birth another. But the Word of God, existing in God the speaker himself, is perfect, subsisting in itself distinct from God the speaker: since they are distinguished by relation alone. Therefore there both conception and birth are the same. Which is signified when in the same authority it is added: Before the hills I was brought forth.

He notes secondly that, because conception and birth in corporeal things are with motion and succession, therefore it is necessary that that which is conceived does not yet exist; and that what is brought forth is not yet distinct from the one bringing forth. But the conception and birth of the intelligible Word is not with motion and succession. Therefore at the same time while it is conceived, it exists: and while it is brought forth, it has distinct being. It is shown in illumination. — Moreover, this belongs to the divine Word also by this particular reason, that its conception and birth are in eternity, in which prior and posterior cannot exist. — It is confirmed by the same authority, when it is said: When he prepared the heavens, I was present.

From these things it is inferred that, since in the carnal generation of animals something is first conceived, then brought forth, then is present to the one bringing forth; in divine generation the Word is simultaneously conceived, brought forth, and present.

He notes thirdly that, just as to intimate the perfect distinction of the Word from the generator the generation of the Word is called birth; so also it is called generation from the womb, according to that saying of the Psalm ⁵⁸: Before the morning star I have begotten you. But to show that such a distinction does not exclude the Word from being in the speaker, it is said in John i that he is in the bosom of the Father.

He notes lastly that in carnal generation there is an active power, from which one is called father, and a passive power, from which one is called mother. Hence certain things belong to the father, such as to give nature and species: but certain things to the mother, such as to conceive and to give birth. But in the generation of the Word the ratio of mother does not apply, but only that of father: since the divine understanding is not through a passive power, but as it were active ⁵⁹, for the reason that the divine intellect is only in act. Therefore all things are attributed to the Father in Sacred Scripture: for he is said both to give life to the Son, and to conceive, and to give birth.

It must be noted, when St. Thomas says that the mother in carnal generation is named from the passive power, that this is not to be understood as if with respect to the generation of an animal the mother has only a passive potency, and in no way an active one, as some seem to attribute to St. Thomas: but because with respect to the formation and organization of the body the mother acts only passively, inasmuch as from her blood the body is formed and organized. With this, however, stands that she also acts actively with respect to something. For, as is had from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Third Part, q. xxxii, a. 4, and in the Third Book, d. iii, q. ii, a. 1, since three things are found in the generation of man, namely the formation and organization of the body, which is principal in generation; the preparation of the matter, so that it may be apt for the formation and organization of the human body, which precedes organization and formation; and also the good disposition of the offspring, which accompanies or follows the said formation: as to the first the mother acts only passively, because what she prepared and provided for the formation and organization of the body behaves to the formation itself only materially, for it is that from which as from matter the body is formed. But as to the other two she acts actively: for in the mother there is an active power by which her blood is prepared and disposed so that from it the human body can be formed; likewise in her womb there is a power which provides nourishment and improvement to the conceived offspring, as is according to the mind of Avicenna, in the chapter on the Deluges ⁶⁰.
From which it is clear that the reasoning of Scotus, in III Sent., d. iv ⁶¹, against St. Thomas is null, when he argues that since male and female are of the same species, it is necessary that similar powers follow their forms; and thus, since an active vegetative power follows the form of the male, it is necessary that the vegetative power of the female also be active.

What is inferred is indeed conceded, nor is this against the teaching of St. Thomas. For he himself concedes that the generative power is active in the female as well as in the male: but he says that this is perfect in the male and extends itself to the formation of the generated; but in the female it is imperfect, and does not extend itself all the way to the formation of the generated, but only to the preparation of the matter, or also to some improvement of the conceived offspring. Hence, although the generative power of the female is active, it is nevertheless said to concur passively to generation, but not actively, because, although it acts actively with respect to certain things, nevertheless with respect to the formation of the offspring, which is principal in generation, it acts only passively, namely while from the matter prepared by her the offspring is formed.

It must be noted, when it is said that the divine understanding is not through any passive power, but as it were active, that there is a difference between the human intellect and the divine intellect, because the human intellect is moved by intelligible things, and therefore is called a passive power, as that which is compared to its object as passive to active, from which it follows that human understanding is through a passive power: but the divine intellect is not moved by its object, but is entirely the same as it. Therefore it is not called a passive power: and consequently divine understanding is not through a passive power. But it is said to be, not through an active power simpliciter, but as it were through an active one: because the divine intellect is not properly a cause and active power with respect to its act, since it is distinguished from it neither according to substance nor according to esse; but it is said to be as it were active, because, if they are distinguished by the work of the intellect, we understand that the act of the intellect itself is not caused in it by an object, but only that the intellect, existing of itself in act, is the productive principle of it.

Caput XI: Quomodo filius Dei dicatur Dei sapientia

Because in what precedes ¹ St. Thomas applied to the generation of the Word the things that are said concerning divine Wisdom in the authority from the eighth chapter of Proverbs cited above, using divine Wisdom for the divine Word, he wishes to show from human affairs that the Word of God can fittingly be understood through divine Wisdom. Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, he shows what was proposed; second, he infers one corollary ²; third, he removes a certain doubt ³.

I. As to the first, he first premises that wisdom in man is called a certain habit by which our mind is perfected in the knowledge of divine things. But even the conception or inner word concerning divine things formed through that habit is also accustomed to receive the name of wisdom, just as acts are accustomed to be named by the names of the habits from which they proceed. For just as that which is done justly is sometimes called justice, and so of other things, so also that which is conceived wisely is called wisdom.

He premises secondly that in God wisdom is spoken of from the fact that He knows Himself. But nevertheless this is not a habit, but His essence, since God does not understand through a species, but through His essence; indeed, even His very act of understanding is His essence.

Then he argues thus: The Son of God is the Word and conception of God understanding Himself. Therefore, as conceived wisely by the divine mind, He is properly called conceived or begotten Wisdom. — The consequence is clear from the things that were premised. — The conclusion is confirmed, because the Apostle, in 1 Cor. 1, names Christ the Wisdom of God.

As to the second, St. Thomas infers that the Word of divine wisdom is fittingly named the brightness of light by the Apostle. It is proved. The word of wisdom conceived in the mind is a certain manifestation of it, just as in us all habits are manifested through acts. And divine wisdom is called light insofar as it consists in the pure act of cognition. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because the manifestation of light is its brightness proceeding from it. — The reason is confirmed: because the Son ascribes the manifestation of the Father to Himself, Jn. 17.
As to the third, because someone could think from the aforesaid that the name of wisdom belongs to the Son alone, St. Thomas removes this. And he says that, although the Word of God is properly called conceived Wisdom, nevertheless the name of wisdom spoken absolutely must be common to the Father and the Son, since the wisdom that shines forth through the Word is the Father's essence; but the Father's essence is common to Himself and to the Son.

II. For the clarity of what was said, that wisdom in us is a habit, but not in God, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49, a. 4, and q. 50, a. 6, that, since it is of the nature of that which is disposed through a habit to have something of potentiality, as the intellect is related to potency, so it is related to understanding through a habit. But the intellect is related to potency in a threefold way, just as there is a threefold order of intellects. For the human intellect, since it is pure potency in the genus of intelligible things, as was shown above ⁴, is entirely in potency with respect to all intelligible things. Therefore, with respect to all things that it has to understand, it needs some superadded habit through which it may understand. — But the angelic intellect is not pure potency in the genus of intelligible things, nor is it even pure act. Therefore it is not in potency with respect to all intelligible things, but partly in potency and partly in act; for with respect to itself it is in act, but with respect to other things it is in potency, namely as to the actual consideration of them. Therefore an angel does not need a habit to know himself, but knows himself through his essence; but to know things other than himself, he needs a superadded habit, unless perhaps they are such as have such a connection with his essence that they are known simultaneously with it through the essence itself. — But the divine intellect is in no way potency, but is pure and most simple act. Therefore it is in potency with respect to no intelligible thing, but with respect to all things is always in act. And on that account it understands nothing through a superadded habit, but through its essence. — From which it follows, since wisdom is nothing other than the principle by which the highest things are known, but both the angelic and the human intellect are in potency toward the knowledge of these things, while the divine intellect is in pure act, that wisdom in both angels and in men is a habit, but in God it is not a habit, but is His essence, through which He always actually understands all things.

Concerning the reason assigned in the text why wisdom in God is not a habit—namely, because He does not understand through a species—it should be noted that St. Thomas assumes that a habit of the intellect either is an intellectual species or includes an intelligible species, as was shown above ⁵, when it was explained that intelligible species are related antecedently to the habit of science. And therefore it follows exceedingly well that, if God does not understand through a species, He does not understand through a habit.

III. For the explanation of the corollary ⁶, it must be considered that, since light is a quality visible per se, namely as that by which something is seen, it is properly called light according as it is in some luminous body in actu, by which other things are illuminated; but brightness is called the light caused in another. Therefore, also metaphorically in spiritual things, light is called that from which something is intelligibly manifested, according as it is in an understander in actu, by whom an intellectual manifestation is made to others; but brightness is called that which is caused by light whereby the intellectual cognition itself is manifested to others. On this account St. Thomas says that divine wisdom is called light insofar as it consists in the pure act of cognition, that is, insofar as actual cognition itself is considered per se, as existing in God Himself understanding; but brightness is the very manifestation of the light proceeding from it, that is, something proceeding from the actual divine cognition itself by which the divine cognition is manifested.

IV. Concerning the removal of the doubt ⁷, it must be considered that by the name of wisdom spoken absolutely St. Thomas understands the name itself spoken without any other limiting addition; just as, by contrast, when it is called begotten Wisdom, the name of wisdom is not spoken absolutely, but with the adjunction of this name begotten. He means, therefore, that if the name of wisdom is taken without the adjunction of another limiting name, it is common to the Father and the Son; for just as the Son is wise and wisdom, so the Father is both wise and wisdom, because namely wisdom then expresses nothing other than the divine essence according as through it God knows Himself, but the divine essence is common to all the persons. But if it is taken with the adjunction of this name begotten, or conceived, it is not common, but proper to the Son; for the Son alone is called begotten Wisdom, but not the Father, who proceeds from no one, nor even the Holy Spirit, who does not proceed through an act of the intellect, but of the will. For begotten Wisdom does not express the divine essence alone, but the essence itself with the relation of begotten and conceived, which relation it is agreed belongs to the Son alone.

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Prooemium

Caput I: Quod sit generatio, paternitas et filiatio in divinis

Caput II: Quod filius Dei sit Deus

Caput III: Quid opinatus sit Photinus de filio Dei, et eius improbatio

Caput IV: Opinio Sabellii de filio Dei, et eius improbatio

Caput V: De opinione Arii circa filium Dei

Caput VI: Improbatio opinionis Arii de filio Dei

Caput VII: Solutio ad auctoritates quas Arius pro se inducebat

Caput VIII: Solutio ad auctoritates Photini et Sabellii

Caput IX: Rationes contra generationem et processionem divinam

Caput X: Quomodo accipienda sit generatio in divinis, et quae de filio Dei dicuntur in Scripturis

Caput XI: Quomodo filius Dei dicatur Dei sapientia

Caput XII: Quod non est nisi unus filius in divinis

Caput XIII: Solutio ad rationes supra inductas contra generationem divinam

Caput XIV: De spiritu sancto, quod sit in divinis

Caput XV: Rationes ex quibus aliqui spiritum sanctum existimaverunt esse creaturam

Caput XVI: Quod spiritus sanctus sit verus Deus

Caput XVII: Quod spiritus sanctus sit subsistens persona

Caput XVIII: Quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de spiritu sancto dicuntur

Caput XIX: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto in Scripturis respectu totius creaturae

Caput XX: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto in sacra Scriptura respectu rationalis creaturae, quantum ad ea quae Deus nobis largitur

Caput XXI: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto secundum quod movet creaturam in Deum

Caput XXII: Solutio rationum supra inductarum contra divinitatem spiritus sancti

Caput XXIII: Quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio

Caput XXIV: Rationes ostendere volentium quod spiritus sanctus non procedat a filio, et solutio ipsarum

Caput XXV: Quod non sunt nisi tres personae in divinis pater, filius et spiritus sanctus

Caput XXVI: De incarnatione verbi secundum traditionem sacrae Scripturae

Caput XXVII: De errore Photini circa incarnationem

Caput XXVIII: De errore Manichaeorum circa incarnationem

Caput XXIX: De errore Valentini circa incarnationem

Caput XXX: De errore Apollinaris circa corpus Christi

Caput XXXI: De errore Arii et Apollinaris circa animam Christi

Caput XXXII: De errore Apollinaris dicentis animam rationalem non fuisse in Christo, et de errore Origenis dicentis animam Christi ante mundum fuisse creatam

Caput XXXIII: De errore Theodori Mopsuesteni et Nestorii circa unionem verbi ad hominem

Caput XXXIV: Contra errorem Eutychetis

Caput XXXV: De errore Macarii Antiocheni ponentis unam tantum voluntatem in Christo

Caput XXXVI: Contra eos qui dixerunt ex anima et corpore non esse aliquid unum constitutum in Christo

Caput XXXVII: Contra eos qui ponunt duo supposita vel duas hypostases in una persona Christi

Caput XXXVIII: Quid Catholica fides sentiat de incarnatione Christi

Caput XXXIX: Obiectiones contra fidem incarnationis

Caput XL: Quomodo oporteat intelligere incarnationem filii Dei

Caput XLI: Quod assumptio humanae naturae maxime competebat verbo Dei

Caput XLII: Quod humana natura assumpta a verbo non praeextitit assumptioni, sed in ipsa conceptione fuit assumpta

Caput XLIII: Quod natura assumpta a verbo in ipsa conceptione fuit perfecta quantum ad animam et corpus

Caput XLIV: Quod Christum decuit nasci ex virgine

Caput XLV: Quod Christus natus est de spiritu sancto

Caput XLVI: Quod Christus non fuit filius spiritus sancti secundum carnem

Caput XLVII: Quod non sit dicendum Christum esse creaturam

Caput XLVIII: Solutio rationum contra incarnationem superius positarum

Caput XLIX: Quod peccatum originale traducatur a primo parente in posteros

Caput L: Obiectiones contra peccatum originale

Caput LI: Solutio obiectionum positarum

Caput LII: Rationes quibus videtur probari quod non fuit conveniens Deum incarnari

Caput LIII: Quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari

Caput LIV: Solutio rationum supra positarum contra convenientiam incarnationis

Caput LV: De necessitate sacramentorum

Caput LVI: De distinctione sacramentorum veteris et novae legis

Caput LVII: De numero sacramentorum novae legis

Caput LVIII: De Baptismo

Caput LIX: De confirmatione

Caput LX: De Eucharistia

Caput LXI: De errore infidelium circa sacramentum Eucharistiae

Caput LXII: Solutio praemissarum difficultatum, et primo quoad conversionem panis in corpus Christi

Caput LXIII: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte loci

Caput LXIV: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte accidentium

Caput LXV: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte actionis et passionis

Caput LXVI: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte fractionis

Caput LXVII: Solutio auctoritatis inductae

Caput LXVIII: Ex quali pane et vino debet confici hoc sacramentum

Caput LXIX: De sacramento poenitentiae. Et primo, quod homines post gratiam sacramentalem acceptam peccare possunt

Caput LXX: Quod homo peccans post sacramentorum gratiam potest converti per gratiam

Caput LXXI: De necessitate poenitentiae et partium eius

Caput LXXII: De sacramento extremae unctionis

Caput LXXIII: De sacramento ordinis

Caput LXXIV: De distinctione ordinum

Caput LXXV: De episcopali potestate: et quod in ea unus sit summus

Caput LXXVI: Quod per malos ministros sacramenta dispensari possunt

Caput LXXVII: De sacramento matrimonii

Caput LXXVIII: Quod per Christum resurrectio corporum sit futura

Caput LXXIX: Obiectiones contra resurrectionem