Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

As to the third ¹, this conclusion is set down: God is most perfectly blessed, and his blessedness exceeds the blessedness of all others. This comparison, however, is understood with respect to any blessedness of other intelligent beings, as is clear from the arguments; not with respect to supernatural blessedness, although he exceeds this as well.

I. It is proved first. God is his own beatitude. Therefore he is perfectly and singularly blessed. — The consequence is proved. Because the closer anyone is to beatitude, the more perfectly he is blessed: just as one who is blessed in act is more so than one who has beatitude only in hope.

Second. God loves his own beatitude more than the blessed love theirs. Therefore he delights more in it. Therefore his desire rests more fully, and his beatitude is more perfect. — The antecedent is proved: because each thing loves itself, other things being equal, more than it loves anything else; a sign of this is that one loves those closer to oneself more. But God's beatitude is God himself, whereas the beatitude of others is not what they themselves are. — The first inference is proved: because where love is greater, there delight in attaining what is loved is greater. — But the last, which is not proved, is evident: because delight is a kind of rest of appetite.

In the proof of the antecedent, it must be noted that Saint Thomas said ceteris paribus that each thing loves itself more than another because it is not unfitting that a man will some good to another more than to himself, in which the neighbor seems to be loved more: as when someone exposes himself to death for the sake of a friend. But in this the other things are not equal. For, since in man there is an intelligible and a corporeal nature, he loves his spiritual nature more according to reason than his corporeal nature: and therefore he exposes himself to death for the sake of a friend on account of the good of virtue, which is the good of rational nature. Hence that he loves the bodily life of another more than his own is because not all things are equal: since in the other is considered a bodily good, but in himself a spiritual good and a good of virtue. But, if the good of virtue be removed, each one will love his own life more than another's. And similarly, if someone be in equal need with another, he will provide for himself rather than for others: but if the other be more in need, it is not unfitting that someone deprive himself of something in order to come to the aid of the other. Where, therefore, all things are equal, each one loves himself more than another: but where not all things are equal, the contrary can be the case.

It must be noted further that St. Thomas argues from greater delight to the fact that beatitude is more perfect, not because delight is essentially beatitude, but because, since it follows upon beatitude as its complement, where the beatitude is greater there must also be a greater delight.

Concerning the last consequence, note that by desire of God ² desire is not taken properly, as it is an appetite for what is not possessed, but commonly for the appetite of a thing loved, even when it is present.

II. Third. God is blessed through His own essence; others, however, are blessed by participation. Therefore divine beatitude exceeds every other beatitude. — The antecedent, as regards the first part, is evident. — As to the second part, it is proved: because nothing other than God can be the highest good. — The consequence is also proved: because that which is so through essence is greater than that which is said to be so through participation.

2. Concerning the proof of the second part of the antecedent, a doubt is raised. For the highest good is taken either simply, or in the genus of goods participable by a creature. If it is taken in the first way, then, when it is argued that a creature is blessed participatively because it is not itself the highest good, the argument supposes something false, namely that the beatitude by which a creature is formally blessed is the highest good simply. For it was said above ³, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that the formal beatitude of a creature is not the highest good simply. — But if it is taken in the second way, it is false that nothing other than God is the highest good. For formal beatitude itself is something other than God, since it is an act of a created intellect; and yet it is the highest good in the genus of goods participable by a creature ⁴.

3. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that beatitude names the ultimate end of an intelligible nature and the highest good. And therefore, insofar as something has the character of ultimate end and highest good, it has the character of beatitude. Now something is the ultimate end simply speaking, and consequently the highest good simply speaking: as God, who is the end of all things extrinsically. But something is the ultimate end in a qualified sense: namely, intrinsic to a thing, by which it is joined to the extrinsic end in the most perfect way. And such is the highest good in a qualified sense: because it is the highest intrinsic perfection to which a thing can arrive. So too there is a twofold beatitude: one, namely, simply speaking and essential; the other in a qualified sense, insofar as it is a certain participation in and likeness of essential beatitude. The first is uncreated beatitude, which is God; the second is created beatitude, which is the act of the created intellect.

It is therefore said that the highest good is taken in this argument as the highest good simply, that is, what has the character of the ultimate end simply. But when it is objected that the argument then presupposes created beatitude to be the highest good simply, which is false: it is said that the argument does not presuppose this, but wishes to derive it as an absurdity. For if some creature were blessed by its essence, it follows that its beatitude would be the highest good simply: because what something is by essence, that it is simply and of itself, not by participation in another; and consequently its beatitude would be the ultimate end simply and the highest good. And thus it would follow that something other than God would be the highest good simply.

4. But then a doubt arises. For that something is such by its essence does not preclude its also being such by participation in another, if that other is created: because every essential perfection is a certain participated likeness of the divine nature. Therefore, given that some created thing were its own beatitude, it does not follow that it is not blessed by participation in uncreated beatitude. And thus it is not necessary that its beatitude be the highest good simply speaking.

It is answered that "to be such by essence" can be understood in two ways, for now, according to what is said in Verit., q. XXI, a. 5. In one way, as opposed to that which is such by something superadded to the essence: thus we say that God is good by essence, because He is His own esse, in which the ratio of goodness is grounded; but a creature is not good by essence, because it is good by an esse superadded to its essence. In another way, as opposed to that which is such presupposing an order to something else: thus God is said to be good by essence because He is good through Himself, presupposing nothing else; but a creature, even if it were its own esse, would not be said to be good by essence, but by participation, because nothing can possess the ratio of good and end unless an order to the ultimate end is presupposed. Here, therefore, "to be such by essence" is taken in the second way, and not only in the first. For no creature is blessed by essence: not only because it is not itself the act of beatitude, but also because it is not blessed through itself, as if presupposing no order to a further end; rather it is blessed, and has in itself something having the ratio of the highest good and ultimate end, inasmuch as it is joined to the highest good simply and to the end simply ultimate; just as something ignited is said to be in some way fire by reason of its order to that which is fire through itself. The argument in opposition, however, proceeds concerning that which is such by essence only in the first way. For something can be such not by anything superadded to its essence, and yet will be such by participation, that is, by reason of an order to another. But it does not proceed concerning that which is such by essence in the second way: for it is false that what is in this way such by essence and through itself is such by participation.

III. Fourth. No other intellectual operation can be compared with His operation. Therefore God is incomparably blessed above all things. — The consequence is evident, because beatitude consists in the perfect operation of the intellect. — The antecedent is proved as follows: because that operation of God is His very substance; and in one operation God perfectly understands Himself as He is, and all things that are and that are not, good things and evil. But in other intelligent beings, understanding itself is not subsistent; nor can anyone understand God, who is the highest intelligible, as perfectly as He is perfect, since no being's esse is as perfect as divine esse, nor can any operation be more perfect than its substance; nor does any intellect know all that God can do; nor does anyone know all that he knows in a single operation.

2. Concerning the argument set forth to prove that no one can understand God as perfectly as He is perfect in Himself—namely, that no being's esse is as perfect as the divine esse, and that no one's operation can be more perfect than his substance—a doubt arises. For although an operation is not more perfect than the substance of a thing, it can nevertheless extend beyond the substance of that thing with respect to its object: just as the operation of sight extends to the heavenly bodies. Therefore, from the fact that the esse of a creature does not equal the perfection of the divine esse, it does not follow that its operation cannot reach Him.

3. For the clarification of this, it must be considered, from the teaching of Saint Thomas, IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. II, a. 3 and 4, that, since the principle of action is the form by which the agent acts, the measure of the action must be taken from the side of that form: yet in relation to the subject in subsistent forms, that is, insofar as the subject is subordinated to the form more or less. Therefore the perfection of the operation is taken according to the esse that is from such a form in the thing. And because the esse of a thing corresponds to its substance, since those things whose essence is more perfect have also a more perfect esse, therefore the perfection of the operation of a thing must correspond to its substance, so that the operation is not more perfect in its order than the substance is in its own. And thus is understood what Saint Thomas says, that the operation is not more perfect than the substance of the thing: namely, considering each in its own order. It follows, therefore, universally that for whatever being the esse and substance do not equal the esse of an intelligible thing, its understanding also is not equal to it, so as to be as perfect in attaining the object as that intelligible object itself is. And because the esse and substance of no creature equal the divine esse in its perfection, therefore neither can the intellect of any creature understand God as perfectly as He Himself is perfect in Himself.

To the argument, however, it is said that with respect to extensive quantity, which is taken according to the multitude or fewness of objects, the operation need not be proportioned to the essence, such that it cannot extend to more things than the essence of the one operating, nor to anything higher than the substance itself is. But with respect to intensive quantity, which consists in the efficacy of operating—of which Saint Thomas here speaks—it must be proportioned to the essence. Hence Saint Thomas does not say that the operation of other intelligibles cannot reach the divine esse, but rather that other beings cannot understand God Himself so perfectly as He is perfect in Himself.

IV. Fifth. Divine understanding exists whole and at once eternally, whereas our understanding has succession, insofar as the continuous and time are joined to it per accidens. Therefore divine beatitude infinitely exceeds human beatitude, just as the duration of eternity exceeds the flowing now of time. — The consequence is proved. For the more united a thing is, the more perfect its goodness and virtue are, especially if it does not pass away in a moment but endures forever.

2. A doubt is raised concerning the antecedent. For, although our understanding has succession insofar as the continuum and time are joined to it per accidens, nevertheless per se it exists in an instant and as a whole simultaneously, as is said in Verit., q. 8, a. 14, ad 12, and IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, [quaestio 3], ad 1; and thus in itself it does not have succession, as if one part of an intellection succeeded another part. Therefore our understanding does not differ from divine understanding on the ground that the latter is unified and whole at once while ours is not whole at once.

Doubt is also raised concerning the conclusion drawn there ⁵. For it does not seem to follow from what was premised. For it was said in the premises that our understanding is successive. Therefore it occurs not in an instant but in time. Therefore the divine understanding is not related to ours as eternity to the flowing now of time, as is inferred.

3. For the clarification of this, it must be considered that, although the operation of the intellect is intrinsically instantaneous and existing all at once, and consequently the measure fitting it first and per se is indivisible; nevertheless, because it necessarily requires the operation of the phantasia, which has a certain continuity and succession while apprehending the singular in the manner of a continuum and as existing in time, the very operation of the intellect is said to be successive per accidens; not indeed because one part of it is measured by one part of time and another part by another, since, as was said, it exists all at once; but because the very operation of the phantasia, which is necessarily joined to intellection, has succession. And this is what Saint Thomas says: our understanding has succession insofar as the continuum and time are joined to it per accidens—that is, it has succession not indeed in itself, but in the operation of the phantasia conjoined to it, in which there are both continuity and succession; just as the substantial esse of a corruptible thing is said through something else to be in time and to have succession, because, although that esse itself exists all at once, it nonetheless underlies transmutation, in which there is a before and an after, on account of which it can be said not to exist all at once.

4. It is said, therefore, to the first doubt that the dissimilarity between our understanding and the divine is this: although our understanding in itself is whole at once, by reason of what is necessarily joined to it it is not whole at once, especially in the knowledge of enunciables. Therefore it is not wholly unified. But divine understanding is wholly unified: because it has neither of itself nor through another any succession. Therefore divine understanding is more perfect than our understanding.

It could also be said that, although a single act of understanding involves no succession, the whole of human understanding, in which our natural happiness consists, does involve succession: for we do not know the things of God by one act of understanding, but by many acts succeeding one another; and since in this life we come to know God through phantasms, and no single phantasm leads to knowledge of all that is known of God. But God knows all things by a single operation. Therefore His knowledge is more unified, and consequently His beatitude more perfect.

5. To the second doubt it is answered, following the first response to the first doubt, that although one act of understanding is accidentally in time, as we said, yet primarily and per se it is in an instant, since it is whole at once. Therefore, since the operation of the divine intellect, which is its beatitude, is eternal, its comparison to the operation of our natural intellect, which is our beatitude that we acquire by our own powers, is also a comparison of eternity to the flowing now of time: because, just as the things measured are related to one another in perfection, so too are their natural and per se measures.

V. Sixth. Our contemplation, in which human happiness chiefly consists, if there is any in this present life (which is said because human life is more a continuous misery than to possess any happiness), is interrupted by fatigue and various occupations; it is also subject to errors, doubts, and various accidents. But divine happiness is not. Therefore divine happiness is incomparably greater than human happiness, especially that of this present life.

VI. Seventh. Divine beatitude embraces all human beatitudes. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved by running through each beatitude. For the contemplative life, it possesses the most perfect consideration of itself and of others; for the active life, the governance of the whole universe. As for the false beatitude, which has only a certain shadow of that most perfect felicity, it has, in place of pleasure, a most excellent delight in itself and a universal joy in all goods, without admixture of anything contrary; in place of riches, every manner of sufficiency of all goods; in place of power, infinite virtue; in place of dignity, the primacy and governance of all beings; in place of fame, the admiration of every intellect that knows it in whatever way.

It must be noted, following Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X ⁶, that there is a twofold happiness: namely the contemplative, which consists in the act of wisdom; and the active, which consists in the exercise of the moral virtues, and principally in the act of prudence, whose office it is to direct the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, when Saint Thomas locates contemplative happiness in God, he says that God possesses a most perfect and perpetual knowledge of Himself and of others: for this belongs to wisdom, inasmuch as wisdom comprehends within itself all the speculative habits. But He attributes active happiness to Himself by reason of His governance of the universe. For all moral virtues are concerned either with external goods, or with the goods of the body, or with the passions of the soul, and to all of these the other moral virtues extend themselves according to the rule of prudence. And thus the whole of active happiness consists in a certain governance, either of oneself or of another, according to right reason. Now it is greater to govern the universe than to govern one man alone, or a household or a kingdom, and this is accomplished through the moral virtues, and especially through prudence. Hence active happiness belongs to God in a more excellent manner than to men, just as does contemplative happiness also, and it is of a far higher order than human happiness. Therefore there are not two happinesses in God, as there are in us, but only one, containing eminently and unitedly whatever is contained multiply and divisively in every form of our happiness.

2. Concerning speculative happiness, there is a doubt. For it belongs concomitantly to the notion of happiness that the appetite be at rest, and consequently that one take delight in it, since delight is nothing other than the rest of the appetite. But the speculative intellect does not move the appetite, only the practical intellect does: as Saint Thomas says in the Prima Secundae, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2, and this is the mind of the Philosopher, On the Soul III ⁷. Therefore some speculative happiness is wrongly posited.

It is answered that the will can be moved by apprehension in two ways: in one way, to seek what is apprehended; in another way, to rest in the thing apprehended. For the first motion, practical apprehension is required, by which something is judged to be desirable and to be sought as a good and fitting. And it is of this motion that Saint Thomas and Aristotle speak. — But for the second motion, practical apprehension is not required, because for delight the attainment of a fitting good and knowledge of such an attainment suffice, as is said in the Prima Secundae, q. 32, a. 1. Hence, since speculative cognition is a good of the one understanding, especially concerning a perfect intelligible, speculative cognition itself, when possessed and known to be present, causes delight through natural concomitance.

To God himself, who is most perfectly blessed, be honor and glory for this exposition of the first book. Amen.