Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has treated of the divine life in itself, he now treats of the species of that life ¹, showing it to be a blessed life ². Concerning this he does three things: first, he shows that blessed life befits God; second, that God is His own beatitude, in the following chapter; third, that His beatitude exceeds all beatitude, in chapter one hundred and two.

I. As to the first, the following conclusion is proposed: God is blessed.

It is proved first. God is an intelligent being. Therefore his proper good is beatitude. Therefore he is blessed. — The first consequence is proved: because the proper good of any intellectual nature is beatitude. — The second is also proved: because God is not related to his proper good as something tending toward a good not yet possessed, since that belongs to one existing in potency; but as something that already possesses its proper good.

Note that proper good is understood here by Saint Thomas as the good to which a nature is ordered as such. For thus beatitude is the proper good of an intellectual nature, because the intellectual nature, as intellectual, is ordered to it as to its perfection.

II. Second. The intellectual beatitude of a nature is its most perfect operation. But the operation of God as intelligent is most perfect. Therefore He is blessed. — The major is proved: because His beatitude is that which in Him is most perfect, for this is what is most willed by Him. Now the most perfect thing in each being is its most perfect operation, both because power and habit are perfected through operation, and because the Philosopher, in Ethics X, chapter 8, holds that happiness is a perfect operation. — The minor is also proved: because the perfection of an operation depends on four things, namely on the genus of the operation, which must be immanent; on the principle of the operation, namely that it be of the highest power, that is, of intellect perfected by habit; on the object of the operation; and on the form of the operation, namely that it operate perfectly, easily, firmly, and with delight. Such is God's operation: since God is intelligent, His operation is consequently immanent; His intellect is the highest of powers, nor does it need a perfecting habit; and He understands Himself, who is the highest of intelligibles, perfectly and with delight, without any difficulty.

2. Concerning that proposition, The most perfect thing in each thing is its most perfect operation, it must be considered that this comparison is made with respect to those things which supervene upon a nature already complete in its substance, and not with respect to those things which are in the thing simply. For what is most perfect simply, in the thing, is the substance of the thing, not the operation. But it is quite true that among the perfections supervening upon the substance, the most perfect is the most perfect operation. — It can also be called most perfect, not indeed essentially and in itself, but completively: because it is the last thing which intrinsically completes the perfection of an intellectual nature.

3. Concerning the difference between immanent and transitive action, note first that when it is said that by an immanent action nothing is made other than the operation itself, this is understood to mean that in the operation itself there is received a matter about which the action is: not, however, that nothing at all is produced by it, since above ³ he said that by intellection the word and concept are produced in the intellect, as we explained there. For immanent action differs from transitive because by a transitive action something is done in the patient about which the action is: but by an immanent action nothing is made in the thing understood, although something is made in the intellect itself.

Note, secondly, that when Saint Thomas says that such operations can be ultimate, because they are not ordered to any product which would be an end, what is meant by this is that something can indeed be produced by an immanent act, but not in such a way that it has the character of an end to which the operation is ordered, as a transitive action has as its end the product of its very operation. For the word produced by intellection is not the end of the intellection; rather, the intellection is more truly its end, because the word is produced so that the intellection may be perfected. Since intellection is completed insofar as it reaches the thing understood, and the word is produced so that by means of it the intellect may behold the thing, it follows that the word is ordered to the intellection as to its end.

Immanent action therefore differs from transient action because through a transient action something is produced in the patient, and that is the end of the operation; but through an immanent action nothing is produced in the thing understood, and if anything is produced by it, that is not the end of the operation, but rather, on the contrary, the operation is its end. From this it follows that immanent actions are perfections of the agent, whereas transient actions are perfections of what is done. It also follows that the immanent action is by its genus more perfect, because it is itself the end, while the transient is not.

4. Concerning that proposition, Happiness is according to the operation of the intellect through the habit of the perfect, it must be noted that it holds true of human happiness: for of this the Philosopher was speaking ⁴, from whom that proposition is taken. For the operation of the human intellect cannot be perfect unless it is perfected by a habit, since our intellect is imperfect. But it is not true of divine happiness: since it has been said that the divine intellect does not need a perfecting habit, being perfect in itself.

III. Third. Divine perfection comprehends every perfection in a certain simplicity. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because he must be blessed who is perfect with respect to all things that he can desire; for by beatitude every desire is quieted, since it is the ultimate end. — It is confirmed also by the authority of Boethius.

Fourth. God has no need of other things: nor does He will other things for His own sake because He needs them, but because it is fitting to His goodness. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because he who is sufficient to himself and in need of nothing is truly blessed, since his desire is at rest.

Fifth. God has whatever He wills, and He wills no evil. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident from the definition of the blessed given by some. — The antecedent, as regards its second part, was proved above. — As for the first part, it is proved thus: It is impossible that something not yet possessed should come to God, since He is in no way in potency. But God cannot will anything impossible. Therefore He cannot will to have what He does not have. Therefore He has whatever He wills.

It is confirmed by the authority of 1 Timothy, at the end.