Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

According to the corollary¹ it is: Hatred of any thing cannot befit God.

On this corollary, then, Saint Thomas does two things: first, he proves the proposition; second, he removes a doubt².

I. As to the first, he argues first as follows. The will of God cannot be inclined toward evil, as was shown above. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For toward those whom we hate, we will evil: namely, under the aspect of evil.

Second. God wills the good to each thing. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because he wills in other things apart from himself that they be a likeness of his goodness.

II. But this argument seems not to conclude, for two reasons. First, because it could be said that, while God wills something to be in a creature, he certainly wills the good of the creature; but when he wills the privation of its esse, he wills evil. Therefore it is false that he always wills things other than himself insofar as, willing his own goodness, he wills it to be diffused in others.

Second, because although God wills some good for every being, inasmuch as he wills it to be, he can nevertheless will evil and privation to it on another account: just as for the damned he wills that they be, and thus loves them; he also wills their damnation, and thus hates them. Hence that consequence seems false: God wills good to each one, Therefore he hates nothing—unless the antecedent is understood exclusively, namely, he wills only good. But then it would be false, as has been shown.

2. For the clarification of this point, it must be considered, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the chapter immediately following³, and in the First Part, q. XIX, a. 9, that evil is never willed by God except by reason of some good joined to it which is more willed than the good removed by such an evil. Hence God never wills evil in itself: but sometimes he wills it secondarily, inasmuch as he wills his goodness to be manifested through some perfection to which a certain evil is joined; thus, because he wills justice, he wills punishment; and because he wills the order of nature to be preserved, he wills certain things to be corrupted.

Therefore, to the first point, it is said first that God certainly wills the evil of someone when he wills his death or the privation of some good. — It is said second that he does not will that evil as the evil of someone, which constitutes the ground of hatred, but as conjoined with some good, for instance the order of the universe. Therefore that proposition, God wills things other than himself inasmuch as, in willing himself and his goodness, he wills it to be diffused in other things, is universally true. For the divine will is never borne toward things other than itself, whether good or evil, without willing some participation of its goodness.

To the second, it is said similarly that, even if God wills damnation for someone, he does not will it as that person's evil in itself, but insofar as he wills the good of justice.

III. Third. It would follow that God wills that his action, by which it is produced, mediately or immediately, not be—which he hates. But this is impossible. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because if one hates something, one wills it not to be. And in willing this, one wills what is required for it. Now what is required is that it not be the action of God by which it is produced into being; since nothing can cease to be while the action of God, formally by which it is produced into being, remains.

But that argument does not seem to conclude. For it is not impossible that God wills his action not to be so as to be terminated at the esse of some thing, since in fact it sometimes happens thus—namely, when a thing ceases to be.

It is answered that Saint Thomas speaks of a thing as long as it is in nature. For God cannot will that a creature not be for the time for which it exists. And thus, as long as the creature exists, God cannot have it in hatred.

Fourth. God is the cause of all things. Therefore he loves all things. Therefore he hates nothing. — The first inference is evident, because all agents, in their own way, love their effects.

It is confirmed by the authority of Wisdom XI.

IV. As to the second point⁴, because someone might object: God is said in Scripture to hate certain things, as in Malachi I, I have hated Esau, and in the Psalm, You have hated all who work iniquity. Therefore God hates certain things: — he answers that this is said by way of similitude, but not properly. And this is said in two ways. In one way, insofar as God wills the evil contrary to the good that he wills for a creature not to be, since those things which we will not to be, we are said to hate: according to that text of Zechariah VIII, Let each one hold no evil against his friend, etc. — In another way, insofar as he wills a greater good which cannot be without the privation of a lesser good.

Concerning the first mode, it should be noted that, as is said here, love and hatred properly belong to subsisting things. For, as was said above⁵, to love properly is to will the good of someone: and thus it belongs to that which can have goodness in itself, not to that which can be the goodness of another. Similarly, to hold in hatred properly is to will evil upon someone: and thus it belongs to that which can have a privation of goodness. But both are subsistent things: for what is the goodness of another does not subsist, nor does what is formally the evil of another; but it is well suited to that to which goodness belongs, and to that to which privation of goodness belongs, as to a subject. Therefore, when God is said to hate the evil that is repugnant to someone's good—as when he hates lying or adultery—this is not said properly, since they are not subsistent things, but by a certain likeness: namely, because just as one who holds a subsisting thing in hatred wills it not to be, either simply or in some respect, so God wills those evils not to be.

Concerning the second mode, it must be considered that hatred is directed at someone's evil, as is said in the Malo, q. XII, a. 4, under the aspect of evil: but not at evil insofar as it has the character of a good from some circumstance. Therefore, when God wills the privation of something on account of the good of justice, or the corruption of something on account of the good of the universe, he is not said properly to hate: because he does not will its evil insofar as it is its evil. He is said, however, to hate by similitude, because he wills its evil: for one who properly hates something wills its evil.

Since, then, it has been said that God cannot hate anything, this must be understood properly, insofar as hatred belongs to a subsistent being; and it is of its evil, insofar as it is its own, that it is held in hatred.

V. But a doubt arises here. For if God is said to hate nothing because he wills no subsisting thing not to be, and wills evil to others only on account of the good joined to it, then by the same reasoning man can have nothing in hatred: because the will of man wills nothing except under the aspect of good, as Saint Thomas says in many places ⁶, and this is the mind of Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. ⁷, and of Augustine ⁸.

To make this evident, it must be considered that in the object of a power's operation a twofold formal ratio can be found: one common, under which every object is referred to the power; another particular, by which one operation of the power is specifically distinguished from another. The first can be called the formal ratio in the manner of a mover, because nothing can move the power except under that ratio. The other, however, can be called the formal ratio in the manner of a terminator, because to it the operation is primarily terminated as specified and as such an operation. Thus, when whiteness is seen, the common ratio in the manner of a mover is color, for whiteness does not move sight except insofar as it is colored, by which the visual power itself is specified, just as every passive power is specified by its formal and adequate active principle. But the particular ratio, by which the vision of white is specified as being a vision of white distinct from the vision of black, is the ratio of white; for the operation is specified by the formal ratio of the object to which it is primarily terminated as such an operation. Now the vision of white, as such, is primarily and per se terminated to the ratio of white, although, insofar as it is vision absolutely, it is terminated to the ratio of the colored. Similarly, in every object of the will, with respect to the act of pursuit, there is a certain common formal ratio in the manner of a mover, and this is the ratio of good; for nothing can move the will, and appetite universally, except under the ratio of good. There is also a certain particular ratio in the manner of a terminator, by which this operation of the will, as such, is distinguished from another operation and specified; and this is the formal ratio of the object to which such an operation is terminated as such. Just as volition of health is primarily and per se terminated to the ratio of health insofar as it is volition of health, although health does not move the will except under the ratio of good.

It is said, therefore, first, that if we speak of the formal reason in the manner of a mover, the will wills nothing actually in the manner of pursuit except under the aspect of good, namely insofar as it is apprehended under the aspect of good. But if we speak of the particular reason in the manner of a terminator, by which the operation is specified, then it can will evil absolutely under the aspect of evil. And thus we say that hatred is directed toward the evil of someone absolutely under the aspect of evil: for the act of hatred, first and per se, as such an act, is terminated at the reason of the evil of that which one hates; although that evil does not move the will unless it is apprehended under the aspect of good. In this it differs from anger, which, although it is directed toward harm to one's neighbor, nevertheless the reason of harm is not that at which it is first terminated, but the reason of just vindication: for the angry man desires vengeance as judged to be just on account of the injury inflicted.

It is said second, that God cannot properly hate anything, but man can. For, since the divine goodness is for God the reason for willing all things other than himself, he can will nothing except insofar as his goodness is manifested in it. And thus evil and non-being, which he wills for someone, he wills under the aspect of some good: just as one who wills something as a means to health wills it by reason of health, and that act of will is specified by health as by its end. But man can will another's evil under the aspect of evil and of harm to him absolutely, in the role of what terminates the act, as was said. And therefore he can hate someone.