Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Finally, on the contemplative virtues, Saint Thomas determines the matter ¹: they are called contemplative, I say, because they are ordered to the contemplation of truth, and not to an external work, as the moral virtues are active.

And it is proved that they are in God in the highest degree.

First, then, concerning wisdom. For he knows himself most of all who is the first cause of all things. Wisdom, moreover, as is said at the beginning of the Metaphysics, consists in the knowledge of first causes. — Likewise by the authority of Job 9; and Ecclesiasticus 1; and of the Philosopher, Metaphysics I, who says that it is a divine, not a human, possession.

Second, indeed, concerning knowledge. For he knows the order of all causes and effects, and through this the proper causes of individual things. Now knowledge is the cognition of a thing through its proper cause. It is true, however, that he does not know these things through ratiocination. — Likewise by the authority of 1 Kings 2.

Third, concerning the intellect. For it has immaterial cognition of all things without discursive reasoning. — Likewise by the authority of Job 12.

He concludes, finally, that these virtues in God are the exemplars of ours, as the perfect is of the imperfect: of the same formal ratio, that is to say, understood analogically ².

Concerning the virtue that is called intellect, it must be noted that, with respect to the mode of cognition, every divine cognition by which God knows something to be can be called intellect, because he apprehends all things by simple intellect, as we apprehend first principles, but not with discursive reasoning. But if we wished to distinguish divine cognition on the side of its objects, we would say that divine cognition is called intellect insofar as by it God knows the first principles from which all our demonstrations derive their efficacy.