Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Saint Thomas next treats of the virtues that concern actions ¹. In this he does two things: first he shows how they can be attributed to God; second, he removes a certain doubt ². As to the first, he does three things: first, in general he proves that some of them befit God; second, he proves this particularly concerning each of them ³; third, he shows how certain other virtues do not befit him, and that those which he proves to befit God cannot befit him according to some of their acts ⁴.

I. As to the first, he proposes this conclusion: Truth, justice, liberality, magnificence, prudence, and art are in God.

It is proved first. The acts that are the matter or object of these virtues are not repugnant to divine perfection. Therefore they do not have anything, according to their proper species, on account of which they would be excluded from divine perfection.

Second. There are the perfections of intellect and will, which are the principles of operations without passion of the intellect and will. Therefore, etc.

On this assumption a doubt arises, when it is said that virtues of this kind, which are concerned with actions, are perfections of the intellect and the will. For St. Thomas seems to say the opposite in the First Part of the Second Part, question 60, article 5, and in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 134, article 4, ad 1. For there he holds that liberality and magnificence reside in the sensitive appetite; and consequently that they are not perfections of the intellect or of the will.

It is answered that, just as money can be considered in two ways, in one way as the object of a passion, such as concupiscence, delight, love, or hope, and in another way as the matter of expenditures and outlays, so there is a twofold virtue of liberality and magnificence with respect to these. One is that which concerns the passions directed to money itself, namely, that which moderates concupiscence and love of money: so that, I say, a man loves money with moderation, lest through excessive love of it he be hindered from giving and from expenditures that are fitting. And this is the one that Saint Thomas, in the passages cited, places in the sensitive appetite. But he does not speak of this one here. — The other is that which concerns the expenditures themselves, and it consists in the use of money. And this is placed in the will: for use pertains to the will, as Saint Thomas says in the First Part of the Second Part, q. XVI ⁵. And it is of this one that Saint Thomas speaks in this chapter; and in the First Part, q. XXI, a. 1, ad 1, and in On the Virtues, q. I, a. 5, where he places liberality in the will.

II. As to the second, he proves it singularly concerning each of them ⁶. And first concerning art, thus. Of all those things that proceed from God into being, the proper reason is in the divine intellect. Therefore art is in God: for art is right reason about things to be made. — It is confirmed by Wisdom VII, where it is said, the maker of all things, etc.

Note that art is here enumerated among the virtues, not because it perfectly possesses the character of virtue. For it belongs to the character of perfect virtue that it make a faculty of operating well and a good use of such a faculty ⁷: for justice makes a man prompt in faculty to act justly, and to act justly in fact. Art indeed makes a faculty of acting rightly, from which it has in some way the character of virtue, as do also the habits of speculative intellect; yet it does not make a good use of such a faculty, for one who possesses an art can produce a bad workmanship, just as one who possesses the art of grammar can speak ungrammatically. Therefore it does not possess perfectly the character of virtue, but only in a qualified sense: insofar as it makes its possessor in some way good, and renders his work good according to the faculty.

Second, it is proved of prudence. The divine will is determined to one thing rather than others through cognition. Therefore prudence is in him: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as is said in Book VI of the Ethics. — It is confirmed by the authority of Job 26, where it is said, With him is prudence.

Thirdly, concerning justice. God, in willing something, wills what is owed to His perfection. Therefore justice is in Him: for it belongs to justice to render to each what is his own. Hence it is said in the Psalm, The Lord is just and has loved justices. — How there can be something owed in the works of God will be shown below, ⁸

Fourth, it is argued from liberality. God does not will to communicate His goodness to anyone so that something may thereby accrue to Himself, but because it is fitting for Him. Therefore He is liberal: for to give not on account of some advantage expected by the giver from the giving itself, but on account of the goodness itself and the fittingness of the giving, is an act of liberality. — This is confirmed by the authority of Avicenna, who says that He alone is properly liberal, since every other agent intends to obtain some good from its action. — Likewise by the authority of the Psalm: When you open your hand etc. And also James 1: Who gives to all abundantly and does not upbraid.

Fifth, concerning truth which is a virtue. All things that receive their esse from God bear his likeness, insofar as they are good and have their proper rationes in the divine intellect. Therefore truth is in him: for it belongs to the virtue of truth, as is said in Ethics IV, that one show himself in his deeds and words to be such as he is. — This is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Romans 3, But God is truthful etc.; and of the Psalm, All your ways are truth.

III. As to the third ⁹, he says first that the virtues which are ordered to actions of inferiors toward superiors, such as obedience, latria, and the like, do not befit God.

He says second that if the virtues attributed to God are certain imperfect acts, then in respect of those acts the virtues themselves do not befit God. Hence prudence, as regards the act of taking good counsel, does not befit him: since counsel is a kind of inquiry, as is said in Ethics VI, which has no place in God. Hence it is said in Job 26: To whom have you given counsel etc.; and in Isaiah 40: With whom did he take counsel etc. But according to that act which is to judge well about things counseled and to choose what has been judged, nothing prevents prudence from being said of God. — Saint Thomas adds, however, that nevertheless counsel is sometimes said of God metaphorically: either on account of the likeness of concealment, as is clear in Isaiah 25, according to the old translation, where it is said, Let your ancient true counsel be fulfilled; or insofar as he satisfies those who consult him, for without any discursive process the intelligent one instructs those who inquire.

Likewise, justice, with respect to the act of exchange, does not belong to God, since He receives from no one (that is, anything that is of a creature and not of God), as is clear from Romans XI and Job XLI (though we are said to give something to God in a figurative sense, insofar as God accepts what we give): but it does belong to Him well enough with respect to the act of distribution. Hence Dionysius, in chapter VIII of the Divine Names, says that God is praised for justice as distributing to all according to their worth, in keeping with Matthew XXV: He gave to each according to his proper ability, etc.

IV. But a doubt arises. For the opposite of this seems to be held in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 61, article 4, reply to objection 1. There it is stated that the form of the divine judgment, insofar as it recompenses rewards for merits and punishments for sins, is considered according to the notion of commutative justice.

2. To this doubt Capreolus seems to reply, II Sent., d. XXVII ¹⁰, that if we speak of meritorious acts according to their substance and as they proceed from free will, then between God and man, when God repays for merits, there is not properly commutative justice. And thus is understood what Saint Thomas says in many places, that there is no commutative justice between God and man ¹¹. — But if we speak of meritorious acts insofar as they proceed from grace and the motion of the Holy Spirit, then between God rewarding and man well deserving there is properly commutative justice: because an equal is rendered for an equal.

But this does not seem to me to be the mind of St. Thomas. For the argument he adduces here, and in the First Part ¹², namely that God receives from no one, tells as much against meritorious acts insofar as they are from free choice as against meritorious acts insofar as they proceed from grace. For just as He receives from no one a natural act as though that act were of man alone and not of God, since He Himself gave every natural power to the creature and applies it itself to operation; so too, and far more, He does not receive from us an act informed by grace as though it were something entirely ours, since grace itself, which is the principle of merit, is infused into the soul by Him. If, therefore, because He receives from no one, there is not justice in Him with respect to the act of commutation, then it must be said universally true that in no divine judgment is there simply and properly commutative justice.

3. For which reason it seems to me that I must speak otherwise, always with deference to the better judgment.

For the clarification of this, it must be considered that, since commutative justice posits an equality between what is given and what is received, or between the giver and the receiver, two things belong to its very definition: namely, that there be an equality of what is simply given and received, as, I say, if five are received and five are given; and that what is given be truly given, which is certainly the case when that which is said to be given belongs to the giver, and in no way to the one to whom it is given, insofar as he is such. If, therefore, both of these conditions are found in an act of justice, commutative justice is properly said to exist there. But if not both conditions hold, but only one, or some other condition of it, it will not be said that commutative justice exists there, but rather some mode of it.

It is said, therefore, first, that in God there is not, simply and properly speaking, commutative justice. For when something is rendered by God for our act that is only morally good, there is not there an equality simply speaking, since God gives more than man merits; and further, every good work belongs more to God than to the creature. But when something is rendered, namely beatitude, for an act meritorious de condigno, it is indeed rendered equal for an equal, yet the merit itself also belongs more to God than to the creature who merits. And therefore in no divine judgment is the whole rationale of commutative justice preserved. And Saint Thomas speaks in this sense in this passage and in the First Part.

It is said second, that in the form of the divine judgment, when it renders to each according to his merits, there is distributive justice simply and properly, insofar as it is given to each according to the measure of that one: namely, such that as is the proportion between merits or sins, so is the proportion between rewards or between punishments. Yet there is there a certain mode, that is, a certain condition, of commutative justice: insofar as in this distribution of rewards or punishments there is observed a certain equality between what is given to one and his merit; either simply, insofar as as much is rendered as anyone merits, as in the giving of beatitude; or according to proportion, insofar as God gives according to the fittingness and dignity of His goodness, and the creature operates according to its smallness. And in this sense is to be understood what was adduced from the Second Part of the Second Part. For Saint Thomas does not wish that in the form of the divine judgment by which He renders rewards to merits and punishments to sins there be properly and completely an act of commutative justice: but that there is there a certain mode of commutative justice and a certain condition of it; as is clear from his doctrine in IV Sent., d. XLVI ¹³. Therefore there is no contradiction.

V. As to the fourth point ¹⁴, Saint Thomas removes the doubt. For it seemed that there was a certain contradiction in his words, since above, in the preceding chapter, he said without qualification that the virtues pertaining to the active life, insofar as they perfect this life, do not belong to God; yet in this chapter he proved that some of them do befit Him.

Therefore he replies that virtues of this kind are not of the same account in God and in man, but in Him they have a more universal extension. The reason for this is that the actions to which such virtues are ordered do not, according to their accounts, depend on human affairs: for to judge about what is to be done, or to give and distribute something, is not the prerogative of man alone, but of any being possessing intellect. Therefore these virtues are not ordered to such actions insofar as they are contracted to human affairs, except insofar as they order the active life of man. Hence in God they are of a more universal character than in men: for the justice of man is directed to the city or the household, whereas the justice of God is directed to the whole universe.

From these things it follows that the divine virtues are the exemplars of ours ¹⁵: because those things which are contracted and limited are likenesses of the things exemplified from them in an uncontracted state, just as the light of a candle is related to the light of the sun. — But the others, which do not properly belong to God, have no exemplar in the divine nature, but only in the divine wisdom, as is also the case with corporeal things.

2. Concerning this response, it must be considered that it is one thing to speak of distributive justice absolutely, and another to speak of human distributive justice or divine, and so on for the other virtues attributed to God. For justice taken absolutely does not determine for itself a mode with respect to human distributions, but signifies an order toward the distribution of goods of whatever kind, according to proportion; whereas human justice signifies an order toward the distribution of goods that come into human use, and is specified by them. And because divine distribution is not limited to goods of this sort—God being the distributor of all perfections—therefore human justice does not befit God: but justice according to its unlimited ratio befits Him well, which nevertheless in God has the mode proper to the divine nature. And similarly it is said of the other virtues.

For this reason Saint Thomas said above that in God there are not virtues insofar as they perfect human life: that is, they are not present according to that limitation by which they are human virtues; although certain of them are found in him according to their common account, and in a certain higher manner. And the same holds for all the other perfections that belong formally to God and to creatures: for they are unlimited in God, but limited in creatures. Hence we indeed grant that wisdom is in God, but not human wisdom. For although the common analogous account takes on the divine mode as it is in God, just as it has the human mode as it is in man, yet it stands differently and differently toward this mode and toward that one. Because as it is drawn toward man, it takes on a certain limitation and specification, and becomes particular. But as it is located in God, it does not take on limitation and specification, nor does it become particular: rather, what it said confusedly and potentialiter when considered absolutely, it says entirely as it is in God actualiter according to a certain eminence. Therefore it remains an unlimited and infinite perfection. Yet that very perfection, as it is in God and in man, is of the same account, not simply, but analogically: as was shown above ¹⁶, while the divine names were being treated.

VI. Concerning the corollary ¹⁷ it must be noted, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas (I Sent., d. xix, q. v, a. 2, ad 4), that things can be in God exemplarily in two ways: namely, in his nature and in his intellect. Those things are said to be exemplarily in the divine nature which are formally both in God and in the creature. For since there is one reason of both proportionally, whatever perfection is in a creature is exemplified by a perfection existing in the divine nature as the imperfect by the perfect: thus, because wisdom is formally in God and in man, human wisdom is a kind of imitation of divine wisdom. — But those things are said to be exemplarily in the intellect whose proper reasons are known. And since God knows the proper reasons of all things, even of those which are not formally in him, therefore all things are exemplarily in the divine intellect, or in the divine wisdom, as is said here.

Thus, therefore, our virtues, which we posit formally in God, are exemplified from the virtues existing in the divine nature; but not those virtues which we do not posit properly in God, but only metaphorically.

VII. Now concerning this corollary itself a twofold doubt arises. First, because it seems that nothing can be in the divine wisdom exemplarily that is not also exemplarily in the divine nature. For the divine wisdom embraces the proper rationes of all things precisely because it apprehends its own essence as the proper ratio of each thing, inasmuch as each thing is a certain participated likeness of the divine esse ¹⁸. Therefore whatever is in the divine wisdom exemplarily must also be in the divine nature; otherwise the divine essence could not be apprehended as the proper ratio of each thing.

Second ¹⁹, because Saint Thomas, in the Prima Secundae, question 61, article 5, holds that temperance and fortitude are exemplary virtues in God: which, however, are known not to belong to God properly, but only metaphorically.

2. To the first of these it is answered that the exemplar of something can be understood to be in another in two ways. In one way, according to a conformity in nature: namely, because in it there is a likeness of that thing according to natural being, as one white thing is like another white thing. In another way, according to representation alone: in which way the conception of a stone in the intellect is an exemplar of the stone. Some things, then, have their exemplar in God in the first way, such as wisdom; others only in the second way, such as prime matter.

It must be considered, second, that those things are properly said to have a likeness to one another by way of agreement in nature which agree in something formally—that is, what is found in each according to its formal character. But if what is in one formally is not in the other formally, but only virtually and eminently, those things are not said to be alike by agreement in nature. Yet although that which thus contains the other virtually and eminently has no agreement in nature with it, it can nevertheless be conceived as proportioned to the other and as its proper ratio: just as the power of the sun, although it has no likeness in nature with heat, can nevertheless be conceived as the ratio of heat, because it contains heat virtually and eminently; and so the power of the sun, conceived as proportioned to heat, will be its proper exemplar in the intellect, even though in itself it is not an exemplar formally according to esse of nature—unless we wish to take the name "exemplar" improperly for every likeness however taken, whether, I say, adequate or exceeding.

To the point, then, it is denied that nothing can be exemplarily in the divine wisdom which is not exemplarily in the divine nature, taking "to be exemplarily in the nature" as meaning to have in it a likeness according to formal convenience in nature. For both stand together: that something in the divine intellect, or in cognized esse, has its proper exemplar, because its proper ratio is conceived by the divine intellect; and yet it does not have esse formally in the divine nature, but only virtually, and thus does not have an exemplar in that nature.

But when it is argued that something is exemplarily in the divine wisdom because the divine essence is taken as its proper ratio, this is indeed conceded, but the consequence is denied. For it is supposed that, according to the mode of understanding, the divine essence is first a formal likeness of all things—as having formally in itself the perfections of all things—and is then apprehended as the proper ratio of some thing. But this is false. For the divine essence is not conceived as the proper ratio of some thing because it is that thing's formal likeness, having with it a conformity in nature; but rather because it is either its formal likeness or its eminent and virtual one. Now I call a formal likeness that which is of the same ratio, either simply or proportionally. Hence, when the divine essence is conceived as the proper ratio of something that does not exist in it formally but only eminently, that thing is in God exemplarily according to an intelligible representation alone. But when it is conceived as the ratio of what exists in it formally, the thing represented has in God both a likeness and an exemplar according to intelligible representation and according to formal conformity in nature. For human wisdom is represented according to its proper ratio by the form understood or conceived by the divine intellect; and it has a formal conformity with the divine nature insofar as it is wisdom, since wisdom exists in God and in man according to one analogous ratio, as was shown above ²⁰ And the same is said of the virtues that properly belong to God.

3. To the second it is said first that St. Thomas, in the Prima Secundae, wishing to preserve the opinion of Macrobius and Plotinus, places fortitude and temperance in God not according to the same analogical account, but calls fortitude the very immutability of God, and temperance the conversion of the divine intention to Himself, with which human fortitude and temperance have some likeness. Hence they are said of God metaphorically.

It is said second, that Saint Thomas there takes "exemplar" improperly: namely, for any likeness of a more perfect and eminent kind on which another depends. Here, however, he speaks of the exemplar properly: namely, for a formal likeness, by which another is exemplated according to the same analogical ratio, which ratio is the form conceived.