Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has shown how the passions are related to God, he now shows the same concerning the virtues ¹. In regard to this he does two things: first, he shows how the virtues are in God; second, he draws certain corollaries ². In regard to the first he does two things: first, he shows universally of the virtues how they are in God; second, he determines concerning the species of virtue, in this same chapter ³.

I. As to the first, he sets down two conclusions. The first is: The divine goodness contains all the virtues in its own way. — The second is: No virtue is in God according to a habit.

The first is proved. Just as the divine esse contains every perfection, so the divine goodness in a certain way contains all goodness. But virtue is a certain goodness of the virtuous person, since by it he is called good, and his work good. Therefore etc.

It must be noted that, just as divine esse, although it comprehends every perfection in itself, does not contain all of them in the same way, but contains some formally, as perfections simpliciter, and others eminently, as bodily perfections; so too, although the divine goodness contains all virtues, it does not contain all of them formally, as will be evident below; but some it contains formally and others eminently. Therefore, to intimate this, Saint Thomas said that the divine goodness comprehends all goodnesses in itself in a certain way; and in the conclusion he said that the divine goodness contains all virtues in its own way.

The second conclusion is also proved. First, because it does not befit God to be good or to act through something superadded, but through His essence. — Second, because the divine act is wholly most perfect. But a habitus names an imperfect act, a medium between potency and act. — Third, because in God there is nothing of potency. But a habitus is perfective of potency. — Fourth, because in God there is no accident. But a habitus is an accident.

Virtue, therefore, in God does not signify some habit superadded to the divine essence: rather, it is the divine essence itself, inasmuch as by it God is good and His work is rendered good.

II. As to the second point, concerning the species of virtue, he treats in ⁴. Now since human virtue is twofold—some pertaining to the active life and some to the contemplative—he first treats of what pertains to the active life; secondly, of what pertains to the contemplative, chapter XCIV. With regard to the first he does two things: first, he treats of virtues in general; secondly, of each species individually ⁵.

As to the first, he proposes this conclusion: The virtues pertaining to the active life, insofar as they perfect this life, cannot belong to God.

It is proved first. The virtues of this kind are those by which we rightly use bodily goods. But these bodily goods cannot befit God. Therefore, etc.

Second. Such virtues perfect the conduct of men according to a political manner of living. Hence they do not seem to fit well those who do not live in a political way. Therefore they cannot befit God, since his manner of living and his life differ far from the mode of human life.

But a doubt is raised concerning the antecedent. For temperance does not perfect man with respect to his political life, but with respect to himself: namely, so that he may conduct himself according to reason with respect to the pleasures of touch. Therefore that antecedent is not universally true.

It is replied, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in III Sent., dist. XXXIII ⁶, that the moral virtues produce rectitude of act in relation to the civil good, and consequently according as this civil manner of life requires. Hence, if this civil manner of life be removed, or if one is not ordered and proportioned to the civil good, they will not be perfect virtues simply. Therefore Saint Thomas says in this place that for those who do not practice political association they do not seem very fitting, as if to say: Although they do belong to such persons, they nevertheless do not belong perfectly and completely, because they are not ordered to civil association and are not adapted to it.

It is said, therefore, in reply to the argument that the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood of virtues taken as perfect and complete. Hence it was also stated in the conclusion that such virtues, insofar as they perfect human life, cannot belong to God. Temperance, then, not only perfects man in himself, but also in relation to the civil good: and it is praiseworthy insofar as it is proportioned to the civil good, speaking of acquired virtue.

III. As to the second point, he treats of the species of active virtue ⁷. But since some virtues direct us with respect to the passions, and others with respect to actions, he shows first how the virtues that concern the passions are related to God; second, how those that concern operations, in the following chapter.

As to the first, he does two things: first, he shows that these are not properly in God; second, he shows that some are attributed to him metaphorically ⁸.

The conclusion is therefore stated: The virtues that direct us with respect to the passions are not in God. It is proved. First, because the passions, from which virtues of this kind derive their species, are not in God. — Second, because the sensitive part, in which virtues of this kind are found and in which alone passions can exist, as is said in book VII of the Physics, text 18, is not in God.

2. It must be noted that Scotus, in Book III of the Sentences, distinction XXXIII ⁹, holds that from the right commands of the commanding will a certain habit can indeed be generated in the sensitive appetite, but that habit, although it may in some way be granted to be a virtue, because it inclines toward things consonant with right reason, is nevertheless not properly a virtue. First, because it is not an elective habit, nor one inclining to choices. — Second, because Aristotle, Ethics I ¹⁰, excludes the sensitive part from virtue. — Third, because the passions are also in the will, according to Augustine, City of God XIV, chapters V and VI: and thus it will be necessary to place them [the virtues] also in the will. — Fourth, because the moderation of the passions is to be attributed more to the will than to the sensitive appetite: and thus virtues are not to be posited in it on account of the moderation of such passions.

It follows, therefore, that what is said here is false, namely, that virtues of this kind are in the sensitive part.

3. But these arguments do not compel. To the first, indeed, it is said, as can be gathered from the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Prima Secundae, q. 56, a. 4, ad 4, that a habit's being good and elective can be understood in two ways: in one way, because it is the proximate director of right choice; in another way, because it provides the principle of right choice. For a virtue it suffices that it be an elective habit in either of these ways; but it is not required that it be elective in both ways. For prudence is an elective habit in the first way; whereas the other moral virtues, which are in the sensitive appetite, are elective habits in the second way; for they make the right intention of the end, which intention is the principle of right counsel and of right judgment, and consequently of right choice. Hence it is denied that a habit which is in the sensitive part is not elective, nor inclines remotely to right choice—although it does not incline to it proximately.

To the second it is said that the Philosopher there excludes the apprehensive sensitive part from virtue, but not the appetitive part. Indeed, he himself grants that virtue exists in the part which is by nature ordered to obey reason. Such, however, is both the intellective and the sensitive appetite.

To the third it is said that no passion is in the will insofar as it is a passion: but there are indeed in it certain simple acts corresponding to the passions with respect to the ultimate difference.

To the fourth, it is said that indeed a habit can be generated in the will by which one is strengthened against the passions, as is said in the Second Part of the Second Part, q. 155, a. 1. Yet no such habit has the character of virtue: because it does not completely perfect the appetite with respect to the movement of the passions; but virtue properly resides in that power in which the work of virtue is brought to completion, as is said in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 56, a. 5. Hence, since the work of the appetitive virtue with respect to the passions is completed in the sensitive appetite, as is said in the same place, therefore the virtues concerned with the passions are in it itself.

IV. As to the second point ¹¹, Saint Thomas notes that the virtues moderating the passions which are according to the inclination of the appetite toward some bodily good delightful to the senses, such as sobriety, chastity, continence, and temperance, are said of God neither properly nor metaphorically, since they concern the passions, and no likeness of them can be found in God according to any effect. But the virtues moderating the passions according to the inclination of the appetite toward some spiritual good, such as honor, dominion, victory, vengeance, and other things of this kind, concerning whose appetite fortitude, magnanimity, meekness, and the like are concerned—although these are not in God properly, because they concern the passions—are nevertheless said of God metaphorically in Scripture on account of the likeness of the effect. For in 1 Kings, chapter 2, it is said, "There is none strong as our God"; and in Micah 6 ¹², "Seek meekness, seek good."

From these things it is evident that, when it is said in the First Part, q. XXI, a. 1, ad 1, that the virtues which are concerned with the passions, among which temperance is enumerated, cannot be attributed to God except metaphorically, this is not to be understood as though St. Thomas wished to say that all virtues of this kind can be said of God metaphorically, but that some of them, such as fortitude and the like, can be said metaphorically; as if it were said: this genus of virtues can be said of God metaphorically, though not with respect to all its species.

V. But it seems that St. Thomas contradicts himself on two counts. First, because here he says there are some virtues moderating the passions which concern spiritual good. It follows, therefore, that not all the virtues which direct man's active life are those by which we rightly use bodily goods. The opposite of this was said above in this chapter.

Second, because he places honor among spiritual goods. But in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 103, article 1, it is said that honor implies something corporeal, since it consists in bodily signs.

2. It is answered that bodily good can be taken in two ways: in one way, as said of the body and of everything joined to the body in any manner whatsoever; in another way, as said only of that which can be perceived of itself by some external sense. And conversely, spiritual good can be taken in two ways: namely, for that which is neither a body nor joined to a body; and for that which cannot fall under an external sense of itself. Therefore, when it is said that the virtues of the active life are those by which we rightly use bodily goods, bodily good is taken in the first way. But when it is said that certain virtues moderate the passions concerning spiritual goods, spiritual good is taken as distinguished against bodily good taken in the second way, not however in the first way. For passion is distinguished because one kind is concerned with a good delightful according to sense; another, however, with a spiritual good, namely with a good that is not perceived of itself by an external sense; as is had from the doctrine of Saint Thomas, Prima Secundae, q. LX, a. 5. Hence there is no contradiction between what is said in this chapter. And thus the answer to the first objection is clear.

To the second it is said that honor is here called a spiritual good, because, taking honor for the reverence itself, it is not perceived in itself by the external sense. For reverence is an act of fear, and it is not perceived by sense except while it is actually manifested through external signs. It is, however, a bodily good in the first way, because it is joined to bodily signs, from which reverence becomes a certain unity. In the Secunda Secundae, however, honor is taken for those external acts by which someone's excellence is attested.

3. But another difficulty arises. For honor belongs most of all to God. If, then, honor is a bodily good in the first way, because it is something annexed to the body, and for this reason is counted among bodily goods, in whose use the active life consists: it follows that a bodily good, whose use pertains to the active life, belongs to God. Similarly dominion and vengeance will belong to Him; these must be said to be bodily goods in the first way, since the moral virtues are concerned with them. But the opposite of this was said above. Therefore either there is a contradiction, or these are in no way bodily goods pertaining to the virtues of the active life.

It is answered that, although goods of this kind, which are called bodily goods in some way, are attributed to God, they do not belong to him as perfecting the good itself, as they are the goods of man. And in this sense it was said that such bodily goods do not belong to God.