Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Second, he shows that in God there is also love according to the proper character of its species ¹. Concerning this, however, he does four things: first, he shows the proposition by arguments; second (third), he confirms both this conclusion and the preceding one by authorities ²; third (second), he removes a certain doubt ³; fourth, he shows how the other passions, which according to the proper character of their species are repugnant to divine perfection, are attributed to God in Sacred Scripture ⁴.

I. As to the first, it is argued first as follows. God wills His own good and the good of others. Therefore in Him there is love according to the act of His will. — The consequence is proved. Because it belongs to the nature of love that the lover wills the good of the beloved.

Note that he says love is in God according to an act of the will, so as to preserve himself from the love which is a passion of the sensitive appetite.

Secondly ⁵. God wills the good of each thing insofar as it is its own:

Since each thing wills to be insofar as it is good in itself, although one thing also orders itself toward the good of another. Therefore it truly loves both itself and other things. — The consequence is proved. Because for the truth of love it is required that the lover will the good of someone as it is his own. For if he willed his good only as it contributes to the good of another, that good would be loved per accidens: just as one who wills wine to be preserved so that he may drink it, or a man so that he may be useful or pleasing to him.

It must be noted that by the truth of love Saint Thomas understands its proper nature and perfection. For in perfect love, and per se, one loves another when one wills his good as his, and not merely on account of another. For as is said in the Prima Secundae, q. 26, a. 4, just as that being is being simply which has esse, while that is being in a qualified sense which exists in another; so the good simply is that which has goodness itself, while the good in a qualified sense is that which is the good of another. And therefore the love by which something is loved so that it may have good as its own is love simply: but the love by which something is loved so that it may be the good of another is love in a qualified sense.

It must also be noted that it is not unfitting that one and the same thing be good in itself, as possessing goodness, and yet also be ordered in some way to the good of another: just as sweet medicine has in itself appetibility, and is ordered to health. Hence likewise it is not unfitting that something be loved simply, while its own good is wished for it as its own; and further, that it be ordered to the good of another. That which is loved only in a qualified sense is what is loved solely as the good of another. On this account St. Thomas says that God wills the good of each thing as it is its own, and thereby truly loves each thing, even though he orders one to the good of another. For God wills that each thing be perfect according to the condition of its nature; and he wills, along with this, that one thing be aided by another.

II. But a doubt arises concerning what has been said. For in the First Part, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3, it is said that God, strictly speaking, does not love irrational creatures with a love of friendship (and the same seems to be said of the love of benevolence), but only with a love of concupiscence, insofar as he orders them to rational creatures and to himself. Now that which is loved strictly by a love of concupiscence is loved secundum quid and as the good of another, not simply as having goodness of itself, as is stated in the First Part of the Second Part, cited above. Therefore God does not will the good of an irrational creature as it is its own good, but only as it is another's: and he does not truly love it, but only secundum quid. The opposite of this is asserted here.

2. To make this evident, it must first be considered that it is not the same thing to say "Love is divided into the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence" and to say "Love is divided into friendship and concupiscence." For the first division is fitting: it is a division not into different acts of appetite, but a division of one and the same act of love according to different rationes. For since to love is to will good to someone, the same act, insofar as it is directed toward the one to whom we will good, is called the love of friendship, inasmuch as it resembles friendship; for a friend wills good to a friend. But insofar as it is directed toward the good which we will to someone, it is called the love of concupiscence, on account of a certain likeness to concupiscence; for concupiscence too is directed toward the good which we will to someone, though it is directed toward it insofar as it is absent. — The second division, however, would be incongruous. First, because, since friendship is a habitus, as is said in Ethics VIII ⁶, it cannot divide love, which is an act. Second, because love is an act distinct from concupiscence, and thus cannot be divided into concupiscence and friendship.

It must be considered, second, that although the love of friendship and friendship are not the same thing, nor the love of concupiscence and concupiscence, nevertheless the love of friendship is sometimes taken for the very act of friendship, or for friendship itself; and the love of concupiscence for concupiscence itself, insofar as love is of a good that is absent. But this is not the proper sense of that division.

It must be considered, third, that benevolence can be taken in two ways: namely, commonly and properly. Taken commonly, it signifies an act of the will by which we will some good absolutely for someone insofar as it is his good.

3. It is said, therefore, first, that God has no friendship with irrational creatures, friendship being taken in its proper sense. For they can neither love God in return nor share with Him in the intellectual and blessed life, both of which belong to the nature of divine friendship.

It is said second, that God loves them with the love of friendship, properly so called. For he wills for them natural goods and esse.

It is said third, that God loves them with the love of benevolence in the common sense of the term. For he wills their good to them insofar as it is their good, since he is their cause. And this Saint Thomas intended in III Sent., d. xxxii, a. 2, ad 2.

It is said fourth, that he does not love them with benevolence properly so called. For he does not will their good as being only their good, but also orders their good to the good of others.

It is said in the fifth place that God loves these things with a love of concupiscence, properly so called. For he wills their good in relation to a rational creature.

It is said sixth, that God does not love by concupiscence properly so called. For such an act is not found in God, since it includes an imperfection.

From these things it follows that God loves these things both with the love of friendship and with the love of concupiscence: insofar as he wills good to them as it is their good, and insofar as he orders them to the utility of rational creatures. And this is what Saint Thomas signified in this place when he said that God wills the good of each thing as it is its own, even though he also orders one thing to the good of another.

4. To the doubt, therefore, it is said that St. Thomas in the First Part takes love of friendship for friendship itself, as is clear from what he says there, and not for love of friendship properly so called. Likewise, he takes benevolence properly, not commonly so called. Neither of these is directed to irrational creatures. He does not, however, deny that he loves irrational creatures with love of friendship properly taken, and with benevolence commonly taken, as he intended in this passage. Therefore it does not follow that he loves them only in a qualified sense, and that in no way does he will the good of the irrational creature as it is his.

But what he seems to say there, namely that she loves them with a love of concupiscence only, must be understood of the love of concupiscence as distinguished from true friendship, which indeed does not exclude the love of friendship. For because he does not will good to irrational creatures as it is their own good alone, but also as it is theirs and even as it redounds to the utility of others, therefore she is said to love them with the love of concupiscence, and not only with the love of friendship (although she has no friendship toward them): which is to love them with the love of concupiscence only as distinguished against friendship, but not as distinguished against the love of friendship, in accordance with what was said above.

First, then, this Saint Thomas speaks in the first way; but in the second way in the First Part.

III. Thirdly ⁷. That by which all things are united to God, namely his goodness, which all things imitate, is the greatest and most intimate to God, since it is goodness itself. Therefore in God there is love not only true, but also most perfect and most firm. — The consequence is proved. Because the lover is related to the beloved as to that which is in some way one with him. Then, because each thing naturally wills and desires its own good in its own proper way, if this belongs to the nature of love, that the lover wills the good of the beloved, it follows that the lover is related to the beloved as to that which is in some way one with him. Then, because, as Dionysius says, love is a unitive force: the greater that by which the lover is one with the beloved, the more intense is the love; and the more intimate and united it is to the lover, the firmer is the love.

Concerning that proposition, "Each thing naturally wills its own good in its own way," it must be noted that Saint Thomas said "in its own way" on account of the diversity of appetites. For there is a certain appetite which is merely natural, not following upon the apprehension of the thing desiring but upon a natural form, as the appetite of a heavy body for the place below; and there is also an animal appetite following upon the apprehension of sense; and there is a rational appetite following upon the apprehension of reason. According to this diversity of natures, each thing naturally desires its own good. For things lacking cognition desire their proper good by a merely natural appetite; those having only sensitive cognition, such as brute animals, desire their good by a sensitive appetite; while those possessing reason, such as human beings, naturally desire their proper good by a rational appetite.

Concerning that proposition, the lover is related to the beloved as to something that is in some way one with him, note that the lover is sometimes one with the beloved by essence, as when someone loves himself; sometimes he is one either by likeness or by any other unity, as when one craftsman loves another craftsman of the same art. Therefore, for love there is not always required a union according to substance: but a union according to likeness, or in any other manner whatsoever, suffices. And therefore it was said that the lover is related as being in some way one with the beloved, but not always as one simply.

Concerning what was said, the more one the lover is with the beloved, from whom he loves, the more intense is his love, it must be noted, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas in Secunda Secundae, q. XXVI ⁸, and III Sent., d. XXIX ⁹, that this is true with respect to that good which pertains to that union: just as one wills a natural good to a blood relative with more intense affection than he would to a fellow soldier, because the natural union of origin is greater than the union of military service. And this must be understood simply speaking. For in a certain respect, on account of some accident, it can happen that a greater and more intense affection is had toward those less closely united. Hence Saint Thomas adds that sometimes a love which arises from some passion becomes more intense than a love which arises from natural origin, although it passes away more easily: for it can happen that someone, on account of thirst that has come upon him, desires more intensely sweet wine set before him and offered to him than a blood relative or friend.

IV. There arises, however, a doubt concerning the argument by which the lover is shown to be related to the beloved as to that which is in some way one with himself. For from these two propositions, to love is to will the good of the beloved, and, each thing naturally wills its own good, nothing else follows than that each thing naturally loves itself; it does not follow, however, that the lover is related to the beloved as to that which is one with himself.

Item, it does not seem that the proposition taken from Dionysius is relevant to the matter at hand. For the intention of St. Thomas is to speak of the union of the lover and the beloved which precedes love: hence from the magnitude of that by which the lover is united to the beloved, love takes its intensity. But the proposition of Dionysius, namely, Love is a unitive force, is not understood of a union preceding love: because an effect is not prior to its cause. Therefore it is not relevant to the matter at hand.

2. For the clarification of the first doubt, it must first be noted that something can be understood to will its own good naturally in two ways. In one way, because it wills and desires its own good by a natural act, but not by a free act: in the way in which we say that man naturally wills beatitude. — In another way, because it has a natural relation to its own good as to its proper object: in the way in which we say that sight tends naturally toward the visible; for it has an order to the visible according to its nature, because it is apprehensive of the visible, not of the audible.

It must be noted, secondly, that we can take "one's own good" in two ways. In one way, as opposed to an accidental good: in this way we say that rational and risible are the proper goods of man, whereas whiteness is not a proper good of man. — In another way, as opposed to another's good and one foreign to him: in the way in which we say that what is possessed by someone is his own, and that everything which belongs to anyone in any way is his; so that in this way it is the same thing to say "someone's proper good" and his own good.

In this proposition, therefore, Each thing naturally wills its own good, "naturally" is taken in the second way; and likewise "its own good" is taken in the second way. And the sense is that each thing, by its appetite, has a natural ordination to the good that is in some way its own, as to the principal object of appetite; but not to the good of another insofar as it is wholly alien. For since appetite is an inclination consequent upon a thing's form, whether natural or apprehended—and given that nature has an inclination toward the good of that nature itself, as a stone is given an inclination toward the place below because that place is fitting for a heavy body, and brute animals are given a sensitive inclination toward pursuing what is fitting for them according to sense, and likewise man is given a rational inclination so that by reason he may provide for himself what is necessary—it follows that the nature of every appetite is ordered and inclined toward the good of the one who appetes, in some way, as toward its principal object. Hence also, when someone wills a good to another, this is because he esteems the one to whom he wills the good as another self; and thus the good that he wills to him is in some way his own, on account of his union with him according to affection. Therefore the argument of Saint Thomas proceeds well in this sense: The lover wills the good of the beloved. But the will is borne only toward a good that is in some way the good of the one willing. Therefore the lover wills the good of the beloved insofar as it is in some way the lover's own. But this is only because lover and beloved are in some way one. Therefore the lover stands related to the beloved as to what is in some way one with him.

3. As to the second doubt, it must be considered that, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Prima Secundae, q. XXVIII, a. 1 ¹⁰, a threefold union of the lover with the beloved concurs in love. One indeed precedes love as its cause: which is a union either according to substance, as when someone loves himself; or according to likeness, as when someone loves another. — Another is according to affection: which is love itself. For love names a certain complacency and fittingness of the appetite toward the appetible thing. — The third follows upon love: and it is a real union; for the lover seeks to unite the beloved thing to himself really as far as he can.

Hence what Dionysius says, that love is a unitive force, is understood formally and causatively, for it is a certain union of lover and beloved, and it causes union: although it can also be called a unitive force of the antecedent, inasmuch as it presupposes a certain union of lover and beloved. Therefore Saint Thomas rightly brought forward that, because the lover stands to the beloved as to something that is in some way one with himself, it follows that the account of love consists in this, that the affection of one tends toward the other as toward something one with himself in some way; that is, that there be a certain union according to the affection of lover and beloved. And to this the authority of Dionysius gives assent, saying that love is a unitive force formally.

The objection therefore assumes something false: namely, that the intention of St. Thomas is to speak of a union that precedes love. On the contrary, he speaks of a union that is essentially love.

In proof it is said that from the magnitude of that by which the lover is united to the beloved, he argues the intensity of love, arguing as it were from the magnitude of a cause to the magnitude of an effect. For if love is a certain union according to affection, it follows that, the greater what causes such a union is, the greater will be the union, and thus the greater and more intense the love. Hence this does not hold: From the magnitude of that by which union is taken he argues the intensity of love; therefore he speaks of a union preceding love.

It is said, however, that even if he were speaking of a union preceded by love, the saying of Dionysius would still be to the point. For it would be understood that love is the unitive force of what precedes it, that is, presupposing a certain union of lover and beloved.

V. Fourth ¹¹. Love is not repugnant to God according to the reason of its species. Therefore it is in Him. — The antecedent is proved. It is not repugnant by reason of its object: for its object is the good. Nor by reason of its manner of relating to that object: for a thing is not less loved when possessed, but more, since when possessed it becomes more akin to us; although the opposite sometimes happens per accidens, namely when we experience something in the beloved that is repugnant to love. This is declared from motion in natural things, which is intensified by proximity to the end. Therefore etc.

It must be noted that, as was said just above ¹², something precedes love as its cause of union, which is either according to substance or according to likeness or in some other way. And because, when something is already actually united to the lover, it is already more one with him, therefore a thing is loved more when it is united—provided the same apprehension remains by which it is judged good and fitting. But since it can happen that what, while absent, was reckoned good and fitting in every respect, and for that reason greatly loved, once possessed is discovered to contain something evil and unfitting for the lover, and hence something repugnant to love: therefore the present is loved less than the absent. And we experience this every day. Hence Saint Thomas says that because a good, when possessed, becomes more akin to us—that is, more intimate and closely joined—it is therefore loved more, other things being equal; but sometimes the opposite happens per accidens, namely because something may come to be known in the beloved thing that was not known before.

VI. Fifth. God moves all other things to union with himself, by giving them esse and perfections. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because it belongs to love to move toward union, or to unite mutually, as Dionysius says. — Saint Thomas declares this by touching upon the threefold union adduced above ¹³, which concurs to love: namely, according to likeness, according to conformity of affection, and according to act. That the last of these is caused by love is evident: because it is proper to friends to rejoice in mutual presence, in living together, and in conversation.

VII. Sixth. In God there is joy and delight. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because love is the principle of every affection; joy and desire are only of the good that is loved, while fear and sorrow concern the evil contrary to the good loved; and from these all the other passions arise.

It must first be noted, from the Prima Secundae, q. xxv, a. 2, and Verit., q. xxvi, a. 5 ¹⁴, that when love is said to be the principle of every affection, this is to be understood according to the order of execution and attainment: for complacency in the good, and the adaptation of the affections to it, precede the movement or rest in it, or even the flight from the opposed evil. But according to the order of intention and of appetition, delight and joy precede love: for delight, when intended, causes love and desire, and nothing is loved except because it is apprehended under the aspect of the delightful.

It must be noted, secondly, that when it is said that all the other passions arise from joy, desire, fear, and sadness, by "desire" hope is understood, as is said in the Verit., where above, ad 1, and in the Prima Secundae, in the question cited above, a. 4, ad 1: for they have a likeness, because each is a passion with respect to a good not yet possessed.

Item, that these four passions are not related to the other principal passions in the same way. For from joy and sorrow other passions arise finally and as completing them simply: for all passions terminate ultimately in joy or sorrow; and joy and sorrow are the rationale of every other passion. Hope and fear, however, are principal in their own genus, because they do not presuppose other passions in their power, namely in the irascible: and they complete the others, which tend toward something else as toward the future. This is to be understood of those which tend per se toward evil or good: for if we were speaking of those which tend toward evil per accidens, namely under the aspect of good, as is anger, then hope would not be last, but rather precedes daring and anger.

But these belong to another matter. For our purpose let this alone suffice: that love is the principal passion in the way of attainment, because it precedes these four passions. Of these, some, namely joy and sorrow, are simply prior to all the others, as the rationes of every act of appetite; others, namely hope and fear, are principal in the irascible power, and among those passions that tend toward a good as future.

2. But a doubt arises. For from this reasoning it can be argued that desire, taken properly, is the principle of every affection. For desire, according to the way of attainment, precedes all those four passions from which the others arise: for the appetite is first moved by desire toward a good before it is brought to rest in it by joy. Therefore, if love is the principle of every affection on this account, then by the same reasoning so is desire.

It is answered, and it is said first that, although desire sometimes precedes joy, it does not necessarily precede it: for joy belongs to a good naturally conjoined, as it is in God, of whom nevertheless there is no desire. Love, however, precedes by necessity: for no one rejoices except from the presence of the thing loved.

It is said second, that it is evident of itself that desire presupposes love: for nothing is desired unless it is loved. Hence desire cannot be the first principle of all affection. The reasoning of St. Thomas must therefore be understood thus: Love is the first origin and the necessary one of those passions from which all others arise; therefore it is the principle of all affection. But it is evident that this cannot be argued of desire: because the antecedent would be false; for desire is not the first and necessary origin of those passions.

VIII. As to the second ¹⁵, since it happens in us that we love one thing more than another, because intensity and remission are found in the act of loving, someone might believe that, although there is love in God, He nevertheless does not love one thing more than another: since intensity and remission are found only in a mutable nature; and His other operations are not said of Him according to more and less; for He does not know one thing more than another, nor does He rejoice in one thing more than another. Therefore, removing this doubt, he says first that there is a difference between love and the other operations, because the other operations are directed toward only one object; but love, taken properly and per se, is directed toward two objects; for to love is to will good to someone, and thus it is directed toward the one to whom we will good, and toward the good which we will to him. But the very good which we will to ourselves or to another we are not said to love properly and per se, but per accidens, because we will it to another: rather we are said properly to desire it. — From this difference follows another: namely, that other actions are said according to more and less in only one way, namely according to the vigor of the action, which is to say according to intensity and remission, when someone acts more effectively upon the object of the operation; but love can be said according to more and less in two ways: either on account of the good which we will to someone, because, I say, we will either a great or a small good to him; or on account of the vigor of the action, according as we will an equal good to someone more effectively or more fervently.

He says, second, that in the first mode God loves one more than another: while he wills a greater good to one than to another. — But in the second mode, not so: since the vigor of an action is measured according to the virtue by which it is performed; and every divine action is of one and the same virtue. And thus there is no difference between love and the other divine operations. For in no way is there found in the divine love intensification or remission, just as neither in his other operations: although he wills a greater good to one and a lesser to another.

2. Concerning what Saint Thomas says, that love alone is borne toward two objects, it must be noted that this is to be understood of love in comparison with those operations of the soul that are formally and properly posited in God, such as intellection and joy, as is clear from the words of Saint Thomas; but not in comparison with the other passions of the sensitive appetite. For, as is said in Prima Secundae, q. 46, a. 2, anger also is borne toward two objects.

Likewise, by what is said—that love alone is borne toward two objects—hatred is not excluded. Rather, it is included: for since they are opposites, it must be that if one is borne toward two objects, the other also is borne toward two.

This must also be understood of love as it is taken completely: namely, insofar as the same act is love of concupiscence and love of friendship. For if it were taken for the love of concupiscence precisely as such, it would not necessarily be borne toward two objects. Hence Saint Thomas says at the place cited above that love and hatred sometimes regard only one object, as when someone is said to love wine or to hate it.

IX. As to the third point ¹⁶, it is proved that there is joy and delight in God by the authority of the Psalm, Proverbs ix, Luke xv, and of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, last chapter. — That love is in Him is proved by the authority of Deuteronomy xxxiii, Jeremiah xxxi, John xvi;

of certain philosophers who posited the love of God as the principle of things; and of Dionysius, chapter 4 of the Divine Names, who says that divine love did not permit him to be without seed.

In God, therefore, nothing among our affections exists properly except joy and love. And even these are not passions in Him as they are in us.

X. As to the fourth, ¹⁷, he says that other passions, which by reason of their species are repugnant to the divine perfection, are said of God in Scripture metaphorically, on account of a likeness of effects or of some preceding affection.

Concerning the second mode, namely that which is on account of the likeness of a preceding affection, it must be noted that the passions which are said of God only metaphorically are in no way said of him with respect to the affection they formally signify, that is, with respect to the very act of appetite they signify, since that act, by its own specific difference, signifies something repugnant to divine perfection. Yet sadness, although it is not posited in God by reason of its proper affection, is nevertheless posited metaphorically, because there is in him some affection similar to the affection which sadness presupposes in us. For we are sad because something happens contrary to those things which we will and approve; and thus sadness presupposes love and willing of the opposite of what happens, which is a certain affection and act of appetite. In a similar way, because God approves and loves something whose opposite happens, and from this has an affection similar to the preceding affection of sadness in us, therefore, on account of the likeness of such an affection, God is said to be saddened.

But a doubt arises. If something happens contrary to those things which God loves and approves, it follows that the will of God is not always fulfilled. But this is false, since it is most efficacious. Therefore, and so on.

It is answered that the consequent will in God is always fulfilled, but not the antecedent will. Hence, what is said here to happen sometimes contrary to those things which God loves and approves—for instance, when someone acts against the divine precept and its prohibition—is to be understood of love and approval as they pertain to the antecedent will: but not as they pertain to the consequent will. For an explanation of this distinction, see Part One, q. xix ¹⁸; I Sent., d. xlvi, a. 1; and Verit., q. xxiii ¹⁹, etc.