Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Having shown what the passions are that must be removed from God, Saint Thomas further shows which ones may in some way be attributed to him ¹.

On this point he does two things. First, he shows that joy and delight befit God. — Second, he makes the same clear concerning love, in the following chapter.

As to the first, he does two things: first, he proves the proposition; second, he shows the difference between joy and delight ².

1. The first conclusion is therefore proved as follows. Joy and delight are not repugnant to God according to their species, and they exist in the will according to their species. Therefore neither can they be lacking to the divine will. — The consequence is evident, because whatever exists in our will must also exist in the divine will, unless it be repugnant to the divine perfection. — The antecedent is proved as regards its first part: because joy and delight, according to their species, are repugnant neither by reason of their object nor by reason of their mode of relating to that object; for their object is a good possessed in act, neither of which is repugnant to God. — As regards the second part it is proved thus: because the object of the sensitive appetite and of the will is the same, namely evil and good as apprehended, although the object of the will is more common than the object of the sensitive appetite, since the object of the latter is good simply speaking, whereas that of the former is good or evil as perceived by sense. But the operations of appetite take their species from their objects. Therefore in the will there are operations similar in species to the operations of the sensitive appetite, differing in this, that such operations in the sensitive appetite are passions, while in the will they are simple operations. Therefore etc.

II. Concerning the first part of the antecedent, it must be noted that, as was said in the preceding chapter ³, by the proper account of a species of passion we understand not the whole that falls within the definition of the passion, but what is posited in its definition as its proper difference, by which it is distinguished from other passions. For thus joy and delight, insofar as they are in the sensitive appetite, although they include passion in their account as a genus (for they are passions of the sensitive appetite), and on this ground are repugnant to divine perfection; yet by reason of their proper difference, by which they are formally distinguished from the genus—inasmuch as they signify the quieting of the appetite in a conjoined good—they are not repugnant to divine perfection, and they are found even in the will. And for this reason they are said, by reason of their species, not to be repugnant to divine perfection.

Concerning the difference between the object of the will and of the sensitive appetite, it must be noted that the object of the will is not called good simply, and that of the sensitive appetite sensible good, as though the will were terminated only at universal good, while the sensitive appetite is terminated at sensible good. For this is false. For just as the intellect understands not only the universal ratio of good but also the ratio of sensible and particular good, so too the will is borne not only toward the universal ratio of good but also toward particular sensible good. Rather, this difference is understood with respect to the formal ratio under which something terminates the act of appetite. For good simply—that is, not limited to any particular ratio of good but taken absolutely—is the object of the will: for whatever participates in the ratio of good can fall under the will. But good not simply, rather contracted to sensible good, is the object of the sensitive appetite: because whatever has the ratio of sensible good can fall under the sensitive appetite, but not whatever participates in the absolute ratio of good. Hence, although the same thing is desired by the will and by the sensitive appetite, nevertheless it terminates the act of the will insofar as it is good absolutely; but the act of the sensitive appetite insofar as it is a certain sensible good.

Concerning that proposition, Appetite regards good or evil, it must be noted, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas Prima, q. xx, a. 1, that good and evil are the proper objects of appetite, but in different ways: for good is the object of appetite principally and per se, while evil is so secondarily and through something else, namely insofar as it is opposed to good. Therefore, when it is sometimes said absolutely that good is the object of the will, this is not opposed to what is said here, that good or evil are objects. For when the question concerns the first and per se object of the will, it must be said that good is its object; but when the question concerns the object both per se and through something else, it must be said that it is good or evil. The same power extends to opposites ⁴: just as sight regards the visible and the non-visible, and hearing the audible and the non-audible, as is said in II de Anima ⁵, but one per se, the other indeed through something else.

It must be noted, however, that the will is related to good and evil in one way, and sight to the visible and the invisible in another. For the will can have a positive act with respect to both: it pursues the good, and it flees and detests evil, by an elicited act. Sight, however, has no positive act with respect to the invisible: for in vision there is only an act of one kind, namely, apprehending its object per se; and this act cannot terminate in the invisible, since sight is not constituted in act by the invisible. But it is said to be per accidens of darkness itself, because from the fact that we cannot be affected by visible things—no defect existing in the power, and the objects being sufficiently present—we judge by some interior power that the air is dark.

III. Concerning the second part of the antecedent ⁶, it must be noted that the passions of the sensitive appetite are not of the same species as the operations of the will: for acts of different powers are not of the same species; since, indeed, powers are distinguished proximately by their acts taken formally, that is, as compared to their formal objects, it is repugnant for powers to be of different species and their acts to be of the same species. And therefore, when it is said that a passion is in the will according to the same specific account, this must be understood not of identity simply, but proportional. For in the will there is an operation of the same account according to a certain proportion with the operations of the sensitive appetite: but not of the same specific account entirely and simply. And similarly it must be understood when they are said to be in God according to the account of their species. For just as wisdom is in God and in creatures according to the same account proportionally, not simply, so too are passions of this kind ⁷.

2. Concerning the proof of the second part of the antecedent itself, a doubt is raised. For it seems to suppose something false, namely that joy and delight are certain operations. This Saint Thomas denies in the Prima Secundae, q. 31, a. 1, ad 1, where he says that when it is said, "Delight is an operation," this is a predication through a cause, not through an essence.

It is answered that operation can be taken in two ways: in one way, commonly, for every act elicited by a power; in another way, for that act by which a power is moved toward its object, which is called the motion of the appetite toward the good, as motion is distinguished from rest. In the first way, delight is an operation, and in this sense the Philosopher calls it such, Ethics VII and X Ethic. ⁸, operation: for it is an act elicited by the appetite. In the second way, it is not an operation but follows upon an operation: for it is not a motion toward the desirable thing, but a resting in the good attained. Therefore what Saint Thomas says in the Prima Secundae, that esse is predicated not per essentiam but per causam, when it is said Delight is an operation, must be understood of operation taken in the second way, and not in the first.

Or it may be said that delight is not that operation which is connatural and delightful to the one desiring; yet it is an operation of the appetite accompanying such a connatural operation. The first sense was intended in the Prima Secundae, but the second in this passage.

IV. Second. God is most at rest in himself, since he possesses all sufficiency in himself. Therefore he rejoices and delights most in himself. — The inference is proved: because joy and delight are a kind of resting of the will in its object willed.

It must first be noted that the appetite is said to be quieted by the attainment and presence of a good, because toward that good it is no longer moved by desire, but is satisfied by its presence. Now, the greater the good that is possessed, the more it satisfies the appetite, so that one desires fewer things thereafter. And therefore, where the good possessed has in itself all perfection and sufficiency—as is the divine good—it satisfies the appetite totally, so that nothing else is desired any further. And from this God has it that his good is most delightful to himself: because, since he is the highest and most perfect good, there remains in his appetite no movement of desire toward acquiring another good, but he rests in himself most perfectly.

It must be noted, secondly, that delight can be called rest and motion in different ways. For if the order of the appetite to the good is considered, it has the character of rest. Just as a thing in motion, when it has reached its terminus, comes to rest, so the appetite, having obtained the good it desired, rests: and to rest in this way is to delight. If, however, the order of the appetible to the appetite is considered, then it is a kind of motion: for the appetite is moved by the good present and conjoined. Therefore Saint Thomas says in the Prima Secundae, cited above ⁹, ad 2, that it is rest, when the presence of the delightful object is considered: but it is motion, insofar as there remains an alteration of the appetite from the appetible.

From this it is clear that delight is called the rest of the appetite in a different way than rest is said of bodies. For in bodies rest signifies only the negation of motion and signifies nothing positive formally. But the rest of the appetite in a good possessed signifies an act of the appetite together with the negation of further inquiry: for after the one desiring has the good he sought, he is no longer moved by appetite to seek it, but delights in the good attained. And this act by which he delights is called rest because it occurs with the cessation of the motion of execution by which the one desiring was tending toward the acquisition of the end. In God, however, such rest is posited not insofar as it is the terminus of an appetite tending toward an end to be acquired, since such a motion of appetite is not in God, but by reason of its perfection, inasmuch as it is a certain quieting of the appetite in a good possessed.

V. Third. God has the most perfect operation in understanding. Therefore, just as our understanding is delightful because of the perfection of its operation, so God's understanding will be most delightful to God. — The consequence is proved. Because delight is a certain perfection of operation, as is said in Book X of the Ethics, chapter IV.

How delight perfects the operation by way of a completing good supervening, and by way of an agent indirectly, namely insofar as one who takes delight in the work operates more diligently and attentively: see Saint Thomas, Prima Secundae, q. 33, a. 4.

Fourth. Every good is a likeness of the divine goodness, and nothing of any good is lost to it. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because each thing by nature rejoices in what is like itself, as being suited to it; unless the opposite should occur per accidens, insofar as it impedes its own advantage.

VI. As to the second point ¹⁰, because St. Thomas is seen to use the names gaudii and delectationis indifferently, lest deception arise on this account, he shows how they are distinguished. And he says that they are distinguished by reason, if each is taken properly: for delight arises from a good really conjoined, and is concerned only with a good conjoined; but joy is concerned with something external, and the mere quieting of the will suffices for its definition.

But it seems that St. Thomas here contradicts what is said in the Prima Secundae, q. 31, a. 3. For there he holds that delight is a species of joy, and that every joy is a delight, but not conversely; here, however, he seems to hold the opposite. For either joy is understood to be about exterior goods only, or about both the good conjoined and the exterior good. If in the first way, then they are related not as inferior and superior, but as divided from one another as opposites. If, however, in the second way, joy will be superior to delight: for every delight will be a joy, since delight is only about the good conjoined, whereas joy is about this and about the exterior good; but not every joy will be a delight, since joy about the exterior good is not a delight, according to what is said here.

To make this evident, it must be considered that in this passage Saint Thomas compares delight and joy insofar as each is found only in the will, namely insofar as they name the simple operation of the will without passion. And when he says that joy is about an exterior good, it is not to be understood that it is about the exterior good alone, but that it is both about a conjoined good and about an exterior good: by which it is distinguished from delight, which is about a conjoined good only. That this is indeed the meaning of Saint Thomas's words is clear from what he subjoins, namely: God properly delights in himself, but rejoices in himself and in others: for if joy were about an exterior good only, he would not rejoice in himself and in others.

We may therefore speak of delight in two ways: either insofar as it is a common notion applying both to the delight that is a simple operation of the will and to the delight that is a passion of the sensitive appetite; or insofar as it is found in the will alone, namely when it names the rest of the will in the good. If it is taken in the first way, it is thus something higher than joy, and joy is a species of it, according to Avicenna in his book On the Soul ¹¹: because joy is found only in beings possessing reason, being a delight consequent upon reason; whereas delight is found also in brute animals, in whom there is no joy. And in this way St. Thomas spoke in the Prima Secundae. — But if it is taken in the second way, then joy is higher than delight: because it concerns both a good conjoined to us and a good external to us, whereas delight concerns only the conjoined good. And in this way he understood it in this place. — Hence there is no contradiction.

But what is said in the First Part of the Second Part, question 32, article 5, that the actions of others are for us a cause of delight, must be understood of delight taken in a general sense, insofar as it contains joy under itself; not, however, of the delight which is contained under joy, of which we said this passage is speaking.