Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas had treated of the divine intellect and will, he now treats of the passions and the virtues¹. In regard to this he does two things: first, he treats of the passions; second, of the virtues, in chapter XCII. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he deals with those things that are removed from God; second, with those things that befit him, in the following chapter. — He treats first of the passions and then of the virtues, because the objects of certain virtues are the passions; but one must treat first of the objects.

On the first point he does two things: first, he shows that no passion belongs to God by reason of the genus, that is, according to the formal character of passion; second, he shows that some are removed from him also by reason of his proper species².

As to the first, it must be noted that by the name "affections" Saint Thomas understands the passions themselves, as is clear from the Prima Secundae, q. 22, a. 2³. Hence, when he says that in God there are no passions of the affections, this is an intransitive construction, and the sense is that in Him there are no passions of the appetite, which are a kind of affections. Now the passions of the appetite are called a kind of affections in contrast with the passions of intellect and sense, which are mere receptions and not motions and inclinations toward a thing, which is what the name "affection" conveys.

I. It is proved, therefore, first, that no passion, insofar as it is a passion, can befit God, thus. According to the intellectual affection there is no passion, but only according to the sensitive affection, as is said in Physics VII, text 18. Therefore there is no passion in God: for in Him there is no sensitive affection, just as neither sensitive cognition.

It must be noted, from the Prima Secundae, in the place cited above⁴, and from De Veritate, q. xxvi⁵, that passion properly so called is found only where there is bodily transmutation. For passion properly names the reception of one thing with the rejection of another through motion; and since to be moved belongs to bodies, therefore in the act of the intellective appetite, because it is not the act of a bodily organ, there is no passion, but only in the act of the sensitive appetite. Hence even the motions of the sensitive appetite itself are defined with some bodily transmutation: for anger is said to be the heating of the blood about the heart⁶.

Second. God is not a body, nor a power in a body. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because every affective passion occurs by way of some bodily transmutation.

Third⁷. It is not possible for God to be in any way drawn outside his natural disposition, since he is altogether immutable. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because in every affective passion the one undergoing it is drawn somewhat outside his essential condition⁸ or connatural disposition; hence animals die from their intensity.

II. But here a doubt arises that must not be passed over. For an essential condition is said to be one which follows upon a thing's essence; and a connatural disposition is said to be one which follows upon the principles of a nature. Now, while the essence and the natural principles remain, what follows upon the essence cannot be removed: otherwise it would not follow necessarily from the essence. Therefore a passion cannot draw someone outside his essential disposition except by corrupting it. Therefore what is said here is false, namely, that the one undergoing the passion is drawn outside his essential condition.

It is answered that a condition can be called essential in two ways, and likewise a connatural disposition. In one way, because it follows of necessity from the essential and natural principles: as being capable of laughter is a connatural disposition and essential condition of man. In another way, because it accompanies the essence always, if the thing is left to its own nature and no impediment intervenes: as having two hands is connatural to man. The first kind of essential condition cannot be removed from the thing while the subject remains: for no agent whatsoever can remove being capable of laughter from a man. But what is called essential or connatural in the second way can be removed by some impediment or extrinsic agent: for something can be a man and yet not have two hands. It is in this second way that Saint Thomas intends to speak of an essential condition. Hence, when he had said that the patient is drawn in some way outside its essential condition, lest anyone think he was speaking either of the principles of the essence or of what follows of necessity from such principles, he added, as it were explaining what he had said, or connatural disposition, as if to say: I call an essential condition every connatural disposition, that is, what follows the nature of a thing left to itself with every impediment removed. Now this happens in some way in every passion. For either the body grows warm from the motion of the appetite or grows cold, or the heart contracts or dilates, beyond the customary course of its nature. He says, moreover, that the patient is drawn in some way, and not simply outside its natural and essential condition: because it is not altogether deprived of its natural disposition, but only in some part; when, for example, it is either intensified or diminished beyond its usual state.

III. Fourthly ⁹. The divine will is not determined in itself to one thing with respect to creatures, but by the order of the divine wisdom. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because every affection that exists by way of passion is borne determinately toward one thing according to the mode and measure of the passion: since passion has an impulse toward something single, just as nature does; and for this reason it must be restrained and regulated by reason.

2. Concerning this proposition, the passion has an impulse toward something one, just as does nature, a doubt is raised. For only that which can be borne and directed in diverse ways is fittingly restrained and regulated by reason. On this account the operation of the nutritive power is not regulated by reason, because it is determined to one thing. But, as is said here, the passion must be regulated and restrained by reason. Therefore it is not determined to one thing. And so Saint Thomas seems here to contradict himself.

3. For the clarification of this point, it must be considered, as in the Questions on Truth, q. 25, a. 1 and 4, that the natural appetite is determined to one thing in one way, and the animal appetite in another. For the natural appetite does not follow upon any apprehension on the part of the appetent thing, but upon a natural form; and because a natural thing is determined in its esse, therefore such an appetite is toward one determinate appetible object. Hence, once the form is posited and impediments removed, the act follows: just as, when gravity is posited in a heavy body, downward motion follows, if the heavy body is outside its proper place and is not impeded. — The animal appetite, however, follows upon the apprehension of sense. And because sense can apprehend something as suitable and as harmful, and sometimes apprehend nothing as suitable or as harmful, therefore such an appetite is not determined to one appetible object of itself, nor does it always issue into act once impediments are removed; but if something is apprehended as pleasurable and suitable, it is borne toward it of necessity; and conversely, if it is apprehended as harmful to sense, it necessarily flees it. In this it differs from the rational appetite, which is not determined to one thing except with respect to the end, however much something be proposed to it as good and useful.

From this it is clear that the natural appetite is determined of itself to one thing; but the animal appetite is not determined to one thing unless an apprehension is presupposed, by which something is proposed to it under the aspect of its proper object. And because, as is said in the Prima Secundae, q. 17, a. 7, sensitive apprehension in man is naturally subject to the regulation of reason, since it is itself particular while reason is universal, just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal power; therefore the very motion of the sensitive appetite too is naturally regulated by reason; namely, so that a certain mode and limit be imposed upon it by reason judging that it ought thus to be desired—for instance, that vengeance ought to be desired in such a way and not otherwise. The passion, then, is determined to one thing by the apprehension by which something is judged delightful and fitting, or evil and harmful. — To that also, considered in itself, it tends with its whole force: since it naturally tends toward everything delightful and naturally recoils from everything sorrowful. Thus anger, considered in itself and absolutely, tends with its whole force toward vengeance: and therefore, lest it be vicious, it is necessary that reason impose some boundary upon it. And it is similar with the other passions.

To the doubt, therefore, it is said first that the likeness between nature and passion is to be taken only with respect to determination to one thing, but not with respect to the mode of determination. For both nature and passion are indeed determined to one thing, yet in different ways: for nature is determined to one by a natural form, whereas passion is determined by the apprehension of sense, or even of reason.

It is said second, that a determination to one thing arising from apprehension can be checked and regulated by reason. And it can be related to that one thing in diverse ways: namely, according to its whole impetus, if the apprehension of sense is not commanded by reason; and according to some limitation, if the apprehension itself is regulated by reason. But a determination to one thing arising from form does not need to be regulated by reason in order to be good: because of itself it is not subject to reason.

IV. As to the second ¹⁰, it is shown that certain passions are removed from God even by reason of their proper species: namely, by their proper difference, by which each is placed in its own species and distinguished from another passion. And six conclusions are set forth.

The first is: Sadness and sorrow are not in God. It is proved. Their object is evil already inhering, just as the object of joy is a good present and possessed. But this does not befit God. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For, since every passion receives its species from its object, such a passion as has an object incompetent to God is removed from him according to the account of its proper species.

2. The second is: Hope or desire is not in God. It is proved by supposing that the account of the object of any passion is taken not only from good and evil, but also from the fact that someone is in some way related to one or the other of these. From which it follows that, if the manner of being related to the object of a passion does not befit God, then the passion itself is removed from him as well. Then thus: the object of hope and desire is a good, not indeed obtained or possessed, but to be obtained or not possessed. But this cannot befit God, since his perfection is so great that nothing can be added to him. Therefore, and so on.

But a doubt arises. For one hopes not only for good for oneself, but also for one's friends. Therefore, although nothing can be added to the divine goodness and perfection, yet since something can be added to a creature, there could be in God hope whereby He would hope that a creature would obtain something.

It is answered that hope, which is a passion of the sensitive appetite, extends only to the good of the one hoping, since the good of the sensitive appetite is what is pleasurable and fitting according to sense. But hope, which names an act of the will, can also extend secondarily to the good of another, insofar as through love someone is united to another, as is said in the Second Part of the Second Part, q. 17, a. 3. Nevertheless, even taken in this way, hope cannot be in God: because hope properly regards a good that is future even with respect to the one hoping; but nothing is future for God. — If, however, anyone wished to take the name of hope more broadly, namely for that act of the will by which one wills for another a good future for him with certainty, then it would not be unfitting to say that God hopes for our beatitude. But this would be an abuse of words.

It must be noted, however, that hope, insofar as it can be about things pertaining to another—that is, about the outcome of some thing—is not about the very outcome of another's good except insofar as it is reckoned as a good for the one hoping, as is said in III Sent., d. xxvi, in the exposition of the Text ¹¹ Therefore, since nothing of goodness can be added to God, it can in no way be said that there is hope in God. For this reason Saint Thomas, in order to show that there is no hope in God, adduced only this as his reason: that nothing can be added to the divine perfection.

3. The third is: Fear is not in God. It is proved. First, because its object is an evil that can befall one. But in God there is no potentiality for evil. — Second, because fear exists only in one who exists in potency.

4. The fourth is: Repentance is not in God. It is proved: first, because it is a species of sadness; second, because it implies a change of affection. Neither of these is in God.

5. The fifth is: Envy is not in God. It is proved. First, because it is a species of sadness. Second, because one is saddened over another's good. Neither of these is in God. — The second is proved as follows: someone is saddened over another's good insofar as he takes the other's good to be an evil for himself. But this cannot be in God. First, because no one's good can be an evil for him, since He is the universal good; and from a particular good nothing is lost to the universal good. Second, because that which is good simply and is not an evil for itself cannot apprehend it as an evil, since His knowledge is without error.

It must be noted that the universal good can be taken in two ways: namely, by universality of predication, and by universality of perfection. And of both it is true that nothing is removed from it by any particular good whatever. For the universal ratio of what is predicable is not destroyed or made imperfect by particular ratios: for it is not because man is an animate, sensible, rational substance that it is removed from animal that it is an animate, sensible substance. For this participation of the common in the particular is not by separation or removal of any part from the universal itself, but by the communication of its whole ratio to the particulars themselves. And because the universal according to perfection contains in a certain way whatever the universal according to predication contains, therefore by the particular that participates the universal nature nothing is taken away from the universal, but only its likeness is communicated to the particulars according to their mode: just as, if there were a universal man separate in the manner of a Platonic idea, particular men would participate that universal man, not by detracting some part from him, but by receiving his likeness according to their condition. So also fire communicates its species to other things without diminution of itself. Therefore other particular goods participate in the universal good, which is God, inasmuch as they bear some likeness of it; yet nothing is subtracted from that universal good by the particular goods.

6. The sixth is: Anger is not in God. It is proved. First, because it is an effect of sadness. Second, because it is an appetite for another's evil for the sake of vengeance. For anger is an appetite for vengeance on account of a sadness conceived from an injury inflicted. But both of these are removed from God. — The first indeed is clear from what has been said above. — The second, however, is proved. Because to desire evil happens from this, that evil is judged to be good. But this cannot befit God.

It is concluded from all of this that, by the same reasoning, whatever other passions are or are caused apart from these must be excluded from God.