Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has treated of the divine will insofar as it is will, he now treats of it insofar as it has the character of free choice ¹.

And this conclusion is put forward: In God free choice is found.

I. It is proved first as follows. God does not will things other than himself by necessity. Therefore, etc. — The inference is proved: because free choice is said with respect to those things which one wills not by necessity but of one's own accord.

It must be considered, for the clarification of this argument, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 5, that something is related to free will as belonging to its very concept; whereas something else belongs to it insofar as it exists in some nature. For it belongs to the concept of free will that it be able to order itself to diverse objects directed to an end. But to be able to act for good or evil does not belong to the concept of free will; rather, this belongs to it insofar as it is found in a nature capable of defecting. Similarly, that one wills something and afterwards its opposite through a change of will belongs to it insofar as it exists in a nature mutable in some way. Therefore, when Saint Thomas wishes to show that there is free will in God, he assumes only what belongs to the concept of free will, namely, that one is not necessitated to this or that, but can will this or that in relation to an end. For this belongs most eminently to God: since no creature has any necessary relation to His goodness, which is the end.

II. Second. The divine will, in those things to which it is not determined by nature, is inclined in a certain way by the intellect, as was said above, chapter LXXXI. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because man is said to have free will for this reason: that he is inclined to will by the judgment of reason, not by the impulse of nature as brute animals are.

It must be noted that, since the account of free choice consists in this, that it can be directed toward diverse things, and since animal appetite follows upon cognition, in order that appetite may be able to tend toward diverse things, cognition and judgment concerning the desirable must extend to many things. Now this is proper to intellect and reason, for in brute animals the judgment is fixed by nature. Hence it is rightly said at this point that man is of free choice in that he is inclined to will by the judgment of reason. Therefore, as was said above ², according to the mind of St. Thomas, Verit., q. xxiv ³, the root of liberty is in reason, though formally it is in the will. Wherever, then, the inclination of the will follows not nature but the judgment of the intellect—which is to be inclined through the intellect, as is found in God with respect to creatures—that inclination is free and pertains to free choice.

III. Third. God, with respect to himself, has only will, but with respect to other things he has choice. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved: because will is of the end, as is said in Book III of the Ethics, chapter 7, ⁴; but choice is of the things that are toward the end. — The consequence is also proved: because choice is always made through free judgment.

Concerning that proposition of Aristotle, Will is the end, note that will is not taken here for the power, but for the act of will, as is said in the Prima Secundae, q. viii ⁵: for that act of will which is simply and absolutely called willing is properly with respect to the end. Although sometimes we also say indiscriminately of every act of will that it is willing: but this is an improper usage. For the act denominated from the power is its simple act. Now a simple act is one that is terminated at the per se object of the power. But the end is the first and per se object of the will. Therefore that act is properly called willing, or will, which is terminated at the end.

2. Concerning that proposition, Choice is always made through free will, a doubt arises. For, as is said here, choice concerns those things that are toward an end. But many things are toward an end which we do not will freely, but with the same necessity by which we will the end: such as those things without which the end cannot be had. Therefore choice does not always pertain to free will: unless we say that free will inclines to something necessarily, which is repugnant to its definition.

To make this evident, it must be considered that, since choice implies a certain separation from other things, and separation occurs only among things that are mixed together, choice properly concerns things that are mixed and alike, when one of them is preferred to the others. Therefore, where there is only one means ordered to an end, there is no choice with respect to it: but the reason for willing the end and that which is toward the end will be one and the same, and likewise the necessity. Where, however, an end can be reached by many means, there can be choice with respect to each of them. Similarly, all things necessary to the end—namely, without which the end cannot be had—have the character of a single means; and with the same necessity they fall under the will along with the end, if they are known to be necessary. And there is no choice among them: for what is necessary cannot be preferred to others, because it does not agree with them, which are merely useful, but is separated from them of itself in the character of being ordered to the end; for it itself is necessary, while the others are useful.

That proposition, therefore, is universally true: Choice always pertains to free will; for choice concerns those things that are not ordered to the end by necessity, and hence that one thing is accepted in preference to another arises from the freedom of the one willing the end.

From this it also becomes clear that the proposition, Election is of those things that are for the sake of an end, must be understood of contingent things: not, however, of things necessary to the end, for these do not fall under election, their necessity being known, but under the willing of the end. Hence every election is indeed of things that are for the sake of an end; yet not all things ordered to an end fall under election. And so, since creatures have a contingent, not a necessary, order to the divine goodness, it follows that all created things fall under the divine election, and consequently under God's free choice.

IV. Fourth. God is most fully the master of His acts, since His act does not depend on another. Therefore, and so on. — The consequence is evident. For a man is called master of his acts by the fact that he has free will.

It is confirmed from the meaning of the name. For that is called free which is the cause of itself, as is said in Book I of the Metaphysics. But this belongs to no one more than to the first cause.

It must be noted that when God is said to be the most sovereign lord of his own acts, this is understood not with respect to the substance of the act, since the act is as natural to him as his essence; but it is understood with respect to its termination upon objects. For God's producing this or that creature lies in his freedom; yet the very substance of active production is his by nature and is not subject to his freedom—unless one were to say in a negative sense that the substance of his acts belongs to him freely and of himself, because it belongs to him from no other, just as things natural to creatures are bestowed on them by another.