Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Having shown that we can assign some reason for the divine will, he shows that on this account it is not necessary to posit any cause of it ¹.

Here it must be noted that it is one thing to say that something is a reason of the divine will, and another to say that something is a cause of the will itself. For when we say that there is some reason for it, we understand that on the side of the thing willed there is some cause answering the question by which one asks why this is willed, and which is the cause of the thing willed itself, from which it has what it has by way of order toward the divine will; for the reason for willing, on the side of the thing willed, is grounded in the thing willed. But when we say that there is some cause of the will itself, we posit that the very act of the will depends upon some cause: just as, when we say that knowledge of first principles is the cause of knowledge of conclusions in us, we understand that the very act by which we know conclusions is caused by the act by which we know principles. This, however, is impossible in God. Therefore Saint Thomas indeed grants that there is some reason for the divine will, but denies that there is any cause of it.

I. And he proves this by the following argument. The end is the cause of willing for the will. But the end of the divine will is its own goodness, and not anything of others. Therefore it itself is for God the cause of willing, and not anything of others. But that goodness is also his very act of willing. Supply: Therefore not even that goodness is really the cause of the very act of willing, since nothing is the cause of itself.

He then adds two points. The first is that one of the things other than God is the cause of another in such a way that it has an order to the divine will. And thus God is understood to will one of those other things on account of the other.

The second point is that from these considerations it is evident that no discursus, that is, no succession of one act causing another, should be posited in the divine will. For God wills His own goodness and all other things by a single act, since His action is His essence: but where there is one act, no discursus is to be considered.

II. It must be noted that the divine goodness is indeed, according to our way of understanding, the cause of the divine will: because it is the end; and the end, in our case, moves the will toward the things that are for the sake of the end. In reality, however, it is not its cause, since it is not really distinct from the act of willing. Therefore, when he had said that goodness is the cause of willing, he immediately added, which is also his very own willing, as if to say: When I say that it is the cause, I do not mean according to real causality, since it is identical with the very act of willing, but only according to our way of understanding.

It should also be noted that the mind of St. Thomas is to prove that nothing other than God is a cause of the divine will, even according to our way of understanding, since nothing other than God is the end of the divine will, although one created thing may be the end of another created thing; but not that it has no cause at all of itself, at least according to a way of considering it. Therefore, once it is granted that the divine goodness is in some way a cause, it suffices for his purpose to show that other things willed are not its cause.

It must be considered further that even in us the volition of the end is a cause of the volition of those things that are ordered to the end only when we will the end absolutely by one act, and the things ordered to the end by another act. For when we will both by one and the same act, then the volition of the end is not a cause of the volition of the things ordered to the end, because the same thing is not a cause of itself. Nevertheless, the willed end is the reason for willing that which is ordered to the end. On account of this, because God wills himself and other things by a single act, the volition of himself cannot be a cause of the volition of others.

III. From these things the error is excluded of those who say that no reason must be given for anything God wills, except because God wills it.

This error is also removed by Sacred Scripture, which declares that God made all things according to the order of His wisdom, as in the Psalm and Ecclesiasticus 1. Ecclesiasticus

It must be noted that the first effects of God depend on the divine will alone, as is said in the First Part, q. 19, a. 5 ²; but other effects depend on other causes. Therefore for those first effects no created reason can be assigned: thus for the production of the universe there is no reason except that God willed to manifest and communicate his goodness, which belongs entirely to the divine will. But for other effects a created reason can be assigned. For God willed man to have hands so that they might serve the intellect by performing various works. Therefore it is false that all things depend on the simple will of God, and that nothing has any reason except that God willed it. Rather, it must be said that divine wisdom is the rule of the divine will; and that therefore God willed thus because through his wisdom this is ordered to that, and ordered such that this should be; in accordance with what is said in De Veritate, q. 23, a. 6.