Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Against the said conclusion some argue ¹: first, because it follows from it that God's will is toward either of two alternatives and contingent, and consequently in potency. — Second, because it follows that God's will would be variable ². — Third, because something unnatural would be in God ³. — Fourth, because it follows that either God wills nothing, or He is determined by something to one alternative, and thus has something prior to Himself ⁴.

I. But to the first of these, Saint Thomas responds that to be able to be either of two can belong to a virtue in two ways: in one way, on its own part; in another way, on the part of that to which it is said. On its own part, when it has not yet attained its perfection, by which it would be determined to one. On the part, however, of that to which it is said, when the perfect operation of the virtue depends on neither, and yet it can be either: just as someone can use different instruments equally to accomplish the same work. These two modes differ, however, because the first redounds to the imperfection of the virtue and shows potentiality within it itself: as is clear in the doubting intellect, which has not yet attained the principles by which it would be determined to one of two opposites. The second mode, however, does not pertain to the imperfection of the virtue, but rather to its eminence, insofar as it exceeds being able to be either of the opposites.

It is granted, therefore, that the divine will is indifferent to either of two alternatives; yet, because this indifference belongs to it not on the part of itself, but on the part of things other than itself, it does not follow that there is in it any potentiality.

Concerning this response, note that the divine will's being indifferent with respect to things other than God is nothing other than its not being determined in itself more to their being than to their non-being: so that, just as it wills those things to be, it can, absolutely speaking, will them not to be, or not will that they be. Now this indifference does not follow from potentiality and imperfection of power, as happens in causes lacking the complement of the form by which they act; rather, it follows from the independence of the end from the things ordered to the end. For whether those things exist or do not exist, the divine goodness, which the divine will wills most perfectly, is perfect in itself; therefore the divine will, being most perfect of itself and willing the divine goodness most perfectly, can—insofar as it comes from itself—will the being of a created thing, and will its non-being, and not will its being. And thus, on account of its eminence, it is indifferent toward many things.

II. To the second⁵ he responds that the divine will does not pre-accept one of two opposites without necessity in such a way that it is considered in potency toward either, so that it would first will both in potency and afterward will one in act; rather, it always wills in act whatever it wills, since there is no potentiality in the divine will: but because what is willed has no necessary order to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will—just as we call enunciables not necessary but possible when there is not a necessary order of the predicate to the subject. Hence, when it is said, God wills this caused thing, this is an enunciable that is not necessary but possible: not as "possible" is said according to some potency, but as possible is said of what is not necessary to be nor impossible not to be, as the Philosopher teaches in book V of the Metaphysics; just as a triangle's having two equal sides is a possible enunciable.

From these considerations Saint Thomas intends to deny the consequence, namely, that it would follow that God's will is variable. For variability and change follow upon real potency, not upon logical potency, which is what is at issue here.

It is also confirmed by the authority of 1 Kings 15, where it is said: The Triumpher in Israel will not be turned by repentance.

2. From this response it can be gathered that our will is said to be "to either of two opposites" in one way, and the divine will in another. For our will, with respect to certain things, is related to either of two opposites both because it does not have a necessary relation to them, and because it is in potency to willing either of two opposites, at times actually willing neither of them. The divine will, however, is related to either of two opposites only by reason of the first, namely because it does not have a necessary relation to the things willed; but not by reason of the second, because it is never without act with respect to one of the opposites, such that on that account it could be said to be in potency to either of two opposites. Hence our will both is a potency related to either of two opposites, and is in potency to either of two opposites. The divine will, however, is indeed a potency related to either of two opposites, because for the character of such a potency a non-necessary relation to each of the opposites suffices; but it is not in potency to either of two opposites with respect to caused things, as is said here, because for such being in potency it is required that it not be in act with respect to one of the opposites; which does not befit the divine will, which is always in act, determined to one of the opposites. — And these things are to be noted most carefully, because they serve for many purposes.

III. To the fourth⁶ he responds before responding to the third⁷, because of the dependence of its solution upon the preceding solution. He denies the consequence: for it does not follow either that God wills nothing, or that He is determined by something external. For it is said first that, since the known good determines the will as its proper object, and the divine intellect is not extraneous to His will, since each is His essence: if the divine will is determined through the knowledge of the intellect, the determination will not be made by anything extraneous.

It is said second that, since the divine intellect apprehends other goods as likenesses of the divine goodness and essence, and not as its principles—as if they were causes of the divine goodness, as medicine is the cause of health—the divine will tends toward them as fitting to its goodness, not as necessary for it. Therefore it does not tend toward them necessarily. This is also apparent in our own will.

IV. Concerning this response there is doubt in several ways. First, because to be determined belongs only to what exists in potency. But the divine will is not in potency, as was said⁸. Therefore it is not determined by anything.

Secondly⁹, because Saint Thomas, in the First Part¹⁰, in answering this argument, says that the divine will determines itself. Therefore it is not determined by the intellect, as is said here.

Thirdly¹¹. If the will is determined, that determination comes from a known object: as Saint Thomas seems to concede. But the known objects to which it is determined are other things than God. Therefore it is determined by something extrinsic. Nor does it avail to say that it is determined by the first thing willed, which is its goodness. For with respect to its own goodness it is necessary and does not need a determinant; but with respect to other things it is free and needs a determinant. Then also because things ordered to an end draw the will to themselves insofar as they are known, and thus determine it.

V. To the first of these it is said first that to be determined belongs not only to what is in potency, but to anything indeterminate in itself and related to either of two alternatives. Yet, according to the diverse mode of indetermination and of being related to either alternative, there is also a diverse mode of determination. For if something is indeterminate in the manner of matter and passive potency, and is related to either alternative on the side of its power, such a thing must be in potency and be determined by some extrinsic agent. But if it is indeterminate in the manner of a free agent, related to either alternative on the side of that to which it is said, such a thing need not be in potency nor be determined by anything extrinsic, but can determine itself by reason of its liberty. Now in this way the divine will is indeterminate and related to either alternative. Therefore there is no need to posit in it any real potentiality, but only logical potentiality, which imports merely a possible relation of terms.

It is said, however, second, that although the divine will is not determined by anything effectively, it is nevertheless determined by something formally, namely by the intellect presenting the object to the determinate will. But neither is it necessary that according to this mode it be ever in potency: for just as the divine will is eternal, so also the intellect determining it; hence there never was a will which was not determined by it.

Therefore that proposition, "To be determined belongs only to a being in potency", is not universally true.

2. But a doubt still remains. For although the act of the divine will is determined from eternity on account of the eternity of the one determining it, and thus the divine will is never in potency, nevertheless any form whatever, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, is related to that of which it is the form as act to potency: just as, if a form were produced in matter from eternity, it would be related to it as act to potency. Therefore everything determined by something formally must have some potentiality in it. Since, then, no potentiality is posited in the divine will, it follows, as before, that it is determined by nothing.

It is answered that, where the determining and the determined have no real distinction between them, neither by reason of nature nor by reason of actual existence, what is determined has no potentiality in itself: and especially when such indetermination does not follow upon a real potentiality but only a logical one, which signifies non-repugnance. Such is the case in God. For the intellect that determines the divine will is entirely the same in reality with the will, distinct from it by reason alone; and the divine will is said to be indeterminate in itself, not because it has real potentiality toward diverse things, but because neither of two opposites repugns to it. Therefore it can be determined without potentiality.

3. But then another doubt arises. For if it is said that God can will either of two opposites by logical power only, and not by real power, then there will not be in God a real power of the will directed toward either of two opposites.

It is said that the esse in God of a power of the will with respect to opposites can be understood in two ways: in one way, that there is in God that thing which is called the volitional power of the will for opposites; in another way, that there is in Him a potentiality of the will toward opposites. If it is taken in the first way, the consequence is denied. For in God, who always wills in act whatever He wills, there is that power which we call will in ourselves, by which He has an absolute indifference to either of the opposites. — But if it is taken in the second way, the falsity of the consequent is denied. For although there is will in God, yet no passive potentiality is said to be in God: rather it belongs to Him that neither of the opposites is repugnant to Him as something secondarily willed.

VI. To the second ¹² one can reply in two ways. First, that the mind of St. Thomas is that the will is not determined by anything extrinsic and really distinct from itself, but determines itself: that is, it is determined by something that is not really distinct from it. Nor does this conflict with its being determined by the intellect, since the divine intellect is really identical with the divine will.

Second, that he speaks there of the effective determinant: because the argument was about such a determinant. For the mind of the Commentator, Physics II, ¹³, whose authority is adduced in that place, is that the contingent in either direction requires some agent by which it is determined. Thus it must be among natural agents, of which he was speaking there, which are contingent of themselves. In this way, then, it is true that the divine will is not determined by another, since it is a free agent and is necessary of itself: but it determines itself in the manner of an efficient cause, or of one producing the act toward such a determinate object. But the present discussion concerns the determinant by way of specifying and proposing the object as to be willed. For this pertains to the divine intellect.

VII. To the third doubt ¹⁴ it is said that, since the will is borne by one and the same act toward the end and toward that which is for the sake of the end, the operation takes its species from the end itself, which is willed principally, and not from that which is ordered to the end, which is willed secondarily. For when someone wills a bitter draught for the sake of health, he is said to will health absolutely, but the draught only in a certain respect. And since there is nothing else by which the object of the will determines the will itself than its act's being specified, in the way in which that species can belong to it, therefore such an act is not determined by that which is for the sake of the end, but by the end itself. And so, since God wills himself and other things by one and the same act, the divine will is not determined by other things, but by himself and his goodness, which is the end.

When, however, it is urged in the first place that the divine will is necessary, not free, with respect to its own goodness: — it is said that, although the act of the divine will is necessary in relation to the divine goodness, it nevertheless requires knowledge of the object, since the will is borne only toward a good that is known; and thus it requires the intellect presenting the object. Hence the divine will has no necessary order to goodness except with its knowledge presupposed.

When it is urged in the second place that things ordered to an end also draw the will to themselves insofar as they are known: — it is replied that they do not draw the will of themselves, but by reason of the end for the sake of which they are desired; for a bitter draught does not draw the appetite of the sick man to itself except by reason of the health desired in it.

It is said, however, that if to determine the act of the will is nothing other than to terminate, whether primarily or secondarily, the act itself—which is to be in some way willed—then it is not unfitting to say that created things determine the divine will. But if determining the act is taken as the same as giving species to the act, which is properly to determine, then in no way should it be said that other things determine the divine will.

VIII. To the third argument ¹⁵ Saint Thomas responds by denying the consequence. For, since by one and the same act God wills himself and other things, his relation to himself is necessary; but his relation to other things is according to a certain fittingness, and is neither necessary nor natural, nor violent or unnatural, but voluntary.

But then a doubt arises. For either that relation precedes the act of the will, or it follows and accompanies it. If it precedes, then it is natural and necessary: because everything that is in God as preceding the act of the will is understood as natural. If it follows, it is also natural: because to an act terminated at some object there necessarily and naturally follows a relation to such an object; just as, given one white thing, there naturally follows a relation of similarity to a co-white thing. Therefore the relation of the divine will to the things willed is altogether natural. The opposite of this is said here.

It is answered that this relation follows the act of the will, but does not precede it. Yet it is said that, when a relation follows upon some foundation, it is called a relation absolutely natural with respect to that which is related when its foundation, precisely as foundation, is natural to the thing; but it is not called natural to the thing from the fact that it naturally follows upon the foundation: just as the likeness of some thing to white is natural to the thing which is naturally white, but not to the thing which is made white by art, although the likeness to whiteness naturally follows upon it. Hence a relation can be called natural in two ways: namely, either according as it is compared to the thing which is related; or according as it is compared to the foundation. In the first way, for a relation to be natural it is necessary that its foundation be natural to the thing which is related; but not in the second way. Therefore the relation of the divine will to the things willed, if it be compared to the divine will itself, is not natural: because its foundation, as such, is not natural but voluntary, namely the very act of willing as terminated to the things willed; for although the divine willing is necessary in itself, yet that it be terminated to creatures is voluntary and free. But if it be compared to its foundation, namely to the act of willing terminated to creatures as to secondary objects, thus it is natural. And it can be said to be natural to the divine will ex suppositione: for supposing that he wills creatures, he necessarily has a relation to them. Now Saint Thomas here speaks of this relation as compared absolutely to the will: not as it is compared to the act of willing creatures, or to the will as existing under such an act.