Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

But since from these considerations it might seem to someone that God also wills other things by necessity, since he wills other things by willing his own goodness, therefore in the second place Saint Thomas shows that the will of God is not of things other than himself by necessity ¹.

On this point he does two things: first, he shows the truth of the conclusion; second, he responds to certain objections ². As to the first, he does two things: first, he proves the conclusion; second, he removes a certain doubt ³.

I. The first conclusion is therefore proved as follows. Divine goodness can exist without other things; indeed, nothing accrues to it through others. Therefore there is no necessity that it will other things on account of the fact that it wills its own goodness. — The consequence is proved: because the will is not borne necessarily toward those things that are for the sake of an end if that end can exist without them. This is proved from the action of a physician with respect to a sick person. Now the divine will is directed toward other things as ordered to the end of its own goodness. Therefore, and so on.

For the evidence of this argument it must be considered that, since the end is the whole ground of willing that which is for the end, insofar as it is ordered to the end, then only do both the end and that which is for the end fall under the same necessity of the will, when there is a necessary relation between the end and that which is for the end. But this is when the end cannot be and be had without that which is ordered to it: thus [because] a ship is necessary for crossing the sea, therefore one who wills to cross the sea necessarily wills a ship. But when such a relation is not necessary, then the will can will the end and yet does not necessarily will that which is for the end: thus one who wills health does not of necessity will that medicine without which health can exist.

It must be considered, second, that something can be necessary to an end in two ways. In one way, because the end simply and absolutely cannot be without it: and such a thing is said to be absolutely necessary to the end. In another way, because, although the end can be without it absolutely, it cannot nevertheless be well and completely without it: and such a thing is said to be necessary not absolutely, but for the well-being and complete perfection of the end. In the first way we say that food is necessary to an animal for the preservation of life; in the second way, however, we say that a painter is necessary to the construction of a house.

Since, therefore, nothing created is necessary to the divine goodness—neither, I say, with respect to being simply, nor with respect to well-being—for this reason Saint Thomas said that the divine goodness can be without other things, and that through other things nothing accrues to it.

2. But a doubt arises concerning this argument. For, if the divine will is for other things as ordered to its own goodness, as is said here, it follows that it wills other things on account of its own goodness, as on account of an end. But no one can will something on account of an end unless, while willing the end, he simultaneously wills what he wills on account of the end. Therefore God cannot will his own goodness unless he wills other things. And thus, contrary to the intention of the argument, it follows that God wills things other than himself of necessity.

It is answered that the end can be considered in two ways: in one way, with respect to its entity absolutely, from which it has that it is desired or loved for its own sake; in another way, as it is compared to that which is ordered to the end under the aspect of a final cause. And thus the will can will the end in two ways: in one way, absolutely, willing its perfection for its own sake; in another way, willing it under the aspect of a final cause of other things. Therefore, when Saint Thomas says that there is no necessity that God will other things from the fact that He wills His own goodness, he is speaking of the volition of His goodness absolutely, insofar as it is divine goodness, but not insofar as it exercises the causality of an end. Yet this stands together with the fact that, by willing that goodness itself under the aspect of a final cause, and as He wills other things as ordered to it, then necessarily, in willing His goodness, He wills things other than Himself. But this necessity is ex suppositione, namely from the supposition that God wills things other than Himself on account of His goodness as on account of an end. This Saint Thomas does not intend to exclude by this argument, but only absolute necessity.

II. Second. God can will that any creature other than himself not be. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. The will, according to its very nature, cannot will that only that good not be, with whose non-existence the entire account of good is destroyed. But no such good exists apart from God. Therefore there is no being which the will, according to its very nature, cannot will not to be, except God. Therefore God can will that any other thing besides himself not be. — The antecedent is proved. For, since the good as understood is the object of the will, whatever is conceived by the intellect in which the account of good is preserved can be an object of the will. Hence, although that something not be is an evil, it can nevertheless fall under the will by reason of some accompanying good that is preserved, though not of necessity. For it is a good that something be even when another does not exist: that is, the non-being of something does not necessarily destroy the account of good. If, therefore, something could not will that a thing not be, it would have to be that in that non-being the account of good is in no way preserved. — But the final inference is evident. For the will is in God according to its whole capacity, namely with respect to every perfection it signifies, since in him all things are universally perfect.

It must be noted that non-being, taken in itself, cannot have the character of good: since the character of good is founded in being, as was shown above ⁴. And therefore it cannot fall under the will of itself. But because it happens that non-being is joined to some good, as the non-being of the sheep's life is joined to the lion's; therefore it can fall under the will per accidens, or by reason of something else, insofar, namely, as the good to which it is joined falls under the will. Now what Saint Thomas adds, though not of necessity, can be referred to two things. Namely, to what he had said immediately before, so that the sense would be that non-being can fall under the will by reason of an accompanying good which is preserved, even though that good is not preserved of necessity if the non-being of another thing is posited. For although this determinate good is not joined of necessity to the non-being of another thing, yet if it can be so joined, nevertheless by reason of that good non-being can fall under the will. — It can also be referred to what he had said, that non-being cannot fall under the will, so that the sense would be that non-being can indeed fall under the will by reason of some accompanying good, yet it cannot fall under the will of necessity, as though, namely, willed necessarily: since it neither states the formal character of the object of the will nor has a relation to a necessary end, because it is a non-ens, and consequently is in itself outside the character of the good and the appetible. And this pleases me more.

III. Third. It would follow that God would will infinite creatures to participate in his goodness in infinite ways. But this is false: for then they would be infinite, since his will is the principle of being for things. — The consequence is proved. God, in willing his goodness, wills things other than himself insofar as they participate in his goodness. But since his goodness is infinite, it is participable in infinitely many other ways than it is in fact participated. Therefore, if from the fact that he wills his goodness he were to will of necessity those things that participate in it, it would follow that he would will infinite creatures.

Concerning the proof of the minor, it must be noted that Saint Thomas does not wish to infer that there would be infinitely many creatures simultaneously, if God willed infinitely many creatures: for, although God now wills finite creatures, it does not follow that all of them exist at once. Rather, he wishes to establish only that there would be infinitely many creatures absolutely, whether successively or simultaneously, according to the disposition of the will. This is false according to the faith, which holds that generation will at some time cease, along with the production of subsistent things, and consequently that infinitely many creatures will not exist even successively.

2. But concerning the very process of reason a doubt arises. For someone might say that God, in willing his goodness, wills of necessity all creatures to be produced through him, but not creatures capable of being produced and able to participate in his goodness. And thus it does not follow that he wills infinite creatures to be.

It is answered that it necessarily follows that he wills infinite creatures. For those things which you say are willed by necessity are either willed by God of necessity insofar as he wills his own goodness, as participations of that goodness; or insofar as by divine wisdom they are ordered to be produced and to participate in the divine goodness. If in the first way, since one thing's relation to the divine goodness is not more necessary in itself than another's, for the same reason that he wills necessarily this participation of his goodness, he will will all such things: for one, as such, does not have more the character of something willed than another. And thus it follows that he wills infinite things. If in the second way, then these things will not be willed of necessity except upon supposition of a disposition of the divine intellect. And thus they will not be willed of necessity absolutely, which is how we here speak of what is willed of necessity, but only ex suppositione. — In the first way, therefore, Saint Thomas drew out the consequence: not in the second way.

IV. Fourth. The will of the wise, precisely because it is concerned with the cause, is concerned with the effect that follows from the cause of necessity, as is clear in the case of one who wills the sun to be above the earth and the brightness of day; but it is not necessarily concerned with an effect that does not follow from the cause of necessity. Yet other things proceed from God not by necessity, as will be shown below. Therefore it is not necessary that God will other things because He wills Himself.

Concerning that proposition, the will of the wise man, because it is of the cause, is of the effect which follows from the cause of necessity, it must be noted that Saint Thomas said the will of the wise man: because the will of the fool could be of the cause and not of the effect. — It must also be understood as concerning one who considers that the effect follows necessarily from the cause: since the will is not directed toward what is unknown. For if someone did not know that the effect follows necessarily from the cause, it would not be required that, in willing the cause, he will the effect. But if he sees that the effect follows necessarily from the cause, and he is wise, then it is necessary that, if he wills the cause, he also wills the effect.

V. Fifth. Things proceed from God as artifacts from an artisan. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. For although the artisan wills to possess his art, he does not will to produce artifacts out of necessity.

Note that Saint Thomas seems to compare the divine goodness to an art: just as a craftsman indeed wills to possess his art, yet does not necessarily will on this account to produce the artifact—indeed, with the art remaining in place, he can will not to produce the artifact—so God indeed wills to have His goodness, yet does not necessarily will other things because He wills His own goodness.

This comparison, however, is not to be taken as though divine goodness concurs in the production of things in the manner of an art: for this is not true, since art concurs by the mode of a formal cause, whereas goodness does so by the mode of a final cause, or of a formal cause to which it is ordered. Rather, this comparison is to be taken on the side of the effect itself. For divine goodness is not the end of creatures in such a way that it might have esse through them, but rather, on the contrary, so that things may participate in it and take on some likeness of it; just as artifacts are certain likenesses of an art, so things other than God are certain likenesses of the divine goodness. Hence the divine goodness stands to the art of the divine intellect as an exemplar form to the concept which the craftsman forms within himself concerning that very form, so that he may produce an effect resembling that form. For the divine intellect conceives within itself the diverse modes in which creatures participate in the divine goodness, and according to these the diverse grades of creatures are produced. From this, then, it follows well that, just as a craftsman can will his art without necessarily willing to produce artifacts, so God can will his goodness without necessarily willing things other than himself: because the effect of each is a certain participated likeness of its cause, though not according to the same ratio of causality.

VI. As to the second ⁵, Saint Thomas removes a certain doubt. For he understands from this that God wills things other than Himself of necessity. For just as, because He wills Himself, He wills other things, so, because He understands Himself as understanding, He understands other things. But He understands other things of necessity in understanding Himself—speaking, namely, of the knowledge of simple intelligence, as was said above ⁶. Therefore He wills other things of necessity in willing Himself.

But he responds that the case is not the same for the intellect and the will. For God understands because the intellect is related to things in a certain way: for the fact that something is actually understood means that its likeness exists in the one understanding. But that one who wills wills something is due to the willed thing being related in some way: for we will something either because it is an end, or because it is ordered to an end. Now the divine perfection necessarily requires that all things exist in God, so that they may be understood in Him; but the divine goodness does not necessarily require that other things exist which are ordered to Him as to an end.

VII. Concerning this reply, doubt is raised in two ways. First, because the difference posited between the one understanding insofar as he understands and the one willing insofar as he wills does not seem to be true. For just as the one willing wills from the fact that the thing willed is somehow disposed, so the intellect understands from the fact that the thing understood is somehow disposed—namely, from the fact that it is in the intellect through its likeness, as is said here.

Second, because the division of the willed assigned here does not seem sufficient, namely: we will something either because it is an end, or because it is ordered to an end. For it is clear that we will something neither as an end nor as ordered to an end: as when at times we will knowledge not as an end, because we desire it while desiring nothing on account of it; nor as ordered to an end, since we can desire it for its own sake and not by reason of its ordering to something else. Similarly God, speaking absolutely, could will only his own goodness: and then he would not have willed it as an end, since he would have willed nothing on account of it; nor as ordered to an end, since it is the most perfect of all beings. Therefore, etc.

2. To the first it is said that Saint Thomas is speaking of the mode of the thing in itself. For the willing thing is borne toward the thing willed, not because the will is made actual by some disposition, but because the thing willed is of such a nature in itself: namely, that it is either an end, or useful to an end, or in any way orderable to an end. But the understanding being understands by this, that the intellect is disposed and made actual by the likeness of the intelligible, and not by this, that the intelligible is so constituted in itself—although it is required that it be somehow present in another, according to another esse than the esse which it has in itself.

To the second it is answered that every good is either an end or ordered to an end by its nature; but because there can be many subordinate ends, one of which is ordered to another, it happens that something is an end only, as the divine goodness; something is ordered to an end only, as bitter medicine; and something stands in a middle way, namely both an end with respect to certain things and, with respect to another, ordered to an end, as health. Hence it is necessary that every good be either an end or ordered to an end; and in either way, either simply or in a qualified sense. But it must be noted that two things belong to an end: namely, that it be desirable on its own account, and that other things be desirable on account of it. The first belongs to it insofar as it is a good, possessing in itself sufficient desirability. The second belongs to it insofar as it is the cause of those things that are toward the end. But because something can be a cause and yet not actually cause, it happens that something has a goodness on account of which other things can be desired, and yet nothing is desired on account of it; and thus that it be an end and yet not actually exercise the causality of an end. It is said, therefore, that every good is either an end or ordered to an end, insofar as every good is either desirable on its own account and that on account of which other things can be desired, or desirable on account of something else; but not such that every good either is what is actually desired on account of something else, or is that on account of which something else is desired in act. — In this second sense, however, the objection proceeds. Therefore it is not against the intended meaning.

VIII. But against the conclusion of this chapter an argument can be drawn from the doctrine of Saint Thomas. For in the First Part, q. 19, a. 2, he says that it belongs to the nature of the will that the good which one has be communicated to others, insofar as this is possible; and from this he proves that God wills things other than himself. Then thus: What belongs to the nature of the will belongs necessarily to the will. But to communicate the good that one has belongs to the nature of the will. Therefore the divine will necessarily communicates its good. Therefore God necessarily wills.

To the first objection one may reply that "reason" is not taken there in the sense of definition, but of a condition of a certain fittingness and propriety. For the sense is that it pertains to a certain propriety and fittingness of the will that it should will to communicate the good of the willing one to others. That this is the sense intended by Saint Thomas is evident, because at the end of that determination he concludes that God wills things other than himself insofar as it befits the divine goodness that other things also participate in it.

Second, it can be answered that "reason" is certainly taken there for definition; but the sense is not that it belongs to the definition of will that one who has a good should communicate it to others; but rather that to what has the character of will, or to what is willing according to its own nature, it befits in its own way to communicate its good, namely voluntarily and freely, just as natural things communicate in their own way, namely naturally.