Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas had determined concerning the divine will on the side of the object, he now determines concerning it with respect to the condition of willing ¹. In regard to this he does two things: first, he treats of the necessity of willing; second, of causality, chapter LXXXVI. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he treats of absolute necessity; second, of necessity ex suppositione, chapter LXXXIII. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he treats of the necessity of willing with respect to God as willed; second, with respect to other things, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he posits this conclusion: God of necessity wills His own esse and His own goodness, nor can He will the contrary.

It is proved first. It is impossible for God not to will something in act: for then he would be willing only in potency, and consequently a being in potency, since his willing is his esse. Therefore it is necessary that he will his esse and his goodness. — The consequence is proved. Because in everything willed he wills his esse and his goodness, just as sight in every color sees light: for he wills his esse and his goodness as the principal object, which is for him the reason for willing other things.

Note that this argument concludes that God wills himself of necessity with respect to the specification of the act, because in everything willed he wills himself. It supposes, however, that he wills himself necessarily with respect to the exercise of the act, because he is not a potential willer.

2. But then a doubt arises. For it was possible, speaking absolutely, that God should not have willed creatures to be: for he could have not produced them. Yet this would have posited no imperfection or potentiality in God. Therefore, if he also did not will himself, there would be no potentiality in him. Either, then, one must say that it is possible for God to will nothing in act: the opposite of which is stated here. Or one must say that he actually wills everything willable by him. Which is false: just as it is false that he produces everything producible.

It is answered that it is one thing to say, This is not willing absolutely, and another, This is not willing with respect to this. For someone to be simply not willing is for him to have no act of will at all simply; but to be not willing with respect to this is not to be wholly lacking an act of willing, but not to have an act of willing terminated to this. In the first way, then, God cannot be said to be not willing, because this would posit imperfection and potentiality in a thing whose nature is to will: but his will of necessity has an act of willing; and, since his goodness is for him the reason for willing other things, it is altogether necessary that he will his own goodness, for every act of will is terminated first to the reason for willing. In the second way, however, it is not unfitting for God, speaking absolutely, to be not willing: because, since this imports nothing other than that the act of the divine will does not have a relation of reason to this, which nevertheless it could have absolutely, it would posit no imperfection in God.

Hence, if we were to suppose that God had not willed a creature to exist, no imperfection would on that account be posited in him, nor any real potentiality, but only liberty would be posited in the divine will itself, and the absence of a certain respect of reason. If, however, we were to suppose absolutely that God does not will his own goodness, it would follow that God is simply in potency as willing and lacks the perfection of the act of willing: for, if he did not will his own goodness, which is the proper object of his will, he would have no act of willing at all. — Hence the argument does not follow.

II. Second. God wills Himself to be as the ultimate end. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because anyone who wills, of necessity wills his ultimate end: just as man, of necessity, wills his beatitude and cannot will misery.

Concerning this proposition, Man wills his beatitude of necessity, it must be known, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas ², that it is to be understood of beatitude taken according to the universal notion of beatitude, and not according to its proper notion. — Likewise, with respect to the specification of the act, but not with respect to its exercise. For if the will elicits an act concerning beatitude in general, that act will be willing, and cannot be nilling: for no one can will not to be happy. Yet nevertheless the will can have no act at all concerning beatitude: as each one experiences in himself de facto.

III. Third. The intellect assents of necessity to the first principles of speculation. Therefore the will adheres of necessity to the ultimate end. Therefore, if there is no other end for the divine will than itself, it wills of necessity that it be. — The consequence is proved: because the end stands in relation to appetitive powers just as the indemonstrable principle does in speculative matters. — This argument is a confirmation of the preceding one.

Fourth. All things, insofar as they are, naturally love their esse in their own way. Therefore God does too, because all things, insofar as they are, are assimilated to God. Therefore He necessarily loves Himself, because His nature is to be of itself necessary.

Fifth. To love God is the highest perfection of a rational creature, since by it the creature is in a certain way united to God. Therefore it exists in God essentially and of necessity. — The consequence is evident, because every goodness and perfection that exists in creatures belongs to God essentially.

Concerning this proposition, To love God is the highest perfection of a rational creature, note that, according to the exposition of some, it holds true in the wayfaring state: for in this life the love of God is nobler and more worthy than knowledge of God, according to that saying of the Apostle, I Cor. xiii ³, If I should know all mysteries and have all faith, but have not charity, I am nothing. But it is otherwise in the fatherland, where the vision of the divine essence is the whole essence of beatitude. Yet even in the fatherland love in some way excels cognition. Of this, however, there will be fuller discussion in the third book ⁴.