Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After St. Thomas had determined concerning secondary volitions in general, he now determines concerning certain of them in particular ¹.

I. And he sets down this conclusion: God also wills those things that are not. Now Saint Thomas does not prove this conclusion; rather, he brings forward objections against it and solves them one by one, leaving from their solution that the conclusion is true and proved. Now concerning this he does two things: first, he sets down the objections; second, he responds to them ².

As to the first point, there are two things that create difficulty concerning this conclusion. One is that, since relatives must exist simultaneously, and willing is said by way of a comparison of the one willing to the thing willed, it seems that no one can will things that do not exist.

The second ³ is this: God cannot be called Creator, Lord, and Father except of things that are. Therefore, by a similar argument, he cannot will except things that are.

From which it follows that God wills nothing that is not eternal, since the divine willing is immutable.

II. As to the second, Saint Thomas responds, and he does two things: first, he rejects a certain false answer; second, he gives the true answer ⁴.

Some, therefore, said in reply to these objections that although certain things are not in themselves, they are nevertheless in God and in His intellect; and thus God wills non-beings—namely, insofar as they are in Him.

Against this response, that it is insufficient, Saint Thomas argues in two ways.

First. It follows that God does not will non-beings otherwise than as they are in himself, or in his intellect. But this is not what those who discuss this question intend; rather, they hold that God wills them to be in themselves. Therefore, and so on. — The inference is proved: because a willing agent is said to will something insofar as that thing is referred to what is willed. If, therefore, the divine will is referred to a non-being only as it is in God and in his intellect, it follows that he wills it to be only in God and in his intellect.

Second. The divine intellect understands not only that the good exists in itself, but also in its own nature. Therefore, the will is related to what is willed in the same way. — The consequence is evident, because the will is related to the thing willed through its object, which is the good as understood.

2. Concerning that proposition assumed in the first reprobation, According to this, anyone willing is said to will something because his will is referred to the thing willed, it must be noted that this can have a twofold sense. One sense is that the relation of the one willing to the thing willed is for him the reason why he wills, taking "relation" to mean the respect alone. And this sense is false. For it is not from the relation that the one willing has it that he wills; rather, on the contrary, because he has an act of willing directed toward the thing willed, there follows his relation to it. — Another sense can be that from the act by which the will inclines toward the thing willed, and to which there consequently accrues a relation to it, the one willing is said to will something. And this sense is true, and this is what was intended. For the one willing is said to will something because his will is inclined toward the thing willed by an elicited act, upon which the relation of the one willing to the thing willed is founded. From which it follows that, if the will is inclined toward the thing willed only insofar as it has esse in the intellect, then the one willing wills it to be only insofar as he has it in the intellect.

Concerning the second argument, it should be noted that when Saint Thomas says that the will is related to the thing willed through its object, he does not mean to exclude the thing willed from the object of the will, as though the thing willed were not the object of the will, for this involves a contradiction; rather, he means to distinguish the thing willed from the formal object of the will. For the very thing willed is the material object; but what I call the understood good is the formal object. And because a power is not terminated at the material object except as it stands under the formal notion, therefore it is said that the will is not related to the materially willed thing except through the understood good; that is, except insofar as it has the notion of an understood good.

It should also be noted that at this point he makes no difference between the intellect and the will with respect to being compared to a thing as it is in itself, although above ⁵ he posited a difference between them in this respect. For, as was explained there ⁶, with respect to that which terminates materially the relation of the one understanding and of the one willing, the intellect does not differ from the will: for the intellect understands a thing with respect to the esse which it has outside the one understanding, and likewise the will wills a thing according to the esse which it has in itself. And this is how Saint Thomas speaks here. — But with respect to that which is the reason for terminating the proper relation of each, they do differ. For the esse which a thing has outside the intellect, or in itself, is not the reason why something is actually understood and terminates the relation of the one understanding as understanding; rather, it is the esse which it has in the soul. But the esse of a thing in itself is for it the reason why it is willed and terminates the relation of the one willing as willing. And this is how he spoke above. Hence there is no contradiction.

III. This false answer having therefore been set aside, Saint Thomas gives the true one ⁷. For to the first objection he replies that, since the relation consequent upon apprehension is to the thing not only as it is in the intellect but also as it is in itself (although at that time it exists only in the intellect), because the one apprehending apprehends its esse precisely as it is in itself, inasmuch as he apprehends not only that it is being understood—which is for it to be in the intellect—but also that it is, or was, or will be; so too it must be that the relation of the divine will to non-beings is not only as they are in God knowing them, but also as they are in their own nature according to some time; for willing follows the mode of apprehension.

2. But this argument does not seem to satisfy the objection. For by it no answer is given to the proposition taken from Aristotle, namely, Relatives must exist simultaneously: from which it follows that there cannot be a relation of one willing unless toward an existing thing.

It is said that from what St. Thomas says here it follows that the proposition assumed is false, if it is understood of the very things that are denominated relatively, which are also called relatives materially. For things that are said relatively need not exist simultaneously; indeed, there can be a relation of an existing thing to something that does not exist in itself. — But if it is understood of relatives formally, that is, of the relations themselves, then those must exist simultaneously. For one relation cannot be without its opposite also being; nor can one thing be referred to another without that other being in some way referred to it.

3. But, since every relation requires a foundation, there remains the doubt as to how relations can exist, and yet the relative things not exist simultaneously.

It is answered that a real relation requires a real and existing foundation; therefore there cannot be real relations without there also being in act relative things and foundations of the relations. But a relation of reason does not require a real foundation existing in nature; it suffices that it be in apprehension, just as the habitude itself has esse only in apprehension. Therefore, since the habitude between a being and a non-being—such as the habitude of one understanding and willing a non-being—is a habitude of reason, it suffices that the thing understood and willed be in the intellect. Hence Saint Thomas says here that although this known thing is only in the knower, nevertheless the relation consequent upon apprehension is to it as it is according to its own nature, not as it is in the knower, as if to say: The relation is indeed to the esse of the thing in its own nature, but it suffices that the thing itself, its own nature, and its esse, for this present now of ours, be in the intellect.

IV. To the second ⁸ he responds that the relation of the one willing to the thing willed is not like the other cases adduced. For to will is an immanent action, and therefore it can be terminated in that which does not actually exist outside. But to make, to create, and to govern signify an action terminated in an external effect, without whose existence such an action cannot be understood.

Note the difference between immanent and transitive action: by an immanent action, insofar as it is immanent, no effect is produced in external matter; but by a transitive action some effect is produced. And since action is not productive of its proximate effect completely and perfectly unless the effect comes to be through it, such an action can exist only with respect to a thing now existing; and the relation that follows upon that action is only toward a thing having esse. For this reason Saint Thomas says that an action of this kind cannot be understood, namely to be in nature, without the existence of the thing, that is, unless the thing itself is understood to be. But since immanent action does not produce an extrinsic term, therefore for its esse a term need not exist. Nor does the relation that follows upon that action require that its term be among things in nature. Indeed, the immanent action itself can be understood even given that its term is not in act. Not so making or creating, which are signified in the manner of transitive action.