Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

In the second place, Saint Thomas determines the manner in which the will holds itself ¹.

And he posits this conclusion: God wills other goods not only in a certain universality, insofar as he wills himself to be the principle of the goods that can flow from him, but also in particular; nor does this conflict with his simplicity.

It is proved first. To will is according to the comparison of the one willing to the thing willed. But divine simplicity does not prevent God from being able to be compared also to many singular things, since he is said to be the best and the first even with respect to singular things. Therefore, etc.

Second. Not only the totality of goods, but also each single good receives its goodness from the divine goodness, just as it receives its esse. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For the divine will is compared to other things insofar as they participate in the divine goodness.

Third. God wills the good of the order of the whole universe in itself, and the good of the order of the universe according to its parts with respect to one another. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident, because the good of the order consists in the individual goods. — But the antecedent is proved as follows: God, from the fact that He wills Himself as the end, wills other things that are ordered to Him as to their end; and this pertains to the first order of the universe. And consequently He also wills the second order, because that second order exists on account of the first, as is stated in Book XII of the Metaphysics, text 52.

Note that Saint Thomas says that God, from the fact that He wills Himself as He is the end, wills other things which are ordered to Himself: because the causality of an end, as was said above ², consists in this, that other things are desired on account of it. Hence, if God willed Himself absolutely, but not as a final cause, He would not will other things on account of Himself. But because He wills Himself under the aspect of a final cause, therefore He also wills other things on account of Himself.

Fourth. If God does not will the individual goods of which the universe consists, the good of the order of the universe will be a matter of chance. But this is impossible, because the other posterior things would be a matter of chance all the more. — The consequence is proved. It is not possible for any part of the universe to compose all the particular goods into the order of the universe. Therefore, if a universal cause, which acts through will, does not compose them, that order will be a matter of chance.

Fifth. God also knows particular goods: namely, by practical intellect. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For a good understood, insofar as it is such, is willed.

It is confirmed, however, by Genesis in the first chapter, where upon each of the works the complacency of the divine will is shown, when it is said, God saw the light that it was good, and so with the other works; and afterwards concerning all of them together, God saw all that He had made.