Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has determined concerning the secondary objects of the divine will, he now determines concerning the mode of willing them¹. And first, on the side of the one willing; second, on the side of the thing willed, chapter LXXVIII.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he determines the manner of willing itself; second, he draws one corollary from it, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, the following conclusion is proposed: God, by a single act of will, wills himself and other things.

It is proved first. God wills all other things for the sake of Himself, as for an end. Therefore, by one act He wills both Himself and other things. — The consequence is proved. Because the end is related to that which is desired only on account of it, as the formal reason is to the object. But a power, by one act, is directed toward the object and toward the formal reason of the object: just as by one act of seeing we see light and color, which becomes actually visible through light.

Note that when Saint Thomas said that, when we will something only on account of an end, it takes the character of the willed from the end, he therefore added only, because what is directed to an end can be desired in two ways: namely, in itself, and in relation to the end; just as sweet medicine can be desired both insofar as it is sweet and insofar as it contributes to health. When it is desired by reason of its own goodness, it does not have the character of the willed from its ordering to some other end; but only then, when it is desired as useful and ordered to an end.

Note also that Saint Thomas sometimes speaks indeterminately about the effect of light: as in the Prima, q. 79, a. 3, ad 2, where he reports both the opinion holding that light is required for sight in order to make colors actually visible, and the opinion holding that light is required so that the medium becomes actually luminous, which seems to be the Commentator's², and according to each he explains his own thesis. Here, however, he accepts the first opinion, which he also seems to hold in De Veritate, q. 8, a. 14, ad 6, and I Sent., d. 45, a. 2, ad 1. According to that opinion it would have to be said that color, although in darkness it is actually color, is nevertheless not in sufficient act to move the diaphanous by a spiritual motion, and for this reason it is not actually visible. Hence to be visible in potency and fundamentally does indeed belong to color in the second way per se³; but to be actually visible according to complete act does not, for this is completed by its being actually illuminated, so that from light and color there is made one object of sight, in which the light is the formal element and the color the material object; and the light seems to be terminated to the colored body, which without a terminated body could not be seen in this way, in accordance with what is said in De Veritate, q. 14, a. 8, ad 4. — Yet it could be said that Saint Thomas neither here nor elsewhere says that light is required on account of colors as though he followed that opinion; rather, on the supposition of that opinion, he wishes to establish that sight is borne by one act to the color and to the light; for if light is required on account of color, it is related to it as the formal to the material.

II. Second⁴. In every act by which God wills himself, he wills himself and other things for the sake of himself. But he wills things other than himself only insofar as he wills himself. Therefore etc. — The minor has been proved in the preceding chapter. — The major, however, is proved as follows. One must not posit any act of God as willing by which he wills himself and by which he does not will himself perfectly, since in him there is nothing imperfect. Therefore, in willing himself, he wills himself according to his whole power. Therefore, he wills himself and other things for the sake of himself in every act by which he wills himself. The first consequence is proved: because what is known and desired perfectly is known and desired according to its whole power. The second is proved: because the end has the character of an end not only insofar as it is desired in itself, but also insofar as other things become desirable on account of it.

III. But concerning this process a doubt arises. For from it it seems it could be proved that God necessarily and absolutely wills things other than himself, the opposite of which is shown below⁵. For it will be argued thus: God necessarily wills himself perfectly; therefore he necessarily wills himself according to his whole power; therefore he necessarily wills other things on account of himself. — The antecedent is evident, because nothing in him can be imperfect. — The first consequence and the second are proved from the same propositions by which they were proved here in the propositions de inesse: the first indeed because what is desired perfectly is desired according to its whole power; but the second because the power of an end is such that through it other things are desired.

It is answered that the argument of St. Thomas concludes excellently for the thesis. Nor can it be argued from the course of the argument itself that God wills things other than himself with absolute necessity, but rather well with necessity ex suppositione: which necessity St. Thomas concedes below⁶ to be found in the divine volition with respect to things other than himself. For this argument supposes that God wills things other than himself on account of himself as on account of an end: which was shown in the preceding chapter. And consequently it supposes that the divine goodness exercises the causality of an end with respect to creatures. And from this supposition it wishes to show that by one and the same act he wills both himself and other things. Now from these suppositions it follows that God wills things other than himself with necessity ex suppositione: but not with absolute necessity. For if we suppose that God exercises the causality of an end in creatures, it necessarily follows that God wills himself as exercising the causality of an end: and consequently that he necessarily wills things other than himself. But because that supposition is not absolutely necessary—for God does not necessarily exercise the causality of an end; for he could have willed from eternity not to produce anything, and thus not exercise the causality of an end, whereby other things are desired and made on account of him—therefore God does not will things other than himself with absolute necessity, but freely.

Hence, to the argument adduced: with the first consequent understood concerning the power of God in respect of its exercise and actual causality, the consequence is granted as necessary ex suppositione, but denied as absolutely necessary. — And to the proof, the assumption is denied concerning power in respect of its exercised act. — Likewise, if the first consequent is taken in the sense in which it is granted, the final consequence is granted as necessary ex suppositione, but denied as absolutely necessary. Nor does the assumption prove the consequence as absolutely necessary, but only as necessary ex suppositione.

But if the first consequent is understood of the virtue of the end with respect to the signate act and the first act, then the first consequence is granted even of absolute necessity; but the last consequence is denied. In proof of this it is said that the virtue of the end, taken in this way, is not such that other things are actually desired on account of it, but such that other things can be desired on account of it: just as the virtue of the agent, with respect to its first act, is not such that something is produced through it, but such that something can be produced through it.

IV. But this reply seems to suffer some difficulty. For if that consequence, God necessarily wills Himself perfectly, Therefore God necessarily wills Himself according to the whole of His power, holds as regards its exercised act and its actual causality, on the supposition that God exercises the causality of an end in creatures, but does not hold without that supposition, it follows that something pertains to the perfection of the divine volition on some supposition which does not pertain to its perfection without that supposition. — From this, moreover, it further follows that some perfection which now belongs to the divine volition can, absolutely speaking, fail to belong to it: since the condition now supposed, namely that God exercises the causality of an end in creatures, could absolutely speaking not have been. And thus not every perfection befitting God is absolutely necessary, but some is merely possible. This is against what was determined in the preceding sections ⁷.

To this it can be answered that something can pertain to the perfection of the divine volition in two ways: in one way, intrinsically, namely on the part of the act of willing in itself; in another way, extrinsically, namely on the part of the object willed. If we speak of what pertains intrinsically to the perfection of the volition, then the consequence is denied. For since the act of divine volition is one with respect to all things willed by God, and is identical with the divine essence, however much it be supposed, by some supposition, to extend to some aspect of the thing willed to which it would not extend if that supposition were not made, for this reason the act itself does not have in itself any perfection it would not have if that supposition were not made; rather it always remains of the same intrinsic perfection, just as the divine essence always remains of the same perfection in itself, however much it may be understood to vary in some way according to diverse aspects of reason. — But if we speak of what pertains extrinsically to the perfection of the volition, then there is no incongruity in something pertaining to the perfection of the divine volition upon a supposition being made which, if that supposition were not made, would not pertain to its perfection. For this is nothing else to say than that the perfection of the divine volition has, upon a supposition being made, a relation to some object, or to some aspect of an object, to which, that supposition being removed, it would not have such a relation. Just as, if we suppose God to have determined himself to produce another world, it pertains extrinsically to the perfection of the divine knowledge that it be extended to this determination of God; but this supposition not being granted, it does not pertain to the perfection of the divine knowledge that it have a relation to this determination.

But when it is urged that then some perfection which now belongs to the divine volition could absolutely fail to belong to it, and thus not every divine perfection would be absolutely necessary — I say that none of these is more unfitting with respect to a perfection belonging to something extrinsically than that the relation of the divine will to creatures could absolutely fail to belong to it and not be absolutely necessary.

V. Third ⁸ If he willed himself and other things by one act and then by another, there would be a certain discursive movement in his will. But this is not in God, since he is beyond all motion. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved as follows. The end stands in relation to things to be done just as principles stand in relation to things to be contemplated: for just as we know conclusions through principles, so from the end proceeds the appetite and the operation of those things that are toward the end. But there is discursus in the intellect because principles are known separately and we arrive at conclusions from them. Therefore, if someone were to will the end separately and, on account of it, will those things that are toward the end, there would be a discursus of the will there.

Note that, although discourse properly belongs to reason, nevertheless improperly and by a certain similitude discourse can also be posited in the will, insofar as in the will itself there is posited a succession of operations of which one is the cause of another.

Fourth. It would follow that two acts would be simultaneously present in the divine will. This is impossible: for in one simple power there are not simultaneously two operations, namely wholly distinct ones. — The consequence is proved. Because God always wills Himself.

Fifth. It follows that there will be something else moving the divine will. — The consequence is proved. Because in every act of will, the thing willed is related to the will as mover to motion. This is to be understood of the first and per se thing willed by some act: as would befit things other than God, if God were to will other things not by willing himself, but separately and apart.

Sixth. God's esse is only one. Therefore also His willing: for God's willing is His esse.

Finally. He understands himself and other things in one act, insofar as his essence is the exemplar of all things. Therefore he wills himself and other things in one act, insofar as goodness is the ratio of all goodness. — The consequence is evident. Because willing belongs to God inasmuch as he is understanding: namely, concomitantly and consequently ⁹.