Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Having shown that it is the principal object willed by the divine will, Saint Thomas further shows that there are also certain secondary objects willed by it ¹. Concerning this he does two things: first, he treats of the secondary objects in general; second, in particular, of certain of them, in chapter LXXIX.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he treats of the objects themselves; second, of the manner of willing them, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, the following conclusion is proposed: God, in willing himself, wills other things as well.

It is proved first. God wills himself as the ultimate end. Therefore he also wills other things than himself, in willing himself. — The consequence is proved: because whoever wills the end also wills those things that are ordered to the end, on account of the end.

Second ². Each thing willed by God for its own sake desires perfection and multiplication as far as possible, since we wish the things we love for their own sake to be the best. But the divine essence is willed by God for its own sake. Now it is not augmentable and multipliable in itself, but only according to its likeness, which is participated by many things. Therefore God, in willing His essence, wills also the multitude of things.

II. Concerning this argument, doubt is raised in two ways. First, concerning the foundation of the argument ³. For from it there follows that God wills the being of all things that can participate in his goodness. Since he wills goodness itself for its own sake, it follows that he wills it to be multiplied as far as possible. Now it is multiplied through its being participated in by creatures. Therefore it follows that he wills every possible creature to be brought into being.

Second, concerning the proposition understood implicitly, namely that the multiplication of a good is its perfection ⁴. For Saint Thomas seems to wish to subsume this, when, in order to show that each person desires perfection for the sake of the thing willed and loved in itself, he assumes that the things we love for their own sake we will to be best and better and to be multiplied. But then it follows that, if there were no creature in which the divine essence is multiplied in its own way, the divine essence would not be as perfect as it is when a creature is produced. And thus something of perfection accrues to it from creatures.

III. To the first, one may first reply that the statement that God wills his goodness to be multiplied as much as possible can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that the phrase "as much as possible" signifies an adequation of the perfection of the divine goodness to its multiplication: namely, that God wills every perfection of his goodness participable by creatures to be participated. And this sense is not the true one, nor is it the one intended here. And the objection proceeds against this sense. — In the other way, so that it signifies the mode of communication: namely, that God wills his goodness to be communicated according to that mode of communication by which the divine goodness can be communicated and participated, but not according to modes of communication impossible to it. Hence, since it is possible that it be participated according to a certain proportionality and according to a certain likeness of itself, but not that it be participated according to numerical or specific identity, therefore he wills it to be participated in that way, but not in those ways. And this is the sense intended here. And the objection does not proceed against it.

Second, it can be answered that one who wills something for its own sake does not will the whole multiplication that is possible absolutely, but only what is possible given the direction of reason. And therefore, since divine wisdom is the rule of the participation of its goodness, when God wills his goodness to be participated by creatures, he wills it to be participated not as much as is possible absolutely, but as much as is possible given the rule and ordination of divine wisdom. Hence he wills only those things to be which divine wisdom has determined to be. — Yet I prefer the first answer.

IV. To the second ⁵ it is said that there is a twofold perfection of the divine essence: namely, intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic is that by which God is perfected in himself; the extrinsic is that which is caused by him. If we speak of the intrinsic perfection, then the multiplication of the divine essence in creatures by way of imitation does not pertain to its perfection: for whether creatures exist or not, his essence is most perfect in itself. Hence it is said here that of itself it is neither augmentable nor multipliable. — But if we speak of the extrinsic perfection, which is said to be God's perfection because it is produced by him, then multiplication does pertain to his perfection. And thus it is not unfitting that something of perfection accrue to the divine essence from creatures by way of extrinsic extension. For this means nothing other than that, when creatures exist, there is some perfection exemplified by the divine essence; and, when they do not exist, there is no such perfection. And therefore God, willing his essence, wills his extrinsic perfection, and not only what is intrinsic to himself and essential.

2. Note, however, that although it may be granted that the multiplication of the divine essence is in some way its perfection, inasmuch as every perfection is exemplified by it, and that therefore it is willed by God, it does not seem to me to be granted that God's willing things other than himself, as such, signifies a perfection in God. For although the absolute element signified when I say "God wills things other than himself" signifies a perfection, because it is an act of the divine will—indeed, it is the divine essence itself—nevertheless the respect signified toward the very things willed signifies no perfection or imperfection, because a relation, as a relation, signifies neither perfection nor imperfection, as St. Thomas often says ⁶; nor does the act itself receive perfection from that object, since the divine operation is not perfected from without, just as our operation receives perfection from an extrinsic object. Therefore, if God willed nothing other than himself, he would be no less perfect in willing it: for the act of willing itself, with respect to all the perfection it signifies, would remain even if it were not terminated at an extrinsic object.

3. But against this there seems to be the argument of Saint Thomas, Prima, q. xix, a. 2, where he argues that, since natural things, insofar as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, it also belongs to the nature of the will that one communicate to others the good that one has. And much more does it belong to the divine will to communicate its good to others by way of similitude. For this argument seems to be founded on the principle that whatever perfection is found in the lower must be posited proportionally in the higher. And implicitly there is understood this proposition: that God wills things other than himself is a perfection of his will.

It is answered, and first it is said that that argument is not founded upon the proposition, "Whatever has perfection," etc., but upon a certain proportionality of intellectual substance to natural things, which Saint Thomas had laid down in the first article of that question: that as natural things are related to their natural good, so intellectual nature is related to the good apprehended through an intelligible form; for just as a natural thing is perfected by its natural good, so intellectual nature, insofar as it is of this kind, is perfected by the good apprehended, whose species informs the intellect. Therefore, just as natural things are inclined toward communicating their own good in their own way, namely by natural appetite, so too intellectual nature, which is also willing, is inclined toward communicating its own good in its own way, namely through the will. And this befits God especially. Therefore it is concluded that God wills things other than himself: namely freely, and according to a certain fittingness.

It is said second, that neither is this proposition, that God's willing things other than himself is a perfection of the divine will, to be understood in this argument. Rather, only this comparison and likeness is understood: just as from the fact that natural things are perfect there follows a natural inclination to communicate their good, so much more, because God is most perfect and the exemplar from which all perfection is derived, there follows from his perfection a voluntary inclination to communicate his own goodness. But it is agreed that what is not understood here is that God's volition concerning creatures is God's perfection insofar as it is a volition of creatures.

V. Third ⁷. God loves other things. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved: because He wills and loves His own esse in itself and for its own sake; and every other thing is a certain participated likeness of His esse. But one who loves something for its own sake consequently loves all things in which that thing is found. This is proved by the example of one who loves sweetness for its own sake.

Fourth. All things in some way preexist in God through their proper rationes. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because God, by willing himself, wills all things that are in him.

But this argument seems to conclude that God also wills beings that will never exist, since the rationes of these too are in God. But this is false, because in that case the will of God would not always be fulfilled. Therefore, etc.

It is answered that the proposition "God, in willing himself, wills all things that are in him" can be understood in two ways. In one way, that he wills them with respect to the esse they have in God. And thus both beings and non-beings he wills to be in God himself: because not only beings, but also non-beings have esse and a ratio in God. — In another way it can be understood that he wills those things to be in themselves. And thus he wills only beings to be. And the word "all" distributes only over beings, not over non-beings. And when it is assumed that all things preexist in him through their proper rationes, this is understood of all things to be produced by him. And by "proper ratio" is meant their proper exemplar and their proper idea. Hence the sense is that all things to be produced by God are in him with respect to their proper idea and proper exemplar: but not with respect to the proper esse which they have in themselves. Now the rationes of things that will never exist are not of this kind.

It seems, however, that the first sense is more to the point. Now he said that such beings preexist in God not absolutely, but in a certain manner: because they do not preexist in him according to their proper esse.

VI. Fifth. The causality of an end consists in this, that other things are desired on account of it. Therefore, the more perfect and more willed the end is, the more the will of the one willing that end extends to more things by reason of that end: because the more something is of greater power, the more its causality extends to more things and to more remote ones. Therefore, the divine essence will diffuse its causality most of all to many things, so that on account of it many things are willed, especially by God: because it is most perfect in the order of goodness and of end.

From the antecedent assumed here, it is clearly gathered from Saint Thomas in what the causality of the end consists, and what it is for the causality of the end to consist in the metaphorical motion of the will. For this is nothing other than being that on account of which other things are desired.

Yet it must be noted that the thing which is the end does not of necessity have it that, in willing itself, one wills other things on account of itself. For someone could will health, taking pleasure in it, without ordering anything to it. And likewise, speaking absolutely, God could have willed his own goodness without willing creatures to exist. But if the thing is willed under the aspect of a final cause, then something must be willed on account of it. For this reason, the causality of an end, as end, is said to consist in this: that something be desired on account of it. Therefore, if God wills his essence as the end of creatures, it is necessary that he will creatures on account of that divine essence. Hence Saint Thomas concludes that many things are willed on account of the divine essence, especially by God, who wills it perfectly according to its whole power. For, since it is the final cause of creatures, God wills it as a final cause, and consequently wills creatures on account of it.

VII. Sixth. God, in understanding himself principally, understands all other things in himself. Therefore, in willing himself principally, he wills all other things. — The consequence is evident, because the will follows the intellect.

But this argument seems not to conclude. For the knowledge of the divine intellect is terminated to things according as they are in the divine essence. But the act of the will is terminated to things according as they are in themselves. Now, a thing cannot fail to be in the divine essence, but it can fail to be in itself. Therefore, although the intellect seeing the divine essence sees other things in it, it does not follow that God, willing his essence, wills things other than himself.

It is answered that it is by no means necessary that God, in willing himself, will other things, as will be shown below ⁸ just as it is not necessary that, in understanding himself, he understand other things practically. Yet nevertheless, just as the intellect freely understands other things practically in understanding itself, so the will, which follows upon the intellect, in willing itself freely wills other things. And thus there is a proportion between the divine intellect and the divine will.

Hence this argument either concludes that the divine will is not repugnant to willing other things, or it proceeds from the supposition that God wills other things. For if God wills other things, He wills them by willing Himself.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture, namely Wisdom 11: "You love all things that are."