Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Third, Saint Thomas shows what the objects of the divine will are ¹. In regard to this he does two things: first, he treats of the principal object willed; second, of the secondary objects willed, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he proposes this conclusion: The principal object willed by the divine will is the divine essence.

It is proved first as follows. What is understood by God principally is the divine essence. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because the good understood is the object of the will.

Note that "intellect" is taken principally not only as that which is first apprehended according to our mode of conceiving, but also as that which is supremely intelligible; for such a thing is also supremely willed and principally so.

Second. If it were not so, something would be above the divine will, which would move it. The contrary of this is evident from what has been said. — The consequence is proved. Because the appetible is related to appetite as mover to moved. And likewise the willed to the will, since the will is of the genus of appetitive powers in us ².

It must be noted, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas in Verit., q. XXIII, a. 1, ad 3, and in the Prima, q. XIX, a. 2, ad 2, that when the appetible is said to be related to appetite as mover to motion, this is understood of what is appetible first and per se, which is the end: not, however, of the secondary appetible, which is desired on account of the end. For such a thing, as is said in I Sent., d. XLV, a. 2, ad 2, does not stand to the will as its mover, but as its effect and as moved by it.

Note also what Saint Thomas says, that the will in us ³ is of the genus of appetitive powers, whereby he showed that it must also be the case in God that the end moves the will, according to our manner of understanding. For the genus of appetitive powers is found in God, in his own way, proportionally to our appetite: just as is the genus of cognitive powers. But just as the cognitive power is in God with respect to the perfection of the act, which is to know, but not with respect to its imperfection; so too appetite is in God not indeed with respect to this act which is to desire, which includes some imperfection, but with respect to other acts, such as delighting, loving, and the like ⁴. And because it is common to appetite, with respect to every act regarding the end, that it be moved by the end, therefore this also must be posited in God, according, clearly, to that manner of understanding by which we know God from creatures, and by which we apprehend God's will and his goodness as two distinct things. But if the end of the divine will were posited as something really distinct from it, it would be necessary for the divine will to be really moved by it by the motion of a final cause. And this is the foundation of this argument.

II. Third. If God wills something other than himself principally, then something other than God will be the cause of his willing. Therefore also of his being, since his willing is his esse. — The consequence is proved: because the principal object willed is for each one who wills the cause of his willing.

Note that this argument differs from the preceding one: for in the former the object was compared to a power, whereas in this one it is compared to an act, as cause to effect.

Fourth. God is the ultimate end, because He is the highest good. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because for anyone willing, the principal object willed is his ultimate end.

Fifth. Nothing is proportioned to the divine will with equality except its essence. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved.

Because each power is proportioned to its principal object according to equality: since the power of a thing is measured by its objects, as is said in I Caeli, text 116.

In the proof of the consequence, it must be noted that this equality between the power and the object is not always to be understood according to equality of predication, but in some cases it is understood according to the equality of a certain containment: namely, that everything to which the power is terminated is contained in the principal object, and whatever is contained in the principal object is naturally apt to be attained by the power. Thus we say that the divine essence is adequate to the divine will: because everything willed by it in any way whatsoever is contained in the divine essence as in the highest good and the exemplar of all goodness. But no created good contains everything that falls under the divine will, except perhaps by a containment of reason and analogy. Here it must be observed that, although in other inferior cases something common according to reason is assigned as the adequate object of a power, nevertheless with respect to God, as regards his immanent operations, common objects must be assigned to him by the commonality of virtual containment. For since the divine power is most perfect, the most perfect commonality of object must be assigned to it. Now the commonality of virtual containment is more perfect than the commonality of reason according to predication, since the former is an actual containment, while the latter is a potential and material containment. Therefore the divine essence is assigned here to the divine will as its proportionate object, inasmuch as it contains everything willed virtually and according to eminence.