Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has determined concerning the divine perfection with respect to the intellect, he now begins to determine concerning it with respect to the will ¹.

On this point he does two things: first, he treats of the will insofar as it is will; second, insofar as it has the character of free choice, chapter LXXXVIII. — As to the first, he does two things: first, he treats of the will itself; second, of the condition of willing, chapter LXXX.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he treats of the divine will as regards its esse; second, as regards its quiddity, in the next chapter; third, as regards its object, in chapter seventy-four.

I. As to the first, the following conclusion is proposed: God is willing.

And it is proved first. From what has been said, God is an intelligence of the good. Therefore He is a willer of it. — The antecedent is evident, because, since He understands perfectly, He understands being together with the ratio of the good. — But the consequence is proved as follows: the good understood is the proper object of the will; therefore the good understood, insofar as it is such, is willed; therefore one who understands the good, insofar as he is such, wills it. The first consequence is not proved ². But the second is proved: because "understood" is said with reference to the understander.

Concerning the antecedent and its proof, it must be considered that the good can be apprehended by the intellect in two ways: namely, materially and formally. It is apprehended materially when the thing that is in itself good is considered, yet the ratio of goodness is not considered in it, but rather the ratio of truth or some other ratio. It is apprehended formally, however, when it is considered precisely under the ratio of goodness: that is, when the intellect judges it to be good and fitting for the one understanding. The good apprehended in the first way does not have the ratio of an actual object of the will, nor can it move the will; but only the good apprehended in the second way. For this reason, when Saint Thomas wishes to show that God understands the good insofar as it has the ratio of an actual object of the will, he concludes that God understands being together with the ratio of the good, on account of the perfection of his knowledge, by which he apprehends every ratio of a thing: for he knows that being has the ratio of the good, and consequently the ratio of the desirable and the willed.

Concerning the first consequence, note that, just as it is nothing other to say, This is the proper object of the intellect, than to say, This is understood, or intelligible, because by the name of understood or intelligible (for here we take both as equivalent) is signified the formal ratio of the object of the intellect insofar as it is an object, just as by "visible" is signified the formal ratio of the object of sight insofar as it is an object; so it is nothing other to say, The good understood is the proper object of the will, than to say, The good understood, insofar as it is such, is willed. For it is signified that the ratio of the object of the will, insofar as it is an object, which is signified by my saying "willed" or "willable," is founded upon the good apprehended formally insofar as it is apprehended and understood, so that the good would not have the ratio of the willed unless it were formally understood: just as if we were to say that a body, insofar as it is colored, has the ratio of the visible. Therefore, since the same thing is said by the antecedent and the consequent of the first consequence, but in the consequent the proper name of the object of the will is expressed, which is not expressed in the antecedent; therefore St. Thomas does not prove that consequence, as being manifest of itself.

Concerning the second consequence and its proof, note that, since the order of the powers follows the order of the objects, it is necessary that, if the object of the will, as it is an object, is founded upon the object of the intellect insofar as it is an object, the will also be founded upon the intellect, and that the willing be founded upon the understanding—namely, in such a way that one accompanies the other. And upon this the consequence and its proof are grounded. For the good understood, insofar as it is of this kind—that is, insofar as it is understood—is the foundation of the willed; and they are materially the same; by reason of the one I take the reason of the other; so that nothing has the reason of the willed unless it be a good understood, and to the good understood, insofar as it is of this kind, there follows the reason of the willed. Now "understood" signifies an order to the one understanding, namely as its formal object insofar as it is an object: just as "visible" signifies an order to the one seeing. Therefore it must be that the understanding and the willing are materially the same, namely with respect to the supposit; and that the esse of understanding be the foundation from which something has it that it be willing.

II. Second ³. All intelligent and sentient beings desire and will. But God is intelligent. Therefore He is willing. — The antecedent is proved. In every intelligent and sentient being there is a relation to a thing insofar as it is outside it, since within them is the form of the thing understood and sensed. Now anything having some form has by that form a relation to the things that exist in the nature of things, as is clear in the case of white wood, which by its whiteness is like certain things and unlike others. Therefore either this relation is through their understanding and sensing, or through something else, namely through appetite and will. Not the first: for through that, the relation of things to the intelligent and sentient being would be attended to more, since understanding and sensing occur insofar as things are in the one understanding and sensing. Therefore the second. Therefore etc.

Regarding the antecedent, note that it must be taken distributively, that is, by matching each item to its corresponding one: for not all sentient beings will, but all sentient beings appetize, and all intelligent beings will. Hence Saint Thomas subjoined: but the will is properly in the intellect, that is, in an intelligent nature.

III. But concerning this argument doubts are raised in several ways. First ⁴, because St. Thomas seems to imply a contradiction. For if whatever has some form has, by means of that form, a relation to the things that exist in the nature of things; while in intellect and sense, insofar as they are understanding and sensing, there is found the form of the thing understood and sensed: it follows that the one understanding and sensing, precisely by understanding and sensing, has a relation to the thing as it exists outside. Therefore a contradiction is implied when it is added that this is not by the fact that they sense and understand.

Second, ⁵: The intellect understands a thing according to the esse that it has in itself, and likewise sense senses it, and is assimilated to the thing existing outside through the form that it has. Therefore it is false that the intellect and the senses, by the very fact that they understand and sense, have no relation to the thing as it exists outside.

Third ⁶. Just as for the intellect to understand it is necessary that the thing be in the soul, so too for the one willing to will: because the will is not directed toward the good except as known. Therefore the one willing has no more of a relation to the thing as it exists outside than does the intellect.

Fourth ⁷. If this process held, it would follow that the one understanding would will whatever he understood. For if in the one understanding there is a relation to the thing as it exists outside him, and this relation belongs to him only through the will, then everything the intellect understands falls under the will. But this is false, because what is understood speculatively does not fall under the will in that way. Therefore, and so on.

IV. To make the first doubt evident, it must be considered that the relation of the intellect to the thing understood, as understood, by means of the form which it has within itself, is one thing; and that of material things to that which has the same or an opposite form is another. For the relation of the intellect to the thing understood, as it is understood, is a relation founded upon a certain unity, inasmuch as the intellect in act is itself the thing understood in act ⁸. And therefore the relation belongs to the intellect through the form it has toward the very thing understood in the same way that it belongs to it so as to be the very thing understood in act. Now the thing understood in act is such not according to the esse which it has outside the intellect, for according to that esse it is not united to the intellect, but according to the intentional esse which it has in the intellect. From this it results that by the same intelligible form the intellect is in act, and the thing understood is actually understood, as was explained above ⁹. It follows, therefore, that the understanding being, as understanding, does not signify a relation to the thing understood, as it is understood, according to the esse which it has outside the intellect, but according as it is in the intellect. And I say the same of the sensing being. On this account Saint Thomas says that thereby the relation of things to the understanding and sensing subject is more clearly attended to: namely, because from the fact that a thing is understood and sensed, it must be raised up to spiritual esse, by which it is united to the understanding and sensing subject, in which this kind of relation is founded. For assimilation and relation are rather attributed to that which must necessarily be drawn away from its natural esse if it is to have a relation to something, so that it may be said that the thing itself, existing in its natural esse, has a relation to another through the abstracted esse which it has within it, rather than that, conversely, the other should have a relation to it, with the union and consequent identity that follow.

To the argument, therefore, it is said that the intellect, informed by the likeness of a thing, certainly has some relation to the thing outside; yet that relation is not the relation of the one actually understanding as such to the actual understanding as such, insofar as the understanding is formally referred to the one understanding and conversely, which is a relation of identity and union with the other that follows upon it. For the understanding is not formally in act understood by the esse it has outside, but by the esse it has in the intellect. Therefore this consequence does not hold: The one understanding has a relation to the thing insofar as it is outside; therefore it has that relation by the very fact that it understands formally. It does indeed have it, but not by the fact that it understands; rather, by the fact that it wills.

Hence that proposition, "The one who understands, by the very fact that he understands, has a relation to the thing outside," can have a twofold sense. One is that in understanding he has such a relation formally, as if the relation to the thing outside were the relation of the one understanding qua understanding, to the thing understood qua actually understood. And then the proposition is false, and its opposite is what this Saint Thomas holds. For the relation of the one understanding qua understanding is not to the thing as it exists outside, but as it exists in the intellect, as we have shown. — The other sense is that such a relation accompanies the one who understands qua understanding, as if understanding were the origin of such a relation. And thus it has truth: for the relation of the one willing, and the inclination toward the thing apprehended by the intellect, follows upon the intellect's apprehension.

V. To the second ¹⁰ it is said that this proposition, "The intellect understands a thing according to the esse that it has in itself, or according to the esse that it has outside the intellect," can bear two senses. One is that the esse of the thing outside is that which is understood. The other is that the esse outside is the reason why the thing is actually understood, and the foundation of that relation.

If it is understood in the first way, it is granted that the thing is understood according to the esse it has toward what is outside. And thus it can be granted that the one understanding, insofar as understanding, has a relation to the thing outside. But Saint Thomas does not speak in this way in this passage, since this is a material consideration of the thing understood.

If it is understood in the second way, the proposition is thus denied. For esse ad extra is not the reason why a thing is actually understood by some intellect; rather, esse in intellectu is. And thus the understanding thing, as understanding, or as asserting a relation to the intellect in the intellect, does not assert a relation to the thing as it is ad extra, but as it is in the intellect. And because Saint Thomas speaks formally, therefore it is absolutely denied that the understanding thing, by the very fact that it understands, has a relation to the thing outside as it is outside. And therefore, since it is necessary that a thing having some form have a relation to those things that are in the nature of things formally as they are in the nature of things, something else must be sought from which the understanding thing has a relation to the thing outside the intellect formally, such that esse ad extra is the reason for terminating that relation.

Here it must be noted that, since the intelligible species does not have complete esse except while the intellect actually understands, the intellect does not have a perfect and actual likeness to the thing understood except while it understands. Therefore, when Saint Thomas speaks of the relation of the one understanding that follows upon the intelligible form, he speaks of the relation that belongs to the one understanding insofar as he actually understands. And because the relation of the one actually understanding, as such, to the thing understood is formally not to the thing as outside, but as in the intellect, he says that the one understanding does not signify a relation to the thing insofar as it is outside by the very fact that he understands. With this, however, it stands that the thing outside, and its esse outside the intellect, can be materially the thing understood.

VI. To the third ¹¹ it is said that esse in the soul is required in one way on the part of the object of the intellect, and in another way on the part of the object of the will. On the part of the object of the intellect, it is required as the formal ratio from which something has it that it be actually understood with respect to this understanding subject; for it is actually understood by this, that it is one with the intellect. — On the part of the object of the will, however, it is required as a condition of the object whereby it may move in the ratio of a final cause; for unless the good were apprehended, it would not move the will. But esse itself outside the soul is the formal ratio why the thing is appetible; for appetite is directed toward the thing not according to the intentional esse it has in the soul, but according as it has esse outside the soul. Thus real esse is the ratio of the thing's being willed and desired, and the ratio of the willed whereby it has that it is willed; but esse in the soul is a condition of the object considered in the ratio of a mover.

VII. To the fourth ¹² it is said that Saint Thomas speaks of form absolutely and simply, according to the proper account of form: not of this or that one in particular. For by means of form, considered absolutely and in its own order as intelligible and sensible, the understanding and sensing being has a relation to the thing as it exists outside: because just as a natural inclination follows upon a natural form, so an inclination and appetite of the animal follows upon an apprehended form. Yet it is necessary that that apprehended form be of the good and the fitting, insofar as it is good and fitting. Hence what Saint Thomas says elsewhere ¹³ — namely, that an inclination follows upon every form — must be understood not of any form whatsoever considered in particular and absolutely, but of any order of forms. For upon one order of forms there follows a natural inclination, while upon another there follows an animal inclination. Therefore there must be a natural appetite and an animal appetite: which nevertheless has no actual relation and inclination to the thing unless it be under the aspect of the fitting as apprehended.

2. From these points the error of Scotus is evident, in IV Sent., d. xlix, q. iv ¹⁴, who says that there is no difference between intellect and will with respect to being terminated toward what is outside or within; and that intuitive knowledge is terminated at the thing in itself. For it is clear from what has been said that no knowledge is terminated at a thing outside unless the thing itself is within the intellect through its likeness. And thus esse in the intellect is the reason why the thing is actually understood: although the thing outside is that which is materially understood.

VIII. Thirdly ¹⁵. God takes pleasure in His own esse and His own goodness. Therefore He is willing. — The consequence is evident. For God is an intelligent being; and therefore, if He desires anything, this is by way of will, which is the appetitive power of an intellectual nature. — The antecedent is proved. It belongs to every being to desire its own perfection and the preservation of its esse in its own manner: so that, while it does not possess them, it desires them through the appetitive power of its kind, namely either natural, or sensitive, or intellectual; and while it possesses them, it rests in them. Therefore this belongs also to the first being: for what follows upon every being belongs to a being inasmuch as it is a being; but what is of this kind belongs most of all to the first being.

But a doubt arises. For to desire the preservation of one's own being pertains to natural appetite. Therefore, from the fact that God takes delight in His own esse, it does not follow that He is willing.

It is answered that natural appetite can be understood in two ways: either as opposed to free appetite, or as opposed to appetite that follows apprehension. In the first way, the appetite for preserving one's own esse is natural in beings possessing intellect; but not in the second way. For although intellectual nature, insofar as it is natural, has a natural and necessary inclination toward the conservation of its own esse, this inclination nevertheless pertains to the will and follows the apprehension of the intellect.

IX. Fourth. To understand is most delightful for God. Therefore God is willing. — The antecedent is proved: because understanding, the more perfect it is, the more delightful it is to the one understanding. — The consequence is also proved: because intelligible delight is through the will, just as sensible delight is through the appetite of concupiscence.

Fifth. The form of the divine intellect is the cause of motion and of esse in other things, since God acts upon things through the intellect. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because a form considered by the intellect neither moves nor causes anything except through the will, whose object is the end and the good, by which one is moved to act. For the speculative intellect does not move, nor does pure imagination without an estimation of good or evil.

Note that Saint Thomas does not wish to say by this that the speculative intellect can move the will when joined to an estimation of good or evil: for this estimation already pertains in some way to the practical intellect, since it judges something to be avoided or pursued. Rather, the sense is that the intellect considered as purely speculative does not move, just as neither does pure imagination, which of course says nothing about what is to be avoided or pursued; but the intellect insofar as it is in some way practical, which concerns the reason of good or evil, does move well, and likewise imagination concerning something as good or evil.

X. Sixth. God is the first mover. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because among motive powers and those possessing intellect, the will is found first: since it applies every power to its act; which it has because its object is the end — although the intellect also moves the will in the manner of a final cause, but not in the manner of an efficient cause.

Note from what this Saint Thomas says that the power to which the end pertains has the ability to move all the others efficiently, and therefore it holds the first place in the order of efficient movers. It does not, however, hold the first place in the order of movers simply: for it is itself moved by the intellect with the motion of the end, when the intellect proposes to it its object. How this is so was shown in the preceding work ¹⁶.

Seventh. To God most of all belongs acting through himself. Therefore he acts through will. — The consequence is proved: because the free has the character of that which acts through itself, since the free is that which is the cause of itself. But will holds freedom in acting first and foremost; for one is said to act freely insofar as he acts voluntarily. Therefore what acts through itself acts through will.

It must be noted that "to act of oneself" can be understood in two ways. First, as the same as acting through one's own form; and thus to act of oneself is not universally to act through will. — Or, second, as the same as acting not through the necessary motion of something extrinsic. And thus to act of oneself is to act through will: for the will can be compelled by nothing extrinsic, and, being free, can be necessitated by none.

Note from the teaching of Saint Thomas, Verit., q. xxiv ¹⁷, that freedom of choice resides formally indeed in the will, to which election formally belongs; yet radically it is in reason, because appetite follows the mode of cognition. Therefore he says in this place that the will first has freedom in acting: as if to say that it belongs to the will first and formally to act and choose freely, although this freedom takes its origin from the mode of cognition.

XI. Eighth. God is an appetible end, and he appetes himself as end, so to speak. Therefore he is willing. — The consequence is evident. For, since he is intelligent, if he appetes himself, he appetes himself by intellectual appetite. — But the antecedent is proved. For the end and the agent acting for an end are always found to be of one order in things. This is clear from the fact that the proximate end, which is proportionate to the agent, falls into the same species as the agent, both in natural things and in artificial ones. But nothing is coordinated with God as of the same order except himself, since there are many first beings. Therefore he himself is the first agent on account of himself as end. Therefore he appetes himself as end: since an agent acting for an end appetes the end.

Note that the foundation of this argument is the following: since an agent acting for a proximate and proportionate end is of one order of beings with that end itself—namely, because a natural agent acts for a natural form, and an artificial agent for an artificial form, and so with the others—but nothing is placed in one order with God, since He alone is the first of beings, it must be said that God is not the proximate end of any created agent, nor is any created end proportionate to the divine agent; rather God Himself is the end of God Himself as agent, and God acts for Himself as for an end proportionate to Himself. And since He is an intelligible end, it is necessary that He be desired in an intelligible manner. This is to desire through the will.

Note also that when Saint Thomas said that God desires Himself as an end, he added, so to speak. For according to the proper sense of the word, to desire pertains to a thing not yet possessed, and it is taken as equivalent to to long for. Yet sometimes its meaning is extended, so that every act of the will is said to desire. And in this way it is taken here, when God is said to desire Himself as an end. Saint Thomas therefore added those words in order to show the impropriety of the expression.

It is finally confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, All things whatsoever he willed etc.; and of the Apostle, Romans 9, Who resists his will? etc.