Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

The sixth conclusion, answering the sixth objection, is: God knows lowly things; nor does this detract from his nobility, but rather attests to it ¹.

I. It is proved first. God is of infinite power in understanding. Therefore his knowledge extends to the most remote things. Therefore to whatever is most lowly. — The first consequence is proved. Because the power of the divine intellect in understanding is assimilated to active power: since it knows not by receiving from things, but rather by the fact that it inflows into them. Now the stronger an active power is, the farther it extends its action. — The second is also proved. Because the degree of nobility and lowliness in beings is considered according to nearness to and distance from God.

Note that when Saint Thomas says that God understands more by the fact that He flows into things, the phrase "by the fact that" is not to be taken causally, but consequentially and concomitantly. For flowing into things is not the cause of God's understanding things; rather, conversely, because He understands, He flows into them what He has conceived by His intellect.

II. Second. If He did not know lowly things, it would follow that He would not understand even the most noble things. And thus He would not understand things other than Himself. — The consequence is proved, supposing that each thing, considered in itself, is noble: for everything that exists in any way whatever, whether in act or in potency, is a likeness of the first act, and from this has its nobility; but something is called lowly only in respect of what is more noble. Then thus: The most noble of other things are no less distant from God than the lowest created things are from the highest: namely, the former are distant as finite from infinite, the latter as finite from finite. Therefore, if the distance of lowly things from the most noble prevents lowly things from being known by God, much more will the distance of the most noble things from God prevent their being known.

III. Third. God knows the order of the universe. Therefore He knows both the nobler and the lowlier things. — The antecedent is proved: because the good of the order of the universe is nobler than any part of the universe, since each of its parts is ordered to its good, as is said in Metaphysics XII ², text. 52. And therefore, if God were to know some noble nature, He would know above all the order of the universe. — The consequence is also proved: because such an order cannot be known unless the nobler and the lowlier things are known, in whose distances and relations it consists.

Note that when Saint Thomas says that the good of the order of the universe is nobler than any part of the universe, this is not to be understood as though the very relation of order in itself were the noblest of beings; but rather because all the parts of the universe taken together, insofar as they are ordered, are the noblest of beings, and nobler than any part taken by itself.

IV. Fourth. If the lowliness of the things known were to redound upon the knower, it could do so only accidentally: namely, either because, while he considers lowly things, he is drawn away from thinking of more noble ones; or because from their consideration he is inclined toward certain undue affections. But neither of these can befit God. Therefore, and so on. — The major premise is proved as follows. For it belongs to the nature of cognition that the knower contain the known according to his own mode: that is, however lowly the thing known may be, it is nonetheless in the understanding according to the mode of the one understanding. Hence its lowliness cannot redound upon the understanding per se; but if it does redound, this is accidental.

V. Fifth. A cognition that can extend at once to nobler things and to base things ought not to be judged base. But such is divine cognition, since God considers both himself and other things by one and the same knowledge and consideration. Therefore, etc. — The major is proved. For a power is not judged small because it can deal with small things, but because it is determined to small things, namely because it can deal only with small things. For what can deal with great things can also deal with small things — namely, when the small things are contained in the great; but not if they are altogether disparate. Therefore, in like manner, a cognition that can extend at once to noble and base things ought not to be judged base; but rather one that can extend only to base things; as in us, in whom there is one [kind of] knowledge of divine things and another of human things, and in comparison with the nobler the lower is reputed more base.

It is confirmed by the authority of Wisdom VII.

VI. From these points the argument to the contrary is answered ³; and, in addition, the authority of Aristotle that can be adduced is answered. For when it is said that the nobility of a science is measured by the nobility of what is knowable in it, the answer is that this must be understood of those things to which the science is principally ordered, and not of all things that fall within the science. For under the most noble science, among us, fall not only the highest beings but also the lowest, as is clear in First Philosophy, whose consideration extends from the first being down to being in potency. But the lowest things fall under the divine science as known together, as it were, with the principal object known.

Note that although First Philosophy treats of matter, which is potency—a matter which also falls under the consideration of the Natural Philosopher—it is nevertheless considered in each science under a different aspect and for a different reason: it pertains to First Philosophy insofar as it is a part of being; but to Natural Philosophy insofar as it is a part of mobile being and the first subject of transmutation.

From the fact that Saint Thomas says that the consideration of First Philosophy extends from the first being down to being in potency, it is gathered that real being is the subject of Metaphysics, and not common being, shared by real being and being of reason. For if the subject were common being, shared by real being and being of reason, then being of reason would be posited here as the lowest thing belonging to Metaphysics, rather than being in potency, which is matter; yet being of reason has less of entity than being in potency.

Against Aristotle, who seems to want, in Metaphysics XII ⁴, ch. 51, that God does not understand anything outside himself; and that lowly things are better unknown than known: it is said first, that his meaning is that God understands nothing other than himself as the perfection of his intellect, as if it were his principal object of knowledge.

It is said second, that vile things are better known by ignorance than by knowledge when the cognition of vile things and of noble things is different, and the consideration of vile things impedes the consideration of noble things.