Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

The second conclusion is: God also knows those things which do not exist ¹. Concerning this, Saint Thomas does three things: first, he proves it; second, he explains it ²; third, he removes a certain error ³.

I. It is proved, therefore, first. A thing knowable can exist without there being our knowledge of it. Therefore God's knowledge of something can also exist without the thing itself existing. — The antecedent is evident from the Philosopher's example of the squaring of the circle. — The consequence, however, is proved: because, as is clear from what was said above, the relation of divine knowledge to the things known is the same as that of knowables to our knowledge.

Note that the foundation of this argument is that the knowable is prior to our knowledge naturally, as its cause; but divine knowledge is prior to every knowable thing. Now, when the prior is removed, the posterior is indeed removed, but not conversely; rather, the prior can exist without the posterior, unless the posterior follows from the prior by a natural sequence. And therefore the knowable can exist without our knowledge existing, and divine knowledge without the knowable existing.

II. Second. The knowledge of God is like the knowledge of a craftsman, since it is the cause of things. But the craftsman knows those things that are not yet crafted, since the form of the art flows forth from the craftsman's knowledge into the external matter. Therefore, and so on.

Note that this argument differs from the preceding one: for there it proceeded from a comparison between the knowable and divine knowledge, whereas here it proceeds from the condition of divine knowledge absolutely considered.

Note also that the likeness of the divine science to art must be considered in some respect, but not in all respects. For there is a likeness with respect to causality, because each is the cause of the thing knowable. But there is a dissimilarity, because the science of the craftsman presupposes matter upon which he acts, as Saint Thomas says elsewhere ⁴ and produces only form in matter; whereas divine science is the cause both of matter and of form.

III. Third. God knows wholly the power and perfection of his essence. But his essence is representative not only of beings, but also of non-beings. Therefore he knows not only beings, but also non-beings. — The consequence, with its major premise, is evident. — The minor, however, is proved. Because the divine essence is the likeness of those things that proceed from it, namely either in act or in power. Now the whole universe of other things, namely existing things, does not equal the divine power and perfection: since every other thing has a limited esse and perfection, whereas the divine essence is of infinite perfection. Therefore it is representative of far more things than are those that exist in act.

Note that from the fact that each thing other than the divine essence has limited esse, Saint Thomas wishes to conclude that even the totality of all beings has limited esse: for from things having finite esse and perfection there does not result infinite perfection (unless perhaps they were infinite in species); just as from finite quantities no infinite quantity results. And consequently it follows that the totality of being cannot equal the infinite divine perfection.

IV. Fourth. The divine intellect knows in the manner of a knower knowing what a thing is, not only definitions but also enunciables, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore it can also have knowledge of things that do not exist. — The consequence is evident. Because by that cognition whereby the intellect knows what a thing is, it can have knowledge even of things that do not exist.

2. But a doubt arises. For is cognition presupposed to the cognition of what a thing is? Therefore the cognition of what a thing is cannot be of non-beings.

It is said first, by denying the consequence. For although the question "what is it?" presupposes the question "whether it is?" with respect to us, the knowledge of what a thing is can nevertheless belong to things that are not actually: because the intellect, in knowing the quiddity, abstracts from actual existence; and therefore, whether the thing exists actually or not, the intellect none the less apprehends its quiddity. Hence, when it is said that knowledge of whether a thing is precedes knowledge of what it is, the meaning is not that the thing must exist actually, and that it must first be actual before it is known what it is; but rather that the thing's nature itself must have being, and that esse must befit it in its own way—namely, either at certain times, or in virtue of its cause, or in some other way. Now this can befit a thing that does not exist for some time in nature. Thus we understand the quiddity of a rose that does not exist in act; yet we suppose that its nature has a certain being, and that esse belongs to it in its own way in nature. But God knows quidditatively those things that will never have esse in nature, yet could nevertheless be; and He knows that they are beings, and that they have esse in virtue of God Himself, though not in themselves.

It is said secondly, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas in Verit., q. II, a. 8, that we must speak one way of God's knowledge and another way of our knowledge. For God's knowledge is the cause of things, whereas our knowledge is caused by things. Therefore God's knowledge can precede the things known, and thus the cognition of what a thing is can, in Him, be of a thing that never had esse—since a cause can precede its effect, as is evident in art, which precedes the esse of the thing made. But our knowledge cannot exist unless things preexist from which it is caused: for what is later cannot exist when the prior is removed. Hence the cognition of what a thing is cannot be acquired by us unless the thing first has esse and is first known, through the senses, to have esse—although that very cognition of what it is, once had, abstracts from esse. That proposition, therefore, "The cognition whether a thing is precedes the cognition of what it is," holds true only in the acquisition of our knowledge, while we first know through the senses that the thing is, or that the thing exists under actual existence, before the cognition of what it is is caused in the intellect. But it does not hold true in God's knowledge, which is not caused by things.

To this sense is understood what is said in I Posteriorum ⁵: Of the subject one must know beforehand that it is. For, in the discovery of a science, it is necessary that we first know through the senses that a thing is before any passion of it be known: because from that cognition by which a thing is known under actual existence, the whole science takes its origin. And therefore of a thing which never was we cannot acquire science by discovery.

V. Fifth. God has knowledge of things through their cause, since, in knowing himself, who is the cause of all things, he knows other things as it were as his effects. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because some effect can be known in its cause before it exists: as a future eclipse is known by the astrologer from consideration of the motions of the heavens.

2. Note that in this passage the mode of knowing non-beings is not being investigated, but their cognition absolutely considered. Therefore the preceding arguments prove absolutely that God knows non-beings, whether He sees them in themselves or in their cause. But the argument that follows proves that He sees and knows them even as they are in themselves.

VI. Sixth. God's understanding is measured by eternity. Therefore it extends to all things that, in the course of time, do not yet exist. — The antecedent is evident: because God's understanding has no succession, just as His esse does not, but is whole at once and ever-abiding, as was said above. Now this belongs to the very notion of eternity. — But the consequence is proved thus: because eternity is present to any time whatever, or to any instant of time, when it is compared to the whole course of time as the indivisible to the continuous; not indeed as that indivisible which is the terminus of a continuum, since eternity is altogether outside time; but as that which is outside the continuum, and yet coexists with every part of the continuum, or with any point marked in the continuum, just as the center of a circle is related to its circumference. Therefore whatever exists in any part of time coexists with the eternal, as it were present to it; and, since the eternal has no succession, it follows that all things are present to the whole of eternity. Therefore the divine intellect, throughout its whole eternity, beholds as present whatever is done through the entire course of time.

VII. In this argument there are two things that create the difficulty. The first is the foundation of the argument ⁶. For if whatever is done throughout the whole course of time is present to eternity, then it is true to say now that Antichrist is: because nothing is actually present to anyone except while it is. Therefore it will not be future. And by the same reasoning nothing will be future, but all things will be present.

Item ⁷. Therefore angels, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. LVII, a. 3, ad 3, do not know singulars when they do not exist, because the species that are in the angel's mind are not actual likenesses of them except when they exist; for although those species, in themselves, are related equally to present, past, and future things, nevertheless these things are not related equally to the species: for present things have a nature by which they may be assimilated to them, but future things do not yet have a nature by which they may be assimilated to them. Similarly, therefore, it will be said that although eternity, in itself, is related equally to present, past, and future things, nevertheless these things are not related equally to eternity; because things that do not exist do not have a nature by which they coexist with eternity. Therefore non-beings do not coexist with eternity.

2. The second doubt concerns the proof of the consequence ⁸ For it does not seem to follow: Eternity is present to any part of time. Therefore, understanding that is measured by eternity extends to all things that exist at whatever difference of time. For this does not hold: The present instant measures my vision. Therefore I see all visible things that are present to this instant. Nor does it hold on the side of the intellect: All intelligible things are now present to the instant measuring my intellection. Therefore I understand all intelligible things.

VIII. For the solution of the first doubt, it must be noted that, since non-beings can be understood to be present to God in eternity in two ways—namely, by their real coexistence with God, and only according to known and objective esse—certain Thomists hold that non-beings are present to God in eternity in objective esse, that is, because they are known by God from eternity; but not according to the real coexistence of the esse of things with the divine esse.

It seems to me, however, as most Thomists also hold, that it is the mind of St. Thomas that all things, both past and future as well as present, are present to God in eternity in both ways: so that they really coexist in eternity and are known by him eternally. I am moved to this because, wherever St. Thomas speaks of this matter, when he gives the reason why God knows future contingents with certainty, he assigns this one: that all things are present to God and to eternity, and that eternity is present to every time or instant of time; as is clear in this chapter, and in the Prima Pars, q. 14, aa. 9 and 13, and in De Veritate, q. 2, a. 12, likewise in Book I of the Sentences, d. 38, a. 5. It would be begging the question, however, if he understood that all things are present to God intuitively but not according to real coexistence: for he would be assuming what he ought to prove. Since this cannot be attributed to so great a man in a matter of such importance, it must be said that he wished to argue that God understands all future contingents because the divine understanding extends to all things that are present to its measure and coexist with it; now the measure of the divine understanding is eternity, with which not only things present to us, but even things future to us, really coexist.

IX. Following, therefore, this part—which indeed seems to suffer the greatest difficulty because of our habituation to temporal things—in order to arrive at its clarity, we must first consider, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas in I Sent., d. 19, q. II ⁹, and the Prima Pars, q. x, that eternity and time, although they agree in this, that both are taken as measures of the duration of a thing, nevertheless differ, because time is the measure of a successive and divisible thing, namely motion; whereas eternity is the measure of an indivisible esse, existing whole at once and altogether unchangeable, which is the divine esse. — From this difference another difference also arises. For since motion, which is measured by time, is divided into successive parts, one of which succeeds as another departs, and while one exists the other is awaited, it is necessary that time itself be divided into like parts, namely such that some are past and some future: for a proper measure must be proportionate to what is measured. Eternity, however, because it measures an indivisible esse existing whole at once, is not divided into several parts, one of which would be past and another future, but exists wholly at once; and it stands related as a kind of now, and as an indivisible duration ever standing and ever present, receiving no variation whatsoever. On account of which it is well defined by Boethius in book V of the Consolation ¹⁰, as the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life.

2. It must be considered, second, that just as the divine esse is related to every created esse as the common to the proper, namely by a commonality of perfection and causality, on account of which all things are said to be in God as in their cause and their exemplar, so eternity, in its character as a measure, is related to whatever time measures the esse of a temporal thing as a common measure to a proper measure; such that in it are contained all the differences of time, just as a proper and particular measure is contained in the common and exceeding measure. On account of which Saint Thomas says that eternity comprehends all time ¹¹. And because what is contained by a particular measure is also contained by the common measure containing it, just as what is contained in a vessel is also contained in the heavens, it follows that everything contained under some difference of time, whether it be past, present, or future time, is also contained under eternity; so that just as a thing is said to be in some time as in its proper and adequate measure, so it is said to be in eternity as in an inadequate and exceeding measure ¹²; just as all things that are in their proper places are said to be in the air or in the heavens as in a place common to all. And thus we say that all things contained under any difference of time, namely past and future as well as present, are in eternity. And because eternity has no parts, such that one thing could be said to be under one part of eternity and another thing under another part, but it exists whole and simultaneous, therefore it is most fittingly said that all things are contained and are in the whole of eternity.

3. It must be considered, thirdly, with Aristotle, Physics IV Phys. ¹³, that two things which have the character of the measured are said to coexist in one way, and two durations in another. For two things measured according to duration of their esse are said to coexist because their existences are contained within one and the same present measure of duration: just as two men having esse on the same day, or at the same instant of time, are said to coexist. Two measures, however, properly speaking, are said to coexist because one is contained within the other: just as a day is simultaneous with a month because it is contained by the month. Therefore, when it is said that the temporal coexists with the eternal, the meaning is that the esse of a temporal thing and the esse of an eternal thing are measured by one measure of present duration. And since this cannot be verified of time, which is the proper measure of a temporal thing—because the eternal is not measured by any difference of time but is above all time—it must be understood of eternity, which is the proper and adequate measure of eternal esse, while being an exceeding and inadequate measure of the esse of a temporal thing. And thus we say that created and temporal things coexist with God, even those not yet existing in the present time, inasmuch as both the esse of God and the esse of temporal things are measured by this present measure, undivided into past and future—the former as by an adequate measure, the latter as by an exceeding one.

4. Therefore, when Saint Thomas says that things coexist with God even which are not present to us in time, but are past or future with respect to us, it is understood that the esse of each is measured by one present measure, which is eternity: not, however, that the esse of each is measured by the time present to us, as those seem to understand who attack this position of Saint Thomas.

Similarly, when it is said that eternity is present to every time, the meaning is not that both eternity and all time are present to us in our present time, for this would involve a contradiction; but that all time is contained in eternity, which is a measure ever present, just as a proper and particular measure is contained in the common and exceeding measure.

5. Yet it must be noted that a difficulty arises for us in this matter because, since our knowledge originates from temporal things, the words imposed by us to signify something—namely, a thing or an action—also consignify some difference of time. And therefore, when we say, This coexists with God, there seems to be consignified that the existence of this thing with God is in a time present to us. Which indeed, so understood, cannot be verified of a thing not coexisting. But if we abstract the signification of the word of present tense from the consignification of this present duration which is time, and instead consignify only some measure of duration as present without descending to this or that one, the difficulty and impossibility are removed. For if, when I say, Antichrist coexists with God, nothing else is understood than that both the esse of God and the esse of Antichrist are in one measure of duration, which is neither past nor future but present, it is clear from what has been said that it is most true: because they are in eternity, which is a present measure. But if with this it were understood that such a present measure is time present to us, it would be false. Just as, when it is said that Socrates is an animal, if nothing else is understood than that he is an animated sensible substance, something true is said; but if it is understood that he is such a sensible substance which is a brute animal, something false is said.

From this it is clear that, when it is said that non-existent things in time present to us, whether future or past, coexist with God, in the true sense intended by Saint Thomas it is not necessary to understand that they are simultaneous with God in the now of eternity, although this is true; it suffices to understand that they are simultaneous in some measure of duration that is present, whatever that may be. But when we descend to particular measures, it is true of this measure which is eternity, in which all things have their esse; just as, when it is said that Socrates is an animal, it is not necessary for the truth of the proposition to understand that he is this animal which is man, although he is no other animal than man. But when it is said that all things coexist with God in the whole of eternity, we descend to the particular measure which is eternity; and the sense is that the esse of all things and the esse of God are in this present measure of duration which is eternity, having no parts, but existing whole and simultaneous. And it is similar to what would be said of Socrates, that he is this animal which is man.

6. But if it is asked whether, according to the position of Saint Thomas, Adam now coexists with God, and likewise concerning the Antichrist, it is answered that "now" can signify time on the side of the signifying proposition, as it were the measure of its truth; and it can signify time on the side of the thing signified, as measuring its esse. In the first way, the sense is that at this present moment this proposition is true: "Adam coexists with God." And then it is said to be true, because Adam, and the time in which it was true to say "Adam is," share with God in the present measure which is eternity, as we have already said. — In the second way, the sense is that the esse of God and of Adam are in this instant of time. And then it is said to be false. — And similarly it is said of these propositions: "All things always coexist with God," "All things coexist eternally with God," and "All things are present to God," and of similar ones.

X. Thus, therefore, the position of St. Thomas, once understood, suffers no calumny. Indeed, it is necessary to hold it in this way. This can be clearly shown by the following argument. For I ask: either it is true now, as the phrase is commonly understood, that is, with respect to a relation to eternity, that Adam coexists with God and Antichrist; or it is not true that he coexists, but only that Adam coexisted and that Antichrist will coexist. If the first is granted, the point is established. If the second is granted, then in eternity there is past and future. For nothing is said to be past or future in relation to any of its durations unless that duration has within itself past and future, as is evident in time. But this is repugnant to the nature of eternity. Therefore, etc.

XI. To the first argument to the contrary ¹⁴, which is taken from Scotus, in the First Book, distinction xxxix ¹⁵, the solution is clear from what has been said. For it is granted that, just as Antichrist is present to eternity, namely because he is measured by eternity as by an inadequate measure, which is a present measure; so it is true to say that Antichrist is, that is, he is measured by some present measure, namely eternity, at the time at which it will be true to say that Antichrist is. But just as it is not true that he exists in a time present to us, so it is not true that he is present to God in a time present to us, as though his presence to God were measured by a time present.

To the same sense it is also conceded that All things are present and nothing is future, namely insofar as they are compared to God and to eternity: although, insofar as they are compared to time, not all things are present, but some are past and some are future.

But whether it should be granted simply and absolutely that "Antichrist is," and that "All things are present and nothing is future," it is said that it should not. For, since esse and present esse, taken absolutely, according to the customary signification import esse in the present time; and since nothing is posited in that proposition by which it could be determined to eternity: it would be signified that Antichrist and all things are in the present time. But when it is said that "All things are present to God," or that "All things coexist with God," because by reason of that term "to God" presence and coexistence can be understood as being in some measure common to God and creature, which is eternity: therefore both can be granted absolutely.

XII. From this the defect in Scotus's reasoning is evident, at the place cited above, when he infers that if something is future in act with respect to God, it is simply in act, and it is impossible for it to be afterwards put in act: because what is said to be such with respect to the first cause can simply be said to be such.

For it is evident that this does not follow: namely, that if something is future in act with respect to God, it is therefore in act simply and absolutely speaking. But the assumption offered in proof of that claim lacks truth when what is said of a thing with respect to the first cause, and what is said of the thing simply, are understood according to different measures, as is the case here. For when it is said, "This is future to us in act with respect to God," it is verified according to the present measure that is eternity; but when it is said absolutely, "This is in act," it is understood according to the present measure that is time. Therefore the first statement is true and the second false. And hence nothing prevents the future from being posited as being in act for us.

2. It is also evident from the same foundation how to answer another argument of Scotus ¹⁶, where he says that, if my sitting [in the future] is present to eternity in the esse of existence, it is now produced in that esse; because nothing other than God has esse in the flux of time unless it is produced by God according to that esse.

For it is evident that that does not follow. For it is not said that my sitting is present to God in this present time, but in some present measure, which is eternity. Now something is said to be produced absolutely "now" when it has esse in the present time measured by the utterance.

3. From what has been said, the solution to the other argument is also evident ¹⁷, by which it is argued that then the esse of a thing will not precede non-being, but they will exist simultaneously. And thus contradictories would be true at the same time.

For it is said that one must not say absolutely, "The non-being of a thing is simultaneous with its being," because this would refer to the present time, and thus a contradiction would be implied. But it is indeed true that they are simultaneous in relation to God and in eternity, which attains the being and non-being of a thing together, without succession.

But of contradictory propositions it must never be conceded that they are simultaneously true, even when things are compared to God and to eternity: for one of the two propositions is always false. For when it is said, "Antichrist is present to God," "Antichrist is not present to God," the negative proposition is false. — Similarly, when it is said, "Antichrist is not in eternity," the proposition taken negatively is false: for it is false that he is not present to God and that he does not have esse in eternity. But if that proposition were understood in an affirmative sense, so that the sense would be, "Antichrist is not, that is, has non-being, in eternity," such that the predicate would be negative or infinite while the proposition itself was affirmative, then both propositions would be true: for Antichrist in eternity both has esse and has non-esse, inasmuch as eternity simultaneously attains both his esse and his non-esse. But then it is evident that they are not contradictory propositions, since both are taken affirmatively.

But if it is said that the inference holds from an affirmative with an infinite or negated predicate to a negative with a finite or affirmed predicate—for it does hold: He is unjust, therefore he is not just; and consequently there also holds: It has non-being, therefore it does not have being; and thus, if the affirmative is true, the negative is also true—it is said that this rule holds where the proposition imports some measure of time. For since in one time opposite predicates cannot be together, nor being and non-being of the same thing, therefore, when for some time an infinite predicate or non-being is attributed to something, the finite predicate and the being opposed to it must be excluded from it for that same time. But that rule does not hold where the proposition imports a measure which is eternity: because, as was said, eternity, existing whole at once, measures both opposites at once—the being and the non-being of a thing—as a common and inadequate measure, so that it can be said that in eternity a thing has being and non-being.

XIII. In answer to the confirmation ¹⁸, it must be known, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the places cited above ¹⁹, that although the aevum, by which the esse of the angels is measured, is whole at once and has no diversity of parts, just as eternity does not either, nevertheless it admits some succession and division to be joined to it in what is measured by the aevum: which is indeed foreign to eternity, which tolerates no alteration or succession in an eternal thing. Hence, although the esse of a thing measured by aeviternity is whole at once, yet the operation of the angel by which it understands other things is not whole at once, but one act of understanding succeeds another. And therefore the angel's act of understanding is not measured by the aevum, which has no succession, but by discrete time, which has succession just as the operation itself does. Hence many acts of understanding are measured by discrete time; a single act of understanding, however, is measured by an instant of discrete time. But as it is with the act of understanding, so it is with the representation of the species through which the act of understanding is brought about: namely, its representation is not whole at once, but successive, according as things come into being successively. And therefore the case of the likeness of the angelic intellect is not the same as that of eternity: since in eternity there is no succession, whereas in the representation of the angelic species there can be succession.

From this it follows that Scotus's argument, where above ²⁰, concludes nothing against us. For he says that, since the aevum coexists with the whole of time according to us, it follows by the same reasoning that an angel, who is measured by the aevum, knows all future things. — For it is said that representation by an angelic species is not measured by the aevum, but by discrete time: and therefore it is not whole simultaneously. Hence it is not necessary that the angel know simultaneously all things that are future. Even if it were measured by the aevum, moreover, it would not follow from this that the angel would know future things, just as we argued concerning God: because the angel's understanding is not measured by eternity as the divine understanding is, but by discrete time, or by an instant of discrete time, as will be shown below ²¹.

XIV. To the second doubt ²² it is answered that this argument presupposes, from what precedes ²³, that God knows all things that are actually present to Him according to their esse, and that fall under the same duration as His intellection of them, because His essence, existing as one, is the likeness of all beings. But because some wished to remove knowledge of non-beings from God on the ground that science is only of beings, he shows that this does not have the effect of removing knowledge of non-beings from God: for although non-beings are not actual at this time, they are nevertheless present to eternity, which is the measure of divine intellection, for the time for which they will be. Now we do not know by a single act of seeing or understanding all things that are really present to us through coexistence, but only those that are actually present to us in objective esse. Therefore it is not similar.

It may also be said that the difference between our knowledge and divine knowledge is this: not every knowledge possible for us is present in us all at once, but it has succession, since we now know one thing, now another. But every knowledge possible is present in God in Himself all at once, since the divine intellect is not in potency, because the whole breadth of His knowledge is measured by eternity, which has no succession but is wholly simultaneous. On this account the argument proceeds well as follows. Divine knowledge extends as far as its duration, which is eternity: because the whole breadth of divine knowledge is measured by eternity as by an adequate measure. But eternity comprehends all time, and consequently everything that exists in whatever time. Therefore divine intellection also extends to all time and to the esse of things in whatever time. And thus the argument of Saint Thomas proceeds. — The argument, however, would not hold of our knowledge. For the major would be false, namely: Our knowledge, which we have now, extends only as far as its measure extends, which is the present time; because the whole breadth of knowledge possible to be in us is not measured by this demonstrated present time as by an adequate measure, since there is in our knowledge a succession of different cognitions according to different times. There is therefore not a similar account of divine understanding and of our understanding. It would be similar, however, if the present time in which this understanding of ours occurs were the adequate measure of all knowledge possible to us in that time, so that the whole breadth of such knowledge would be measured by that time; for since in this present time we can know all things that coexist with us, speaking distributively, and as far as the intellect's side goes, it would follow that by that one act of understanding we would understand all things existing with us. And if we posited that very present time to coexist simultaneously with past time and future time, and thereby to measure every knowledge possible to us as being in past time and in future time, then by the present act of understanding we would know both past things and present things. But since this is not so, therefore it is not similar.

XV. As to the second ²⁴, two points are noted for the clarification of the conclusion proved. The first is that things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been, are known otherwise than things that are present, past, or future. For the latter are known not in themselves, but as existing in the divine power: and they are said to be known by the knowledge of simple intelligence. But these latter are known as existing in their own power, in their proper causes, and in themselves: and they are said to be known by the knowledge of vision.

The second is that God has knowledge of all such things through His essence: insofar as it is representable according to the many things that are not, nor will be, nor have been (which pertain to first knowledge); [it is] also the likeness of the power of every cause; and the esse of every thing which it has in itself.

From these things the answer to the objection is evident, which was that knowledge is only of beings ²⁵. For it is said that all things known by God are in some way: because they are either in the power of God, or in their proximate causes, or in themselves.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Ecclesiasticus 23, and Jeremiah 1.

2. It must be noted, for an understanding of that distinction in the divine cognition between knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision, that this distinction is not to be taken on the side of the divine science itself, as though it possessed any multiplicity in itself—since it was said above ²⁶ that God knows all things by one simple and indivisible knowledge—but on the side of the objects known through it. For some things are known by God which have esse at no difference of time; and with respect to these, that knowledge is called knowledge of simple intelligence, because it terminates in a thing and nature producible but not joined to the esse of actual existence outside God himself, but simply as it has esse in God. Some things, however, have esse at some time; and with respect to these, the same indivisible knowledge is called knowledge of vision, because things are seen by us when they have esse in themselves. Thus there is only one divine knowledge in itself, by which God knows all things; but it is multiplied according to reason and receives different names, according to the diversity of the objects upon which it terminates.

XVI. As to the third point ²⁷, he excludes the error of those who say that God knows only singulars because he knows them only in their universal causes: just as one who would know this eclipse, not as it is this one, but as it proceeds from an opposition. For it is clear that this is false, since we say that he knows singulars not only in their causes, but also as they are in themselves.

But a doubt arises here: for it seems that Saint Thomas wishes that to know the singular in its cause is to know only universally. For this does not seem true. For an astrologer, knowing a future eclipse, knows it at such and such a determinate time and in such and such a position. But this is to know the singular in its singularity: because the singular is called singular precisely because it is determined to this here and now.

It is answered that to know the singular in a universal cause is not to know it as determined to here and now, because this can be known only by sense. — And when it is said that the astrologer knows the eclipse as determined to here and now, the reply is that this is not true: