Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

The first conclusion for resolving the proposed question is this: God knows singulars¹. And it is understood of material singulars.

I. It is proved first. The effects of God subsisting are singular things, not universals: for universals do not subsist, as is proved in VII Metaphysics, text 51. Therefore God knows singular things. — The consequence is proved. Because He knows other things insofar as He is their cause.

Concerning the proof of the consequence, it must be noted that inasmuch as can specify the account of cognition, and it can express the concomitance of cognition and causality. If it specifies the account of cognition, it can have a twofold sense: first, that the account of causality is the cause of cognition; in another way, that the cause itself, insofar as known, is the cause of knowing other things. In the first way, the sense is that God's being the cause of things—namely, such a cause as operates through knowledge—is the reason why God knows other things. In the second way, however, the sense is that, since God is the cause of things through his essence, and knows other things by knowing his own essence, it follows that from the knowledge of their cause he has knowledge of those things themselves. But the first sense cannot be true, and therefore it was not intended by Saint Thomas. For in agents acting through intellect, cognition precedes causality in the order of nature, since causality is founded upon cognition. And so being an agent cause through intellect is not the reason why something is known; rather, conversely, an agent acts through intellect because it knows—namely, practically. Therefore, taking inasmuch as specifiatively, the second sense must be embraced.

It seems, however, more true that ly inasmuch as is not taken specifically, but signifies the concomitance of causality and cognition: and let the sense be that it necessarily knows all things of which it is the cause, because it is a cause through an agent intellect, and consequently causality and cognition accompany one another in it; and therefore it must be that, according to our manner of understanding, it knows a thing before it acts upon it.

II. Second. God knows matter, and the individuating accidents, and the forms existing in individuated matter. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. God's understanding is His essence. Therefore He understands all things that are in His essence in any way whatever. Therefore He knows all those things: because in His essence all things that participate in esse in any way whatever are present virtually, since He is the first and universal principle of being; but matter has esse in potency, and an accident has esse in another, and these are certain participations of esse. — The consequence is also proved. Because, once the principles from which the essence of a thing is constituted are known, it is necessary that that thing be known. Now a singular essence is constituted from this designated matter and an individuated form: and they would fall into its definition if it could be defined. — Concerning the matter of this argument something was said above².

III. Third. God perfectly knows the common nature of being, by knowing His own essence. Therefore He knows the universal and the singular. Therefore He knows the singular nature. And thus it is not repugnant to Him to know the singular. — The first consequence is proved: because the universal and the particular are differences or per se passions of being. But the nature of a genus cannot be known unless its first differences and proper passions are known. — The second consequence is also proved: because, just as one would not perfectly know the universal if he knew only the intention of universality and did not know the universal nature, so neither would one know the singular if he knew only the intention of singularity and did not know the particular nature.

Note concerning that proposition, The nature of a genus cannot be known unless its first differences are known, that, since a genus is a certain universal whole, and cannot exist in nature unless it is limited by some difference, it cannot be perfectly known unless the differences by which it is limited are known: for no nature is perfectly known unless it is known in the way in which it can exist in nature. He makes mention of the first differences, however, and not of the others, because in order that a genus exist in nature, it suffices for it, as far as it is concerned in itself, that it be limited to one of its differences: and if something else is at times required, this is not on account of itself, but on account of the inferior requiring other differences in order to exist. For example, in order that body exist in nature, it suffices for it that it be animate; but that it cannot exist unless it is also sentient, this is not on its own part, but on account of animated body not being able to exist in nature unless it too be limited by some difference, since it too is a genus; for the proximate genus, limited to one species, does not require another difference in order to exist.

Note also that when it is said that the universal and the singular are differences of being or passions, Saint Thomas takes "differences" in a broad sense ³ For, as was shown above, being cannot have differences; but they are called differences of being because they explicate certain opposed modes of essendi which are not expressed by the name of being. Saint Thomas, moreover, does not care whether they are called differences in this way, or rather passions, since it makes no difference to the point at issue. They seem, however, to be more passions than differences, on account of the implication of the second intention.

IV. Fourth. In the divine cognition is contained every perfection of cognition. Therefore it knows singulars. — The consequence is evident, because in this consists the perfection of some knowers. — But the antecedent is proved: as God is his own esse, so he is his own understanding. But from the fact that he is his own esse, all perfections of being are contained in him as in the first origin of being. Therefore from the fact that he is his own knowing, it must be that in his cognition is contained every perfection of cognition, as in the first fountain of cognition.

Note that, just as knowing beings are placed in a twofold order of things, namely in the order of beings and in the order of knowers, so it must be that they are reduced to two first principles from which those orders themselves draw their origin exemplarily. And therefore, just as with respect to the order of beings they are reduced to the divine esse as to that which is the exemplar of all esse, so insofar as they are in the order of knowers, they are reduced to the divine cognition as to the exemplary form of all cognition. On account of this Saint Thomas says that in it is contained every perfection of cognition as in the first fountain of cognition.

V. Fifth. Whatever man knows by intellect, imagination, and sense, God considers by His one and simple intellect. Therefore He knows singulars: for we know these by sense and imagination. — The antecedent is proved: because the cognitive power in God is superior to that in man. Now in all ordered powers it is commonly found that the superior power, existing as one, extends to more things, while the inferior extends to fewer and multiplied things, as is evident from imagination and sense: for the imaginative power extends to all those things to which the external senses extend, and even to more.

2. But a doubt arises concerning the foundation of the reason. For the human intellect is superior to imagination and sense, and yet it does not know singulars, which are known by sense and imagination. Therefore that foundation is not universally true, that a superior power extends itself to all things into which an inferior can, and further into more.

This can be answered in three ways. First, by denying the assumption. Indeed, our intellect can know singulars, considered absolutely; although it does not know them except indirectly and reflectively, being joined to a body, because of the mode of understanding it has, namely through abstraction from matter. Hence the separated soul will be able to know them through species that are not abstracted but infused.

Second, that the proposition of St. Thomas is understood of distinct and complete natures in species, such as God, angel, and man; but not of the powers of the same nature, as is the case here with intellect, imagination, and sense; because, although these are distinct powers, they are nevertheless all powers of man, who is of one species. — But this reply does not seem to accord with the mind of St. Thomas. For both here and elsewhere ⁴, to make that proposition clear, he gives an example from imagination and sense, which nevertheless belong to one nature.

Third, it can be answered that our intellect can know singulars, but in a more eminent mode than sense and imagination. Hence the proposition of St. Thomas, which is Boethius's, in the Consolation, Book V, ⁵ is understood as it is explained in De Veritate, q. II, a. 6, ad 4, and q. x, a. 5, ad 5, and the First Part, q. LXXXVI, a. 1, ad 4: whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do, but in a more eminent mode. Here it must be considered that, since the universal nature outside the intellect is not really distinct from the singular nature, but is limited within the singular itself by its individuating conditions, therefore whoever knows the universal nature also knows the singular nature. But it is true that whoever knows it without the individuating accidents knows it as universal, immaterially and abstractly; whereas whoever knows it as determined by material conditions knows it materially, and concretely with respect to the individuating principles, and insofar as it is singular. Our intellect, therefore, understands a substance that is singular in a more eminent mode, because it knows it universally and immaterially, while sense knows it materially. And thus it knows it in a nobler way, since it knows the singular with respect to the intimate nature of the species, while sense knows it with respect to the material accidents.

3. But still this response does not seem to satisfy. For it does not seem to preserve the point of the argument introduced here. For St. Thomas wishes to conclude here that God knows singulars not only as regards their essence, through abstraction from material conditions, but also as regards the very material conditions themselves. Therefore that proposition must be understood concerning the same mode of cognition: namely, that whatever a lower power knows, a higher power can know in the same way.

It is said first that whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do—always in a nobler way on the part of the agent, but sometimes also on the part of the thing known. Now, on the part of the thing known this can be in two ways: either because it can do so not in the manner of the object in which the lower power can act, but because it can do so in some higher manner; or because it can do so both in that manner and in some other. Our intellect, therefore, knows singulars in a nobler way than sense does, both on the part of the one understanding and on the part of the thing understood, because it is immaterial in knowing, and it understands a thing not with respect to its extrinsic accidents, as sense does, but with respect to its very quiddity. In God, however, there is a more eminent mode than the mode of our intellect and sense, both on the part of the knower and on the part of the thing known: for sense knows only material accidents per se, our intellect knows only its nature and substance, whereas the divine intellect knows both substance and accidents—which is a more perfect knowledge of the singular insofar as it is singular; and further, His knowledge is most noble on the part of the knower.

It is said, secondly, that whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can also do, sometimes even in the same way on the part of the object, because it is directed to that mode of object to which the lower power is directed, although it can also be directed to some other mode, provided, I say, that on the part of the higher power there is nothing repugnant. Hence Saint Thomas said that this is commonly true, as if he were saying: It is universally true that it can do it in the same way, unless something repugnant is found in the higher power. This he also gives to be understood in Verit., q. x, a. 5, ad 5, where, explaining the aforesaid proposition, he says that what a lower power can do a higher power can do, yet not always in the same way, but sometimes in a higher way; from which it follows that it can also sometimes do it in the same way, namely on the part of the object. Now, in the divine intellect there is nothing that is repugnant to the cognition of singulars in their singularity. But in our intellect there is something repugnant, namely, that the species by which it understands are likenesses only of universals, since they are received in the intellect through a certain abstraction from individuating conditions, as is said below ⁶. Therefore our intellect cannot understand singulars in the way in which sense does, on the part of the thing known; rather, it understands in a more eminent way.

The divine intellect, however, in its singularity knows things as sense does, namely even with respect to their very singularity; and further, with respect to their substantial quiddity, which sense cannot do.

4. Whence the argument concludes well, if the foundation of the argument is rightly understood: namely, that what a lower power can do, a higher power can do either in the same way or in a more eminent one; and always in the same way on the side of the object, that is, in that mode of the object toward which the lower power is directed, and sometimes along with it tending toward a higher and other mode of the object, unless there is something repugnant to the nature and mode of the higher power. But it can always do so in a more eminent manner on the side of the agent.

VI. Sixth. God's knowledge of things is of the mode of practical knowledge. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is evident, because by His knowledge God is the cause of things. — But the consequence is proved, because practical knowledge is not perfect unless it reaches singulars, since its end is operation, which is in singulars.

Note that this argument is distinguished from the first and the second, because here the very condition of cognition is considered in itself, whereas in those cases the things known were being considered.

Note also that Saint Thomas said God's knowledge of other things is of the manner of practical knowledge, but is not absolutely practical, because since God knows Himself and other things by one and the same knowledge, it cannot be called simply practical, since He knows Himself speculatively: but it eminently contains both the speculative and the practical. Yet when compared to things other than Himself as if to be produced by Him, it takes on the manner of practical knowledge, insofar as it is ordered to operation.

VII. Seventh. The intellect that is the mover or cause of the first mobile knows that mobile insofar as it is singular. Therefore God knows the singular. The antecedent is proved: because the first mobile is moved by a mover acting through intellect and will. But a mover could not move it through intellect and will unless he knew the mobile insofar as it is here and now, and consequently singular, for such it is as mobile. The consequence too is proved: because either that mover is God, and thus the point is established; or there is something below God whose intellect can know the singular by its own power, which our intellect cannot do—and then all the more can the intellect of God do this.

Note that if some intellect, by reason of its perfection, is able to attain something which the human intellect cannot attain, the divine intellect must be able to attain it far more readily: since in it there is no repugnance to understanding any thing whatsoever, and it is the most perfect of all intellects. Therefore Saint Thomas argues most excellently that, if another intellect can, by its own perfection, know a singular thing unknown to the human intellect, then much more will the divine intellect be able to do so.

VIII. Eighth ⁷. If God's knowledge of singulars were denied, this would be because we see that our intellect, by reason of its immateriality, does not know singulars—since God is far more immaterial. But this is no obstacle: for there is some particular reason in our intellect why it does not understand singulars, which is not present in the divine intellect. Therefore, and so on.

The minor is proved. And first, as to the first part, assuming that assimilation to the thing known in us comes about through the action of sensible things upon the cognitive powers: a form of a lower order cannot, by acting, produce its likeness in a higher degree. Therefore the form of a sensible thing cannot produce a likeness of its singularity so as to be altogether immaterial. Therefore in our intellect there cannot be a likeness of the singularity of a sensible form. Therefore a singular sensible form cannot be known by our intellect. — The antecedent is evident, because the agent is more honorable than the patient and than act. — The first consequence is evident from itself. — The second also holds, because the likeness that is in the intellect is immaterial. — The last, however, is proved thus: because all cognition comes about through an assimilation of knower and known.

Second, the minor is proved as regards its second part. Because the knowledge of God is not through the action of the thing known upon the knower, but on the contrary knowledge is the cause of things. Hence, since its causality extends as far as the singularity of the sensible form, the likeness of its singularity will be in the intellect. And thus it can know the singular.

The whole reason for the diversity, then, is that in our intellect there is no likeness of the singular thing, but there indeed is in the divine intellect.

It must be noted, from what Saint Thomas says, that the immateriality of the species of our intellect is not the reason why they are not likenesses of singulars; for if it were, this would also hold in the divine intellect. Rather, it is because the likeness is received from the sensible things themselves by the power of the agent intellect; but a singular cannot cause in the intellect a likeness of itself as such.

IX. Concerning this process, doubt is raised in several ways. First ⁸. If a form of a lower grade cannot produce a likeness of itself into a higher grade, it follows that a sensible form will not be able to cause its likeness in the medium and in the sense: because that is of a nobler grade than the material form.

2. Second, ⁹ The agent intellect does not produce the intelligible species in the intellect except through a phantasm. But the phantasm is a likeness of an individual thing. Therefore a likeness of an individual thing will be produced, though it is produced immaterially.

If it is said that the phantasm acts only by reason of the universal form, and therefore does not cause instrumentally except the likeness of the universal form — against this. First, because to act belongs only to a particular thing, not to a universal.

Second, because it acts only insofar as it is a likeness. But a likeness is not universal, but particular. Therefore, etc.

3. Thirdly ¹⁰ It would follow that the intellect could in no way know singulars, if a likeness is required for knowledge, and there is no likeness of the singular in our intellect. But this is false: because, as is said in the First Part ¹¹ and De Veritate ¹², where above ¹³, they are known indirectly and reflexively.

4. Fourth ¹⁴. Our intellect, as is said in the First Part, q. LXXXVI, a. 7, in order to understand its proper object must turn itself to phantasms, so as to behold the universal nature existing in the particular. But it cannot do this except by knowing the singular: just as something cannot be seen in a mirror unless the mirror be seen. Therefore our intellect knows singulars, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas.

X. To the first of these it is said that, although the form of a sensible thing is received in the medium and in the sense without matter, it is nevertheless not received without material conditions: since it is received under determinate dimensions and a determinate situation, as is also evident in the forms resulting in a mirror. Therefore it is contained within the breadth of a material form: for a certain form is material because it exists with matter and material conditions, and another because it has material conditions. On this account the sensible form does not produce its likeness to a higher degree simply, but to some more perfect degree, yet within the breadth of its own order. That proposition, however, "A form of a lower degree cannot produce its likeness into a higher degree," is to be understood of a degree higher simply, that is, one which is above the whole breadth of its own order. Hence, when St. Thomas wishes to conclude the proposed point from this, he deduces that the sensible form cannot produce a likeness of its singularity so as to be altogether immaterial. As if to say that, although it can produce a thing in some way immaterial, because that can be contained within the breadth of its own order, it cannot nevertheless produce a thing altogether immaterial, since that is above the whole order of material form. On this account he says in On Spiritual Creatures, a. 10, ad ult., and in the Question on the Soul, a. 4, ad 1, that the form which is in the sense can imprint a form in the imagination, because they are of the same genus, since each is individual and material: but the imaginary form cannot of itself imprint an intelligible species, because it is of another genus, since it is a universal form. And in On the Soul, in the place cited, ad 3, he says that the condition of the recipient cannot transfer the received species from one genus into another: it can, however, while the genus remains the same, vary the received species according to some mode of being.

If it is said that the argument brought forward for that proposition—namely, that the agent is nobler than the patient and the act—proves the point as much for a degree within the breadth of its own order as for a degree entirely superior, because even within the breadth of its own order the agent is nobler than the act, and thus in no way can any form produce one nobler than itself, even within its own breadth,—the answer is given, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Potentia, q. 5, a. 8, that sensible action, with respect to the diffusion of the likeness of its form into the medium according to a spiritual intention, belongs to it insofar as it participates something of the property of a superior nature, namely of the separate substances: since lower things always have some participation in what is above them. From this it follows that an agent which by its own nature is less noble can produce a nobler form, as participating in a superior nature, as proximate agent and agent of itself, yet within the breadth of its own order. It is said, therefore, that within the breadth of its own order, the agent need not, by its own nature qua such, be nobler than the form produced when it does not act by an action proper to it as such, but from a participation in a superior nature: in this way the sensible acts upon the medium and upon sense spiritually.

XI. To the second point ¹⁵ it is said that the phantasm does not concur in causing the species by reason of its own nature, by which it is compared to the subject, namely insofar as it is such an accident; but insofar as it is a likeness of the thing outside. And because the thing outside, as is said in Verit., q. viii, a. 11, does not act through matter but through form, therefore, speaking per se, when the nature of the agent is considered, the phantasm is a likeness of the thing with respect to form, although per accidens, insofar as it is received in a bodily organ receiving materially, it has it that it is also a likeness of the material dispositions, insofar as from its materiality it also represents the conditions of the form of the agent outside. On this account it causes in the intellect a likeness of the form only, but not of the material dispositions: because it acts as a likeness of the form per se; and thus the form only, from which the universal nature is taken, is for it the reason for acting instrumentally into the intellect together with the agent intellect. Therefore, although the phantasm is a likeness of the singular thing, it need not produce in the intellect a likeness of the singular thing: because it does not act by reason of the material dispositions of the singular thing, but by reason of the nature and form latent in the phantasm. And therefore the answer given there ¹⁶ is a good one. And it is that of St. Thomas Verit., q. ii, a. 5.

To the first objection it is said that, although acting is not of a universal thing—that is, as it stands under the intention of universality, for thus it has only objective esse—but of a singular thing, nevertheless the very nature can be the reason of acting by reason of the form, from which the universal nature is taken, and not by reason of the material conditions, from which singularity is taken.

To the second it is said that, just as in a singular thing accidents appear only externally, and yet beneath them lie hidden the nature and substance, on account of which they are said to be accidents of such a substance; so too the species which is in sense and imagination, although it is a likeness expressly external to sense and imagination, representing the accidents, by reason of the materiality of the subject in which it is received is nevertheless virtually and implicitly a likeness of the form from which it is caused; and in an immaterial subject, together with the agent intellect, it can cause a likeness representative of the nature alone to the intellect, but not of material accidents.

XII. In answer to the third ¹⁷, it must first be considered that when the intellect arrives at knowledge of one thing through knowledge of another, it is not always required that it have its own species of that thing; rather, the species through which the first thing is known can suffice for its cognition and can be called in some way a likeness of it. Thus, because we arrive at some knowledge of separate substances from sensible things, we need not possess their proper likeness; sensible species suffice, which can in some way be called remote likenesses of those substances, just as sensible things themselves are in some way likenesses of immaterial things. Since, therefore, the intellect does not know singulars primarily and directly, but by reflection—when, having grasped the quiddity, it turns back to consider its own act and the intelligible species, from which it turns toward the phantasm and the singular—it is not necessary that it have in the intellect their proper likeness, which is an intelligible species; it suffices that it have a certain remote likeness of them.

2. But whether in this cognition by reflection the intellect forms within itself a proper concept of the singular: — I would say that it does, just as from material quiddities it forms some proper concept of an immaterial substance; although it is not a quidditative concept, on account of the weakness of our intellect. I am moved to this because, since the intellect posits a comparison between the singular and the universal, as when it says, Socrates is a man, which proposition the intellect itself forms, as is said in the First Part, where above ¹⁸, the reflected knowledge must precede the formation and knowledge of that complex.

Nor does it avail if it be said that this does not require the formation of a proper concept, but that it can be known through an alien concept, which is in a way a concept of Socrates arguitively, not representatively, just as with an unknown deity: if it were called A, the intellect would form this proposition, A is a first substance, etc.; for in forming that proposition the intellect is content with a confused concept and with what the name signifies — this, I say, does not avail. First, because St. Thomas does not speak of a confused cognition of the singular, but of a distinct one; since he wishes that to be known indirectly and by reflection which he denies can be known directly, namely the singular in its singularity, because it is of that that the question is asked; and he wishes that from such a cognition one should form this proposition, Socrates is a man; but from that confused cognition it would not be known that Socrates is a man as Socrates actually is, but only some singular thing indistinctly. Hence neither would it ever be known that the deity is a first substance, etc., unless some distinct concept of the deity were had, even if it were not quidditative simply speaking. — Second, because in order for something to be understood, it is necessary that it be made objectively present to the intellect. Now St. Thomas holds a concept to be necessary for this. And therefore, if the singular is to be understood in its singularity, some proper concept of it must be formed: either one entirely distinct from every other concept, or one that contains the proper concept virtually, representing expressly, namely, the singular in its singularity.

Nor does it stand in the way that, according to Saint Thomas, it is repugnant to our intellect to have a likeness of a material individual, because otherwise it would not abstract from this here and now. For it is said that it is repugnant to the intellect to have a likeness of an individual that is an intelligible species caused by the thing: because the intellect receives species from the motion of things themselves and through abstraction from material conditions; and therefore, even in understanding those things that are known directly through species, it abstracts from this here and now, inasmuch as the species itself represents universally. But it is not repugnant to the intellect to have a likeness of a singular that is a concept formed by the intellect itself, while, knowing the intelligible species, from the very species known it forms within itself a concept of the phantasm and of the singular, from which the species is in some way caused. Nor must the intellect abstract from this here and now with respect to those things it knows reflexively, although it is immaterial in itself: because that concept, existing immaterially and not determined to this here and now in its esse, represents material conditions immaterially, just as does the species of an angelic intellect.

Nor is there any objection in what St. Thomas says in Question de Anima, article 20, in reply to the first objection, namely that this reflection is accomplished only through the assistance of the imaginative power. For this does not argue that the singular is not known by its proper concept, but rather that, just as in direct cognition the operation of the imagination is required, forming the phantasm in act, so too in reflex cognition, by which the singular is known, on account of the dependence and binding of the intellect in understanding upon the sensitive powers.

XIII. To the fourth doubt ¹⁹ it is said that this turning of the intellect to the phantasms is not a cognition of the phantasm, as though the intellect, in order to see its object, had to see the universal nature in the phantasm and in the particular thing seen by it, just as things are seen in a visible mirror. But I understand this turning in such a way that the intellect, in understanding the universal nature itself, must be united by a kind of continuation to the imagination: namely, that it cannot understand the universal nature unless the imagination itself, constituting the phantasms in act at the command of the intellect, is also at work, as Saint Thomas says below ²⁰.

That Saint Thomas holds this meaning is clear from his procedure in the same place. For, wishing to prove that the intellect must be turned to phantasms, he proves that for the intellect to understand by knowledge already acquired, an act of the imagination and of the other intellectual powers is required. And below ²¹ he proves the same thing because the universal nature is not known perfectly unless it is known as existing in a particular; but we know the particular through sense and imagination. From which it follows that the intellect's being turned to phantasms is nothing other than moving the imagination to form a phantasm.

2. But a doubt still remains. For from the fact that the imagination forms the phantasm and knows the singular, it does not seem to follow that the intellect knows the nature as existing in the particular, since, on this exposition, the intellect does not apprehend the singular itself, but the imagination does.

It is answered that, just as the exterior sense sees accidents existing in a substance as existing in a substance, and yet does not see the substance itself—it is the intellect that sees the substance, or also the cogitative power, if the substance is considered as particular—so conversely it is not unfitting for the intellect to see the substance and the universal nature as it is in the singular, and yet not to see the singular itself, but only the imagination. Hence it is not said to be seen in the singular as in a thing seen by the intellect: but because it is seen according to the mode in which it is in the singular, by way of a universal form, while the imagination sees the singular itself.

3. But when it is urged ²² that nothing can be seen in a mirror unless the mirror itself is also seen: — it is said first that indeed the singular is seen by one considering nature as existing in the singular, not through the intellect, but through the imagination.

It is said second, that the simile of the mirror does not hold. For things are seen in a mirror because the species of the mirror is received in the sight, by which both the mirror and the thing in the mirror are seen; and therefore it is necessary that each be seen. Here, however, the nature is not seen in the particular through a species existing as singular in the intellect, but through a species which is only a likeness of the universal nature: just as the accidents of a singular nature are seen in the substance, the substance not being seen except per accidens, because the species which is in the sight is a likeness of the accidents alone, and not of the substance. Hence it can also be conceded that the intellect then understands the singular per accidens, namely because it understands something conjoined to the singular: just as the sight sees the substance per accidens, insofar as it is itself conjoined to what is visible per se.

XIV. Ninth ²³. It would follow that God is most foolish, according to the argument of the Philosopher against Empedocles, as was cited above ²⁴, if He did not know singulars, which even men know.

It is also proved by the authority of Hebrews 4. And the contrary error is excluded by Ecclesiasticus 16.

XV. From what has been said, the solution to the argument on the opposite side is evident ²⁵. For when it is said that a material singular cannot be known by an immaterial power, since all cognition comes about through assimilation, the assumption is denied. And in proof of this it is said that, although that by which the divine intellect understands is immaterial, it is nevertheless a likeness of matter and form. — Understand this of the representative likeness, which is required for cognition: not, however, of the likeness that signifies a conformity in nature. — Or, if we understand it of a likeness conforming in nature (since there is also in some way a likeness between God and the creature, as was said ²⁶), it must be understood in accordance with what is said in the First Part, q. LVII, a. 2, ad 2: not of a conformity in genus or in species, but according to a certain analogy, just as the higher has a likeness to the lower, as the sun to fire.