Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Because truth, according to the Philosopher, III de Anima¹, is found in our intellect insofar as it composes and divides; and since it was said² that God neither composes nor divides, someone might suppose that truth is not in the divine intellect. Therefore, to exclude this, Saint Thomas determines the question concerning the truth of the divine intellect³. In regard to this he does two things: first, he shows that truth is in God; second, he shows what that truth itself is like, ch. LXI. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he shows that there is truth in God; second, that it is His own truth, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, the following conclusion is proposed: Although the divine intellect neither composes nor divides, truth is not thereby excluded from it, which, according to the Philosopher, belongs only to the composition and division of the intellect.

And it is proved first⁴. The divine intellect knows not only quiddities but also enunciations. Therefore what the divine intellect says in understanding is composition and division. Therefore truth is not excluded from the divine intellect. — The first inference is evident, because an enunciation is a kind of composition. — The second, however, is proved as follows. Truth in the intellect pertains to what the intellect says, not to the operation of the intellect: for the operation need not be adequate to the thing understood, since the thing is sometimes material while understanding is immaterial; but it pertains to what the intellect says and knows in understanding. Since, therefore, the truth of the intellect is the adequation of intellect and thing, insofar as the intellect says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not, it follows that the intellect is true when it is so in the thing as it says: and thus, if it says a true composition, it is true.

It must be noted, concerning the definition of truth, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Prima Pars, q. XVI⁵, and De Veritate, q. I⁶, that this definition whereby it is said that truth is the adequation of thing and intellect—which is Isaac's—is given according to what formally perfects the ratio of the true. And it can pertain both to the truth of the thing and to the truth of the intellect: for a thing is said to be true insofar as it is adequate to an intellect; and an intellect is said to be true insofar as it is adequate to the thing, namely because it is so in the thing as it is said and understood by the intellect. Now this adequation of the intellect to the thing is not taken on the side of the act: for the act does not have the ratio of a likeness of the thing understood, such that it might be said to be adequate or inadequate to it, although it proceeds from some likeness of it and terminates in a likeness. Rather, it is taken on the side of the form of the intellect, according to which the intellect is said to be like the thing and adequate to it. Hence truth, on the side of the intellect, signifies some form in the intellect which is a likeness of the thing understood, insofar as by means of it the intellect is adequate to the thing: so that that likeness is not formally truth except by reason of that adequation.

It must also be noted that when it is said that the truth of the intellect is the adequation of intellect and thing, according as the intellect says esse of what is or non-esse of what is not, this is understood of truth as it is known and stated. For the sense is that the intellect is then true, as knowing or stating the true, when it states or knows that what is, is, or that what is not, is not. — In this way also is understood what is said in IV Metaph., text. 27⁷, namely that the true is that being is and that non-being is not. For this is understood of the true as known. For the true is then known when it is known that what is, is, and that what is not, is not; and likewise it is then said to be true when it is stated that what is, is, and that what is not, is not.

II. But concerning what is said here a threefold doubt arises. The first is that St. Thomas, in De Veritate, q. 1, art. 1, says that knowledge is a certain effect of truth. But that which is said is the term and effect of knowledge, not its cause. Therefore truth does not pertain to that which is said. The opposite of this was stated here.

According to⁸ it is because, if what the divine intellect says is composition and division, then the divine intellect composes and divides: for in us there is nothing else to compose and divide than to utter some complex concept. But this is false, as was shown above.⁹ Therefore it is false that the divine intellect says composition and division.

The third¹⁰ is because the fact that understanding is immaterial and the thing understood is sometimes material does not seem a sufficient reason why understanding itself should not need to be adequate to the thing. For even the complex concept is immaterial in the intellect: and yet it is adequate or inadequate to a material thing.

III. To the first of these a twofold answer can be given. First, that since truth imports the likeness of the thing known, according to which the intellect is conformed and adequate to the thing, truth is found in the intellect in two ways, just as the likeness of the thing understood is found in it in two ways. For sometimes the likeness is found in it imperfectly, as when it is informed by an intelligible species but does not actually consider; sometimes, however, perfectly, as when it actually understands and forms a concept of the thing conformed to it. Therefore truth is found in the intellect both imperfectly, by reason of the intelligible species taken precisely, and perfectly, by reason of the concept formed about the thing. Hence, when it is said in the Quaestiones de Veritate that cognition is the effect of truth, this is understood of truth taken imperfectly. But when it is said here that truth pertains to what is said, this is understood of perfect and complete truth.

It can be answered secondly that the knowledge of our intellect is terminated at two things: namely, at the concept, which is formed by the act of understanding; and at the thing represented by such a concept. And in the order of nature the concept is produced before the thing is understood as existing outside. From which it follows that by nature the intellect is first conformed to the thing through its concept before it knows the extrinsic thing as it exists outside the intellect. And since truth consists in the conformity of intellect and thing, therefore in the order of nature the intellect is true before it is terminated at the thing outside. In this way knowledge—not taken simply and as it proceeds from the intellect, but as it is terminated at the thing insofar as it is in itself—is an effect of truth. And yet truth pertains to what is said. I say, then, that what is said is not an effect and terminus of knowledge insofar as knowledge is terminated at something outside; rather, in this way it is its cause: because the concept is for that very knowledge the reason why it is terminated at something outside—although, speaking absolutely, it is an effect and terminus of the intelligible operation. For the concept of the intellect, according to Saint Thomas, is said to be the principle of knowing insofar as knowledge is terminated at the thing represented through the concept: not, however, insofar as it proceeds from the intellect. For as is clear in the First Part, q. XV, and De Veritate, q. III, "idea" names the concept which is a terminus produced by the act of the intellect, and it is posited as the principle not only of production but also of the cognition of things. — This answer I consider better, and more in keeping with the intention of Saint Thomas.

2. To the second it is said that what is stated in this place is not to be understood as though the divine intellect were said to utter composition or division, as if it uttered a composition made by the divine intellect itself, as the objection proceeds, just as our intellect utters a complex word by producing it; but because it utters, that is, conceives and understands, the composition and division of our intellect by a simple word, which represents every composition of our intellect. This is clear: because he derives this from the fact that he knows enunciations, not indeed formed by him, since it has been shown that he does not compose, but formed by our intellect. That this is also true is evident from what is said in the First Part, q. 16, a. 5, ad 1, where it is said that the divine intellect, by its simple act of understanding, judges about all things and knows all complexes. But this suffices for his purpose, whereby he wishes to show that he knows truth, although he does not compose. For if he knows the composition of our intellect (yet simply, and without composition on the part of his own act), since that composition contains truth, it follows that he knows truth.

3. To the third it is said that, since understanding does not have the character of representing the object but only of attaining it, no adequation could be understood in it except in the esse of nature. And therefore, since understanding is necessarily immaterial, if the thing understood is material, there cannot be an adequation between them. But the concept of the intellect is the representative form of the thing understood. Therefore, although there is not between it and the thing an adequation according to the esse of nature, there can nevertheless be an adequation according to representation, insofar as it represents the thing as it is in the thing. Therefore that is a sufficient account of the understanding itself, which would not be sufficient of what is said, that is, of the concept.

IV. Second, ¹¹. Given per impossibile that the divine intellect knew only incomplexes, in the way our intellect does, it would still be true. Therefore truth is not to be removed from it on the ground that it does not compose. — The consequence is proved: because our intellect, in apprehending a quiddity, is always true.

Toward the manifestation of this, he notes two things. The first is that there is a difference between the incomplex, which is said or understood, and the complex, because the incomplex, insofar as it is of itself, is neither equal to the thing nor unequal to it, since of itself it contains no composition or application to the thing; but the complex does so well, in which the comparison of the incomplex to the thing is signified by the mark of composition and division.

The second is that the incomplex intellect nevertheless apprehends the quiddity of a thing in a certain relation to the thing: for it apprehends it as the quiddity of this thing. Hence such an intellect is said to be always true per se, as is said in III De Anima, text 26: although it can be false per accidens, by reason of an admixture of composition, either of the parts of the definition among themselves, or of the whole definition to the thing defined; by the former a definition is said to be false simply, by the latter false with respect to this thing. So likewise the divine intellect would be true in knowing its essence as its own.

V. Concerning what is said here about the incomplex, it must be considered that the incomplex concept and the incomplex are not the same in this context. Rather, the incomplex is the very object, taken formally and precisely, which is apprehended by the first operation of the intellect and represented by the incomplex concept, which the intellect conceives within itself. And thus the incomplex and the incomplex concept are distinguished as the thing represented and the likeness actually representing.

The incomplex term itself, for instance that which I call "rational animal," can be considered in two ways on the side of the thing. In one way, absolutely and in itself, namely with respect to its nature taken precisely and formally. And thus it is clear that it imports no comparison or adequation to the thing: for "rational animal" says nothing other than human nature itself as signified specifically, that is, signified without the individuating accidents.

It can be considered in another way, according as it is apprehended by the intellect. And thus it includes a comparison to the thing concomitantly. And this is its very being understood, together with a comparison to the thing. For the intellect apprehends rational animal not by abstraction from anything whatever and indifferently, but as the quiddity of this thing: for when it wishes to understand the quiddity of man, it forms of him this quiddity, rational animal. And thus that which in itself neither states a comparison to the thing nor consequently is true or false is understood with a comparison, and is understood truly, insofar as it is so in the thing that this is its quiddity, just as the intellect apprehends this as the quiddity of this thing. And thus the intellect is true, as having within itself an adequation to the thing understood, which adequation formally completes the account of truth; yet not as actually knowing truth, since by this operation whereby it forms the quiddity it does not apprehend such an adequation of its concept to the thing.

VI. Concerning that proposition, "In the complex, the comparison of the incomplex to the thing is signified," it must be known from the teaching of Saint Thomas in Verit., q. 1, a. 9, and VI Metaph., last lecture, that truth is known by the intellect insofar as it reflects upon its own act and its likeness. This is indeed true not only of the knowledge of the nature of truth, which pertains to the first operation of the intellect; but also of that actual conformity itself, as denominated by the intellect, imported through the complex, which pertains to the second operation of the intellect. And this I understand thus: not that the cognition of truth is properly and simply an act of reflection, according to the same species of act—for it is evident that in the cognition of any proposition which is directly known in act, truth is known—but because the cognition pertaining to the second operation of the intellect, which is absolutely direct cognition of the complex, can be called reflected cognition by comparison with the simple apprehension of the thing, inasmuch as the intellect cannot form a proposition unless it reflects upon the simple cognition by which it previously considered the quiddity, or something else, simply. And this is what Saint Thomas intends when he says that in the complex the comparison of the incomplex to the thing is signified: that is, the intellect, in forming the complex concept, compares what it had previously conceived incompletely to the thing, attributing that thing so incompletely conceived to it; and thus in the complex itself is imported the comparison of the previously understood incomplex to the very thing to which it is attributed through the verbal copula.

It must be noted, second, that, since the complex and the incomplex do not differ here, as is said, except as that which formally imports a comparison and that which does not import such a comparison but is said absolutely; and since a complex concept corresponds to a complex object, just as an incomplex concept corresponds to an incomplex one: composition and complexing in the intellect is not understood as if there were something constituted by the act of the intellect that is composed out of several concepts in such a way that from them there is made one thing as from matter and form; but rather because there is formed in the intellect a concept representative of the thing, and of what the intellect conceived of the thing incomplexly, and also of the very conformity of that concept to the thing, which it expresses by the verbal copula; and for this reason it is called a complex concept. And thus, by composing, the intellect knows and judges itself to be adequate to the thing: because what it conceived of the thing incomplexly it attributes to the thing outside the mind, and thus it judges that the thing is as it conceived of it, which is to know itself to be adequate to the thing. Hence, when the intellect says that man is an animal, animal is compared to man not only as that animal is outside the intellect, but also as it is conceived by the intellect: in which is imported the comparison of the intellect conceiving that incomplex concept to the thing outside the intellect. On account of which St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. 16, a. 2, that the intellect first knows and says what is true when it judges the thing to be as it is the form which it apprehended of the thing: namely, in such a way that the subject of the proposition signifies the thing to which the intellect attributes something conceived of it, and the predicate signifies the form which it had previously conceived of it incomplexly, and afterwards, with the complexing, understands and says of the thing. And this complexing is signified by the mark of composition and division.

VII. Concerning that statement, that the simple intellect, in apprehending what a thing is, apprehends the quiddity of the thing in a certain relation to the thing; and for this reason the intellect is said to be always true of itself, although the simple expression, or definition, is not true or false in itself, a manifold doubt arises. The first ¹² is this: if the simple intellect, in understanding what a thing is, apprehends the quiddity of the thing in a certain relation to the thing, it follows that there will be in the simple intellect a complexing and composition. Which involves a contradiction. — The consequence is evident. Because it was said ¹³ that the complex differs from the simple on no other account than because in it is designated the relation of the simple to the thing, which is not designated by the simple.

According to ¹⁴ the reason is that, as Saint Thomas argues in the Prima, q. XVII, a. 3, the intellect is not deceived about what a thing is, because it is directly informed by the likeness of the thing's quiddity. For from this argument it follows that an intellect knowing what a thing is can in no way be false. Not indeed on account of the composition of the parts of the definition with one another: for it forms the definition only according to the representation of the species. Nor on account of attributing it to something to which it does not belong: for it always knows, as is said here, the definition as of this thing; and thus even from the species such cognition arises. Therefore, etc.

The third ¹⁵ is because a contradiction also seems to be implied on this side. For if it belongs to the first operation to apprehend the quiddity per se with a certain comparison to that whose quiddity is apprehended, then per se there belongs to it what is naturally apt to follow from that comparison, as happens in the second operation. But falsity is apt to follow from such an operation: namely, when something is apprehended as the quiddity of a thing of which it is not the quiddity, as is conceded in the text. Therefore it implies a contradiction to say that he understands with such a comparison, and yet that in him falsity is only per accidens, namely on account of something extrinsic.

The fourth ¹⁶ is because, as was said above in the first argument, truth is concerned only with the composition and division of the intellect. Therefore what is said here is false, namely that the intellect knowing what a thing is is always true.

VIII. For the clarification of the first doubt, it must first be understood that the understanding of a quiddity in relation to a thing can be taken in two ways: namely, on the side of the thing understood, and on the side of the mode of knowing. It is taken on the side of the thing understood when the relation itself is the object known; but it is taken only on the side of the mode of knowing when the relation itself is not understood, but rather accompanies the very act and mode of understanding. To understand in the first way, with the relation, is to understand that this has a relation to that: and this is to compose. But in the second way it is not to compose, but merely to state and understand the incomplex itself, not by an abstraction wholly from the thing, but as the quiddity of this thing. On account of this St. Thomas says that in this intellection the incomplex itself, and even the definition, is not in itself true or false: that is, what is stated or understood by such an operation does not state the relation itself formally, although the intellect conceives it comparatively as regards the mode of understanding. And it is similar to what is said in Potentia, q. VII, a. 11, that there are certain relations of reason consequent upon the mode of understanding, inasmuch as certain things that have no order among themselves are understood in an ordered way, although the intellect does not understand them to have an order, for then it would be false. So in the present case it must be said that the intellect, in the first operation of the intellect, apprehends the quiddity with a certain relation, understanding it as the quiddity of this thing, and to this mode of understanding there corresponds the relation of reason of the quiddity to that of which it is the quiddity: yet it does not apprehend the quiddity itself as having a relation.

To the argument, therefore, the consequence is denied. — To the proof it is said that St. Thomas does not intend that the very thing said includes the comparison as something said, or even that it formally includes the comparison itself in its account, in the way a complex statement expresses a comparison; but that the comparison is in the mode of understanding. For the simple intellect does not say that man is a rational animal, which would be to say the comparison itself of the quiddity to the thing; although it apprehends this quiddity as the quiddity of man, inasmuch as it forms this definition, rational animal, of man and not of a stone; just as the sense of sight, although it knows whiteness as this one, because its judgment is directed to the particular, nevertheless does not say that this is white, as though judging a conformity of itself to the thing.

IX. For an understanding of the matters touched upon in the second doubt ¹⁷, it must be considered that a thing is said to belong to a thing per se when it belongs to it from its own proper account; but per accidens, or through another, when it belongs to it from something extraneous to its account. Now, that the simple understanding is true per se is the very fact that it is true insofar as it apprehends the quiddity simply, and thus is true; for its proper account consists in the apprehension of the quiddity. But that it is false is per accidens, or through another, namely that it is false from some extrinsic account joined to it: namely, from the joining of composition to the simple apprehension of the quiddity.

It must be considered, second, that the composition mixed into the first operation of the intellect can be understood in two ways. In one way, formally: namely, because in forming a definition it forms some proposition. In another way, virtually: namely, because from the very formation of the definition a proposition is naturally apt to follow through the second operation of the intellect. In the first way, composition cannot be mixed into the first operation of the intellect: for if the intellect were to form a proposition in its apprehension of a quiddity—for instance, if it were to say man is a rational animal—that would not be an understanding of simples, shared out with the composition and division of the intellect. In the second way, however, it is not unfitting that such a composition be joined to that operation: for from the fact that the intellect forms this definition of man, rational animal, it follows that it can form this proposition by the second operation, man is a rational animal; and so with other things. Therefore, when it is said that in the first operation of the intellect there can be falsity per accidens on account of a composition mixed in, this is understood of a virtual, not formal, admixture of composition. For while the intellect conceives of the circle this definition, a square figure, there is virtually included in this apprehension that a circle is a square figure; and while it forms this definition, an insensible animal, there is virtually included that some animal is insensible. On account of this it is said in Prima, q. XVII, a. 3, that the intellect, in forming this definition, "A rational animal is four-footed," is false, because it is false in forming this proposition, "Some rational animal is four-footed". And in Verit., q. I, a. 12, and in I Sent., d. XIX, q. v, a. 1, ad 7, it is said that a definition is not false except insofar as it implies a false affirmation. And here it is said that the intellect, in knowing a quiddity, is false per accidens, insofar as the definition includes some composition: for whether the definition is simply false—namely, because it is composed of parts that do not cohere—or false with respect to this thing—namely, because it is not the definition of this thing—it is not false except by reason of the false proposition virtually included in it; and the intellect apprehending a quiddity is not false except by reason of the false composition virtually included in such an apprehension.

It must be considered, thirdly, that the notion of quiddity, insofar as it is such, does not involve any composition. For there are certain quiddities—namely, the quiddities of separate substances—which have no composition: neither, I say, from parts, since they are simple; nor with a supposit, because in them what a thing is and that whose it is do not differ intrinsically, as is clear in Book VII of the Metaphysics ¹⁸. Therefore the intellect knowing what a thing is, insofar as it is such, has no composition to include of itself, since there is no composition in the intellect knowing a thing as it is in itself except from some composition existing in the thing. But if any knowledge of what a thing is contains a proposition implicitly, this does not belong to it insofar as it is absolutely knowledge of what a thing is, but insofar as it is knowledge of what a material and composite thing is, whose knowledge is drawn from diverse parts.

For, when the definition of such a thing is drawn from diverse elements, it is not always known through some species first and immediately caused by the phantasm; rather, it must be investigated by division and composition, from which investigation there is caused in the intellect a cognition of what the thing is, with a certain composition implicitly and virtually contained in it. And because in such a composition of differences with one another, and of the definition with the thing defined, the intellect can err—namely when it composes into one definition differences that cannot exist together, or attributes to a thing a definition that does not befit it—therefore falsity and inadequacy to the thing, arising from an implicit false composition, can also occur in the intellect knowing what a thing is. If, then, the intellect knowing quiddity is considered absolutely and in itself—insofar, namely, as it is knowing quiddity—it has the property of always being true: because, as far as its nature goes, it has at once to know quiddity from the intelligible form directly and immediately representing it, in which cognition the intellect is always adequate to the thing understood; just as the sense is always adequate to its proper sensible object, which it apprehends immediately from its proper species, unless it is impeded by something extrinsic. But if it is considered as knowing the quiddity of a composite thing, then it can be false, insofar as it must investigate that quiddity by division and composition, and thus form it with a certain composition. Since, therefore, such composition, and the preceding inquiry, accrue to the cognition of quiddity considered absolutely, falsity is said to befall the intellect knowing quiddity only per accidens, occurring as it does beyond the account of such cognition.

2. But from what has been said a doubt arises. For just as in the intellect knowing the quiddity of a composite thing a false composition is sometimes included virtually, so too sometimes a true composition is included. If, therefore, it is called accidentally false because it implicitly and virtually contains a false composition of the intellect, then by the same reasoning, on account of an implicit true composition, it will be called accidentally true: for both compositions are extraneous to that cognition. But the opposite of this is asserted both by Aristotle and by St. Thomas, who hold that it is always essentially true. Therefore, etc.

It is answered: and it is said first that certainly, with respect to the truth which accompanies the implicit composition in the cognition of what a thing is, the intellect knowing what a thing is is said to be true per accidens, just as it is false per accidens by reason of the false composition included within it. And if it had truth from no other source than from that very true implicit composition, it would not be said to be true except per accidens.

It is said secondly that, besides this truth, it also has a truth from itself, insofar as it is knowledge of what a thing is, formally adequate: because it is naturally apt to apprehend the quiddity by simple intuition from the representation of the intelligible species, in which apprehension it is always adequate to the thing, since through the intelligible species of the thing the intellect has understanding as through its own proper form, as knowing, unless it be drawn into falsity by something extrinsically adjoined. But it cannot thus be said to be false per se: because it is false only from the adjunction of composition; for if composition were not adjoined to the knowledge of what a thing is, it would never be false, nor ever inadequate to the thing.

It must be noted, however, that it is one thing to speak of the first operation of the intellect, and another to speak of the cognition of the quiddity universally. For when we speak of the first operation of the intellect, which is called the understanding of simples, divided off from the other operation, which is called composition and division, it has been said that falsity is not in it except per accidens. But when we speak of the cognition of quiddity in general, falsity can be in its cognition even per se. For a quiddity can be known in two ways. In one way, simply and absolutely, which is to know it by the first operation: and thus in its cognition there is no falsity per se. In another way, attributively, which is to attribute it to something by the second operation of the intellect. And then in its cognition falsity can be per se, just as in the attribution of other things.

3. From these things it is clear with respect to the doubt ¹⁹. For it is said that a cognitive power certainly cannot fail of itself with respect to that thing by whose likeness it is first and of itself informed. It can nevertheless fail per accidens: namely, when the quiddity itself is not apprehended from the simple and sole representation of the species, but is investigated from diverse phantasms and sensible things with a certain composition, as happens in composite things.

X. From this also the answer to the third doubt is evident ²⁰. For it is said that it does not belong per se to the first operation of the intellect that it understand a quiddity as this thing, distinct from the quiddity: because this belongs only where there is some composition in the thing, from which some distinction can be drawn between the quiddity and the possessor of the quiddity. Hence, if our intellect were to apprehend the quiddity of a separate substance as it is in itself, it would not apprehend it as this, but absolutely: since there would be no distinction there between the quiddity and the possessor of the quiddity. Therefore deception happens to our intellect per accidens, not per se: insofar as it happens to it, from the condition of a composite object with some composition, to apprehend the quiddity; for it cannot apprehend the quiddity of a composite thing as a quiddity unless it apprehends it as this, because such a quiddity is the quiddity of something in composites; nor can it apprehend it without its parts.

XI. For the clarification of the fourth doubt ²¹, it must be considered that certain Thomists say first concerning truth that it is not the conformity of any intellect whatsoever, but only of a complex intellect, that is truth.

They say, second, that no incomplex intellect, as such, has per se conformity to a thing: because the incomplex, as such, includes no relation of equality or inequality to another.

They say, third, that for the truth of the intellect as knowing, it is required that truth be in it as known.

They say, fourth, that the intellect is not said to know truth because it knows the conformity of the simple intellect to the thing, which conformity the simple intellect itself does not know: — first, because it is false that the simple intellect does not know that conformity, since it is something definable; second, because that conformity is known only reflexively, whereas truth is known directly: — but rather because the intellect that composes and divides knows its own conformity to the thing, inasmuch as every complex enunciation includes in its own definition that it be equal or unequal to the thing enunciated, since it is essentially a likeness that this be in it or not in it.

XII. But since I do not think this opinion to be the mind of Saint Thomas, I shall show that all these things are false in order. And thus the position of Saint Thomas will be set forth. From which exposition the answer to the raised doubt will be clear ²².

Their first claim, then, is false as regards St. Thomas. For in his view not only the conformity of a complex intellect to the thing, but also that of the simple intellect, is formally truth: so that truth is an intelligible likeness existing in the intellect, whether simple or compounding and dividing, by which the intellect is conformed to the thing understood. This is clear first from what is found in the First Part, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, and in De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: “Being cannot be understood without the true, because it cannot be understood without being adequate to the intellect.” From this the argument proceeds thus. In every act of understanding whereby being is understood, being must be conformed and adequate to the intellect. Therefore the intellect too must be made adequate to and conformed with the thing. But being is called true on account of such adequation, as is evident from the words of St. Thomas. Therefore also the conformity of the simple intellect to the very being understood is truth. The consequence is evident: because things are not called true except in relation to the truth of the intellect.

Furthermore, as Saint Thomas says in this place, even if, per impossibile, the divine intellect were to know only incomplexa, it would still be true, because our intellect is always true in apprehending a quiddity. But an intellect is not called true except by reason of conformity and adequation. Therefore the very conformity of the simple intellect is truth.

Furthermore, in the passage cited ²³ it is said that there is a simple true intellect just as there is a true thing. Therefore truth is in it. Therefore its conformity and adequation is truth.

Further, a thing is said to be true by the truth of the intellect, and not only enunciables: as is clear from the First Part, q. 16, a. 1 and 7. Therefore truth is in the simple intellect. Therefore etc.

2. From these points it is clear that what was said according to that position is false. For if the simple intellect is true of itself in apprehending what a thing is, there must be in it a conformity to the thing of itself. Although the simple concept does not import comparison, nevertheless the representative concept of the simple is conformed to the thing, and has such an ordination to the thing, inasmuch as it represents the quiddity of something as its own and thus as it is in the thing. And on account of this the intellect is said to be conformed and true: just as white is said to be like something by reason of whiteness, which is the foundation of likeness.

3. The third statement of that opinion is also expressly against the mind of St. Thomas in the First Part. For there ²⁴, art. 2, he holds that the form of the intellect, insofar as it is knowing, is the likeness of the thing known; and that to know that conformity is to know truth; although by the first operation the intellect does not know that conformity of itself to the thing, but is said to be true only as a thing is true. From these points it follows that for the truth of the intellect insofar as it is a knowing thing, it is not required that it be known. For, according to his mind, truth is not known by the simple intellect; and yet in it, insofar as it is knowing, conformity is found as in a real thing; and to know this conformity is to know truth.

4. The fourth statement is also false in itself, and is shown to be against the mind of St. Thomas. That it is false is argued as follows. Truth is first known by the intellect composing and dividing directly, even according to their opinion. But the conformity of that intellect to the thing which it has while it composes or divides is not known except by reflection. Therefore the intellect composing and dividing is not said to know truth because it knows its conformity to the thing which it has while it composes. — The minor is proved. The intellect cannot know itself to be conformable and adequate to a thing unless it understands itself understanding: for the one includes the other. But the intellect does not understand itself understanding except by reflection. Therefore, etc.

Nor is it an objection that every complex thought is said to include per se that it be equal or unequal to the thing. — For if it were understood to mean that it represents the complex object and its own conformity to such an object, this is false: because the intellect's complex conception represents nothing but the complex itself; just as the incomplex represents nothing but the incomplex; for the concept by which the intellect understands man to be an animal represents nothing other than man's being an animal. But if it were understood to mean that such a concept is the foundation per se of conformity, then this belongs no more to the complex concept than to the incomplex one, since by either concept the intellect is conformed and equated to the thing.

That this is also against Saint Thomas is shown. First, because in the First Part ²⁵, when he had said that the intellect is true from the fact that it has in itself a likeness of the thing, and likewise sense, he adds that "neither sense nor the intellect, in knowing what a thing is, knows the conformity of itself to the thing, but only the intellect composing and dividing, and on this account it is said to know truth." Now these statements would not be true unless the intellect, in understanding truth, understood its own conformity to the thing in the first operation. — Second, because in VI Metaphysics ²⁶, last lecture, he holds that the intellect has within itself a likeness of the thing understood insofar as it conceives the rationes of incomplex things, yet it does not for that reason judge that very likeness, but only when it composes and divides; and that in the second operation there is truth and falsity in the intellect insofar as it reflects upon that very likeness, knowing and judging it itself. Behold: according to him, the intellect knows truth by knowing the conformity of the simple intellect to the thing. — Third, because in this argument he says that the complex is called true or false because in it is designated the comparison of the incomplex to the thing.

From these things it is established that the simple intellect is properly and per se called true formally and intrinsically, as having truth in itself. And thus the saying of the Philosopher is verified, that it is always true per se: although it is not true as knowing truth.

In confirmation of this fourth point, it is said that knowing the conformity of the intellect occurs in two ways. In one way, quidditatively: which is to know what such a conformity is. In another way, denominatively: which is to know that the intellect itself is actually conformed to the thing. In the first way, a simple intellect can know truth, but not in the second way; and of this Saint Thomas understands that the intellect does not know its own conformity by knowing what a thing is.

To the second objection, it was said above ²⁷ how truth is also said to be understood in a way reflexively and in a way directly.

XIII. To the doubt therefore raised ²⁸ it is said that truth being in something occurs in two ways. In one way, subjectively: namely, as a form existing in a subject. And thus it is not in the composition and division of the intellect alone, but also in simple apprehension, that is, in the simple intellect. And in this way the simple intellect is understood to be per se always true. — In another way, objectively: namely, as known. And thus it is in composition and division alone. And universally, wherever St. Thomas or Aristotle says that truth pertains to the composition and division of the intellect, this must be understood of truth as known.

Where it must be noted that, since the concept which the intellect forms in understanding is not the thing understood, although it is the intrinsic terminus of the intellection produced by the intellection itself, but is the medium by which the intellect is borne toward the thing known as its representative; in order to see whether or not the intellect knows truth through some operation of its own, we must not examine whether the concept formed through such an operation is true, because every concept of the intellect, whether, I say, it be simple or complex, is either true or false: for if it is adequate to the thing, it is true; but if inadequate, it is false; and thus in every intellection there is either truth or falsity — rather, we must examine that which is represented through the concept. For if it imports a comparison of equality or inequality of the intellect to the thing, then the intellect will be said to know truth or falsity through such an operation: because truth and falsity consist in adequation and inadequation. But if it imports no such comparison, the intellect will not be said to know truth or falsity through such an operation.

Therefore, since a concept produced through the simple operation of the intellect represents something incomplex, and this incomplex thing itself [however] expresses no comparison to the thing, as was said above ²⁹—for “rational animal,” which is expressed through the simple concept of the intellect, imports no comparison—therefore the intellect, knowing in an incomplex manner, for example when it apprehends rational animal, does not know the true or the false. But since a concept produced through an act of combining or dividing represents something complex, and the complex itself imports a comparison of the intellect to the thing—for when I say that man is an animal, this imports that the intellect is adequate to the thing when it conceives animality of man in an incomplex manner, which it signifies and states when it attributes animal to man by saying that man is an animal—therefore the intellect, in combining and dividing, knows the true or the false.

Therefore it was well said ³⁰ that truth is objectively in the intellect, as what is known, only in composition and division. For it can indeed be said that the quiddity of a thing is in some way objectively in the knowing intellect, insofar as the very concept of the thing, adequate to it and essentially truth itself, is the intrinsic term of intellection; but it is not in the intellect objectively as what is known, because the concept itself is not that which is known, but rather the incomplex thing which is represented by such a concept.

2. But what seems to be said in Truth, q. 1, a. 3 — namely, that the intellect is conformed to a thing only when it composes or divides — must be understood of a perfect and complete conformity. For although, in understanding the quiddity of something, the intellect is conformed to the thing, yet because it is still in potency to composition, in which its ultimate perfection consists, as is said in the following argument, it is then incompletely conformed to the thing. This conformity is completed and perfected, however, by judgment, which judges that what it conceived simply belongs to the thing itself. And this comes about by composing and dividing.

Nor does it conflict with what has been said that Saint Thomas says in the First Part, in the cited question ³¹, article 2, namely that, strictly speaking, truth is in the intellect composing and dividing, and not in the intellect knowing what a thing is. For it is said that "truth is properly in the intellect" can be understood in two ways. In one way, by the property of the thing: namely, because that which is properly truth is in the intellect. And thus truth is properly also in the simple intellect. — In another way, by the property of expression: that is, according to the proper sense of a proposition. And thus truth is properly only in the intellect composing and dividing. For when it is said, "The true is known by the intellect", it is properly signified that it is known from or through the intellect. But this belongs to the composing and dividing intellect alone. And Saint Thomas's words are to be understood in this sense.

To the same sense is understood what is said in the same place, namely that the name "true" imports something known. For it is understood of the name itself as it is posited in this proposition, "The true is in the knowing intellect": for it signifies that it is in it objectively, as known formally. But the name "true", taken per se and absolutely, signifies the concept of the thing adequately.

XIV. Thirdly ³². In God there is the perfection which the intellect has through knowledge of incomplex and complex things: just as it has all other perfections. But truth accompanies the intellect insofar as it is perfect. Therefore, etc. — The minor is proved as follows. Because an intellect apprehending an incomplex object does not yet attain its ultimate perfection, since it is still in potency with respect to composition and division; but when it arrives at composition, it is already perfect. Now truth accompanies the intellect when it has already arrived at composition, since, strictly speaking, truth exists only in composition and division.

It must be noted here that the cognition of incomplexes and of complexes can be considered in two ways: in one way, by considering each in itself on the side of the act; in another way, in comparison to the thing understood, namely, insofar as they are cognitions of one and the same thing. In the first way, simple apprehension is more perfect, as being simpler and reaching into the innermost depths of the thing. In the second way, however, complex cognition is more perfect: for through simple apprehension our intellect does not attain a complete and ultimate cognition of all that is in the thing, but composition is required for a perfect cognition of the thing. Hence, in this way, complex cognition includes the incomplex.

It must also be noted, when it is said that the intellect attains truth when it has already proceeded as far as composition, that this is not to be understood as though truth were not contained in the composition itself but followed upon it; for, in light of what was said above, this is clearly false. Rather, it is because truth is not found formally in the intellect as known except while it composes or divides; for only then does it understand its own adequation to the thing, which is properly for truth to be in the intellect according to the proper manner of speaking.

XV. Fourth. Truth is the good of the intellect, as is said in Ethics VI, chapter 2. Therefore truth is in God. — The inference is proved: because God possesses all goods in Himself, as was said above.

It must be noted that truth is called the good and the perfection of the intellect insofar as it is known, as is said in the First Part, q. XVI, a. 2. Therefore, speaking absolutely, it exists only in that intellect by which it is known. And because it is known only by an intellect that composes and divides, therefore it exists simply only in that intellect: although in another way it is said to be in sense and in the simple intellect, namely as it is in reality. From this it follows that truth also exists in the divine intellect, which contains the perfection of the composing intellect by a certain eminence, as known and understood.

Finally, the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Romans III.