Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Fourth, he shows that the divine intellect does not understand in the manner of one composing and dividing ¹.

I. And he argues first as follows. God knows all things by knowing his own essence. But he does not know that essence by composing and dividing, since in it there is no composition. Therefore, and so on.

Note, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the First Part, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3, that to the composition and division of the intellect there must correspond some composition on the part of the thing: whether it be of matter and form, of substance and accident, or in any other way. But I understand this as applying to the thing either according to itself and by its own nature, or according as it is in our concept. For it is not required that the very thing about which composition and division is formed have in itself any composition; otherwise all the propositions we form about God would be false, since in Him there is no composition. Rather, what is required is that it have at least a certain multiplicity in the intellect. And thus the divine essence has composition and multiplicity, according as we form many concepts of it. But because this happens from the imperfection of our intellect, which cannot comprehend it as it is in itself, therefore, where an intellect is adequate to it—as is the divine intellect—in it there is no composition even as it is understood, since it is not conceived under many concepts. Hence by such an intellect it is known without composition. Therefore Saint Thomas said that God does not compose His essence in knowing it because that essence is not composed, namely in itself; and he added also that He knows Himself as He is, in order to show that neither does it have composition even as it is understood by Himself. And thus, understanding it, He composes it in no respect: since some composition on the part of the thing must correspond to the composition of the intellect in one or other of those ways.

II. Second. If it were to compose and divide, it would not consider all things in a single intuition, but separately. — The consequence is proved. Because things that are composed and divided are naturally apt to be considered separately from one another. For if, once it were known what a thing is, it were immediately known what inheres in it or does not inhere in it, there would be no need for composition and division.

It must be noted, as is stated in the First Part, q. 85 ² and 58 ³, that our intellect knows by composing and dividing because, since it proceeds from potency to act, it does not at once possess perfect knowledge of a thing; rather it first knows the quiddity of the thing, then the attributes and relations surrounding it. Hence it is necessary for it to unite what it has known separately, by composing or dividing, in order to have perfect knowledge of the thing. But if, upon apprehending the quiddity, it saw simultaneously in that very quiddity what belongs to it and what does not, it would have no need of composition, because it would at once have perfect knowledge of the thing. This indeed happens to the divine intellect, which apprehends in a single act all things that can be or not be in a thing.

Third. In God there cannot be prior and posterior. Therefore there is no composition in Him. — The consequence is proved: because composition and division are posterior in consideration to what a thing is.

Note that this argument differs from the preceding one: for that one proceeded from the order of things known as simple, whereas this one proceeds from the order of the cognitions themselves—of simple cognition, I say, and of composite.

Fourth. In the divine intellect there is nothing by accident. Therefore in it there is no composition and division. — The consequence is proved: because in cognition of what a thing is, the intellect is not deceived except by accident, whereas concerning composition and division it is deceived, just as sense is not deceived regarding its proper sensibles but is indeed deceived regarding others.

Note that the foundation of this argument is that in the divine intellect there cannot be understood to be composition and division except in the way in which it can be found in the intellect knowing what a thing is: because the divine intellect is simply intellect, and it knows all things in the way our intellect knows what a thing is, as was said above ⁴. And since in the knowledge of what a thing is, as such, composition is not admixed except accidentally, on account of which falsity can even be present in it; therefore neither in this way can composition be in the divine intellect, in which nothing is accidental.

Fifth. It would follow that the divine intellect is composed. — The consequence is proved: because a composition formed by the intellect exists in the intellect, not in the thing outside the intellect, although something in the thing corresponds to it, as we said above ⁵ If, therefore, the divine intellect composes, there will be in it a form distinct from it. And thus there will be in it some composition.

Sixth. If this is so, then God's understanding is not one only. Therefore his essence is not one only, since his operation is his essence. — The first consequence is proved: because an intellect that composes and divides judges different things by different compositions. For the composition of the intellect does not exceed the terms of its composition; for by the composition by which the intellect judges that man is an animal, it does not judge that a triangle is a figure.

Note that under the name "composition" is sometimes signified the very operation of the intellect, and sometimes the concept produced by that operation. Here, however, it is taken for the very operation itself. For it is true that such an operation does not exceed its term as produced by it: just as no other operation exceeds its own term. And therefore, if the term of one composition is "man to be animal," and it represents nothing else in reality, that operation cannot be extended to judging anything else.

III. But since someone might infer that God does not know enunciables, because He does not compose: Saint Thomas removes this, saying that this does not follow from what has been said. For, although God does not compose or divide, He nevertheless knows the composition of all things, inasmuch as His essence, one and simple, is the exemplar of all things multiple and composite, both according to the thing and according to the reason.

But here a doubt arises. For beings of reason have no esse, but are only known. Therefore the composition of reason is not known through the divine essence. For the divine essence is not the exemplar of beings that have no esse and cannot have it.

It is answered, and first it is said that by the composition of reason Saint Thomas does not understand a composition that is a being of reason insofar as a being of reason is distinguished from a real being: but rather a composition and complex concept formed by the intellect and reason. This is a real being: yet distinct from a natural being, which outside the intellect is represented by the intellect itself.

It is said second, that the divine essence is also in some way the exemplar of a being of reason, on that side on which it participates esse in some way.

Finally, both the conclusion and the meaning of the conclusion are confirmed by the authority of Isaiah 55, where it is said, For my thoughts are not etc., even though it is said in the Psalm, The Lord knows the thoughts of men. Likewise Dionysius, chapter 7 of the Divine Names.