Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Third, he shows that divine consideration is not ratiocinative or discursive ¹.

It is proved first. God does not know one thing after another as if successively. Therefore he does not reason discursively. — The consequence is proved. Because our consideration is ratiocinative or discursive when we pass from one thing under consideration to another. On this point Saint Thomas notes that no one is said to reason from the fact that he inspects how a conclusion follows from the premises, considering both at once; for this occurs not by arguing, but by judging arguments, just as knowledge is not material because it judges material things.

It must be noted, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas, Prima, q. LVIII ², and Verit., q. VIII ³, that two things are required for the nature of discourse: first, that several things be known through distinct cognitions; second, that the cognition of one be the cause of the cognition of the other. Hence to discourse is to proceed from one thing previously known to the cognition of another thing known afterward, which was previously unknown. On account of the failure of the first condition, one who sees many things in a mirror is not said to discourse: because he knows them all by a single act of vision. On account of the failure of the second, one who first knows a man and second a stone is not said to discourse: because one cognition is not the cause of the other. Therefore it is rightly said here that one who considers how the conclusion follows from the premises, considering both at once, does not discourse: namely, because one does not proceed from what is previously known to what is known afterward.

II. Second. God knows all things by a single operation. Therefore he does not reason discursively. — The consequence is proved. Because one who reasons considers the principles with one operation and the conclusion with another; for it is not necessary that, once the principles have been considered, one proceed to the conclusion, if from the very fact that the principles are considered, the conclusions were also considered.

It must be noted that principles can be considered in two ways: in one way, in themselves and absolutely; in another way, as ordered to the conclusion to be inferred. When they are considered in the first way—for example, when it is considered that man is a rational animal, in itself; and likewise when it is considered that a rational animal is capable of laughter, in itself and separately—the conclusion is not known, for instance, Man is capable of laughter: rather, each premise is considered by one cognition in itself, and the conclusion by another. But when they are considered in the second way—that is, when the minor is taken as subsumed under the major—then the minor as subsumed and the conclusion are known together. On account of this it is said in Posterior Analytics I ⁴ that one who knows and simultaneously infers knows by another act of knowing. But this second cognition presupposes the first: for propositions are not ordered to inferring a conclusion unless the propositions themselves have first been known in themselves. On account of this St. Thomas says that one who reasons intuits the principles before the conclusion: namely, because he first knows them absolutely, prior to their being ordered to the conclusion. And consequently he knows each by a different act of cognition.

It must also be noted that this second argument is different from the first. For in the first, the argument proceeds from the succession of cognition, which is required in discursive reasoning; in the second, however, it proceeds from the otherness of the cognition of the principles and of the conclusion. Now it is not formally the same thing to know successively and to consider by distinct cognitions, although the one accompanies the other.

III. Third. In the divine intellect there is no potency. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because every discursive cognition has something of potency and something of act, since in its principles conclusions exist in potency.

But this argument seems not to conclude. For principles do not contain their conclusions except in active potency, as is said in Physics II ⁵, if they are taken formally. Now it is not unfitting that something be contained in God potentially in this way, since all creatures are contained in Him thus.

It is answered that, although conclusions are contained in first principles in an active potency, nevertheless from the fact that they are so contained in the principles and are known in them only potentialiter, it is necessary to posit in the intellect a potency for a new action, and also a passive potency: for thus the intellect is in potency to eliciting an act of cognition which it does not have; and it is in potency to receiving actual cognition which can be caused by the knowledge of the principles. But from the fact that creatures are in God according to an active potency, it is not necessary to posit in Him any potency for eliciting a new act, nor a passive potency. Therefore the cases are not alike.

IV. Fourth. In the divine science nothing can be caused, since it is identical with God himself. Therefore, and so on. — The consequence is proved. Because in discursive science the principles are in a certain way the efficient cause of the conclusion. Hence, too, demonstration is a syllogism that makes one know.

Note that Saint Thomas says the principles are in a certain way the efficient cause of the conclusion quodammodo causam efficientem conclusionis, but not simply its cause. For they are not a cause producing knowledge of the conclusion as an agent that acts, but rather as the reason for acting: for the intellect, from its knowledge of the principles, causes knowledge of the conclusion within itself.

Fifth. In God there can be only natural cognition. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, as is evident in us, the things we know naturally, such as the first principles, we know without discursive reasoning, namely from the mere cognition of the terms.

Sixth. Ratiocination is a certain movement of the intellect passing from one thing to another. Therefore it does not befit God. — The consequence is proved. Because every movement must be reduced to a mover that is altogether immobile. But the divine intellect is the first origin of movement, as will be shown below ⁶

Seventh. The highest in us is not reason, but intellect, which is the origin of reason. Therefore God does not discourse. — The consequence is proved. Because the highest in us is lower than that which is in God: since the lower does not attain the higher except in its own highest.

Note that the intellect in us is called the origin of reason, insofar as the knowledge of first principles, which belongs to the intellect, is the cause and origin of discursive reasoning, which belongs to reason.

Eighth. From the imperfection of intellectual nature there arises ratiocinative cognition. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved: because what is known through another, as happens in ratiocinative cognition, is less known than that which is known in itself; and to know it the knowing nature is not sufficient without that by which it is made known.

Note that, although our intellect is naturally fitted to know many conclusions with certainty and evidently, it nevertheless cannot have certain and evident knowledge of them except by resolution to the first principles, as Saint Thomas says, III Sent., d. xxiii, a. 2, q. 3 ⁷. Therefore it is said here that it does not suffice for the intellect to know them without a medium. But if our intellectual nature were wholly perfect, it could know conclusions in the principles at a single intuition, and there would be no need of a passage from one to the other. Hence such discursive knowledge argues an imperfection of the intellectual nature.

Last. The divine essence is the likeness of all things. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because those things whose species are in the knower are known without discursive reasoning.

Note that some things can have a species in the intellect in two ways, namely mediately and immediately: immediately, when they are represented by it directly; mediately, when they are represented secondarily and remotely. The quiddities of things, therefore, have their species in our intellect immediately and proximately; combinations of them, however, remotely and mediately. But in the divine intellect there are species both of complexes and of incomplexes immediately, since the divine essence is the proper likeness of all things. What Saint Thomas says, therefore—that those things whose species are in the knower are known without discourse—is to be understood of those things which are represented first and immediately by species; in this way all things have their species and likeness in God in some manner.

V. From these, the arguments that could be brought against this conclusion are resolved. The first is that God knows all things through His essence. — For it is said that this does not suffice for a discursive process, since the divine essence stands to other things not as a principle to conclusions, but as a species to the things known.

But it seems that St. Thomas, Truth, q. 2, a. 4 ⁸, says the opposite of this. For he says there that the esse of things in God is assimilated to him in that manner by which effects are in their cause and conclusions in their principles.

It is answered that, since in every likeness there is also joined some unlikeness, things may be said to be alike in one way and unlike in another. The principles of our intellect are related to conclusions as cause to effect, virtually contained in the cause itself; but not as a likeness actually and distinctly representative of the conclusions, nor as their proper account. Therefore, since the divine essence is the cause of all creatures, there is some likeness between the divine essence with respect to creatures and a principle with respect to its conclusions. But insofar as the divine essence actually represents all creatures and represents them distinctly, whereas principles do not actually represent their conclusions virtually contained in them, in this respect there is an unlikeness between it and the principles. For one reason, then, it was said in the Quaestiones de Veritate that they are alike; for another reason, likeness is here denied—especially because what is at issue here is knowledge by which one thing is known through another, wherein the divine essence differs from the principles of demonstrations. For these lead to knowledge of something else in such a way that they are first known, and afterwards from their knowledge one arrives at knowledge of the conclusions. But this is not so with the divine essence: rather, it leads to knowledge of other things as an intelligible species and as a conceived species, which is not first known in time before that which is represented through it.

2. The second objection is that, since we syllogize, it seems unfitting that God should be unable to syllogize. — But it is said that, although He does not syllogize—since this follows from the imperfection of our intellect—He nevertheless has the science of syllogizing, as judging of arguments.

Finally, the conclusion is confirmed by Hebrews 4, where it is said that all things are naked and open to his eyes. But those things which are known by argumentation are not naked and open to us in themselves, but are laid bare and opened by reason.