Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

But since the way in which God understands many things involves great difficulty, Saint Thomas intends in this chapter to explain that very way ¹. Concerning this he does two things: first, he raises the difficulty; second, he answers it ².

I. As to the first point, the difficulty is how God, in understanding His own essence as the likeness of all things, understands all things. For it seems that one of two things follows: either, namely, that He has no proper knowledge of things, which was disproved above ³; or that He Himself is the proper ratio of each thing, which does not seem to be the case. For if God knows all things through His essence as through a likeness common to all, it follows that He has only common knowledge of things and not proper knowledge: because according to the mode in which the likeness of the known is in the knower, so follows the operation of cognition, since such a likeness is the form by which the operation is exercised and produced; and thus, if the divine essence is a common likeness representing that in which things agree, there will be common, not proper, knowledge. But if the divine essence were the proper likeness of singulars—which would be required if God were to know singulars through it with proper knowledge—this does not seem possible. For, since the distinction of diverse things arises from their proper forms, whatever is like one thing according to its proper form must be unlike another: although, insofar as some things participate in one common feature, they may have one common likeness. If, therefore, the divine essence were the proper likeness of one thing—as representing its proper form—it could not be the likeness of another.

II. As to the second point ⁴, first, he shows that the divine essence can be received by the divine intellect as the proper ratio and likeness of individual things; second, he explains how these proper rationes, though many, can exist together with unity ⁵.

First, therefore, the following answer is set down in response to the question: that the divine essence, insofar as it is absolutely perfect, can be taken as the proper reason of individual things.

For the manifestation of which, three things are set forth in advance. First is that the quiddities of things and their definitions are like numbers, as is said in VIII Metaphysics: for just as in numbers, with a unit added or subtracted, the species of the number is varied, so in definitions, with a difference added or subtracted, the species is varied. For sensible substance considered without the rational differs in species from sensible substance with the rational added, at least negatively, because it is not the same species; and likewise in comparison to the irrational.

Second is that with respect to things that contain many elements, nature and intellect behave differently. For if certain things are required together for the esse of something, nature does not allow them to be separated: the nature of animal does not remain if the soul is separated from the body. But intellect can sometimes disjoin things that are conjoined, understanding one without the other, when one of them does not fall within the definition of the other (for then a thing cannot be understood without what is contained within its definition). This is made clear by the example of the number three and of the rational animal.

From these things it is deduced that, where many things are contained in one—that is, perfectionally—the intellect can take it as the proper ratio of very many things by apprehending some of them without the others. For from the first point noted above we have that, once a difference is subtracted, the species is varied; and therefore, if one thing is taken without another, it follows that diverse things are taken. And thus what is taken as an exemplar representative of many things—namely, of each of them per se without the others—is taken as the proper ratio of each of them. This is shown in the number ten, which can be taken as the proper ratio of the numbers contained within it. It is also shown in rational animal, which could be taken as the proper ratio of all irrational animals unless they added certain positive differences. It is further shown by the authority of Clement the Philosopher, cited by Dionysius in chapter 5 of De Div. Nom., who says that the nobler things among beings are exemplars of the less noble.

Third is that the divine essence contains within itself the nobilities of all beings by way of perfection, not by way of composition. And consequently it contains within itself the quiddity of each thing insofar as it posits something: for in that respect it signifies perfection; imperfection, however, insofar as it falls short of true esse, which is the divine esse.

III. With these suppositions, it is proved that the divine essence can be taken as the proper reason of singulars. That in which many things are contained perfectionally can be taken as the proper exemplar and proper reason of those things which are thus contained in it. But in God all things are contained perfectionally. Therefore it can be taken as the proper reason of singulars. Hence what is proper to each thing in its essence it can comprehend, understanding in what that thing imitates its essence and in what it falls short of its perfection. For by understanding its essence as imitable by way of life and not of cognition, it takes on the proper form and reason of a plant; but by understanding it as imitable by way of cognition and not of intellect, it takes on the proper form of an animal; and so with the others. And thus it is clear that the divine essence, from the fact that it is perfect in every way, can be taken as the proper reason of singulars.

IV. It must be noted that the whole reasoning and foundation of Saint Thomas is that a container can, in some perfectional way, be taken as the proper ratio of the things it contains. This is to be understood not according to its adequate ratio, but according to some inadequate and deficient ratio of it. For if it were taken as containing many things according to its total perfection adequately to itself, it would not be the proper ratio of the things contained. Just as the number ten, in which all inferior numbers are contained unitedly and perfectionally, not divisively as distinct species, if taken with respect to its total perfection, is not the proper ratio or proper likeness of nine: because nine does not measure up to the perfection of ten. But if it is taken with respect to the perfection of nine existing in it perfectionally and unitedly, then it is taken as the proper likeness of nine.

It must also be noted, concerning the example of the rational animal, that when Saint Thomas says it can be taken as the proper exemplar of irrational animals unless they added certain positive differences, he is speaking proportionally to numbers. For in numbers, by subtraction alone of a unit another species remains: by subtraction alone of a unit from the number ten there remains the number nine. Therefore, when in the number ten its perfection is considered without considering its last unit, it is considered as the proper ratio of nine: for considered thus it is nothing other than nine. By similar reasoning, if by the mere removal of rationality from the rational animal there were left the species of animal which is the irrational animal, then, considering in man the sensitive nature with the rational removed, it would be taken as the proper ratio of the irrational animal, inasmuch as it would be nothing, as such, other than an irrational animal. But because the removal and absence of this difference which is rational does not suffice for the species of irrational animal, but those species are constituted by positive differences added to animal; therefore, however much the sensitive nature be considered in it apart from the rational, it is not considered as the proper ratio of the irrational animal, which asserts the species of animal positively, but only as the proper ratio of animal taken absolutely; which can be called an irrational animal negatively, because it does not include the rational in its quiddity. Hence what Clement the Philosopher says, that the nobler things are the exemplars of the less noble, is not true universally as regards the proper ratio, but only as regards something.

V. It must also be considered, when it is said that the divine essence can be taken as a proper reason, that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, as the property holds on the side of the thing represented. And then that is called the proper reason which represents what is proper to the thing. — In another way, as it holds on the side of the representing form. And then that is called the proper reason of something which is so the reason of it itself that it is not of another.

In the first way, esse as the proper ratio of singular things does not belong to the divine essence from the very intellect conceiving it with a relation to things, but from the fullness of its perfection, by which it contains in itself the perfections of all things. For if it did not contain in itself the perfections of all things, things could not be known through it, as regards their proper natures. — In the second way, however, it has the character of a proper ratio only from the intellect. That the divine essence is the proper word and proper conception of a thing in this manner, it has only insofar as it is conceived by God, or understood, as imitable by the perfection of this thing and that. On account of this Saint Thomas says that it takes its essence as the proper ratio: which is to say, it understands it in relation to this and to that, and thus understood it has the character of the proper exemplar of this and the proper exemplar of that.

From this, moreover, it is clear that it is not the mind of St. Thomas—as Scotus seems to attribute to him in I Sent., d. xxxv—that these respects of the divine essence to creatures give to it that it represent itself as proper to creatures; rather, from its own perfection it has this. But from those respects it has that it be distinguished into more exemplars of things and into more rationes of them: for the essence itself, when conceived with a habitude and proportion to the nature of stone—as imitable by the nature of stone and prepossessing its perfection in itself—is distinguished according to reason from itself precisely as imitable by a plant, and so with the others.

VI. But it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas I Sent., d. xxvii, q. ii, a. 3, ad 4, that the intellect can be directed toward the conceived form in three ways. In one way, insofar as it is a likeness of the thing precisely: that is, insofar as the intellect uses it as the medium through which it knows the thing. And thus it has no consideration of the form itself, but only of the thing represented by means of it. — In another way, insofar as it is such a thing having such an esse in the soul. And thus it has no consideration of the thing represented, but only of the form itself. — In a third way, by comparing one to the other: for instance, when it considers one to be representative of the other. And thus it knows both at once.

The divine intellect, therefore, can be directed to its own essence in three ways, namely: — Simply and absolutely, insofar as it is such a thing. And thus, in understanding its essence, it does not conceive the proper exemplar of things and their proper ratio formally. — And insofar as it uses that essence as the medium through which created things are represented to itself. And thus it likewise does not understand that essence as a proper exemplar. — And insofar as it understands that essence as imitable by a creature according to this mode of perfection, for instance according to a degree of life. And thus it knows that essence as its proper ratio formally: because it apprehends it together with its relation to a creature, from which relation it has that it is formally the proper exemplar of the creature.

Hence the divine intellect, apprehending its own essence absolutely, apprehends its proper exemplar of things materially, because it apprehends that thing which is denominatively an exemplar; but it does not apprehend its proper exemplar formally, because it does not apprehend it with the relation to a thing from which it formally has what makes it the proper ratio and proper exemplar. Just as one who apprehends the nature of animal absolutely apprehends genus materially, because he apprehends that thing which is denominated genus; yet he does not apprehend genus formally, because he does not apprehend it with the relation to species, from which something has what makes it formally and completely genus. — But the divine intellect, apprehending its essence with the relation of imitability by things, apprehends formally the proper exemplar and proper ratio of a thing: just as one who apprehends animal with the relation of predicability to species apprehends genus formally.

Therefore Saint Thomas says this because God, in understanding His own essence as imitable in the manner of a plant, takes on the proper form and ratio of a plant, and the same holds for other things: as if to say that He does not apprehend His own essence as the proper ratio of some thing formally unless He understands it with such a respect; although, in apprehending it without such a respect, He apprehends the proper ratio of each thing materially and fundamentally.

But it should be noted, when it is said that God knows his essence as the proper ratio, [that] the sense is not that he takes it to be the proper ratio, although he also knows it in that way; rather, that he knows the divine essence with respect to that from which it has that it is the proper ratio of the thing. Just as when we say that our intellect conceives the proper ratio of man, we do not mean that it takes that to be the proper ratio of man, because that pertains to reflexive cognition; rather, that it forms the concept of man, which, as thus formed by the intellect, is the proper ratio of man.

VII. It is shown secondly how these proper rationes are many in God ⁶: — for there must be many, since the proper ratio of one is distinguished from the proper ratio of another. And this conclusion is laid down: The rationes of things in the divine intellect are not many or distinct except according to the many respects of imitability. For insofar as God understands the proper respect of assimilation that each creature has to him, so are there many rationes in him.

And thus the saying of Augustine in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions, Question XLVI, is preserved, where he says that the rationes exist plurally in the divine mind.

The position of Plato concerning the ideas is also saved in some way. He says, moreover, in some way: because Plato himself did indeed posit the ideas, but not in the divine mind, as we posit them; rather, as subsisting per se, which Aristotle attributes to him.

Note that these relations understood by God, insofar as He understands Himself as imitable in diverse ways by diverse creatures, which are relations of reason, do not cause the divine essence to be multiplied in itself, as if on account of the diverse relations it were really many; rather, they are said to produce formally the plurality and distinction of the ideas and proper rationes in known esse. For when the proper ratio and idea of creatures is here taken for the divine essence as understood, as representative of all the perfections found in creatures, it is not understood as a distinct ratio of many things except because it is understood with diverse relations to creatures. And thus, being one in itself, it is understood as terminating the manifold relations of creatures to itself, and from this having multiplicity and distinction in understood and known esse. From this no multiplicity is posited in the thing itself, but only that it is understood in a manifold way on the side of the thing known, on account of the multiplicity of the relations.