Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Francesco Silvestri

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles

First published 1918

In Book I of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's treatment of God and the divine attributes. His commentary proceeds through the arguments of the Summa contra Gentiles chapter by chapter. The present edition follows the commentary printed with the Leonine text in volume XIII (1918) and includes Latin, English, and Spanish texts.


Caput I: Quod sit officium sapientis

Caput II: Quae sit in hoc opere auctoris intentio

Caput III: Quis modus sit possibilis divinae veritatis manifestandae

Caput IV: Quod veritas divinorum ad quam naturalis ratio pertingit convenienter hominibus credenda proponitur

Caput V: Quod ea quae ratione investigari non possunt convenienter fide tenenda hominibus proponuntur

Caput VI: Quod assentire his quae sunt fidei non est levitatis quamvis supra rationem sint

Caput VII: Quod veritati fidei Christianae non contrariatur veritas rationis

Caput VIII: Qualiter se habeat humana ratio ad veritatem fidei

Caput IX: De ordine et modo procedendi in hoc opere

Caput X: De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest cum sit per se notum

Caput XI: Reprobatio praemissae opinionis et solutio rationum praemissarum

Caput XII: De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest sed sola fide tenetur

Caput XIII: Rationes ad probandum Deum esse

Caput XIV: Quod ad cognitionem Dei oportet uti via remotionis

Caput XV: Quod Deus sit aeternus

Caput XVI: Quod in Deo non est potentia passiva

Caput XVII: Quod in Deo non est materia

Caput XVIII: Quod in Deo nulla est compositio

Caput XIX: Quod in Deo nihil est violentum neque praeter naturam

Caput XX: Quod Deus non est corpus

Caput XXI: Quod Deus est sua essentia

Caput XXII: Quod in Deo idem est esse et essentia

Caput XXIII: Quod in Deo non est accidens

Caput XXIV: Quod divinum esse non potest designari per additionem alicuius differentiae substantialis

Caput XXV: Quod Deus non est in aliquo genere

Caput XXVI: Quod Deus non est esse formale omnium

Caput XXVII: Quod Deus non sit forma alicuius corporis

Caput XXVIII: De perfectione divina

Caput XXIX: De similitudine creaturarum

Caput XXX: Quae nomina de Deo possint praedicari

Caput XXXI: Quod divina perfectio et pluralitas nominum divinorum divinae simplicitati non repugnant

Caput XXXII: Quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicatur

Caput XXXIII: Quod non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis pure aequivoce

Caput XXXIV: Quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis dicuntur analogice

Caput XXXV: Quod plura nomina dicta de Deo non sunt synonyma

Caput XXXVI: Qualiter intellectus noster de Deo propositionem formet

Caput XXXVII: Quod Deus est bonus

Caput XXXVIII: Quod Deus est ipsa bonitas

Caput XXXIX: Quod in Deo non potest esse malum

Caput XL: Quod Deus est omnis boni bonum

Caput XLI: Quod Deus sit summum bonum

I. In the second place, Saint Thomas compares the divine goodness to other goods with respect to its excellence, and shows that God is the highest good.

  1. It is proved first. Divine goodness is compared to all goods as universal goodness to particular, since it is the good of every good. Therefore it preeminently surpasses every particular good. — The consequence is evident. For universal goodness surpasses particular goodness, just as the good of a nation is better than the good of one man, because the perfection of the whole surpasses the perfection of the part, speaking simply and absolutely.

II. Second. What is said through essence is said more truly than what is said through participation. God is called good through essence, and other things through participation. Therefore, etc.

Concerning that proposition, that which is said by essence is said more truly than what is said by participation, a doubt arises. For whiteness, which is said by essence, is not said to be white more truly than that which participates in whiteness. — Indeed, it is not even called white.

For the understanding of this, it must be considered that what is said to be something by essence can be compared both to what is such by a likeness which is its cause and to what is such by participation. If in the first way, since "more truly," as is found in Truth q. IV, a. 6, can designate either the truth of a thing or the truth of predication: if it designates the truth of a thing, then it is not necessary that something be more true where it is by essence. For it can be more true where it is by a likeness which is the cause of the thing than where it is by essence: just as natural things are more truly in the divine mind, where they are by an assimilative likeness, than in themselves, where they are by essence. By "more truly" in this way I understand the same as "more perfectly": for on the side of the thing, truth is founded in esse; and therefore to say that a thing is more truly in God according to the truth of the thing is to say that it has in him a more perfect esse than in itself; because the former is divine, while the latter is created. — But if it signifies the truth of predication, then in this sense each thing is more true where it is by essence than where it is by a likeness. For the truth of predication is considered according as something is said of another according to its formal signification. Now nothing can belong to something more formally than if it belongs to it by essence.

If in the second way, then, however the term more truly is taken, the proposition of St. Thomas is true. For what belongs to something through its essence has being in it more perfectly than in that to which it belongs through participation. And it has a greater formal identity with it itself: from which it follows that it is also predicated more truly.

By way of example, it is said that what is understood is the proposition of St. Thomas where that is predicated formally of both, and where the essence itself subsists per se. For then it is more truly said that it is the very quiddity than that it is what has a quiddity. And because God is goodness itself, while other things have goodness, and He is said to be good formally just as other things are said to be good: therefore He is also said to be good more truly and more perfectly. But whiteness does not admit the predication of its concrete term, so as properly to be called white; nor is it per se either, though it is signified per se. Therefore it is not similar.

III. Third. All things have the character of goodness from God. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that which is the cause of others in a single genus is the greatest in that genus.

Note that "genus" is here taken for every common thing according to the same ratio, either simply or proportionally, as was shown above.

Fourth. In God evil exists neither in act nor in potency. Therefore He is the highest good. — The consequence is proved. Because that which is less mixed with evil is better.

It is confirmed by the authority of 1 Kings 2.

Caput XLII: Quod Deus est unus

Caput XLIII: Quod Deus est infinitus

Caput XLIV: Quod Deus est intelligens

Caput XLV: Quod intelligere Dei est sua essentia

Caput XLVI: Quod Deus per nihil aliud intelligit quam per suam essentiam

Caput XLVII: Quod Deus intelligit perfecte seipsum

Caput XLVIII: Quod Deus primo et per se solum seipsum cognoscit

Caput XLIX: Quod Deus cognoscit alia a se

Caput L: Quod Deus habet propriam cognitionem de omnibus rebus

Caput LI: Rationes ad inquirendum qualiter multitudo intellectorum sit in intellectu divino

Caput LII: Solutio praemissae dubitationis

Caput LIII: Qualiter divina essentia una et simplex sit propria similitudo omnium intelligibilium

Caput LIV: Quod Deus omnia simul intelligit

Caput LV: Quod cognitio Dei non est habitualis

Caput LVI: Quod cognitio Dei non est discursiva

Caput LVII: Quod Deus non intelligit componendo et dividendo

Caput LVIII: Quod a Deo non excluditur veritas enuntiabilium

Caput LIX: Quod Deus est veritas

Caput LX: Quod Deus est purissima veritas

Caput LXI: Quod divina veritas est prima et summa veritas

Caput LXII: Rationes volentium subtrahere Deo cognitionem singularium

Caput LXIII: Ordo dicendorum circa divinam cognitionem

Caput LXIV: Quod Deus singularia cognoscat

Caput LXV: Quod Deus cognoscit ea quae non sunt

Caput LXVI: Quod Deus cognoscit singularia contingentia futura

Caput LXVII: Quod Deus cognoscit motus voluntatis

Caput LXVIII: Quod Deus cognoscit infinita

Caput LXIX: Quod Deus vilia cognoscit

Caput LXX: Quod Deus cognoscit mala

Caput LXXI: Quod Deus est volens

Caput LXXII: Quod voluntas Dei est eius essentia

Caput LXXIII: Quod principale volitum Dei est divina essentia

Caput LXXIV: Quod Deus, volendo se, vult etiam alia

Caput LXXV: Quod Deus uno actu voluntatis se et alia velit

Caput LXXVI: Quod volitorum multitudo divinae simplicitati non repugnat

Caput LXXVII: Quod divina voluntas ad singula bonorum se extendit

Caput LXXVIII: Quod Deus vult etiam ea quae nondum sunt

Caput LXXIX: Quod Deus de necessitate vult suum esse et suam bonitatem

Caput LXXX: Quod Deus non de necessitate vult alia a se

Caput LXXXI: Rationes ducentes ad inconveniens si Deus alia a se non necessario velit

Caput LXXXII: Quod Deus vult aliquid aliud a se necessitate suppositionis

Caput LXXXIII: Quod voluntas Dei non est impossibilium secundum se

Caput LXXXIV: Quod divina voluntas non tollit contingentiam a rebus, neque eis necessitatem absolutam imponit

Caput LXXXV: Quod divinae voluntatis potest ratio assignari

Caput LXXXVI: Quod divinae voluntatis nihil potest esse causa

Caput LXXXVII: Quod in Deo est liberum arbitrium

Caput LXXXVIII: Quod in Deo non sunt passiones affectuum

Caput LXXXIX: Quod in Deo sit delectatio et gaudium non tamen repugnat divinae perfectioni

Caput XC: Quod in Deo sit amor

Caput XCI: Quomodo in Deo ponantur esse virtutes

Caput XCII: Quod in Deo sunt virtutes morales quae sunt circa actiones

Caput XCIII: Quod in Deo sunt virtutes contemplativae

Caput XCIV: Quod Deus non potest velle malum

Caput XCV: Quod Deus nihil odit, nec odium alicuius rei ei convenire potest

Caput XCVI: Quod Deus est vivens

Caput XCVII: Quod Deus est sua vita

Caput XCVIII: Quod vita Dei est sempiterna

Caput XCIX: Quod Deus est beatus

Caput C: Quod Deus sit sua beatitudo

Caput CI: Quod beatitudo divina perfecta et singularis est excedens omnem aliam beatitudinem

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