Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Second, it is shown that God is His own goodness ¹.

I. It is proved first. God is his own esse. Therefore he is his own goodness. — The consequence is proved. Because esse in act, in each thing, is that thing's goodness.

It should be noted, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the First Part, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4, that life and knowledge and the other perfections are desired only according to esse in act: for no one desires life except in order to live by it, nor wisdom except in order to be wise by it. And since the notion of the good belongs to what is desirable insofar as it is perfective of another ², therefore the notion of the good belongs to nothing except insofar as it is in act. On this account Saint Thomas says that esse in act in each thing is its good: that is, esse in act is that from which something is called good fundamentally and radically.

2. But a doubt arises here. For if the ratio of the good belongs to nothing except insofar as it is in act, it follows that what is not in act does not have the ratio of the good. But this is false: because health, which the sick man does not yet have, is good, since it is desired by the sick man; and the ratio of the desirable follows upon the ratio of the good. Therefore the ratio of the good belongs not only to that which is in act, but also to that which is not yet in act.

For the solution of this difficulty, a twofold distinction is needed. The first is this. Something can be called good in two ways: in one way, as that which has goodness, or as that which subsists in goodness; in another way, as that by which something is formally good. — The second is this. Being in act can be understood in two ways: in one way, according to exercised act; in another way, according to signed act. In the first way, something is said to be in act when it actually exists in the nature of things, as Socrates living. In the second way, something is said to be in act when it is signified or understood with its actuality of esse, even if it does not actually exist in the nature of things.

It is said, therefore, first, that if we speak of the good in the first way, namely that which has goodness in itself, nothing is good except insofar as it is in act according to exercised act. — It is said second that if we speak of the good in the second way, namely that by which something is good, nothing is good unless it is a being in act at least according to signed act. For something does not have the character of the appetible except insofar as it is considered together with its esse. And thus health, even when not existing, is said to be a being in act insofar as it has the character of a good: because it is not desired except so that someone may be actually healthy through it.

And thus it is universally true that nothing is good except insofar as it is in act, either according to exercised act or according to signed act.

II. Second. God is his own perfection: because his esse is not through anything added that is perfect. Therefore he is his own goodness. — The consequence is evident. Because the perfection of a thing is its goodness.

Third. God is good through his own essence, and not participatively through an order to something else. Therefore he is his own goodness. — The antecedent is proved: because what is good by participation has, prior to itself, something from which it receives the account of goodness. But there is no regress to infinity: since the good has the account of an end, and an infinite regress is repugnant to an end. Therefore one must arrive at something good in itself and essentially. — But the consequence is proved as follows: what is not its own goodness is good participatively and not through essence.

Concerning that proposition, the infinite is repugnant to the finite, a doubt is raised: for it does not seem to prove what is intended. For although the infinite in quantities is repugnant to the finite, as destroying it, yet from this it does not follow that in final causes there cannot be a regress to infinity.

It is answered that in the order of ends, that which is intended ultimately, as for its own sake and not for the sake of something else willed, has simply the character of an end. For an end, as such, is that for the sake of which something is done ³, not what is done for the sake of another. Therefore an end, by its own definition, has the character of a last thing. And hence infinity is repugnant to the character of an end, insofar as it removes the last. If, then, one proceeded to infinity in final causes, nothing would have the character of a last thing, and consequently nothing would be simply an end; rather each would stand ordered toward another, speaking of ends essentially ordered. That proposition, therefore, is not taken as having truth only in continuous quantity, but absolutely and formally. For infinity, that is, what removes an end, is repugnant to the end it removes. And therefore infinity, removing the end of final causes, is repugnant to the end and standing of causes. And because the character of a final cause posits a standing and a last, therefore infinity is repugnant to its very character.

IV. Fourth: and it is a confirmation of the antecedent of the first argument. God is ipsum esse. Therefore He is essentially good and not participatively. And consequently He is goodness itself. — The consequence is proved. Because ipsum esse cannot participate in anything, since it is not potency but act.

Fifth. God is altogether simple. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because everything that has its esse and that which it is has them as one: that is, in it esse and being are not distinguished. And, since its esse is its very goodness, it will not be distinguished from its goodness.

From this ⁴ it is inferred as a corollary that no other good is its own goodness. Hence too in Matthew XIX it is said: No one is good but God alone.

Note for this corollary, from the Questions On Truth, q. XXI, a. 5, that substantial goodness is completed in the esse of a thing. For although the essence of a thing is radically and fundamentally the first goodness of the thing and its goodness in a qualified respect, it is nevertheless not the completing goodness of the thing's substance; rather, that is the esse of its actual existence. For nothing is good substantially, completely, and simply unless it is in act. And because the esse of no created thing is its essence, therefore no created thing is its own substantial goodness absolutely and simply. Nor is any created thing its own ultimate goodness, by which it is called good simply and absolutely: for that belongs to things through superadded accidents, as is clear from Part One ⁵ and from On Truth ⁶, etc.