Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has determined concerning the divine perfection absolutely, he now determines concerning it by descending to particular perfections ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he treats of the perfections pertaining to nature and substance; second, of those pertaining to operation, chapter XLIV. Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he treats of the divine goodness; second, of unity, chapter XLII; third, of infinity, chapter XLIII.

On the first point he does two things: first, he treats of the divine goodness in itself; second, in its relation to other things, chapter XL. On the first point he does two things: first, he treats of that goodness itself; second, he draws one corollary, chapter XXXIX. — On the first point he does two things: first, he shows that goodness befits God; second, that He is His own goodness ².

I. As to the first, the following conclusion is proposed: God is good.

It is proved first. God is perfect. Therefore he is good. — The consequence is proved. Now each thing is perfect when it attains its own virtue, as is said in Physics VII, text 18. But the virtue of a thing is that by which each thing is called good; for it is virtue that makes its possessor good and renders his work good. Therefore each thing, insofar as it is perfect, is good. — This is also evident from the fact that each thing desires its perfection as its proper good.

Concerning that proposition, "We call each thing perfect when it attains its proper virtue," it must be understood that the proper virtue of a thing follows upon its essence: for there are diverse virtues according to the diversity of natures. Therefore, before something has its proper virtue, it does not have the complement of its essence: either with respect to its intrinsic principles, or with respect to extrinsic ones, such as quantity and the like, which are required so that the virtue may go forth into act. But when something has arrived at its proper virtue, namely, so that it can act in accordance with it, we say both that it has the complement of its nature, and consequently that it is perfect.

Second. God is the first object of desire. Therefore he is good. — The antecedent is proved: because he is a mover altogether unmoved, which moves as the first object of desire. — The consequence is also proved. If it is desired, then, I say, either as a good or as an apparent good. Not as an apparent good: for that is not desired in itself, but insofar as it has some species of good. Therefore as a good, which moves by itself.

Third. God is a being in act. Therefore he is good. — The consequence is proved. Each thing naturally desires to be in act according to its own mode, which is evident because it naturally resists corruption. But the good is what all things desire. Therefore a being in act is good. — Likewise, through the privation of act, potency gives rise to evil, which is opposed to good, as is said in Metaphysics IX, text comm. 19. Therefore act is a certain good.

Fourth. The communication of esse and of goodness proceeds from goodness. But this befits God. Therefore he is truly good. — The minor is proved: because God is the cause for others of their being, as a being whose esse is necessary through itself. — But the major is proved in two ways. First, from the very nature of the good, that is, from the natural condition of the good. For each thing diffuses its esse and its goodness into another by acting; the sign of this is that the sign of any perfection is to be able to produce something like itself, as is said in Meteorology IV. But naturally, action and its perfection are each thing's good. Each thing also acts insofar as it is in act. Therefore, etc. — Second, the same major is proved from the account of the good. The account of the good lies in this, that it is desirable, which is an end. But the end moves the agent to act, which is evident from what is said, that the good is diffusive of its esse. Therefore the good also moves the agent to act. Therefore, etc.

The conclusion is confirmed first by the authority of the Psalm: "How good," etc. Second, by the authority of Lamentations 3: "Good is God," etc.

II. Concerning this proposition, "The good is the desirable and the end," a doubt arises: whether the desirable is the essential ratio of the good, and likewise the end. For it seems that it is so. Because wherever St. Thomas speaks of the ratio of the good, he always seems to assign to the good, as its ratio, the notion of the desirable and of the end: as is clear in this place, and in the First Part, q. 5, a. 1, Ver., q. 1 and 21 ³, in I Sent., d. 19 ⁴, and in almost countless other places.

But the opposite holds, because the appetible seems to stand to the good as the visible stands to color: just as color is the object of sight, so the good is the object of the will; and as the visible denominates color itself in relation to sight, so the appetible denominates the good in relation to appetite. But the visible is not the essential ratio of color, but its passion: hence this is not in the first mode, "Color is visible," as appears in II de Anima ⁵. Therefore it will be similar with the appetible.

A doubt also arises concerning the very reason itself ⁶. For in the antecedent Saint Thomas seems to speak of the procession of goodness from something as from an efficient cause. But the proof assumed from the reason of the good proceeds concerning procession from the good as from a final cause: for this proposition, "The good is diffusive of its esse," Saint Thomas interprets in the First Part, q. v, a. 4, ad 2, and in De Veritate, q. xxi, a. 1, ad 4, as concerning diffusion not by the mode of an efficient cause, but by the mode of a final cause.

III. To make the first doubt evident, it must be considered that in the doctrine of Saint Thomas, different authors explain in different ways how the good is appetible. For Hervaeus, in Quodlibet III, q. II, inclines to hold that the ratio of good is a wholly absolute ratio, including no respect; and consequently appetibility, which imports an ordination to appetite, is not of the essential ratio of good.

Capreolus, however, in I Sent., d. III, q. III ⁷, holds that the ratio of the good is respective: not indeed as signifying a pure respect, but as signifying something absolute together with a respect. Hence he says first that the good in its essential ratio includes the appetible; and that this proposition, "The good is appetible," is per se in the first mode. — He says second that it is not the same with color and visible as with good and appetible. For color names the very thing that is the object moving sight, to which "visible" follows as its passion; but the good does not name precisely what is the moving object of appetite, but signifies both what is the moving object of the will and the habitude to appetite; hence the good is more assimilated to this aggregate, "visible color," than to color alone. And on account of this, "The good is appetible" is an essential predication: but not "Color is visible."

IV. But although the authors of these opinions are most learned in every respect, it does not seem to me that they speak according to the mind of St. Thomas in this matter. For that the good does not signify something purely absolute is sufficiently clear in the Questions on Truth, q. 1 and q. 21, where St. Thomas holds that the true and the good differ in reason from being because they add to the reason of being a respect of reason. Therefore Capreolus well answers, in dist. 34 of the Second Book ⁸, and in the place cited above, the arguments for that opinion.

That the relation imported by the name "appetible" is not of the essential ratio of good, but follows upon the ratio of good, is clear from what St. Thomas says in I Ethics ⁹, where, expounding this proposition—"Good is that which all things desire"—he says that first principles cannot be made known through anything prior to them, but are made known through what is posterior, as causes are through their proper effects. And since good is properly the motive of appetite, it is described through the motion of appetite, just as motive power is customarily manifested through motion. From these words he gives us to understand that being appetible is not the essential ratio of good, but follows upon the proper ratio of good, just as visible follows upon color, which is the object moving sight. — This too Capreolus himself held in II, d. xxxiv, thinking better than he had in I Sent.

For which reason it seems to me that one must say that the appetible can be taken in two ways: in one way, formally, namely for that relation which is signified by the name "appetible"; in another way, fundamentally, namely for that which is the foundation of such a relation, inasmuch as it is such. If it is taken in the first way, it is not of the essential ratio of the good, but accompanies the ratio of the good. If, however, it is taken in the second way, it is of the formal and essential ratio itself: for it signifies the good as being inasmuch as it grounds the relation of the appetible. Hence the proposition "The good is appetible" is per se in the second mode, if the appetible is taken in the first way; but it is per se in the first mode, if it is taken in the second way. Therefore, when Saint Thomas says that the ratio of the good consists in this, that it is appetible, this must be understood of the concomitant ratio, if the appetible is taken formally; but if it is taken fundamentally, it must be understood of the essential ratio. And this second view seems to come closer to the intention of the holy Doctor: for the good, according to its ratio, is fundamentally appetible and an end.

2. But then a doubt remains. For according to this response it seems to follow that the good is a mere absolute, as the first opinion said: just as color, which is visible fundamentally, is in itself a mere absolute.

It is answered that, although the good does not include formally the relation of the appetible and the end in its ratio, but only concomitantly, and although the good is appetible and an end fundamentally by reason of its formal ratio, it is nevertheless not merely absolute, but imports the absolute together with a respect. For it signifies a respect of perfective of another both according to the ratio of species and according to the esse which it has in the nature of things: as is clear from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Verit., q. xxi, a. 1, where he holds that the good and the true add over being a respect of perfective, but that the true is perfective according to the ratio of species alone, whereas the good is so both according to the ratio of species and according to esse. Hence the good is fundamentally appetible and an end not merely from the fact that it signifies being, but from the fact that it signifies being with such a habitude of perfective. Therefore when St. Thomas sometimes says that each thing is appetible insofar as it is perfect ¹⁰, this must be expounded as it is expounded in Verit., the question cited above ¹¹, a. 3, ad 2, concerning the perfect as including also the ratio of perfective. — And thus the answer to the first doubt is clear.

V. To the second ¹² it is said first that, because the notion of the good is accompanied by the notion of the final cause, when the good is said to pour itself forth, this is not understood in the manner of an efficient cause, although "to pour forth," according to the proper sense of the word, seems to signify the operation of an efficient cause, but in the manner of a final cause: namely, because it is by reason of the good itself that things are apt to move and act as efficient causes.

It is said second that, although the formal character of the good is accompanied by the reason of a final cause, yet the reason of an efficient cause can also belong to a thing insofar as it is good. For something is fundamentally good insofar as it has esse, and each thing acts insofar as it is in act. Hence that antecedent is taken absolutely, limiting it no more to the efficient cause than to the final cause. Indeed, of both causalities it is true that the communication of esse and of goodness proceeds from goodness. And God is the cause of esse and of goodness in the genus of efficient cause, because he is the first agent depending on nothing; and in the genus of final cause, because he is the ultimate end, for the sake of which all things are and come to be. Therefore Saint Thomas proves that proposition first in the efficient cause, second in the final cause from the reason of the good, so as to show that it holds true in both causalities.