Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

From what has been said there follows the third affirmative conclusion¹, namely: those things that are said of God and of other things are predicated analogically, that is, according to an order or respect toward some one thing.

But he proves this conclusion only by a sufficient division. For things are said either univocally, or equivocally, or analogically. Not univocally nor equivocally, as was shown above. Therefore, analogically.

I. He declares two things. The first is how names of this kind are said analogically. — The second is how the prior name befits God.

First he explains this by means of a certain division. For things are said analogically, or according to a respect toward some one thing, in two ways. In one way, according as many things have a respect to some third thing: just as animal, medicine, food, and urine are said to be healthy in relation to one health, which is that of the animal. In another way, according as the order of one of two things to the other is considered: just as being is said of substance and accident, inasmuch as the accident has a respect to the substance. — Names, therefore, said analogically of God are not said in the first way, because something prior to God would have to be posited; but in the second way.

As to the second point, he notes that the order, namely of prior and posterior, in a name is sometimes the same according to reality and according to the name, because the thing is prior both by nature and by the account of the name; but sometimes it is not the same. For when what is prior according to reality is also prior in our knowledge, then it is the same thing that is prior according to reality and according to the account of the name, since the order of the name follows the order of knowledge, as the sign of an intellectual conception: just as substance is prior to accident by nature as its cause, and in knowledge insofar as it is placed in its definition; therefore being (ens) is said first of substance both according to reality and according to the account of the name. But when what is prior by nature is posterior in knowledge, then the order according to reality and according to the account of the name is not the same: just as, although the healing power is prior to the health of the animal according to reality as its cause, yet because it is known through its effect, therefore "healthy" according to the account of the name is said first of the animal than of the healing thing. — Similarly, therefore, because we know God from other things, the thing signified by the name belongs to God first according to his mode, that is, that thing is first in God than in the creature, because it is the cause of what is in the creature: but the account of the name is posterior. Hence he is said to be named from his effects: namely because the concept conveyed by the name, which is the concept of a creature, is prior to the concept of God, or the concept of the divine perfection, conveyed by the same name.

II. Concerning what was said, that the reality of names said of God and of other things exists in God prior to existing in creatures, it must be noted that, since names of this kind do not signify one nature common to God and the creature (for then they would be univocal), but signify immediately the perfection of God and the perfection of the creature, the perfection that is in God is prior in itself to the perfection that is in the creature, just as a cause is naturally prior to its effect. And therefore it is said that the reality of the names, that is, what is signified by the names, exists prior in God: namely, because that perfection signified by the name which is in God is prior to and more perfect than that which is found in creatures.

Concerning that proposition, "Substance is prior in knowledge to accident," note that it is understood of intellectual, quidditative knowledge. This is clear from the argument adduced, namely that substance is placed in its definition, as was said above² It is also understood of its knowledge whereby it is known insofar as it is a being. For the thing signified by the name "being," as predicated of substance, is prior in nature and perfection to the thing signified by the same name as predicated of accident. Similarly, that thing is first known by the intellect than the thing of the accident itself: since, as was said in chapter XXXII, substance is placed in the definition of accident insofar as it is a being.

Concerning that diversity of analogy, it must be considered that among those modes the following difference is implicitly touched upon: in the first mode of analogy there is something prior to both analogates, namely that to which they have attribution and respect; but in the second mode there is not something prior to all the analogates, rather one of them is prior to the other.

III. Concerning the foregoing, a threefold doubt arises. The first is against the argument by which it is proved that the first mode of analogy does not befit God: namely, that something would be prior to God. For this is understood either of priority according to the thing, or of priority according to the account of the name. If in the first way, the inference does not hold: because, as appears from the given example, health, with reference to which all things are called healthy, is not prior according to the thing, but the healing power, which is medicine, is prior to it, as is said here. — If in the second way, it is not unfitting that something be prior to God, as is also said here.

The second is against the manner of analogy attributed here to the divine names³. For Saint Thomas seems to hold the opposite at Ver., q. ii, a. 11. There he holds that the analogy fitting God and creatures is not according to the agreement and proportion of one to the other, but according to a certain proportionality.

The third is against the manner of priority and posteriority according to the meaning of the name⁴. For in the First Part, q. iii, a. 5, in reply to the opposite objection, it is said that nothing is prior to God, neither in reality nor in the intellect. Therefore a name is not said of God as posterior according to the meaning of the name. The contrary of this is asserted here.

IV. To the first of these it is said that it is understood of priority according to the thing (secundum rem). Wherein it must be noted that in the first mode of analogy, sometimes, with respect to the formal and per se signification of the name, intrinsic denomination occurs only in one thing—namely, that one by comparison to which the others are said analogically to be such: because the signification of the name is formally in that one alone, while in the others it is not present formally; rather they are said to be such extrinsically, by their relation, namely, to that one. Sometimes, however, the formal signification belongs also to the others, and consequently all are said intrinsically to be such. Thus health, imported by the name "healthy," is found only in an animal, and therefore an animal is denominated intrinsically healthy; but it is not found in medicine or food, which are said to be healthy extrinsically by their relation to the health of the animal. Now being is found formally in substance, in quality, and in quantity. Therefore in both modes it is true that something is prior according to the thing among those things said analogically in relation to a third. For "healthy" is said of the animal prior according to the thing than of medicine and food: because in the animal is the very reality of health, whereas in these there is only a respect toward it; and the reality is naturally prior to the respect had toward it. Similarly, being is said of substance prior according to the thing than of quantity and quality, which are said to be beings in relation to it: for the nature of entity is naturally prior and more perfect in substance than in quality and quantity, since the very entity of substance, signified first and formally by the name "being," is nothing other than the substance itself, which is naturally prior to the accident.

It is therefore denied that what is healthy belongs to the animal in reality before it belongs to the others. — In proof of this it is said that, although the healing virtue is naturally prior to the health of the animal, nevertheless it is not that which is formally and primarily signified by the name "healthy," but only the health of the animal. Now we are speaking here of the reality formally and primarily signified by the analogous name.

V. But against this seems to be what Saint Thomas holds, for, wishing to show how the order of the thing is not the same as the order of the name, he maintains that the name "healthy," as regards the meaning of the name, applies first to the animal, but as regards the thing signified, applies first to the health-giving.

It is said that St. Thomas is not speaking of the formal and first signification of "healthy," of which we have spoken, but of the material one, and of the foundation of the respect toward health: for the health-giving power is not signified formally by the name "healthy," but materially. Hence he wished to say that "healthy," as said of the health-giving, is said of a thing naturally prior: for the health-giving power is prior to health. But nevertheless, because that thing is not signified formally, but only materially, as the foundation of the respect toward the health of an animal; therefore "healthy" said of the animal and of the health-giving, with regard to the foundation from which the health-giving has it that it be signified by the name "healthy" through its habitude to the health of an animal, is said prior in reality of the health-giving than of the animal; namely, because the health-giving power is naturally prior to health, as cause to effect. And this sufficed for the purpose of St. Thomas, who wished to show that the order in reality, with respect to every thing imported, is not always the same as the order of the name. With this, however, it stands that, with respect to what is only formally signified, what is said of the animal is also said prior in reality. For what is said of the animal signifies the very form of health; while what is said of the others signifies a habitude to it. Now it is evident that the very thing itself is naturally prior to the habitude to it.

2. It could be answered second that the name "healthy" can be analogical in two ways, according to different considerations. For if it is taken according to its proper, formal, and first signification, which is one on the side of the thing, it belongs to the first mode of analogy. And thus not only according to the reason of the name and its imposition, but also according to the thing signified, it belongs to the animal before other things; and the others, insofar as they are healthy, have something prior to themselves on the side of the thing, namely the health of the animal; for the animal has that very health, while the others have only a relation to it. But if it is taken as signifying several things first on the side of the thing—namely both the due proportion of the humors, which is its proper signification, from which medicine is said to be healthy extrinsically; and the healing power, by which medicine is said to be healthy intrinsically and formally, though improperly—it belongs to the second mode of analogy, and is said of medicine prior in the order of the thing than of the animal; although according to the reason of the name it is the reverse, inasmuch as we form first the concept under which it signifies the proportion of the humors, before the concept under which it signifies the healing power. Nor is it unfitting that St. Thomas uses the same name diversely for an example: for he does this to show that one and the same name, taken in different ways, can belong to different modes of analogy. Hence also in the Questions on the Power of God, q. VII, a. 7, to exhibit both modes of analogy, he gives examples from the name being (ens) according as it is considered in different ways.

VI. It must be noted, however, that because we said ⁵ that the formal and per se signification of the name of an analogical term is sometimes found in only one thing and sometimes in all of them, this does not contradict what is said in the First Part, q. XVI, a. 6, where St. Thomas seems to hold that in all analogical terms the name is found according to its proper meaning in only one thing, from which the others are denominated. For by "proper meaning" we can understand two things: namely, the meaning or nature first and principally imported, in comparison with which other things are said to be such — for this is called the proper meaning of the name because it is imported first and principally; and an analogical name, uttered absolutely, is taken for that signification, as is said in I Perihermeneias ⁶, just as the name "being," spoken absolutely, is taken for substance — or else every meaning formally imported by the name. In the first way St. Thomas speaks in the First Part: for it is certain that the primary signification of the name of an analogical term is found in only one analogate, namely, the first. But in the second way we have spoken here. And it is the mind of St. Thomas in I Sent., d. XIX, q. V, a. 2, ad 1: for it is evident that the name ens, in its formal signification, says something existing in substance and in accident, which is one analogically, as will be shown below ⁷. And similarly for the names which are predicated analogically of God and creatures.

It may also be said that Saint Thomas does not take the analogous there in its whole community and universally, but only for the analogate which, according to what is to be said immediately ⁸, is called a name from one or to one. For this served his purpose: because truth, of which he was speaking there, is said analogically in this way of the intellect and of things. But we have spoken universally of the analogate. For if it be taken universally, it is evident that something is found in one alone according to its formal signification, while something else is found in all.

VII. For the clarification of the second doubt ⁹, it must be known that "analogy" is a Greek word, and it is taken in one way by the Greeks and in another by certain Latins. The Greeks, as is clear from Ammonius and Simplicius in their exposition of the definition of equivocals handed down by Aristotle in the Antepraedicamenta ¹⁰, divide equivocals by design into those which are said from one thing, as some book is called medical from the art of medicine, and some instrument medicinal; and those which are said toward one thing, as medicine and food are called healthy with respect to the health of an animal; and those which are analogous—and they say that things are analogous which are one by proportion, among which there is, namely, a certain proportionality. Hence Ammonius says that analogy is considered in at least four terms: just as the foot of a man and the foot of a couch are analogically called foot; for the proportion which the foot of a man has to the man, the foot of the couch has to the couch.

According, therefore, to its proper meaning, analogues are said to be proportionals, that is, things having among themselves a likeness of proportion. And a name is called analogous when it signifies many things as they are proportional: as "foot" is said of the foot of a man and of the foot of a couch; "sight" of bodily vision and of intellect; "principle" of the heart and of the foundation of a house. Aristotle uses the name "analogous" in this signification: as is clear in Metaphysics V, in the chapter on the One ¹¹, and in Nicomachean Ethics I, chapter VII ¹².

But by some of the Latins, the analogous is taken for every name signifying many things according to some relation either to one thing or among themselves, both those things that are from one and toward one, and all proportionals, calling equivocals by design absolutely analogous. Hence much confusion arises in the knowledge of analogues.

Saint Thomas, therefore, in the Questions on Truth, considering the true account of analogy—that names said of God and creatures analogically are said truly—said that between God and the creature there is an analogy of proportionality, but not of proportion; the latter is more properly called equivocation by design from one thing or to one thing than analogical signification.

2. It must be known further that the analogy of one thing to another, taking "analogy" in its common and usual signification among the Latins, can be understood in two ways: in one way, as distinguished against the analogy of two things to a third; in another way, as distinguished against the analogy of proportionality. For the analogy of one thing to another, divided against the analogy of two things to a third, is taken as a certain common notion, and is divided into the analogy of proportion and the analogy of proportionality. The analogy of proportion signifies a certain determinate distance and relation of one thing to another, insofar as they are signified by some name; but the analogy of proportionality does not signify a certain and determinate relation of one analogate to another absolutely, but rather the likeness or proportion of a proportion of two things to two others, so that between the analogates themselves there is no absolute likeness, but only between their proportions to certain things. For such an analogy can exist both among things greatly distant and among things little distant, as is said in De Veritate, at the place cited, q. 4: for there is no greater likeness of proportions between two and one and six and three, than between two and one and one hundred and fifty. — Sometimes, however, the analogy of proportion, because it exists only between the analogates themselves in relation to each other, is signified absolutely by the common name applied to both the analogy of proportion and of proportionality as its proper name, and it is called the analogy of one thing to another. And thus the analogy of one thing to another is distinguished against the analogy of proportionality, just as the analogy of proportion is; even though the same thing is signified by the name "analogy of one thing to another" and by the name "analogy of proportion."

If, therefore, the analogy of one to another is taken in the first way, then it is an analogy of one to another between God and the creature: because it is according to a comparison of God and creature with each other, and not according to a comparison of God and creature to some third thing of which the analogous name is said priorly than of them. And thus it is taken in this place, in the First Part¹³, and in De Potentia, question VII¹⁴, where it is said that this is an analogy of one to another. — But if it is taken in the second way, then it is not an analogy of one to another: because there is not a determinate distance and relation between God and the creature, such namely that from one the other could be comprehended and bounded by the intellect. And thus he intends in the Questions on Truth, when he says that this is not an analogy of one to another. Hence there is no contradiction. For he does not deny that this is an analogy of one to another absolutely, but that which involves a determinate distance or determinate relation to another.

VIII. But this solution does not seem to accord with the mind of St. Thomas. For, when he speaks of the analogy of God to creature, he speaks of that analogy in which what is prior is placed in the definition of the posterior, just as substance is placed in the definition of accident, as is clear in chapter XXXII, in the sixth reason. Now such is the analogy of proportion, which is distinguished against the analogy of proportionality: as is clear from De Veritate, same question and article, ad 6. Therefore here he takes the analogy of one thing to another for the analogy of proportion. If, then, he denies in the Questions on Truth that it holds between God and creature, there is a contradiction in his statements.

It is answered first, in conformity with what has been said in the preceding passages, that in the analogy of proportion, in which a determinate distance and relation of one to another is attended to, the prior is posited in the definition of the posterior: because posteriors import a certain relation to the first, just as medicine is called healthy in order to the health of an animal, and an accident is said to be a being in order to substance. For in those cases the name was imposed on the posteriors either to signify formally a relation to something else, as "healthy" of medicine; or a thing together with its order to another, as "being" said of an accident signifies the accident in its order to substance—not indeed as to a correlative, but as to a subject. In the analogy of proportionality, however, the prior is not necessarily posited in the definition of the posterior, speaking of names that belong formally and properly to both prior and posterior (for concerning things predicated properly of one and metaphorically of the other, the account is different, as is clear from the First Part, q. XIII, a. 6). For in such things as are said formally of both according to proportionality, it is not necessary that one signify formally a relation to the other, although fundamentally it signifies something from which a likeness of proportions is attended to between them, and from that agreement the same name is imposed on both: just as, when "foot" is said of the foot of a litter, it does not signify a relation to the foot of a man, though it signifies something in which there is agreement with the foot of a man, and from one the name was imposed on the other. Therefore what Saint Thomas says in chapter XXXII—that the prior is posited in the definition of the posterior; and in the First Part, q. XIII, a. 6, that in all names said analogically it is necessary that all be said by reference to one, and therefore that one must be posited in the definition of all—is to be understood of all analogues, whether they are said with reference to one third thing, or have between themselves an analogy which is called analogy of proportion; but not of analogues by the analogy of proportionality, as is said in De Veritate, in the question cited above.

But to that argument drawn from chapter XXXII, it may be said that from it we do not have it that the names said of God and creatures analogically belong to the number of those analogues in which the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior; rather, since St. Thomas wished to show that those things are not said univocally, he assumed that they are said according to prior and posterior, and such a thing is clearly not univocal; and he demonstrated this in those things that are manifest to us, which are analogues according to proportion, in which one is placed in the definition of the other, from which it appears that that name does not say entirely the same ratio; leaving it from this to be all the more necessary that in other things, which are said only according to proportionality, diverse ratios be imported according to prior and posterior, since those significates have a greater distance from one another than the significates that are analogues according to proportion, and are therefore more alien to the ratio of the univocal.

IX. It can be answered secondly, and better in my judgment, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that in every mode of analogy it is true that what is prior is placed in the definition of the posterior, insofar as it is considered and signified analogically. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that we must speak one way in analogates where the order of the imposition of the name is proportioned to the order of the things formally signified, and another way where the order of the imposition of the name does not follow the order of the thing signified. For where the same order is preserved, the name is not said of the posterior except in relation to the prior, because the posterior is not understood except in relation to it. But since, where one thing is conceived in relation to another and is signified with such a relation, that to which the relation is said must be placed in the definition of the latter insofar as it is signified by such a name, whenever such a name is said of it, since it is said with respect to the first analogate, which is placed in its definition. As is clear in those things which are signified formally by the name "healthy": for since the intellect does not conceive medicine as healthy except insofar as it apprehends it to be causative of the health of an animal, nor does it signify it by the name "healthy" except by formally importing the relation of cause to the health of an animal, therefore in the definition of "healthy" said of medicine there is placed "healthy" said of the animal, and this name "healthy" is never said of medicine itself except with respect to the health of the animal.

But where the order of the imposition of a name is contrary to the order of the thing, the name first imposed on what is later according to the thing is said of it in two ways: namely, absolutely, and analogically or proportionally. For the intellect first considered the latter absolutely, and imposed on it the name by means of an absolute concept. Then, through inquiry, it arrived at knowledge of that which is the first analogate according to the thing, and attributed to it the name that had been imposed on the latter. And, knowing that the latter has a relation to the former, it signifies such a relation by the same name in a certain third imposition; and the name which it had earlier imposed to signify the thing absolutely, it afterwards imposes to signify that very thing in its order and relation to another. And thus, since it has also imposed that name on the prior, it takes the name as said analogically of both. From this it happens that sometimes such a name is taken as one, signifying simply, because of the first imposition; but sometimes as several things, said analogically and according to the relation of one to the other, because of the last imposition. And in the definition of the thing itself as it is said absolutely, according to the first imposition, the first analogate is not posited; but it is well posited in its ratio as the name is predicated analogically of those several things; for thus the name that was imposed on the prior thing absolutely is imposed on the latter as said analogically. Just as, if the name "being" (ens) had first been imposed to signify the nature of accident without order to substance—for instance, insofar as it has esse absolutely—and then, upon knowing that having esse belongs to substance in a nobler way than to accident, it had been imposed on substance itself; thirdly, upon knowing that esse does not belong to accident except in substance, it had been imposed to signify accident with order to substance, and would have been taken as signifying analogically both: then this name "being," as it is said of substance, would not be posited in the definition of accident as it is said of accident absolutely, according to the first imposition; but well indeed as it is said analogically, according to the second imposition.

So it is with all the divine names, which are said properly and analogically of God himself and of creatures. For this name "wisdom" was first assigned to signify human wisdom absolutely, just as it was first known absolutely; then, once it was known that it is exemplated from divine wisdom, it was imposed to signify divine wisdom; and finally it was imposed to signify human wisdom in relation to divine wisdom as to its cause and exemplar, and it was taken as an analogous and proportional name. And the same holds for the other divine names. Therefore, according to the first imposition, the first analogate is not placed in the definition of the other: because at that time the name is not taken as analogous but as univocal. But insofar as it is taken analogically—which belongs to it according to the third imposition—the divine perfection is placed in the definition of the creature's perfection when both are signified by the same name.

That this is the mind of St. Thomas, however, is clear from I Sent., in the Prologue, a. 2, ad 2, where he says that the analogy of the creature to the Creator consists in this, that one receives esse and its account from the other: for the creature does not have esse except insofar as it descends from the first being, nor is it called a being except insofar as it imitates the first being. And he adds that the same holds of wisdom and of all other things said of God and creature.

According to this reply, therefore, the saying of St. Thomas is universally preserved, both here and in the Prima, q. xiii, a. 6 and 10, that in all analogates, insofar as they are analogates, the first of the analogates is placed in the definition of the others. — By this also the saying of St. Thomas in the Prima, q. xiii, a. 5 is verified, where he says that whatever is said of God and creatures is said in virtue of some order of the creature to God as to its principle and cause: for it is understood insofar as it is said analogically.

Nor does it stand in the way that St. Thomas says in the Questions on Truth that that proposition has truth only in the analogy of proportion. For his meaning is that in analogy of proportion only, the first thing to which a name is given absolutely is placed in the definition of the others, because, on account of its determinate distance and relation to the others, it can lead to perfect knowledge of them insofar as they are signified by that name. But this is not universally true in the analogy of proportionality: because the first thing to which the name is given, since as such it has no determinate relation to the others but only a proportionality, need not always lead to perfect and quidditative knowledge of the others. With this, however, it stands that in all analogates, insofar as they are analogates, one is always placed in the definition of the others: namely, either that to which the name is first given absolutely, or that to which the name is given secondarily. For in divine names, what is first according to reality but later according to the imposition of the name is placed in the definition of the others insofar as they are analogates: for man is said to be wise analogically because he possesses the perfection by which he imitates divine wisdom; and so with the rest.

X. To the third doubt ¹⁵ it is said that this discourse concerns the order of conceiving on the part of the intellect, insofar as it forms one concept before another in time. But there it is understood of the priority of the simplicity of the concept itself. Hence there is no contradiction. — How something could or could not be simpler than God in reason has been shown above ¹⁶.

XI. For other difficulties that arise concerning the analogy of names, if you wish to understand them fully, see the most ingenious work on the Analogy of Names by the Most Reverend Thomas Cajetan, Cardinal of Saint Sixtus ¹⁷.

I think only one thing needs to be investigated here, which is the foundation of this whole subject, namely: how being and the other names said of God and creature analogically do or do not signify one concept. For various statements of St. Thomas create difficulty in this matter.

For sometimes he seems to say that names of this kind do not signify one ratio but several: as in the First Part, q. 13, a. 5; and in the Quaestiones de Potentia, q. 7, a. 7; De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11; and in other places he repeats the same thing often.

Yet at times he seems to wish that being signifies one concept: as in Truth, q. 1, a. 1, where he holds that every other concept must be resolved into the concept of being. — Likewise in I Sentences, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, he maintains that such names are said analogically of God and creatures in such a way that the common intention and nature has esse in each of those of whom it is said: from which it seems to follow not only that they import one concept of the intellect, but even one nature. — It is also confirmed by this: because when we say that God is wise or just or good, these names seem to be taken, according to the mind of St. Thomas, as we use them of creatures, as though the same ratio attributed to a creature also befits God, although it imperfectly represents the divine perfection. Hence also above ¹⁸ he said that names which signify perfection absolutely and without defect are predicated of God: which seems to be understood with respect to that ratio of creatures which signifies no imperfection.

XII. On this difficulty the opinion of the Thomists varies. For some hold, on account of what was brought forward above ¹⁹, that being, and likewise other terms said analogically of God and creatures, signify one formal or mental concept, distinct from the concepts of other things, although it does not signify one objective concept, one and distinct, but only one by analogy.

Others, however, hold that ens does not signify one mental concept precisely distinct from the concepts of the inferiors, just as it is not one objective concept either; but, just as it signifies the analogates themselves insofar as they are one by proportion or as similar things, so too it signifies all the mental concepts of the analogates insofar as they are one concept proportionally.

XIII. Of these opinions, the second seems to me the truer, and more conformable to the doctrine of the philosophers and of Saint Thomas. For the understanding of which it must be considered that, since being is predicated of things quidditatively and essentially, we can speak of its concept in two ways: in one way, of the concept of the quiddity of the thing, according to which it is predicated adequately and quidditatively of all the analogates; in the other way, of the concept of the quiddity of the name, which is imperfect and inadequate. Now I call a concept perfect and adequate not by an adequation of predication only, but by an adequation of representation as well, namely because it is not only predicated of all beings, but also perfectly represents the nature of the thing signified first and per se by the name "being."

If, then, we speak of the first concept ²⁰, I say thus: that being does not have one mental concept, any more than one objective concept, abstracted from all others. I am moved to this position, first ²¹, because otherwise it could not be avoided that being would be univocal. For what suffices for univocity, as is clear from Aristotle's definition in the Categories ²², is that there be one name said of many things according to entirely the same formal account of a nature as first signified by that name. Now that this account (ratio) in the definition is to be taken for a mental concept, and not for a nature or an objective concept, is clear first from Simplicius and Ammonius on the Categories, who say that ratio is taken there for a definition or description; but a definition or description is an utterance, and consequently exists first in the mind. — It is clear secondly because, wherever St. Thomas speaks of how the divine names are not synonyms, as below ²³, and in Prima, q. xiii, a. 4, and I Sent., d. ii, q. ii ²⁴, likewise in Potentia, q. vii, a. 6, he shows that they are not synonyms because, although they signify one and the same thing, they nevertheless signify it under different accounts ²⁵. And when he explains what he understands by the word "account" (ratio), he says ²⁶ that the account which a name signifies is the concept which the intellect forms of the thing signified by the name. And so, following the treatise On the Divine Names, he never expresses any other meaning of the word "account," even where he speaks of univocation. From this it appears that, even when speaking of univocation, by the "account" whose unity is required in a univocal term he understands a mental concept, not the thing presented to the concept. — It is clear thirdly, because in the treatise on Genus ²⁷ he holds that substance, which is the most general genus, differs from the inferior genera of the category of substance, because in the other genera there is found some one nature underlying the intention of universality, by reason of which, with the uniformity that comes from the account (ratio), the genus itself stands uniformly related to all the things subordinate to it; but in substance there is not one thing underlying the intention, since there is no real agreement between material things and separate ones, of which the genus substance is said; rather, the intellect gathers from diverse things an intention and concept applicable to both natures. And thus, according to him, the agreement of material and immaterial things lies only in the conception of the intellect. And yet the name "substance" is univocal of material and immaterial things; otherwise it would not be a genus. Therefore the unity of the mental concept alone suffices for univocity — and I am speaking of logical univocation, of which the Philosopher speaks in the Categories.

2. But the arguments brought against this determination by some do not convince. For they argue first that, since God understands all things by a single concept, it would follow that all things would be of one univocal account.

Second, because the definition of a univocal name applies to things of which the name is predicated univocally. But the concept of the mind is not predicated of things.

But to the first it is said that for the account of a univocal concept it does not suffice that it be one in any manner whatever; rather, what is required is that it be adequate to the thing formally and primarily signified by the univocal name, such that it is not the concept of any other thing, and that it represent the things univocated with respect to that in which they agree, but not with respect to those features by which they are distinguished from one another: just as the concept of animal is a concept of animal alone and of nothing else; likewise it represents man and horse, to which it applies univocally, only with respect to animality, in which they agree, but not with respect to the differences by which they are distinguished. But the divine concept, by which God understands Himself and all things, is a concept of all things and even of God Himself; yet it is not proportioned to a creature but exceeds it; and it represents all beings not only with respect to those features in which they resemble one another, but also with respect to all the conditions by which each thing is distinguished from another. Therefore it is not univocal, so that all things could be said to be of one ratio as univocals. Yet all beings can indeed be said to be of one ratio as understood by God, inasmuch as all things are comprehended under a single exceeding concept.

To the second it is said that the ratio of the univocal name, in which the things signified are univocal, belongs to the things themselves not by identity, but fundamentally: because in all univocals there is a foundation for such a ratio. Hence, when a univocal name is predicated of univocals, the concept itself is not predicated per se, but the thing in which the concept is founded, and which, through the mediation of the concept, is signified by the name.

By this, however, I do not intend to exclude every other unity besides the unity of the mental concept from the univocal name. Rather, I intend that the unity of the mental concept suffices for logical univocation, even though this unity of the mental concept is sometimes accompanied by some other unity of the objective concept in metaphysical univocation.

XIV. I am moved secondly, because above ²⁸ St. Thomas said that substance is placed in the definition of an accident insofar as it is a being. And this is also the mind of Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 2 and 3 ²⁹. Therefore the concept of being is not one concept abstracted by precision from the concept of substance and accident. — The consequence is evident. For if it were one by precision, nothing would be placed in the definition of an accident insofar as it is a being that is not placed in the definition of substance insofar as it is a being: for what is common, abstracted by precision from its inferiors, includes none of those inferiors in act as such. Much less, then, will they say there is a precise concept of the names said analogically of God and creature: since between God and creature there is a greater distance than between predicamental substance and accident.

To this may be added what we cited above ³⁰: since, I say, Saint Thomas, where he treats of this matter deliberately, holds that nothing can belong to God and creatures according to the same ratio. And in Prima, q. xiii, a. 5, he says that in analogates there is not one ratio as in univocals, nor entirely diverse as in equivocals, but they signify diverse proportions to some one thing.

XV. But if we speak of the imperfect and inadequate concept, pertaining to the quid nominis ³¹, then it is not unfitting to say that ens is one mental concept abstracted from others. For from things that are similar, insofar as they are similar, it is not unfitting that one imperfect concept be abstracted, one that does not perfectly represent the nature of the ground of the similarity, but signifies those things only insofar as they are similar.

Where it must be considered that being and other analogates are distinguished from univocals in this respect, with respect to one and precise mental concept: for although each represents things similar and in agreement, nevertheless the concept of a univocal name perfectly represents the foundations of likeness as signified by that name; just as the concept of animal perfectly represents the nature of animal in man, by which he is assimilated to a horse, so that there is nothing else in man, insofar as he is an animal, than in a horse insofar as it is an animal—although this animal, man, is something other which is not a horse. But that one concept of an analogate does not perfectly represent the foundations of likeness first and per se signified by an analogical name, but something agrees with them which is not represented by such a precise concept, as is clear concerning being. For when someone considers that substance grounds esse per se, but accident grounds esse in another, and that these are alike in grounding esse, although each grounds esse in its own way, he forms a concept common to them as they are alike in this, namely that they ground esse, saying that a being is what has esse. But this concept does not represent the accident insofar as it is a being perfectly and adequately. This is evident because in the perfect definition of accident insofar as it is a being, substance is posited, as Saint Thomas and Aristotle say ³²; and being signifies both substance and accident according to the proper ratio of each. And it is similarly with the other analogates.

It must therefore be said that being does not have one precise, perfect, and adequate mental concept, but immediately signifies the concept of substance, quantity, quality, and the others, insofar as they are one by similitude and proportion: just as, on the side of the thing itself, it immediately signifies all those natures insofar as they are proportional to and similar with respect to esse itself. And in this it differs from the concept of a univocal term: for the concept of a univocal is not many concepts that are one concept only by proportion, but is simply one; just as the thing first signified through it, if it be metaphysically univocal, is one. Now what we say—that which has esse—is an imperfect and inadequate concept of beings, representing them as they are similar. And Saint Thomas speaks of this when he says ³³ that all other conceptions are resolved into the concept of being and add something to it, and that it is the most simple.

But when it is sometimes said that "being" signifies the common intention and nature ³⁴, this is understood of a community that is analogical and one of proportion. For the quiddity of substance is a certain entity and a nature signified by the name "being," and likewise the nature of quantity and of the others. And they agree in an imperfect common intention, which is to ground esse. And they are one nature by a certain proportion and likeness. And because the ratio of being said of substance is more perfect than the ratio of being said of accident, and the ratio of substance is included in the ratio of accident insofar as it is a being, therefore "being" is said of them according to priority and posteriority.

XVI. What I have said of being must likewise be understood of all the other names attributed to God and to a creature analogically, with respect to that unity or multiplicity of concepts. For the name "wisdom," said of God and of a creature, signifies diverse natures immediately, which nevertheless bear between themselves a likeness and proportion, inasmuch as one is exemplified by the other: for just as by his wisdom God considers the highest causes³⁵, but in his own manner, so also does the creature consider those same causes in its own manner through its wisdom. Likewise, these names import diverse mental concepts, each of which would be adequate to one of the analogates, if we could conceive divine wisdom itself as it is in itself. But because we cannot do this, we form indeed one concept adequate to the creature, but we form another concept of God proportionally to the concept of the creature, and this latter is inadequate to it. And further, on account of the similarity of our concept of wisdom to the concept of divine wisdom, we form one common concept of divine and human wisdom, convenient but imperfect and inadequate to both, in which both wisdoms are assimilated. And thus such a name signifies one inadequate and imperfect concept, not expressing divine wisdom perfectly insofar as it is wisdom, but representing both wisdoms as they are alike; yet it does not signify one precise concept, perfect and adequate to the analogates. Hence, when "wise" is predicated of God, its concept, as it is predicated of him, is none other than the proper concept of divine wisdom: just as, when it is predicated of man, its concept is none other than the concept of human wisdom. Hence Saint Thomas says in Prima, q. xiii, a. 5, that when this name "wise" is said of man, it signifies some perfection distinct from the essence of man and from his power and from his esse, and from all things of this kind; but when we say this name of God, we do not intend to signify anything distinct from his essence or power or esse. But it is true that the name wisdom signifies divine wisdom itself only as one thing proportional to created wisdom; whereas this name, divine wisdom, signifies it absolutely and by one reason simply. So that the same thing, insofar as it grounds the similitude and convenience of proportionality, is signified by an analogous name; but insofar as it grounds distance and dissimilitude, it is signified by a proper name. On account of which the analogous name is said to signify one thing by proportion: for all the analogates, and all their concepts, are the same by similitude and proportion; and thus the concept of one is the concept of the other proportionally.