Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

The second conclusion is ¹: Not everything predicated of God and of other things is said by pure equivocation, that is, as those things are said to be equivocal by chance.

It must be noted, however, that St. Thomas here takes pure equivocals as distinguished from analogous terms. For the analogous themselves are also equivocal; yet because they possess among themselves a certain unity of proportion, they are not called purely equivocal—that is, having entirely different meanings. Those which are also called equivocal a casu are so called because a name was imposed by different people on different things to be signified, not from any likeness of one to the other, but simply because it so happened. But they are called equivocal a consilio because they signify one thing in virtue of some likeness to another. For the one who imposed the name, since he considered a certain proportion between them, therefore named them with the same name—yet one in relation to the other, and insofar as one is included within the meaning of the other.

I. The conclusion is first proved. For in equivocals by chance no order or relation of one to another is considered, but it is entirely accidental that the same name is attributed to different things, since a name imposed on one does not signify that it has an order to another. But in names said of God and creatures an order of cause and caused is considered. Therefore, etc.

It must be noted that in the names said of God and creatures there is considered the order of cause and caused, not that such an order is formally conveyed by those names themselves—otherwise all names would be relative names—but because they convey the foundations of the order of cause and caused; and from consideration of this order, since it has been considered that this perfection depends on God as on its cause, and therefore that there is something in God by which there is a likeness between them, especially when it conveys no imperfection from the differential concept, the same name has been imposed both on God and on the creature. Hence what St. Thomas seems to wish to say in this argument—that an analogous name signifies one thing having an order to another—is understood either formally or fundamentally: for in some cases it is formally conveyed, but in others only fundamentally, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter ². This, however, is common to all: that from consideration of such an order the same name is imposed on each of the analogates; so that one may say that the relation of cause to caused is that by which the name is imposed, but not that to which it is imposed as the thing signified by the name. — I would say this according to one way of expounding the words of St. Thomas, adhering to the opinions of others. In the following chapter another way will be shown, perhaps more fitting.

II. Second. There is some mode of likeness of things to God. Therefore the name is not said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way. — The consequence is proved. Because where there is pure equivocation, no likeness is observed in the things.

Note that among purely equivocal things there is no likeness, namely such as would be signified by the equivocal name, as the thing from which the name was imposed. Yet some likeness can well exist between them considered absolutely.

III. Third. From those things that are found in other things, we arrive at knowledge of divine things. Therefore there is not pure equivocation between them. — The consequence is proved. Because when one thing is said of many by pure equivocation, we cannot be led from knowledge of one of them to knowledge of another: since the cognition of things depends not on words but on the meaning of the name.

It must also be noted here that, absolutely speaking, one of two equivocals can lead to knowledge of the other, insofar as they can be similar in some other respect. But speaking formally, taking the equivocals precisely as equivocal—that is, as having only a name in common—one cannot lead to knowledge of the other. For if there were two men who by chance were both called Socrates, from knowledge of one of them insofar as he is Socrates one could not arrive at knowledge of the other on the ground that he too is called Socrates: since they agree in nothing except the name as such; and from words alone no knowledge of a thing is had, nor does anything belong to a thing really by reason of its mere naming.

IV. Fourth. It would follow that no argumentation could be made by proceeding from creatures to God. — The consequence is proved. Because the equivocation of a name impedes the process of argumentation.

It must be considered that in every argumentation the extremes must come together in one middle term and be united. But this is destroyed by equivocation of a name. For if I were to say, Every dog barks; the heavenly constellation is a dog; therefore it barks, it is evident that the extremes are not united in the middle, since the name taken as the middle is understood in one signification in the major premise and in another in the minor. Similarly, if I were to say, Every wise being considers the highest causes; God is wise; therefore He considers the highest causes, if "wise" were said purely equivocally, it would be taken in one signification in the major and in another in the minor, and thus there would be no union of the extremes in the middle.

V. Finally. It would follow that anything said or proved of God would be said in vain. — The consequence is proved. For we would understand nothing of God through those equivocal names, since the significations of those names are known to us only insofar as they are said of creatures, namely either simply or proportionally, that is, insofar as they signify either a perfection of a creature or something having a proportion to a creature's perfection. But a name is predicated of something in vain unless through that name we understand something of it.

If it is said that through these names we know of God only what He is not—as, for example, that He is said to be living because He is not of the genus of inanimate things—then it will be necessary at least that living, said of God and of creatures, agree in the negation of inanimateness. And thus it will not be purely equivocal.

It should be noted that some have said, as Saint Thomas reports in the First Part, q. 13, a. 2, and in Potentia, q. 7, a. 5, that names said of God are said of God by way of negation: as living because He is not inanimate, and so with the others. But this is rejected there. First, because then every name would be said of God formally: since there is no name by which some mode not befitting God is not removed. Second, because, since every negation is proved through an affirmation, the intellect could not deny anything of God unless it knew something of Him affirmatively. Therefore Saint Thomas does not accept this position at this place; but, even granting it, he wishes to hold that names are not said purely equivocally of God and creatures.