Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has treated the divine names in themselves, he now treats them comparatively ¹. In this he does two things: first, he compares the names themselves to the things signified; second, he compares the names to one another, in chapter thirty-five. As to the first, he lays down three conclusions. The first is given in this chapter; the second, in the following chapter; the third, in chapter thirty-four.

I. The first conclusion, therefore, is: No name can be predicated univocally of God and of other things. And "to be predicated univocally" is taken in accordance with the definition of univocals laid down by Aristotle in the Categories ², namely, that to be predicated univocally is the same as to belong to many things according to one and entirely the same account.

It is proved first ³. The forms of those things of which God is the cause do not attain to the species of the divine power. Therefore nothing can be said univocally of God and other things. — The antecedent is proved: because creatures receive them dividedly and particularly, whereas in God they are found simply and universally. — But the consequence is evident: because an effect which does not receive a form similar in species to that by which the agent acts cannot receive the name, by univocal predication, according to that form; for fire generated by the sun is not said to be hot univocally with the sun.

II. For the explanation of what precedes, it must be considered that Saint Thomas, distinguishing the forms of creatures by species from the divine power, says that they exist in the creature divisim and particulariter, but in God simpliciter and universaliter, simpliciter being opposed to what he said divisim, and universaliter to what he said particulariter. Therefore two things must be explained: namely, how this diversity is to be understood; and how this diversity argues a specific distinction ⁴.

As to the first, it must be noted that perfections signified by us under different names, such as justice, wisdom, goodness, and the like, are distinguished in creatures both really and formally: for the ratio of wisdom is one thing and the ratio of justice another, and likewise their entitas is one thing and another, even though they are sometimes one in subject. And this is for them to be divisim in the creature. — In God, however, such things are simpliciter, that is, unitedly and without real division: since all things are one simply and indivisible essence, which is the deity. And because there is one ratio of the deity, if it is considered as it is in itself—for there is one quiddity per se, and it is conceivable by a single concept proportioned to the intellect—therefore wisdom and justice and goodness and the other perfections in God are also one formally: since their ratio is one in number, on the part of the thing considered as it is in itself when understood; for of one thing and essence there is only one ratio that is quidditative, adequate, and total according to itself. It is true nevertheless that this ratio eminently contains the ratio of wisdom, and the ratios of justice and of the other perfections, yet is not adequate or proper to any of them.

It must be noted, however, that when I say wisdom is contained eminently in the deity, and the ratio of wisdom in the ratio of deity, I do not understand this as though divine wisdom were contained eminently in the deity in such a way that deity has a more excellent mode than divine wisdom itself, or as though the ratio of deity were more perfect than the ratio of wisdom if they are considered in themselves; for this is impossible, since deity and divine wisdom are one indivisible entity, and one subsisting esse, and one quiddity and essence, and their ratio is one in number and adequate — but rather because wisdom found in creatures, to which the name "wisdom" was first imposed, is contained in the deity according to a certain likeness having a more excellent mode of being than the mode of being by which it is in creatures; and similarly the ratio proportionate to created wisdom is contained eminently in the adequate ratio of deity, insofar as the ratio of deity is the ratio of wisdom and goodness and the other divine perfections, containing perfectionally and unitively the perfections of all the other ratios which our intellect has formed concerning them. Just as we say the vegetative and sensitive soul are contained eminently in the intellective soul, and their ratios in its ratio, not because the intellective soul has a more excellent mode than the sensitive and vegetative soul have in themselves, and the adequate ratio of the intellective soul is more perfect than the ratio of the vegetative and sensitive soul, which are identical with it; for this is impossible, since in the intellective soul they are one indivisible entity, and they have one indivisible esse, and there is one in number perfect and adequate ratio of that entity and quiddity, if it be conceived as it is — but because that vegetative perfection which is in plants, and the sensitive soul which is in brutes, have in the intellective soul a more perfect likeness possessing a mode than they have in other things; and their ratios are contained by the ratio of the intellective soul eminently, since in it the ratio of the vegetative and the sensitive is the same as the ratio of the intellective, as we said, if the entity of the intellective soul be conceived completely; for of one quiddity there is one in number perfect ratio.

2. Likewise, the perfections exist in creatures particularly, but in God universally. Yet this can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that particularity and universality are referred to the proper esse of the form. For in a creature a perfection has received esse, and consequently does not have the whole esse of the form, but with a certain limitation, according to what was said above ⁵. In God, however, it is subsistent: and consequently it has the whole esse of the form, and unlimited. Therefore it is in a creature particularly, that is, limited with respect to the esse of the form; but in God universally, that is, without limitation and according to the whole perfection of being owed to that form.

In another way it can be understood as saying that a perfection exists in a creature particularly, that is, according to its own proper and particular entity, really and formally distinct from another perfection, so that it is itself and not another perfection existing in the same supposit; but in God universally, that is, according to an unlimited entity, so that all perfections are one essence of the Godhead universally, not indeed by a universality of matter, but by a universality of form and perfection, containing them; and each one is such that it is itself, yet also every other perfection existing in God.

In both ways what is said here is true; yet the second interpretation seems more in keeping with the mind of St. Thomas, if it is compared with what he says in the First Part, q. 4 ⁶ and in other places ⁷ And thus the same thing is signified by divisim and simpliciter as by particulariter and universaliter: which was added for greater clarification.

3. From these things it is evident, according to ⁸, that this mode of being (essendi) indicates a specific distinction. For it is manifest that a perfection which in its cause is one essence and one nature with every other perfection is not of the same species as a perfection that is limited and distinct from other perfections. For the one has greater essential perfection than the other: and this makes for specific distinction. Thus the sensitive soul in man is specifically distinguished from the sensitive soul in brute animals, because in man it is essentially more perfect, since it is also the essence of the intellective soul, which does not belong to the soul found in brutes.

III. Concerning that proposition, "An effect which does not receive a form according to species similar to the form by which the agent acts cannot receive the name taken from that form in univocal predication," there arises a twofold doubt. The first is this: because univocation, at least logical univocation, is found not only in species but also in genus. Therefore, although the effect does not receive the same form according to species as the form of the agent, if it receives the same form according to genus, the name of that generic form will be predicated univocally of them. For "body" is said univocally of heavenly bodies and of corruptible ones, according to the logician; and yet the form of corporeity caused by heaven in these lower things is not the same according to species as the form of corporeity of heaven, but only according to genus.

The second is that then no effect would be univocal with its cause. For Saint Thomas says in the Second Part of the Second Part, q. 110, a. 1, ad 3, that no effect has the species of its cause.

2. To the first of these it is answered that Saint Thomas is not speaking of any name whatsoever of effect and cause, but of a name taken from the form of the effect, as is clear from his words. Now a name is taken from the form of the effect when it signifies that form specifically under its proper ratio, but not when it signifies it under a generic ratio; just as the name "hot," taken from the heat produced by fire, does not signify the generic nature of heat absolutely, but the specific nature: for the action of the agent is not terminated at a form abstracted at the level of genus, but at a form determined to a species. And therefore, if that form is not of the same species in cause and effect, that name is not said of cause and effect univocally: because the ratio imported by the name as it is said of the effect, and the ratio imported by it as it is said of the cause, are not one and the same ratio, which is required for univocation. From this it follows most excellently that no name said of God and creature is said univocally: because every such name is taken from a form received in the effect; and since that form is not of the same species in God and in the creature, therefore the name is not said of God and creature according to one ratio of the name. Saint Thomas therefore does not intend, by that proposition, to exclude every univocal in whatever way between cause and effect: but the univocation of a name signifying the form of the agent under its proper ratio, and likewise the form of the effect. — But what is adduced concerning body is not to the point: because the name "body" is not a name taken from the form of that effect as such, according to its proper and specific ratio.

3. To the second it is said that Saint Thomas in the Second Part of the Second Part is not speaking of an effect separated from its cause, but of an effect that accompanies the essence of the cause in the cause itself, just as being downward is an effect of a heavy body, and being laughable is an effect of man. For such an effect clearly does not have the species of its cause. But this discussion concerns an effect separated from the cause itself and produced by a true and real action, not one resulting from natural concomitance.

IV. Second, it is argued ⁹. Things, even supposing (though this is false) that they would receive from God a form similar according to species, still have in God a different mode of being than in creatures. Therefore their name is not said univocally of God and creatures. — The antecedent is proved: because in God things are ipsum esse, but not in creatures. — The consequence, however, is proved: because if an effect reaches to the species of its cause, unless it receives the same form according to the same mode of being, it does not obtain a univocal predication of the name. For a house that exists in the mind and a house that exists in matter are not said univocally, on account of the dissimilar mode of being; for in the mind it has immaterial esse, but in matter material esse.

It should be noted that, from what this Saint Thomas says, when it is said with Aristotle ¹⁰ that univocals are those whose account of substance is the same, what is meant is that the account is the same both according to form and according to mode of being. For this reason Saint Thomas, Ver., q. xxvii, a. 7, posits two things as belonging to a univocal effect: namely, that the likeness of the effect be in the cause both according to natural esse and according to the same account.

But then a doubt arises. For "body" is said univocally, at least according to the logician, of the corruptible and the incorruptible. And yet these have a different mode of being.

It is said that this argument concludes only concerning physical and natural univocity, in which not only the ratio but also the esse of the thing is considered; but not concerning logical univocity, in which only the ratio of the thing is considered, as seems to be said to the contrary at Pot. q. 7, a. 7, ad 1.

V. Third. Of God nothing is predicated as genus or difference, as was shown above; nor as species, since a species is composed of genus and difference; nor as property or accident, because there is nothing of the genus of accidents in God. Therefore nothing at all is predicated of him univocally. — The consequence is proved: because whatever is predicated univocally is one of these things.

2. To this argument, Scotus would deny the consequence. But to the proof, he would deny the assumption. For according to him, in I Sent., d. iii, q. iii ¹¹, and d. viii, q. ii, being is predicated univocally of God and creature: and yet it is neither a genus, nor a species, nor a difference, nor a property, nor an accident. It is not a genus — which is what would seem most likely — because on account of its maximal commonness it is predicated quidditatively of some differences, though not of the ultimate ones; but a genus is not predicated quidditatively of differences. And thus it is univocal, and is none of those five predicables.

3. But Scotus's reply does not invalidate the argument of St. Thomas. That this may be clearly evident, it must be known that, although from Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text. comm. 10 ¹², it is held that being cannot be a genus because it cannot have differences, since there is nothing of whose understanding being is not part, whereas a genus is not part of the understanding of its differences; nevertheless, if being were posited as univocal, it would have to be a genus and have differences of whose understanding it would not be part. For that which is "not being part of the understanding of the differences" is not of the essence of a genus but accompanies the essence of genus and follows upon it as a property: for a genus is predicated affirmatively, as is a species, and in its quidditative concept includes no negation, as is clear from the definitions of genus and species ¹³; just as not being predicated quidditatively of quality accompanies the essence of substance, yet does not enter into that essence itself. Therefore, to see whether being is a genus, one must first look to those things that constitute the essence of genus, not to those that follow upon it: for if those belong to it, what follows must also belong; for it implies a contradiction that something should belong to an essence while that which necessarily follows from it does not. Thus, since risibility follows upon the essence of man, to see whether Socrates is a man one need not first look at whether he is risible, but whether he is a rational animal: once that is established, it appears that he is risible, since the one follows from the other. For it would be foolish to say: once it is established that Socrates is a rational animal, he is not a man because he is not risible. Indeed, he cannot fail to be risible if he is a rational animal; and if it were granted as true that he is not risible, it would be argued from the sign that he is not a rational animal and hence not a man. In the same way, if the essence of genus belongs to being, one need not deny that it is a genus because it is predicated quidditatively of some differences, which conflicts with what accompanies the essence of genus. Rather, from the fact that the essence of genus is shown to belong to it, it is proved that it is not predicated of the differences; and if it were so predicated, it would be argued a posteriori that it is not a genus, and not that thing from which follows its being a genus.

4. That the character of genus belongs to being if it is univocal is shown both from the foundation of the intention and from the very definition of a second intention. It is shown from the foundation. For a genus, say animal, signifies a certain nature abstractible by the intellect from its inferiors and from every limiting principle, which is contracted by the difference, really identical with it, to the species, in such a way that the difference itself belongs to the intrinsic constitution of the essence of the species. This is evident in animal. For from the very account of animal it is clear that it is conceived without anything limiting it to a species: for when I say "animate sensible substance," no species of animal is signified. It is also evident that by this difference, namely rational, which is really identical with animal, it is limited to man, and this difference is itself intrinsic to the essence of man. Now if being is univocal, these two things must belong to it necessarily. For every univocal term, even in metaphysical univocity, which Scotus posits, signifies one form abstractible from all the univocates. Likewise, being must be limited by a difference and divided into diverse univocates. For since it is something most common, it will be limited either by diverse modes of existing or by some essential difference. Not by diverse modes of existing: because diverse species of substance, say man and horse, of which being is predicated quidditatively, agree in the same mode of existing. Also because modes of existing are not of the essence of a created thing, since in creatures esse is distinguished from essence, as will be shown below ¹⁴: therefore if being signifies one common quiddity belonging to them, and they are not distinguished except by diverse modes of existing, it follows that they would not be distinguished intrinsically and essentially; but this is false, since they are distinguished essentially by differences. Therefore it must be that, if being signifies one nature and quiddity common to them, that quiddity be divided and contracted by those differences really identified with itself. Otherwise there would be two quiddities in man, and likewise in horse, namely the quiddity of being and the quiddity of the difference; and thus it would not be one simply. Indeed neither being nor the difference itself would be predicated of the species in recto: because neither would signify the whole quiddity but a part; and a part is not predicated of the whole in recto.

From the consideration of genus the same point is also evident. For a genus is that which is predicated univocally of many things differing in species, in answer to the question what it is. Now it is clear that if being (ens) is univocal, the definition just given applies to it: for it will be predicated univocally and quidditatively of diverse species. Therefore, etc.

5. From these things it is clear that there is a contradiction in what Scotus says, when he posits that being is univocal and is predicated quidditatively of certain differences. For it follows, as we have shown, by reason of the matter, though perhaps not by reason of the form, that it is a genus. Therefore it is not predicated quidditatively of the differences: because genus is outside the concept of difference. And thus it is contradictory to say both that it is univocal and that it is predicated of the differences.

From these things it is evident that, when Aristotle proves that being is not a genus because it has no differences, his argument is a posteriori. For from the fact that it has no differences, it follows that it is not a genus nor univocal: because, if it were univocal, it would have differences, since it could not be anything univocal other than a genus.

The argument of St. Thomas is therefore effective. And that assumption is true: "Every univocal term is either a genus or a species, etc.," because nothing stood in the way of this division except being (ens), which was held to be univocal and yet not to be any one of these. It was shown, moreover, that if being is univocal, it must be a genus.

VI. Fourth. Nothing is simpler than God, neither in reality nor in the understanding. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because what is predicated univocally of many things is simpler than either of them, at least according to the understanding.

For the evidence of this assumption, it must be considered that one must speak differently of the univocal with respect to simplicity, and differently of the analogical and the equivocal. For the univocal is contracted to its inferiors by some addition: thus animal is contracted to man by rational, and man to Socrates by the principles of individuation. Therefore it is necessary that the univocal itself signify something simpler than the univocates: since the univocates include the univocal itself and add something to its account. But the equivocal, and the analogical—which signifies several accounts insofar as they are one by proportion, which is properly called analogical by the Greeks—is not simpler than any of its analogates or equivocates. Rather, it is more composite: for it does not signify one nature common to its inferiors, to which the inferiors add something; rather it signifies several natures immediately, and is related to each of them as many to one. For canis signifies several things, namely a terrestrial animal, a marine fish, and a heavenly star; but marine fish signifies only one; therefore "marine fish" is not something simpler than "canis"; rather it is as it were more composite.

From which it follows that, although we posit being to be common to God and creature, it is nevertheless not necessary that it be simpler than God: for we do not posit it to be univocal, as if it were one concept saying something common to God and creature, but to be analogical, and to signify several things immediately.

2. Concerning that proposition, "Nothing can be simpler than God, neither in reality nor in the intellect," a doubt is raised. For being (ens) is something simpler according to the intellect: since all conceptions of the intellect are derived by addition to being, as is said in Ver., q. 1, a. 1.

It is said that something can be simpler than another in two ways according to the intellect: in one way, from the condition of the thing itself; in another way, from the condition of the intellect that understands. From the condition of the thing, when one thing has in itself that by which it is conceived by a simple concept, while another has that by which it must be conceived by a composite concept. On the part of the intellect, however, when the intellect cannot comprehend by one concept a thing that is intelligible simply and by a single simple concept, because of its own weakness, and therefore forms diverse concepts of it, one of which is related to another by way of addition. Being, therefore, with respect to the one imperfect concept it signifies, of which there will be discussion below at ¹⁵, is not simpler than God according to the intellect from the condition of the thing itself; but from the imperfection of our intellect, which forms the concept of God by addition to the concept of being, because it does not see God as He is in Himself. For if the concept of the divine essence were formed as it is in itself, adequate to it, that concept would be most simple, containing no plurality: just as the thing itself is most simple, alien to all composition and multiplicity. Hence the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood as meaning that nothing is simpler than God according to the intellect insofar as this arises from the side of the thing itself. Yet with this it stands that being is simpler than God according to the intellect from the defect and weakness of our intellect.

VII. Fifth. Nothing is said of God by participation. Therefore nothing is said of him univocally. — The antecedent is evident. For whatever is participated is possessed in a particular way and not according to every mode of perfection, the opposite of which befits God, as we said above in ¹⁶. — The consequence is proved as follows. For what is predicated univocally of many befits each of them by participation: for the species participates in the genus, and the individual in the species.

It must be noted that the univocal is not said to be participated by its inferiors as though they grasped a part of its essence, but because they do not receive it according to every mode of perfection. For in different things it has different esse, more perfect and less perfect, whereas in one thing not all these modes of perfection are present: although each of them possesses the whole essence of the univocal.

VIII. Finally, everything said of God and of a creature is predicated according to priority and posteriority. Therefore nothing is said of God and of a creature univocally. — The antecedent is evident, because all things are said of God through essence, whereas of a creature all things are said through participation: for God is said to be a being as being very essence itself, and good as being goodness itself; but Socrates is said to be a man not because he is humanity itself, but because he is one having humanity. — The consequence, however, is proved as follows. What is said according to priority and posteriority is not predicated univocally. For in such cases the prior is included in the definition of the posterior, just as substance is included in the definition of an accident insofar as it is a being; from which it would follow that, if being were said univocally, or according to one ratio, of substance and accident, then substance would be posited in the definition of substance insofar as it is a being, which is impossible.

Note that in this argument Saint Thomas posits essence as an abstraction from being, which we said above ¹⁷ was his own mind's teaching.

For the clarification of the antecedent, it must be considered that anything is said of that which is such by essence prior to its being said of that which is such by participation: just as fire is said of that which is essentially fire before it is said of that which is ignited. But being such by essence can be understood in two ways: in one way, because it is the very essence itself as imported by the abstract name; in another way, because, although it is not the essence itself as signified by the abstract name but adds something to it, it nevertheless receives the predication of the latter in the concrete essentially. It is therefore in the first way, not the second, that being such by essence is taken here: as is clear from Saint Thomas's example. It should be noted, however, that he did not give an example of the same name said of God and of Socrates, but of different names, so as to explain the matter more clearly. For if an essential predicate, such as man, is not said of Socrates by essence in the first way, but by participation, much more is this so with the name goodness, which is not said essentially. — On this matter, however, concerning how "by essence" and "by participation" are variously taken, enough has been said above ¹⁸

2. Concerning that proposition, that which is said according to prior and posterior is not predicated univocally, it must be noted, from the teaching of Saint Thomas Ver., q. 11, a. 11, that it is one thing for the inferiors themselves to have among themselves an order of prior and posterior, and another thing to participate in the common thing itself according to prior and posterior. For among those things themselves, to be in such an order is one thing according to esse and according to the ratio of its proper name being prior to the other; and this order does not conflict with univocation, just as in the ratio of number all numbers are univocated and made equal, and yet such an order exists among the species of numbers. But to participate in the common thing according to prior and posterior is to participate in it not according to one ratio, but according to diverse ratios, one of which is prior to the other and is included in the other's ratio. On account of which Saint Thomas says that the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior as agreeing with it according to the common name: just as substance is placed in the definition of accident insofar as it is a being. For if it be asked, what is it for an accident to be a being? it will be answered that it is its esse something inhering in a substance. And such an order conflicts with univocation, since the univocal signifies one ratio, whereas here there are several ratios. — How, however, the prior among the analogates is placed in the definition of the posterior will be shown in the chapter on analogy ¹⁹.

IX. Scotus, in I Sent., in the places cited above ²⁰ holds the opposite of this conclusion, positing that being is univocal to God and creature: explaining, however, that he calls univocal that concept which is so one that its unity suffices for contradictorily affirming and denying it of the same thing; it also suffices as a middle term of a syllogism, so that the extremes, united in a middle thus one, may be concluded to be one with each other without the fallacy of equivocation. He proves his proposition in three ways.

First. An intellect that is certain about one concept and doubtful about diverse concepts has a concept, of which it is certain, distinct from the concepts about which it is doubtful. But an intellect can be certain of something as being, while doubting whether it is finite or infinite, created or uncreated. Therefore the concept of being is other than this or that concept. Therefore it is univocal.

Second. Every metaphysical inquiry concerning God proceeds by considering the formal ratio of something and, after removing from it every imperfection, attributing that ratio to God. Therefore every metaphysical inquiry presupposes that the intellect has one and the same univocal concept, which it takes from creatures. — If it is said that the ratio investigated of God is not the same but another, against this: — it follows that from no proper ratio of those things [that belong to God] as they are in creatures can anything be concluded about God: because the ratio of these and of those is altogether other and other. Indeed, it would no more be concluded that God is wise from the ratio of wisdom as we apprehend it from creatures, than that God is formally a stone.

Third. It would follow that we could not know God naturally by any simple concept. For the phantasm contains virtually only a concept befitting a creature. Therefore, if one concept is not univocal of God and creature, but God's and the creature's are different and distinct, it follows that we could have no such concept of God.

Fourth is the authority of Aristotle, Metaphysics II ²¹. For there he argues that the principles of eternal things must be most true, because each thing is such in the highest degree by reason of that whereby univocation belongs to others. Therefore something common and univocal belongs to God and to other things.

X. In response to these points, it must be considered that, taking the univocal in the way Scotus explained it in that declaration of his, there would be no difference between him and Saint Thomas: for all those things also belong to the analogical. But because Scotus judges that those things cannot belong except to what he calls a concept entirely abstracted from all others, and on this account he judges the univocal to be being, to which such things belong: therefore his arguments are answered.

To the first, it is said first that that concept of which the intellect is certain is other than the concepts about which it is in doubt—not indeed by a complete precision, but as containing them all after the manner of analogy, as will be declared below ²²

It is said secondly, that from this nothing follows except that being signifies some one concept distinct from the concepts of other things. This is granted: for it signifies a certain imperfect concept, as will be shown below.²³ Yet it does not follow that it signifies one univocal concept.

To the second, the consequence is denied. For from that process there is not attributed to God the very same concept, namely of wisdom, but a proportional one, by which God is said formally to be wise, but not a stone.

It is said second, that it is presupposed that the intellect has one and the same common concept, imperfectly signifying both perfections signified by such a name: but not a perfect and univocal concept.

To the third argument it is first replied that, if we speak of the adequate concept of a thing, there is no difficulty in our being unable to conceive God by any simple concept. Indeed, this is necessary, since we cannot conceive any divine perfection as it is in itself. Hence Saint Thomas says in the First Part, question 13, article 5, that when this name "wise" is said of God, it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended and exceeding the signification of the name.

It is said secondly that, if we speak of an imperfect and inadequate concept of a thing, such as is signified by some name, many such concepts can be had of God that are common to Him and to creatures. Nor is it unfitting that some such concept be contained virtually in the phantasm: for what comes first can be contained in what comes later with respect to some imperfect concept common to both, insofar as the thing represented by the phantasm is a certain participated likeness of the prior.

It is said thirdly that even this unity of the imperfect mental concept does not produce univocity, as will be more fully declared in chapter XXXIV ²⁴

It is said fourth that, if a proper concept of God could be had, by which the divine perfection itself might be known according to the mode of eminence whereby it differs from the perfection of a creature, that concept is contained virtually in the phantasm of the creature, insofar as it is an instrument of the intellect investigating the conditions of God from creatures: for the reason that the effect contains its cause participatively. Hence the divine perfection itself is contained in the perfection of the creature, not as an effect in its cause, but as a cause in its effect: namely because the likeness of the cause and its power are preserved in the effect, though sometimes deficiently and imperfectly.

To the fourth it is said that Aristotle takes univocation for analogy, when certain things agree in one account proportionally. According to this account, in what is analogous there can also be comparison, so that one may be said to be more such than another, because its account, conveyed by that name, is more perfect than the account of the other.