Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Having shown that certain names can be attributed to God, Saint Thomas shows that such names are also many¹. In regard to this he does two things: first he shows that the plurality of names and of divine perfections is not repugnant to the divine simplicity; second, he deduces the proposed conclusion². I. He demonstrates the first by the following argument. All the perfections of creatures are in God according to one power of his. Therefore neither those perfections themselves, nor the plural names that signify them, are repugnant to the divine simplicity. – The consequence is evident, because the power of God is his very essence, since nothing can accrue to God. The antecedent, however, is shown by a likeness in three ways³. First, in natural things. For it is supposed that all the perfections of things are in him as effects are in an equivocal cause. Then thus: As the sun is related to heat and dryness and other effects found in lower bodies, so also is God related to all perfections: for in both cases there is a comparison of an equivocal cause to its effects in some manner. But in the sun there is heat and dryness virtually, and they are attributed to the sun through that same virtue, although in fire they are diverse qualities. Therefore all the perfections of things, which belong to other things according to diverse forms, are attributed to God according to one power. But because from the fact that the effects of the sun are contained virtually in the sun, and all things in God, someone might believe that the sun is said to be such, say hot, and God such, say wise, only because they cause things of this kind, and not on account of any similitude existing between them, he removes this false sense, saying that the sun is called hot not only because it causes heat, nor is God called wise because he causes wisdom, as some have wished⁴: but because the virtue by which the sun heats is something conformed to heat; unless it were in some way of the genus of heat, the sun acting through it would not generate what is like itself. Similarly God is called wise because, insofar as we are wise, we imitate in some degree his virtue, by which he makes us wise: that is, insofar as between our wisdom and the power of God there is some similitude and conformity. – This is evident because, if the sun were called wise only because it produces wisdom, then by the same reason it would be called a stone because it causes a stone. Yet we do not say this, because by the name "stone" is understood a determinate mode of being, according to which the stone does not imitate God but is distinguished from him; although in the stone there are also other things that do not signify such a mode, by which it does imitate God, such as goodness, esse, and the like. In regard to that proposition, unless the virtue of the sun were in some way of the genus of heat, the sun acting through it would not generate what is like itself, which Saint Thomas also seems to wish to be true in God, it must be noted that he did not say simply "unless it were of the genus of heat," but added "in some way." For there need not be, strictly speaking, a conformity in genus between the virtue of an equivocal cause and its effect, but there must be a conformity in some one intelligible ground at least analogical and proportional — so that "genus" may be taken for whatever is common according to reason, however it be common — in order that there be some similitude between cause and effect.

II. Concerning what Saint Thomas says, which was also touched upon above ⁵, namely that God is not called a stone, because in the name "stone" is understood a determinate mode of being, according to which a stone is distinguished from God, a twofold doubt arises. The first is this: since every name of perfection, except perhaps the names of the transcendentals, includes something of imperfection, by which it is distinguished from God, therefore no name will be said of God. The antecedent is evident: "wise," "just," "knowing," and the like signify a quality, which does not befit God.

The second reason is that nothing exists in a thing that is not produced by God, and consequently that does not imitate the divine power. Therefore, however much the name of stone imports the mode by which it is distinguished from God, God can still be called stone, just as He is called wise, on account of such a likeness and imitation of that mode of stone in God.

Confirmed. Because the sun is said to be hot, as St. Thomas holds in this passage, notwithstanding that "hot" signifies a proper mode of being (essendi) in fire or air, by which it is distinguished from the sun: for heat is a corruptible quality, by which it is distinguished from the sun's power.

III. For the clarification of these points, it must be known that, when we speak of names—how they apply to God formally or non-formally, and how they import imperfection—we understand this of their formal and proper signification, by which one name is distinguished from another in signifying. For example: the name "wisdom" in creatures, as regards what it properly, particularly, and distinctly imports, signifies knowledge of the highest causes ⁶, although it also imports a quality, as a signification common to itself and other things. But when we ask whether the name "wisdom" applies to God formally, we are not asking about that signification common to itself and others, but about its proper character which it adds to the common significations. We say the same of the name "stone" and other names. Hence it is said in Potentia, q. VII, a. 4, ad 2, that such names apply to God according to the character of difference, and not according to the character of genus.

To the first, therefore, the antecedent is denied, speaking of the proper and formal and differential signification: for it is of this that the discourse is concerned. For there are many names which in such their signification import no imperfection. — To the proof it is said that quality is a common significate, not the differential of any of them.

These names can also be said to be taken in two ways. In one way, absolutely and transcendentally: namely, insofar as they are said analogically of the perfection that is within a genus, and of the perfection that is outside every genus. And then it is denied that they signify a quality formally, as something common to every perfection signified: for the name of wisdom, taken absolutely, is said both of wisdom that is a quality and of wisdom that is substance. — In another way, with a determination, as when we say human wisdom. And then it is indeed true that they signify a quality: but they are not said of God formally as such, because of the mode of creature which is included in such a signification. For although God is absolutely wise, yet human wisdom is not wise.

To the second it is said that the effect, with respect to the imperfection it signifies, has no likeness in God, but only with respect to the perfection. Hence it does not imitate God as imperfect, but is something distinct from God. For this reason a name importing the proper mode of essendi of a material thing, such as the name "stone," because it imports a certain imperfection, since material esse includes a certain imperfection, is not said formally of God, since its whole proper signification does not befit him ⁷, but only virtually, because whatever perfection is found in the stone is contained entirely in the power of God. It is denied, therefore, that there is nothing in a thing that is not produced by God: for the imperfection that is in a thing, namely in the way it belongs to negation to be in a thing, is not produced by God, but accrues on the side of creatures insofar as they are from nothing, as is said in I Sent., d. II, a. 2, and Pot., q. VII, a. 5, ad 8. Hence every mode of creatures, with respect to every perfection it signifies, is from God; but not with respect to the imperfection it includes.

In confirmation it is said that the sun is not called hot formally, but only virtually, as is said in Ver., q. IV, a. 6. Hence the likeness that St. Thomas draws between the sun with respect to heat and dryness, and God with respect to the perfections that are in creatures, is to be understood only insofar as the effect exists in the cause virtually, and many effects are contained in one power, but not with respect to the formal predication of names. For although the sun virtually contains heat and dryness, still the name of heat and of dryness does not formally belong to the sun; but many names of perfections found in creatures formally belong to God, although some do not formally belong to him.

IV. Second, the statement of the antecedent is proved ⁸ from the likeness of the cognitive powers. For the intellect, by a single cognitive power, knows all things that the sensitive part apprehends by diverse powers, and still others besides. And the higher an intellect is, the more it can know by some one thing. Therefore the cause that is highest of all contains all things by one power.

Third, it is proved from the likeness of the operative virtues of man. For just as one royal virtue extends to all those things to which the diverse powers subordinated to it are ordered, so too God, through one simple esse of His own, possesses every perfection that other things attain through many diverse ones—indeed, a far greater one ⁹.

It must be considered at this point that, since the perfections found in creatures are diverse, while in God they are united—inasmuch as one power of His, which is the divine essence, contains them all by actual containment and not by potential containment, as matter is said to contain material forms—all perfections in God exist in a nobler manner than they exist in creatures. For in creatures they have a limited and finite esse, since the esse of every creature is limited to some degree; in God, however, they have an infinite and unlimited esse, subsistent, which is the divine esse. On this account Saint Thomas frequently says that they are in God according to a more eminent mode, namely because they are the divine esse itself and the divine essence itself, which is most perfect, infinite, and unlimited; and that they are in God united, namely because all of them in God are one indivisible substance, which is the divine essence, equivalent to all the perfections of creatures, and containing a perfection still greater.

V. As to the second point ¹⁰, the following conclusion is drawn: It is necessary that there be many names said of God. It is proved. The perfections of things are diverse. Therefore the names of those perfections must also be diverse. Therefore the divine names must also be many. — The consequence is proved. Because we can know God naturally only from His effects.

St. Thomas adds, moreover, that if we could understand the divine essence as it is and adapt a proper name to it, we would express it by a single name alone. This, however, is promised to the blessed, who see the divine essence, according to that text of Zechariah at the end: In that day the Lord shall be one, and his name one.

VI. But a twofold doubt arises concerning this part. The first concerns that last statement, namely, that the Blessed will have one unique and proper name for God because they understand the divine essence as it is in itself. For one unique and proper name of God is had only by one who comprehends God himself. But just as we do not comprehend God, neither do the Blessed. Therefore, just as we do not name God with a unique name, neither do the Blessed.

It is answered, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas (I Sent., d. II, q. I, a. 3 ¹¹), that we can understand in two ways that one who sees the divine essence as it is imposes one name. In one way, so that he forms in his intellect a single concept perfectly and adequately representing the divine essence, and by means of that concept signifies God by one name. And this is not what is meant here. For just as God cannot be perfectly represented by any created likeness, as will be shown in the Third Book of this work¹², so neither can he be represented by a single concept of a created intellect. Hence, however much one may see the divine essence as it is in itself, one cannot in this way name God with a single name: because this could not be done without comprehension. — In another way, so that one who sees the divine Word, which, being one, perfectly represents God, by means of that one Word signifies God by a single name. And this is what is meant here: for this can be done without comprehension.

2. Another doubt concerns the multiplicity of names. For if, because the perfections are diverse, there must be many names, it follows that no name will be equivocal. An equivocal name, being one, signifies many things.

It is answered by denying the consequence. For when we say that from a plurality of perfections in creatures it follows that there are many names, we are speaking of proper names, by which only one thing is signified. For it follows that, if there are several things which ought to be named by proper names, there must be several such names. But to this it is not repugnant that, besides proper names, there should also be other names that are common and equivocal.

If it is further pressed that many men are found to have the same proper name, and thus distinct things need not have distinct proper names — it is said that distinct things must have distinct names if the thing is to be expressed distinctly and made manifest distinctly to another. But where different men have the same name by identity of voice alone, by that name, as such, one is not made manifest as distinct from another. Therefore, if one is to be made manifest to another as distinct from another, it is necessary, beyond that common utterance, to find another particular utterance, for instance a man of such a figure, or the son of such a one, and the like. Therefore the plurality of perfections requires a plurality of names if they are to be signified distinctly and made manifest to another, which is the use for which utterances were invented — although other common utterances may also exist, whether univocal or equivocal.