Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Since it has been proved that every esse of perfection is in God, there now remains to be considered how the words by which the perfections of things are signified apply to God ¹. On this point St. Thomas does two things: first, he treats of incomplex words; second, of complex words, in chapter XXXVI. — On the first point he does two things: first, he treats of these words and names absolutely; second, comparatively, in chapter XXXII. — On the first point he does two things: first, he treats of these words with respect to their predication of God; second, in the following chapter, with respect to their plurality.

On the first point he does three things: first, he shows which names are fitting for God; second, he explains certain statements ²; third, he teaches the manner of naming God with respect to certain things ³.

I. As to the first, he proposes that we must consider what can be said of God or not said of him; what is said of him alone; and what is said of him and of other things at once. And in answering he says three things, according to the three points proposed. For, beginning with the last, as with the more common, he says that names signifying perfection absolutely, without defect, are predicated of God and of other things, as goodness, wisdom, esse, and the like.

To the first, however, he says that names importing perfection with a proper mode are not said of God except similitudinarily and metaphorically—in the way in which, since something is found in one thing resembling the properties of another, one thing is said to be the other, as man is called a stone on account of the hardness of his understanding. Such are the names of the species of creature and of its properties, as man, stone, risible, etc., and those which designate properties of things that are caused from the proper principles of the species.

To the second, however, he responds that names which signify perfection with a supereminent mode, as they befit God, are attributed to God alone, such as the highest good, first being, and the like.

2. It must be noted that, since a name is not attributed to a thing except by reason of its signification, in order that some name be predicated of a thing truly and properly, and not merely metaphorically, it is required that the whole of its proper signification be attributed to it, along with every condition that belongs to the signification as such. For if only a part of the signification belonged to the thing, the name would not be attributed to it truly and properly: just as, although a stone is a substance, it is nevertheless not called an animal, because animal does not import substance alone but also something sensible, which does not belong to a stone. Similarly, if this name "white" were imposed to signify primarily a substance insofar as it is informed by whiteness, it could not be said of Socrates in whom there was no whiteness; for although he would be a substance, he would not be a substance under whiteness, which would be the condition of the substance required for it to be signified by the name "white." If, therefore, some name imports in its signification both a certain perfection and the proper mode according to which that perfection exists in a creature, then since that mode, which is proper to the creature, does not belong to God—although the perfection imported by the name is in Him—that name is not said of God truly and properly. Just as "man" imports the perfection of humanity together with the material mode according to which it exists in the one possessing humanity: therefore this name "man" is not predicated of God as God is, even though the perfection of humanity is in God. — The same holds for names which import in their signification the proper mode according to which perfections exist in God. For such names are not truly predicated of creatures.

II. As to the second ⁴, because it was said that certain names import perfection without defect, therefore, lest anyone take from this an occasion of error, Saint Thomas distinguishes that a name's importing defect can be understood in two ways: namely, either with respect to the thing signified, because, I say, the very defect is part of the signification of the name; or with respect to the mode of signifying. In the first way some names signify with defect, but others do not. In the second way, however, all signify with defect. The reason for this is that, since by a name a thing is expressed according to the manner in which we conceive it by the intellect; and the intellect conceives a simple form as that by which something is, not as that which is, but a subsistent thing it conceives in a kind of concretion and composition, because it receives its knowledge from sensible things, in which the form and the thing having the form are distinct, on account of the composition of form and matter, and simple forms do not subsist but other things exist through them, while subsistent things are composites; therefore it signifies simple things by abstract names, after the manner of a form, to which it belongs to be that by which something is; but subsistent things by concrete names, after the manner of concretion and composition and of a thing having a form; and in each of these ways a certain imperfection is imported.

From these things it is evident that no name is fittingly applied to God with respect to its mode of signifying, although some name may befit him with respect to the thing signified: since such imperfection is not in God, even though the thing signified befits him in some eminent way.

From this the corollary is deduced, concerning the mind of Dionysius, ch. 7 and 5 of On the Divine Names ⁵, that names imposed by us which are attributed to God can be both affirmed and denied of God. This is clear from what has been said. For as regards the meaning of the name, or its signification, they agree with God; but as regards their mode of signifying, not at all.

III. As to the third point ⁶, he notes that the mode of supereminence by which perfections are found in God cannot be signified through names imposed by us except either by negation, as when we say that God is eternal or infinite; or by relation to other things, as when we say first cause or highest good; because we cannot grasp what God is, but only what he is not, and how other things stand in relation to him.

It should be noted, however, that although "eternal" seems to be said affirmatively in its verbal form, it is said negatively according to the reality: for that is called eternal which is altogether immutable, and which lacks a beginning and end of duration; just as, although the word "blind" is an affirmative utterance, it nevertheless imports a negation of sight. For this reason Saint Thomas enumerated "eternal" among the negative names said of God.

IV. Concerning the two points stated above, two doubts arise. The first concerns that proposition: By means of a name we express a thing in the way we conceive it by the intellect. For Scotus, in I Sent., d. XXII, says that this is false, if it is understood precisely. Indeed, he says, something can be signified more distinctly than it is understood. And he proves this because, if it were true, no name imposed by a wayfarer would signify any thing in the genus of substance; rather, just as some property from which the name is imposed is precisely conceived, so such a property would be precisely signified by the name. For “stone” would not signify something in the genus of substance, but something in the genus of action, namely an injury to the foot. But this is false, because the imposer of the name intends to impose the name not on that accident, but on the underlying substance.

According to ⁷ the discussion concerns that proposition: our intellect, which is simple, signifies what is simple not as that which is, but as that by which something is. For from this it follows that no abstract name will be a substantive noun. For a substantive noun signifies something in the manner of a self-standing thing; but an abstract term, according to that statement, does not signify form in the manner of a self-standing thing, but in the manner of something inhering in another, since it signifies as that by which something is, and not as that which is.

V. To the first of these it is said that "the thing is signified more distinctly than it is understood" can be taken in two ways: in one way, so that the mode of distinction holds on the side of the thing signified and understood; in another way, so that it holds on the side of the signifying and understanding. In the first way, the sense is that the thing is signified as more distinct than it is understood to be distinct. And in this sense Scotus's proposition can have truth, nor does it contradict the position of Saint Thomas. For it is not unfitting that a name be imposed to signify a thing that is most distinct from others, and yet not every reason of its distinction be understood. — In the second way, the sense is that the mode of signifying of the name is more distinct than the mode by which the intellect knows the very thing signified. And in this sense Scotus's proposition is false, and Saint Thomas's proposition is true. For since a name does not signify a thing except through the mediation of the concept of the intellect, the name is said to signify the thing confusedly and indistinctly, as far as the side of the name is concerned, when it signifies it under a confused and indistinct concept; but distinctly, when under a distinct concept. Hence the mode of distinct signification of the name follows the mode of the distinct concept: for it represents more distinctly when under a more distinct concept. From this it is clear that it is impossible for a name to signify a thing more distinctly than it is understood. For, since to signify distinctly is to signify under a distinct concept, and the intellect, in conceiving the thing, understands it itself, it follows that the name cannot signify more distinctly than the intellect understands; rather they accompany each other proportionally. For if the intellect apprehends the thing only confusedly and imposes a name upon it, the name will signify confusedly, that is, under a confused concept; but if the intellect understands distinctly, and the name is imposed on the thing according to that concept, the name will signify distinctly.

To Scotus's argument, therefore, the reply is made by denying the consequence. For it is said that, if the substance of a thing were in no way known, but only its property, the name would not signify the substance of the thing but only the property. But because from the cognition of properties one arrives at some cognition of substance, whether confused or distinct—as Scotus himself concedes there, recounting a certain process of Augustine's from VI de Trinitate, c. 6, to prove that every creature is composite—therefore the name also sometimes signifies the very substance. For "stone" does not signify only an injury to the foot, but a certain substance to which this property belongs. And if the imposer of the name knew it distinctly by inquiring from such a property, he signified it distinctly by this name; but if he knew it confusedly, he also signified it confusedly by that name, that is, under a confused concept. Therefore universally it is true that things are named by us according as they are understood: for as Saint Thomas says, Prima Pars, q. XIII, a. 9, ad 2, names do not follow the mode of being that is in things, but the mode that is in our cognition.

VI. For the clarification of the second doubt ⁸, it must first be considered that an accident, whether defined in the abstract or in the concrete, always includes its subject in its definition, which is conveyed by the name. For when it is defined in the abstract, it includes the subject obliquely, as when it is said, snubness is a curvature of the nose; but when it is defined in the concrete, it includes the subject directly, as when it is said, a snub nose is a curved nose. These two ways of including the subject differ, however. For when the abstract name includes the subject in its signification, the subject is not part of what the name signifies; rather, it is expressed as something extrinsic to which the accident has a relation. For since whiteness signifies only that by which something is white, and the subject is in no way that by which something is white, the subject is in no way something signified by such a name. But when the concrete name of an accident includes the subject, it includes it as part of what is signified—though a secondary part—and as co-signified together with the principal signification: for white principally signifies whiteness, but secondarily co-signifies the subject having whiteness. — This is found in Averroes, Metaphysics V, comment 14, and in Saint Thomas on the same passage, ⁹, where they say, against Avicenna, that white primarily signifies the accident, secondarily the subject; and the same is found in Physics I, comment 25. And Saint Thomas adds there, ¹⁰ that whiteness in no way co-signifies the subject. A sign of this difference is that through the abstract term the subject is conveyed obliquely, whereas through the concrete term it is conveyed directly, as something denominated from the form.

It must be considered, second, that being signified in the manner of a substance and being signified in the manner of an accident are referred to the form itself as principally signified. For something is said to be signified by a name in the manner of a substance when it is signified by the name in the way in which substance has esse outside the intellect. And because substance existing outside the intellect is a being not existing inherently in another subject, therefore an accidental form is said to be signified in the manner of a substance when it is not signified together with another thing signified in which it would inhere. And this is how it is signified by an abstract name: for such a name signifies it alone, connoting nothing else along with it. — But something is said to be signified in the manner of an accident when it is signified by the name in the way in which an accident has esse in the nature of things. Hence, since the esse of an accident is to inhere, it is then signified in the manner of an accident when it is signified together with another thing, in the manner of that which inheres in it. And thus it is signified by a concrete name. For such a name signifies the form in the manner of something inhering in a subject, and it signifies that subject itself along with the form in the manner just described.

It must be considered, thirdly, that it is not the same thing for a name to signify in the manner of a substance and for the name to signify in the manner of a complete subsistent. Likewise, it is not the same to signify something as that by which something is on the part of the name, and to signify in the manner of an accident. For a name's signifying in the manner of a substance is understood by comparison to the form principally signified, which is signified alone without any other consignified reality in which it inheres, as is clear from what has been said. But for a name to signify in the manner of a complete subsistent is to signify in the manner of a substance complete in species, and not in the manner of a part. — To signify something as that by which something is such aptitudinally, as is here intended, is to signify something as form and as simple nature, alone and without any consignification whatsoever of anything else, because only the form is that by which something is formally such. To signify, however, in the manner of an accident is to signify not only the form, but along with it also to consignify the subject, as that in which the form inheres, as was said above.

2. From these points it is clear, first, that the concrete name and the abstract name of an accident are distinguished on the side of the thing signified, because the abstract name signifies the form alone, whereas the concrete name signifies not only the form but also the subject of the form. And therefore the former is said to signify in the manner of a substance, the latter in the manner of an accident. — They are also distinguished because the abstract name, since it signifies the form alone, does not signify it as some complete thing that has esse, but as that by which something has esse aptitudinally, for forms, among us, do not subsist as complete in species; whereas the concrete name, since it secondarily signifies the subject which has esse through the form, signifies something as that which has esse, and consequently in the manner of a complete subsisting thing; for only what subsists substantially is that which properly has accidental esse through an accidental form.

It is clear, secondly, that the objection has no force. For it proceeds as if to signify a thing as that by which something formally is were the same as to signify a thing in the manner of an accident. But this, as was shown, is false. For the same name both signifies in the manner of a substance, or of that which stands per se, and as that by which something is. For standing per se can be taken in two ways: in one way, as opposed to that which inheres accidentally; in another way, as the same as being in no way in another, which is the same as subsisting as complete in its species. In the first way the abstract name signifies in the manner of that which stands per se, but not in the second way.

VII. But concerning the foregoing a threefold doubt arises. The first is this: because Saint Thomas, in I Sent., d. XXII, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, says that that which is signified by the name is signified as subsisting; and he gives the example of whiteness. Therefore what we said is false, namely, that the abstract name signifies indeed after the manner of a substance, but not after the manner of a subsistent.

The second reason is that in the Categories, ¹¹ it is said that "white" signifies pure quality. And Saint Thomas, in the Commentary on Book III of the Sentences, distinction VII, question 1, article 1, ad 5, holds that "white" does not signify its subject but conjoins it as something extrinsic. Therefore it was wrongly said that the concrete term signifies not only the form but also the subject.

The third is because the Commentator, in II de Anima, comment. 8, says that in artificial things the name is said first of the matter, and second of the composite. Therefore it is false that the concrete name first signifies the form and secondarily the subject, as was said above.

VIII. To the first objection, it is said that St. Thomas, in the passage cited, takes "to signify in the manner of a subsistent" differently from the way it is taken here and in the First Part ¹². For there "to signify in the manner of a subsistent" is taken as the same as "to signify not in the manner of something proceeding from another," by which mode a noun is distinguished from a verb. Here, however, we take "to signify in the manner of a subsistent" as the same as "to signify in the manner of a complete substance in its species," which properly is that which has esse. Hence there is no contradiction.

To the second it is said that Saint Thomas and Aristotle speak of the first and formal signification of the name: for this must be one. Yet nothing prevents that secondarily it consignifies something else by way of a subject.

To the third it is said, according to the Commentator in the same place, that since the name is said of artificial things both of the individual of substance per se and of the artifact as such, such a name can be considered in two ways. In one way, as it is the name of the artifact as such. And thus it first signifies the artificial form, and secondarily the matter, just like other concrete names of accidents. — In another way, as it is the name of the individual of substance per se and also the name of the artifact. And thus it is said first of the matter, and secondly of that which is gathered together from matter and artificial form; that is, this name is prior insofar as it signifies the individual of substance than insofar as it signifies the artifact, as the Commentator gives the example of an axe; for even when sharpness, which is the form of the artifact, is removed, there remains an axe, which is an individual of substance. And thus the saying of the Commentator is understood.