Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Because it has been shown that in God are the nobilities and perfections of all things, Saint Thomas consequently shows how from this there can be a likeness or unlikeness between God and the creature¹. Concerning this he does two things: first, he shows the proposition as regards the thing itself; second, as regards the way of naming².

I. As to the first, this conclusion is proposed: God has both likeness and unlikeness with all things. The first part is proved. Because He is the agent of all things, bestowing every perfection. Now every agent produces what is like itself, since each thing acts insofar as it is in act, that is, insofar as it actually possesses that which it causes in the effect.

The second part is proved. For the perfections that are in God are not in creatures in the same mode and according to the same account as they are in God: for effects, falling short of their causes, do not agree with them in name and account. But this implies a certain dissimilarity.

It is confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For sometimes Scripture says that there is a likeness between God and the creature, as in Genesis 1, "Let us make man" etc.; but sometimes it asserts a dissimilarity, as in Isaiah 40, "To whom then will you liken him?" etc., and in the Psalm, "O God, who shall be like to you?" — Dionysius likewise sets forth both parts, in chapter 9 of On the Divine Names.

II. For the declaration of the second part of the conclusion, however, he notes that although the form of the effect is found in an exceeding cause in some manner, this is nevertheless according to another mode and according to another rationale: on account of which it is called an equivocal cause. For the heat generated by the sun in these lower things obtains some likeness to the active power of the sun by which it is caused, on account of which the sun is said to be hot, though not under the same rationale: hence the sun is in some way similar to the things produced by it, and in some way dissimilar. Likewise God has both likeness and unlikeness with the things produced by him.

It must be noted here that, just as things are called equivocal in predications when their name is the same but the account of their substance is different³, so a cause is called equivocal when the name of the produced form belongs both to the cause and to its effect, but according to one and another account. Thus we say that the sun is the equivocal cause of heat: because the name of heat belongs both to the sun and to its effect—for the sun is said to be hot and the air is said to be hot—but this is according to different accounts; for the sun is said to be hot not because it has in itself the same form under the same specific account by which the air is hot, but because it has in itself an active power in which heat is contained virtually, which is of a far more excellent nature than the form by which the air is said to be hot. And it is similar in other cases: and especially in God, in whom the form agrees neither specifically nor generically with the effects produced by him, but only according to a certain analogy, as is said in the First Part, q. IV, a. 3⁴. Hence he is not an altogether equivocal cause, but rather an analogous one, as is said in I Sent., d. II, a. 2.

III. As to the second point⁵, this conclusion is set down: According to this likeness, the creature is more fittingly said to be like God than the reverse. It is proved. That is said to be like something which possesses its quality or form. But the creature possesses the form of God, while God does not possess the form of the creature: since form is found in God perfectly, but in the creature according to a certain deficient participation. Therefore the creature is said to be like God, but God is not said to be like the creature.

It should be noted, as is said in I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 2, that a form is properly said to be of that thing which possesses it perfectly and completely; but it is not said to be of that which possesses it imperfectly and by way of some imitation. For this reason, when each of two things between which there is likeness has a form according to the same specific ratio, one is said to be like the other and conversely: because that form is properly the form of both, since both possess it perfectly; and thus each is said to have the form of the other, wherein the ground of their mutual likeness consists. But when the form is perfect and complete in one, while in the other it is imperfect and by way of some imitation, then that which possesses it imperfectly is said to have the form of the other and to be like it, but not conversely. And since every perfection communicated by God to creatures exists in God in a perfect manner—on account of which it is properly called His form—while in a creature it exists imperfectly and according to a deficient participation (just as the wisdom of God is in God simply and perfectly, whereas in creatures there is only a deficient participation of it), therefore the creature has the form of God and is like Him, but God is not like the creature.

But it must be noted that it is one thing to say that a created thing has perfectly and completely some form which is a participated likeness of the divine perfection, and another to say that a created thing has perfectly and completely the form by which God acts upon creatures. The first is true in many cases: for fire has the essence of fire perfectly, and man humanity, which are certain participated likenesses of divine goodness, and these are properly the forms of fire and of man. But the second is false and impossible. For the form by which God acts, and which he communicates in some way to creatures, is the divine essence and divine goodness, which admittedly exists perfectly and completely in God alone, although some participation of it is found in creatures. Therefore Saint Thomas rightly says that the creature possesses the form of God, but God does not possess the form of the creature: namely because every perfection of a creature is some participation of the divine goodness, which is properly the form of God; but the perfection and form of God is not in a creature as its form, since it is not possessed by the creature perfectly, but through a certain participation of it.

From the aforesaid conclusion Saint Thomas infers as a corollary that it is much less proper to say that God is assimilated to a creature. — It is proved: because assimilation implies a movement toward likeness, and thus it belongs to that which receives from another that whereby it may be like it. But the creature receives from God, and not God from the creature. Therefore the creature is assimilated to God, and not conversely.

IV. But concerning what has been said a doubt arises: for equality and likeness are relations of parity, since the equal is said to be equal to the equal, and the like is said to be like to the like. If, therefore, the creature is said to be like God, God will also be said to be like the creature. And if the creature is made like God, God will be made like the creature.

To make this doubt evident, it must be considered that, according to the intention of St. Thomas, it would not suffice to say that a creature is said to be like God, but God is not said to be like the creature, because in the creature there is a real relation, which is called likeness, whereas in God there is no such real relation but only one of reason. For in the same way no name importing a relation of God to the creature would be said fittingly of God, since no relation of God to the creature is real, but all are relations of reason. On account of this, he himself, in the First Part, q. IV, a. 3 ⁶, and in I Sent., at the place cited above, assigns the reason of Dionysius, chapter ix of the Divine Names, namely that in things of one order mutual likeness is received, but not in cause and caused. Now St. Thomas interprets "being of one order" in I Sent., and in the Questions on Truth, q. XXIII, a. 7, ad 11, as when, as one has the form of one, so the other has the form of the other; and this is when the form according to which likeness is considered exists according to the same ratio in both extremes, as whiteness in two men; for in such cases the extremes are said to be mutually like. But that cause and caused do not receive mutual likeness is interpreted, in the places cited above, as when the caused does not receive the form of the cause according to the same ratio, but is made in imitation of the form of the cause: as the statue of Hercules is made in imitation of Hercules; on account of which we say that the statue of Hercules is like Hercules, because it was made in imitation of him and has his form, but we do not say that Hercules is like his statue. Therefore the creature is like God but not conversely, because they stand as cause and caused, where the caused does not receive the form of the cause according to the same ratio, but according to a certain imitation; from which it follows that the creature has the form that is God's, but God does not have the form that is the creature's. Hence it seems that in that place Dionysius is not speaking universally of cause and caused, but of this cause which is God, and of the caused things which are his creatures, which cannot have equality with God. This is clear from the words of Dionysius himself. For after he said, "But between cause and caused we will by no means admit conversion," he immediately adds: "For God, the author of all, has granted that not these alone or those alone be like, but all things that admit likeness, that they may be like."

To the doubt, therefore, it is granted that likeness is a relation of parity, but the consequence is denied: "Therefore, if a creature is said to be like God, God is also said to be like the creature." For likeness is not called a relation of parity because both extremes are denominatively named by the same relative term, but because, as such, "like" is not said of something that either stands above or is subordinated, but of an equal. And if that to which something is said to be like is referred back to it by a mutual relation, it will be referred by the same name; for what is like is like to what is like, namely when each extreme is denominated in respect to the other. Nevertheless, it can happen that sometimes neither extreme is denominated in respect to the other, which occurs when the form is not found in both extremes according to the same account. — Saint Thomas of Aquino seems to intend this reply, in the place cited above, where he says that although likeness and conformity are relations of parity, nevertheless both extremes are not always denominated in respect to one another, but only then when the form according to which likeness or conformity is attended to exists under the same account in both extremes.

2. It must be noted, however, that although according to the proper and customary use of the word we do not say that God is like the creature, or that Hercules is like his image, because such things are not customarily denominated in respect of those things which are made in imitation of them; nevertheless, if anyone wished to extend the signification of the name so that there would be a denomination in respect of a relation understood in God as terminating the relation of the other extreme, so that God would be said to be like the creature because He terminates in Himself the creature's relation and likeness to Him, I would not consider this unfitting. On account of which this Saint Thomas does not say here that God can in no way be said to be like the creature, but that it is more fitting to say that the creature is like God than conversely, namely because this is more according to the customary use of the word. — But when he says in the First Part ⁷ that it must by no means be conceded that God is like the creature, this is to be understood with the proper use of the word preserved. For we are accustomed to call only that thing like another which has its form, that is, which has it as fully and perfectly as the other does; but not when one thing has the form completely and perfectly, while the other has only a certain participation of it, in which case the likeness is understood according to imitation, not according to agreement in a form of the same character.

Similarly, if assimilari, or assimilation, is taken as saying a motion toward the unity of the form according to which likeness is considered, it cannot be said that God is assimilated to a creature, nor Hercules to his image. But if it is taken for what it is to be the term of the likeness of the creature to God, or of the image to Hercules—that is, to be conceived with respect to the term limiting the relation of likeness—then it is not unfitting to say that God is assimilated to the creature and Hercules to his image.