Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas had determined concerning the divine simplicity, from which can be had what God is, insofar as He can be known by us, he now begins to determine concerning the divine perfection, by which is shown what sort of being He is¹. Concerning this he does two things: first, he determines concerning perfection absolutely; second, concerning particular perfections, chapter XXXVII.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he determines the question of the divine perfection; second, the likeness of the creature to God, which results from such a perfection, in the following chapter; third, concerning the words by which the diverse divine perfections are signified, in chapter thirty.

On the first point he does two things: first, he proves that God is universally perfect; second, he excludes a certain doubt².

I. He therefore first proposes the conclusion, saying that, although those things which are and live are more perfect than those which only are, God, who is ipsum esse itself, is universally perfect being: that is, no nobility of any genus is lacking to him.

For the clarification of what is said here, before the conclusion is proved, it must first be considered that esse, according to its common character, contains under itself diverse grades and perfections of being, just as whiteness contains diverse grades of whiteness. These grades accompany one another in a certain order: so that the second cannot be without the first, nor the third without the second and the first, and so on with the others. This containment, however, is a containment of form and act, not of potency, since esse is the actuality of all acts. Now such things as are considered as certain common forms and acts, if they existed per se, would possess every grade of theirs and every perfection; but if they are received in something else, they take on limitation according to the condition of the receiver, and they do not have all their perfections by grade in one thing: just as whiteness, if it were separated from every subject, would have every perfection of whiteness, as Saint Thomas teaches in the first argument, as will be declared there immediately³; but when received in a subject, it is more or less perfect according to the disposition of the subject. Yet whatever has the later grade of whiteness also has the earlier one.

2. It must be considered, secondly, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Prima Pars, q. iv, a. 2, ad 3, and in De Veritate, q. xx, a. 2, ad 3, that esse and living can be considered in two ways: in one way, as living includes esse and adds something to it; in another way, as they are distinguished by reason through the precision of one from the other, taking esse per se, and living per se precisely, namely with respect to that which it adds to esse. Just as the sensitive and the intellective can be considered insofar as the intellective includes the sensitive and adds intellectuality to it: so too the sensitive can be considered per se, and the intellective precisely with respect to the intellectuality which it adds to the sensitive.

If they are taken in the first way, to live is more perfect than esse. But this does not apply to them as signified in the abstract, but only as signified in the concrete. For, as esse is signified in the abstract, it cannot be taken as contained, limited, and surpassed by the grade of life: since it is signified as the form and actuality containing every perfection of being; just as whiteness signified in the abstract is taken as unlimited and containing every perfection of whiteness, and thus as more perfect than itself as limited in some subject. In the concrete, however, as esse is signified by the name "being," and living by the name "living thing," esse is contained within living itself: because then esse is not taken as something unlimited and containing every perfection of being, but as signifying the lowest grade of being, which is contained in life as the imperfect is contained in the perfect.

If, however, they are taken in the second way, then to be is more perfect than to live: because being includes every perfection of esse, and consequently the grade of life, whereas living signifies precisely that grade of esse which is living. And in this way they are signified in the abstract.

Thus, therefore, a living thing is more perfect than a being merely, because a living thing contains within itself the grade of being which is to live and the grade of being simply, whereas a being contains only that lowest grade of being, which is esse. But esse itself, separated from every receiver and subsisting, is not limited to any grade of being, but has in itself every perfection of being. On this account St. Thomas says well, following the mind of Dionysius, chapter 5 of De Divinis Nominibus⁴, that those things which are and live are more perfect than those which are merely, that is, which have only this grade of being which is to exist: yet esse itself, which is God, is a being universally perfect, that is, it has every perfection of being.

II. He proves this conclusion first⁵ Saint Thomas says thus: God is subsistent esse itself. Therefore He has within Himself the nobility and perfection of every single thing. — The antecedent was proved above. — The consequence is proved by supposing that the nobility of each thing belongs to it according to its esse: for nobility would not belong to a man through his wisdom unless he were wise through that very wisdom, and so with other things. From this it follows that, according to the mode in which a thing has esse, the mode of its nobility is taken: for from the fact that the esse of a thing is contracted to a greater or lesser degree of nobility, the thing is said to be more or less noble. Then he argues thus: According to the mode in which a thing has esse, it also has nobility. Therefore what has the whole power of essendi has every nobility. But subsistent esse has the whole power and might of essendi. Therefore it has every nobility. — The minor is proved by the example of whiteness: for although one possessing whiteness of some degree may lack some degree of whiteness because of a defect in the receiver, which perhaps does not receive the whole power of whiteness, yet if whiteness were separated from every subject, nothing of the power of whiteness could be lacking to it. So likewise it will be with esse separated from every receiver, to which nothing of the perfection and power of essendi can be lacking.

From this reasoning it receives a certain confirmation of the conclusion. According to the mode in which something has esse, it falls short of non-being. Therefore that which has all esse is removed from all non-being by it. Therefore from it every defect is removed. Therefore it is universally perfect. Therefore God, who has all esse, is universally perfect.

Finally, he removes the doubt. For those things that are only such are imperfect. Therefore esse is imperfect. If, then, God is ipsum esse, it follows that He is something imperfect. — It is answered that such things are imperfect not because of any imperfection in esse absolutely, that is, because they have esse itself as absolute and unlimited, as the doubt supposes; but because they participate in esse according to a most imperfect degree, which is merely to exist.

III. Concerning this proposition, "The nobility of each thing is its own according to its esse," it must be considered that it is not the mind of St. Thomas that the imperfect grade of being, which is merely to exist, or even the esse of each form, taken as abstracted from the form, is the nobility of a thing; but his mind is that, since the perfection and nobility of each thing come from the form, because it belongs to the form to perfect, the nobility and perfection are not from the form as it is understood as separate from the thing with respect to esse, but as it is united to the thing with respect to its esse. For nothing is properly the form and perfection of something except insofar as it gives esse to it: for wisdom would not be the form of a man unless it gave him to be wise in the way that it belongs to a form to give esse. Therefore the nobility of each thing is its own according to its esse: that is, according to the form as united to it with respect to esse and making the thing to be such.

2. Concerning the example of whiteness, it must be noted that we can consider a twofold perfection in whiteness: one, namely, essential and specific, which is signified by the definition; the other, however, gradual, according to the diverse modes of esse that are naturally suited to belong to whiteness insofar as it is participated variously by a subject, or even exists separated from a subject. If we speak of the first perfection, whiteness existing separately is not more perfect than whiteness existing in a subject, nor is it more perfect in one subject than in another: since the essence of a thing consists in an indivisible. But if the second is under discussion, then whiteness existing separately can indeed be more perfect than whiteness in a subject, and in one subject than in another: for what is separate can lack nothing of the power of whiteness, that is, of the perfection and esse of whiteness, because it is not determined to any fixed degree; and in one subject it can possess a more perfect degree than in another.

But what St. Thomas says—that it happens, from a defect in the recipient, that something of the power of whiteness is lacking to it, because perhaps it does not receive it according to the whole power of whiteness—he stated dubitatively, because it is irrelevant to the purpose at hand whether some subject can receive whiteness according to the whole power of whiteness or cannot. For however that may be, nothing of the power of whiteness can be lacking to a separate whiteness, because it is not limited; but something can be lacking to a white thing on account of its own indisposition.

But what is it in truth? St. Thomas holds, in the Third Part, d. xiii, q. 1, a. 2⁶, that a form existing in a subject is of necessity limited with respect to the esse owed to that form, because it does not have all the esse that is possible to that nature. It is nevertheless possible for a subject to possess that form according to every aspect of that form, so that nothing is lacking to it among the things pertaining to the perfection of that form. The first point I understand thus: since esse separate from every subject is an absolutely more perfect mode of being than any esse in a subject, no esse in a subject can virtually contain the abstract esse equal to it; for the less perfect cannot equal nor virtually contain the more perfect. But abstract and wholly unreceived esse, as most perfect, virtually contains every esse in a subject and equals all such esse. Therefore a form existing in a subject is limited with respect to esse, and does not possess the whole esse of its form by equality and virtual containment, as if having most perfect and unlimited esse. The second point, however, I understand thus: there are certain accidental forms possessing various perfections and completions, insofar as they can be extended to various effects, as is the case with grace. And such forms can be possessed by some subject according to every degree of perfection—that is, insofar as they can extend themselves to all their effects—though not according to the whole esse: just as Christ possessed in himself every completion of the perfection of grace.

IV. Concerning that proposition, "Non-being is to be wholly removed from God," it must be noted that this is not said as though every esse formally and distinctly belongs to God, and every non-being is formally removed from him. For this is false. For God does not formally have the esse of a man or of a horse or of other material things; otherwise he would be formally a man and a horse and all material things. But he has every esse eminently, with respect to every perfection of those things, and virtually. And in this way no non-being belongs to him. For it is not true to say that God is not a man or a horse or anything else material virtually and by a certain eminence, as containing unitedly and indivisibly whatever in those things is divided—although it is true that he is not formally a man or a horse.

V. Second, ⁷. Every imperfect thing proceeds from something perfect: as seed from an animal or from a plant. Therefore the first being must be the most perfect.

Third. God is in no way potency. Therefore he is not imperfect. — The consequence is proved. Because each thing is perfect insofar as it is in act, but imperfect insofar as it is in potency with privation of act.

Note here that imperfection belongs to a potency only by reason of a privation joined to it: for privation is a kind of imperfection, just as form is a perfection. Hence Saint Thomas says that something is imperfect insofar as it is in potency with the privation of act.

Fourth. God is the first efficient cause. Therefore whatever is in act in any given thing is in God, and far more eminently than in that thing. Therefore He is most perfect. — The first inference is proved. Action follows the mode of actuality in the agent, since nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Therefore what is found in the effect must be found in the cause.

St. Thomas notes, however, that it is impossible for esse to be drawn forth by the action of an agent into a more noble act than the act of the agent is, since action follows the mode of the agent's act. But it is indeed possible for the act of the effect to be more imperfect than the act of the agent, on account of the indisposition of the matter, by which the action itself is weakened. Here it must be observed that, since both the agent and the patient concur in a transitive action, from a defect in either it can happen that the effect is weak and imperfect: namely, either on account of the weakness of the agent's power, or on account of the indisposition of the patient. But if the agent is weak, however disposed the patient may be to receive, nevertheless an effect having a more noble act than the principal agent will never be produced: because the action and the effect follow the mode of the form of the principal agent. But if the agent's power is strong, while the recipient is indisposed, then notwithstanding the strength of the power the perfection of the effect will be impeded: because the agent cannot introduce an act into the patient except in the mode in which the latter is apt to receive. — How, however, the effect may be in the active cause in a more noble mode than it is in itself has been shown above ⁸.

Fifth. If it were not universally perfect, it would not be the common measure of all things. But this is false: because nothing can be the measure of all beings except that which is esse itself. — The consequence is proved, because in each genus all things are measured by the most perfect thing in that genus, while each thing is shown to be more or less perfect according as it more or less approaches that thing: thus the white is the measure of colors, and the virtuous man the measure of all men, namely insofar as they are placed in the moral genus.

It must be noted here, as Saint Thomas says in Verit., q. 11, a. 4, ad 4, that whiteness is not the measure of colors except by reason of light, which is as it were the formal element in color; for with respect to this it exceeds all other colors. But with respect to that which is as it were the material element in color, namely the termination of the diaphanous, it is not the measure of other colors.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Exodus 33, "I will show you," etc.; and of Dionysius, chapter 5 of the Divine Names, where he says that God is not in some way an existing being, etc.

VI. As to the second ⁹, since someone might think that God is not perfect because “perfect” seems to be said of what arrives at its completion through being made, whereas God cannot be made: Saint Thomas removes this quibble by saying that, although with respect to the first imposition of the name everything perfect is made—because this name was first imposed to signify that which has been brought from non-being into esse and from potency into complete act so that nothing is lacking to it, and such a thing must be made—nevertheless the name was extended also to signify that which is in complete act, even if it does not arrive at act through becoming. Therefore according to the first imposition of this name God cannot be called perfect; but well enough according to the second, in keeping with Matthew 5: Be you perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.