Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has shown that in God there is no composition from certain things, he now shows that there is no composition in Him with something else ¹. Concerning this he does two things: first, he shows that He is not the formal esse of all things; second, that He is not the form of certain things, in the following chapter.

As to the first, he shows that those erred who held God to be the formal esse of all things. In regard to this he does two things: first, he attacks this error; second, he sets out their grounds and replies to them ².

I. As to the first, it is argued first as follows. Formal esse is divided into the esse of substance and the esse of accident. But divine esse is not the esse of substance (namely, of that which is a genus) nor of accident, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, etc. It must be noted here that, just as being is divided into substance and accident, so too esse is divided into substantial esse, by which a thing is said to exist absolutely in nature; and accidental esse, by which a thing is said to be such, for instance white or black. But just as the division of being into substance and accident can be taken in two ways — namely, as it is a division into genera only; and as it is a division into substance which is said both of the genus of substance and of that substance which is not in a genus, and into the categories of accidents — so too esse can be divided in two ways into substantial and accidental. But since substantial esse contains both the esse of substance which is outside every genus and the esse of substance which is in a genus, if a division is made into substantial esse in common and accidental esse, there is also made implicitly a division into the esse of substance which is in a genus and accidental esse. What Saint Thomas says, then, that formal esse is divided into the esse of substance (namely, of that which is a genus: for thus it must be understood, since only in this way has it been proven above that God is not the esse of substance, when it was proven that God is not in a genus) and the esse of accident, must be understood not of the first and immediate division of esse, but of the secondary and implicit one, insofar as substantial esse comprehends both the esse which is in a genus and the esse which is outside every genus. For if God were the formal esse of all things, He would have to be both the esse of substance which is in a genus and the esse of accident, and not merely the esse of substance which is not in a genus.

II. Second. It would follow that all things would be one simpliciter. This is impossible. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because all things would have one esse. For since things are not distinguished insofar as they have esse, since all things agree in this, it must be that if they are to differ according to esse, either esse itself is specified by differences, or it is received in diverse natures. Not the first: because a difference cannot be added to being, as was shown above. Nor the second, if the divine esse is the formal esse of all things: because it is not an esse received into a nature, but is itself the divine nature. Therefore all things will have one esse simpliciter. Concerning that proposition, "Things are not distinguished from one another according as they have esse," it must be considered that it can have a twofold sense. The first is that the formal ratio of being is specified: and this is the sense, Beings are not distinguished in this, namely having esse, because all things agree in this, namely having esse. Another is that the proper mode of distinction of that which has esse be excluded: and this is the sense, They are not distinguished according to some mode of being, that is, They do not have one esse and another. Just as if we were to say that animals are not distinguished according as they are animals, this can mean either that they are not distinguished in the common ratio of animal; or that they are not distinguished by differences of animal, and thus are not diverse animals. The first sense is true in both cases: and this is what Saint Thomas intends. But the second is false.

III. Third. God has no cause. Therefore He is not the formal esse of all things. — The antecedent is evident: because the esse of God is God Himself, who has no cause, since nothing is prior to Him. — The consequence, however, is proved as follows. Because in certain things esse has a cause, or something as it were a principle, namely the form itself, which is the principle of being (essendi), and the agent itself. It must be noted that, when esse in things produced by another is said to have something as it were a principle, the word "as it were" is not taken in a merely figurative sense, but as expressive of the truth. — How, moreover, the agent and the form are in different ways the cause of being (essendi) was said above ³.

IV. Fourth. Then God would not be any existing thing except in the intellect. But the opposite of this was shown above. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because what is common to many is not outside the many except according to reason, as is clear in the case of animal. For if common animal were something, there would be several animals in Plato: for man is essentially animal, and Plato; and thus in Plato there would be common animal, and the animal that is man, and the animal that is Plato. Therefore if God were the formal esse common to all things, God would be only in the intellect. It must be considered at this point that it is one thing to say that what is common to many, or the universal, is not a being except in the intellect, and another to say that the universal is not something outside the many except in the intellect. For the first is false, and the second true. For the universal itself is not a being of reason, if it is taken materially and with respect to the thing denominated, but is a real being existing in things: for animal is a real being existing in particular animals. But it is true that abstraction itself and universality do not belong to it except in the intellect: for common animal, separated from particular animals, is not found in the nature of things, but can indeed be considered by the intellect through abstraction from all particulars. In this way, then, is understood the conclusion adduced by Saint Thomas: God will not be any existing thing except one that is in the intellect alone, that is: God will not be something existing per se outside the intellect, distinct from and separate from all other things, but will be separated from things only by thought and intellect.

V. Fifth. God would be the terminus of generation. But this is false, since He is eternal. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because generation is of itself a way into esse, and corruption a way into non-esse; for a form is not the terminus of generation, nor privation the terminus of corruption, except because privation makes non-esse and form makes esse. Hence, if form did not make esse, that which received such a form would not be said to be generated. For an understanding of what is said here, it must be considered that the composite, the form, and esse are all termini of generation, but in different ways: the composite is the terminus as that which is generated first and per se; the form as the complement of the essence of what is generated; but esse as its ultimate actuality. Since, therefore, esse is the formal terminus of generation—not as the complement of an essence actualized by another act, but as the ultimate actuality of that which comes to be, beyond which there is nothing further to be actualized—therefore generation is said to be a way to esse; for "way" regards the ultimate terminus per se, and takes its determination from it.

2. But two doubts arise concerning this argument. The first is that it does not seem unfitting that the divine esse should be the terminus of generation. For Christ was truly begotten and is truly a son, and his generation is terminated at no other esse than the divine esse, since in him there is only one substantial esse, according to the teaching of St. Thomas ⁴. Therefore the divine esse is the terminus of generation. The second is that this inference does not seem to hold: God is eternal, therefore he is not the terminus of generation. For the Son is begotten in the divinity, and consequently the divine esse is the terminus of that generation; and yet the Son is eternal.

3. For the clarification of these points, it must be considered that Saint Thomas here speaks of generation that is a change from non-being to being, and not of that which is a simple production. For it follows, if the divine esse is the formal esse of all things, that it is the terminus of such generation, since many created things are produced by that generation. — He likewise speaks of the terminus of generation as newly produced through it, in the way in which the philosophers spoke of the generation of subsistent things, saying that those things are generated which are produced from non-being into being and whose esse did not previously exist. And it is established among them that many things of this kind are generated in nature.

To the first, then, it is indeed granted that the divine esse is the terminus of the temporal generation of Christ, communicated to Him through such a generation of His human nature; yet it is not the terminus of that generation as though it were produced anew by it—in which sense St. Thomas speaks of the terminus of a generation.

By this also the response to the second is clear. For the argument holds: He is begotten as if newly and produced from non-being to being, Therefore he is not eternal; and conversely, He is eternal, Therefore he is not newly begotten. But the Son in the divinity is not newly begotten according to his divinity and by a change from non-being to being; rather, he is produced from the Father eternally by a generation that is a simple production. Therefore he is at once begotten and eternal. There is thus no objection against the proposition: because Saint Thomas here speaks of generation that is a change from non-being to being and by which something is newly produced, of which the philosophers speak; but the Son of God is not begotten in that way according to his divinity.

VI. Sixth. Then the esse of any thing will be from eternity, since the divine esse is eternal. Therefore there will be no generation or corruption. — The last consequence is proved. Because, if there is generation, it must be that that preexisting eternal esse is acquired anew either by something previously existing or by something in no way previously existing. If the first, then the thing generated does not receive a new esse but a new mode of being: since it existed before, and on that position there is one esse of all things. Therefore it is not generated but altered. If the second, then it will come to be from nothing, which is repugnant to generation.

2. Concerning what Saint Thomas says, namely that to receive a new mode of being, but not a new esse, does not constitute generation, a doubt is raised. For it follows that Christ was not begotten in time, and consequently is not the son of the Blessed Virgin, whose opposite Catholics hold. For through the incarnation the divine supposit does not receive a new esse, but a new mode of being, or a new relation to human nature, since in Christ there is only one substantial esse. If, therefore, to receive a new mode of being does not constitute generation, it follows that Christ was not begotten.

If it is said that, although he does not receive a new esse but a new mode of being, he nevertheless receives a new nature, because he begins to be the supposit of human nature, and on this account is said to be begotten — this does not hold. For, as Saint Thomas says in the preceding argument, given that something receives a form, if that form does not make esse, it is not said to be generated.

3. It is said that, since mention has not yet been made of the trinity of the divine Persons, Saint Thomas here speaks of generation as it is understood by the philosophers. Among them, something is said to be generated simply when it begins to subsist in some nature. Now this occurs among natural things when a thing begins simply to be and receives a new esse. Therefore they say that only that is generated simply which receives a new esse, and not that which takes on a new mode of being. According to them, then, that proposition is true, because they considered only the generation of natural things. And if it is posited that the divine esse of all things is their formal esse, it will follow that there is no natural generation. Among theologians, however, something begins to be the supposit of a nature and yet does not begin simply to be: just as the divine supposit begins to be the supposit of human nature and to subsist in it, and yet does not begin simply to be, since it has an eternal esse. Therefore, because Christ begins to subsist in human nature, he is said by theologians to be truly generated, although he did not receive a new esse, but only a certain new relation to human nature, beginning to exist in his own way through the divine esse. Hence that proposition of Saint Thomas, taken according to the mind of the philosophers, is not true unless something receives a new mode of being, or a new relation, by the fact that it begins to be the supposit of a nature of which it was previously not the supposit. This would indeed be impossible among the philosophers, who consider these lower things; but among theologians it is true in Christ. For then that is also truly said to be generated, even though it does not receive a new esse, but only a new mode of being.

But what Saint Thomas said—that if the form does not make esse, the recipient of the form is not said to be generated—must likewise be understood, according to the theologians, unless the recipient of such a form begins to be a supposit subsisting in that form; for if it begins to be a supposit of that nature, it will be said to be generated, even though through such a nature it does not have esse simply. Among the philosophers, however, the statement is true simply: because nothing begins to subsist in some nature among natural things unless it has new esse through that nature.

VII. The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, which places God exalted above all things, as in Isaiah 6; and above all esse, as in Romans 9. For if He were the esse of all things, then He would not be above all things, but one of all things.

It is confirmed secondly, because the error of the idolaters, who imposed the name of God upon wood and stones, would return; this error is refuted in Wisdom 14. For just as it is truly said, "A stone is a being," so could it truly be said, "A stone is God." It must be considered that, just as that is truly said to be a being which has esse as its formal actuality, so, with respect to the mode of signifying, that is truly said to be God which has deity as its form. Since therefore divine esse is identical with deity, if that were the formal actuality of the stone, it would truly be said that the stone has deity as its form, and thus is God.

VIII. As to the second ⁵, he adduces four foundations for a position of this kind. The first is that Dionysius, in chapter IV of the Celestial Hierarchy, says that the esse of all things is the supersubstantial divinity. But Saint Thomas says two things here. First, that from these words it cannot be gathered that the deity is the formal esse of all things; rather, the opposite is gathered, since he says that divinity is above all things. This is also shown by what is found in chapter II of the Divine Names. Second, he says that it is understood thus, that divinity is the esse of all things: because in all things there is found a certain likeness of divine esse from God.

For an understanding of this solution, it must be considered that, since the esse of each thing, as Saint Thomas says in the First Part, q. 105, a. 5, is most intimate to the thing, inasmuch as it is the actuality of all that is in the thing, it must belong to the thing's nature as the actuality of the whole nature and of all its parts. And thus it cannot be something entirely exceeding the nature of the thing whose it is: for human esse is limited with respect to the nature of man, and the esse of a horse with respect to the nature of a horse. Hence, if divine esse entirely exceeds the nature of each thing, and its nature is placed above all natures, as Dionysius willed, it follows that it is not the formal esse of things.

IX. The second reason is that the aforementioned thinkers supposed that the divine esse, to which no addition is made, is not something proper but the common esse of all things, on the ground that what is common is specified or individuated through addition. But Saint Thomas says that the divine esse is without addition not only in thought but also in the nature of things. And it lacks not only addition but also receptivity to addition. Now that which is common, or universal, cannot be without addition, but is considered without addition; yet not without receptivity to addition, as is evident also in the case of animal: for if no difference could be added to it, it would not be a genus. Hence the argument seems rather to lead to the opposite conclusion, as appears also from the Commentator on the Book of Causes.

Note that the divine esse cannot have the character of a common esse by way of universal community, predicable of many; but it is well said to be common by the community of the exemplary form, because every esse is a certain likeness of itself.

Note also that a twofold difference is posited here between common esse and divine esse. For although they agree in this, that nothing is added to them — for nothing is added to the divine esse, since all things in God are ipsum esse itself; likewise common esse, as such, has nothing by which it is limited — they nevertheless differ, first, because the divine esse exists in the nature of things separated from every other thing without any addition. Universal esse, however, like other universals, cannot exist without an addition limiting and contracting it. Second, because the divine esse not only has no addition, but also cannot receive addition: because it cannot be received in another. Common esse, however, can receive addition — not indeed of an essential difference, as was shown above ⁶ — but material: it is limited by the natures in which it is received.

It must also be noted that not only does divine esse admit no addition of anything contracting and particularizing it, but neither does it admit the addition of anything distinct from it that supervenes upon it. The substantial esse of all other things, however, admits the addition of a supervening accident, because there is no created substance that is entirely stripped of accidents and accidental esse. On this account it is well said here that divine esse is distinguished from all others because nothing can be added to it.

X. The third reason is that God is of infinite simplicity. On this basis they judged that what is found at the ultimate point of resolution is God, as being the most simple. But Saint Thomas says that they failed to notice that the most simple thing in us is not so much a complete thing as something belonging to a thing. In God, however, simplicity is attributed to Him as to some subsisting thing.

Note that the answer rests on this: the most simple thing in us, to which resolution is made, need not be God, because that most simple thing which is in us is not so much a complete res as something of a res. But God is a most simple res, and is not something of a res.

We can interpret these words in two ways: The simplest thing in us is not so much a complete thing as something of a thing. First, such that one is excluded and the other affirmed, so that the sense is: It is not a complete thing, but something of a thing: just as if we were to say, Socrates is not so much white as pale, that is, He is not white, but rather pale. — Second, such that both are affirmed: namely, both that it is a complete thing and that it is something of a thing. But then "complete" must be understood not simply, but within a genus. For the actual esse of a thing is complete within the genus of acts, because it is the ultimate actuality, not capable of being actualized by another act; yet it is not a perfectly subsisting thing, but something of a thing, by which the thing itself subsists. — Either interpretation, therefore, can be true. But the first seems more to be intended: namely, that esse is not a thing perfect simply, according to the first interpretation; it is, however, perfect within the genus of acts, according to the second.

XI. The fourth point concerns the manner of speaking: for we say God is in all things. But Saint Thomas says that God is not in things as something belonging to a thing, but as the cause of the thing, which in no way is absent from its effect: and that we do not say alike that a form is in a body and a sailor in a ship.

It should be noted that Saint Thomas does not say that being a form in a body is like being a sailor in a ship as if he wished God to be in things only in the way a sailor is in a ship: for this would conflict with what he said, that God is in things as the cause which in no way is lacking to its effect, since, namely, he always preserves it as long as it exists; for the sailor is not the cause of the ship, and at times he is even absent from it — but rather so as to show that there are many ways of being in something, and therefore the argument does not hold, God is in all things; therefore he is the formal esse of all things, just as it does not hold that the sailor is in the ship; therefore he is the form of the ship.