Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas has excluded composition of essence and esse, he further excludes in this place from God the composition of subject and accident ¹. And he sets down this conclusion: In God there is no accident.

I. It is proved first. Nothing can participate in ipsum esse itself that is not of its essence (though what is can well do so), since nothing is more formal or simpler than ipsum esse itself. God is ipsum esse. Therefore he has nothing that is not of his substance. Therefore there is no accident in him.

For a fuller understanding of this argument, it must first be considered that, since act informs potency, it is always understood to be less composite than the potency itself—that is, having less potentiality and being more actual than the potency. Therefore, where there are several acts of which one is related to another as act to potency, that one which is related as act to the other is simpler and has less composition; thus: for nothing is actualized by something less actual than itself, if only the ratio of act and potency is considered. If, then, subsistent esse had some act added to it, there would have to be some act simpler and more actual than it. But this esse cannot be: since esse is the actuality of all forms. Therefore it cannot have anything added to it. And this is the foundation of this argument.

It must be considered, second, that this argument was taken by Saint Thomas from Boethius in the book De Hebdomadibus. ²: in which place Saint Thomas himself notes that this is common to all things considered abstractly, that they have nothing in themselves which is outside their essence. For each thing is signified as that by which something is formally such: as whiteness is that by which something is white, and humanity that by which a man is formally a man. Now nothing is formally white except through what pertains to the essence of the white; nor is a man formally a man except through what belongs to the notion and essence of man. Therefore what is signified abstractly, if it exists as it is signified, can have nothing distinct from itself. — But concretes are signified as possessing the very form itself. Yet from the fact that something has some nature, it is not prevented from having something else that does not pertain to its notion: for from the fact that man has humanity, nothing prevents him from also having something else besides humanity. — It is therefore rightly said that ipsum esse cannot participate in anything that is not of its essence, but that id quod est can, namely ipsum ens: because esse is abstract, while ens is concrete.

II. Second, ³. Nothing in God has a cause. Therefore there is no accident in God. — The consequence is evident, because every accident has a cause why it is present. — The antecedent is proved: for the cause of it is either the divine essence or something else. If something else, then God would be acted upon and moved by some agent; for nothing induces any form into any recipient except by acting upon it in some way, since to act is to make actual. If the divine essence itself, then in God there will be something by which he causes and something by which he receives: just as corporeal things receive by the nature of matter but cause through form. And thus God will be composite. The consequence is proved: because it is impossible that something be the cause of a thing by that whereby it receives it; otherwise the same thing would, in the same respect, make itself actual.

For the understanding of that proposition, To act is nothing other than to make something actual, it must be noted that making actual is attributed, according to the customary manner of speaking, both to the agent and to the form: for we say that both the thing heating makes something actually hot, and the heat does so. This, however, happens in different ways. For the agent is said to make something actual because it leads the thing itself into the act of the form while simultaneously co-producing the form. On account of which Saint Thomas adds, that which is such is through the form: as if he were saying, To act is to make actual through a form produced in the patient. The form, however, is said to make actual not because it produces anything, but because it is that by which the agent makes something actually be: for whiteness does not make something white by producing it, but is that by which the whitening agent makes something actually be white.

III. Concerning that proposition, "The same, according to the same, does not make itself in act, but acts according to one thing and receives according to another," a doubt arises from a twofold source. First, because although it seems true in composites of matter and form, in which Saint Thomas exemplifies it, it does not nevertheless seem universally true. For in a separate substance its proper accidents are caused by its essence and are received in it; likewise the intellect and the will are caused by the essence of the intellectual soul and are received in it; and yet not according to one thing and another, since they are simple substances having no diversity of parts. Therefore, etc.

Second ⁴, because the intellect of itself causes the act of understanding and receives that very act, and likewise the will causes the act of willing: since these are immanent operations. Therefore, etc.

IV. To the first of these it is said first that in all things which cause something in themselves there must be a diversity between act and potency. For if there were only act, the thing could not have the character of a recipient, since every recipient receives some esse in act from the form which it receives. If, however, there were only potency, it could not have the character of an agent.

It is said second, that this diversity is not to be understood in the same way in all things, but varies according to the variety of natures. For in composites of matter and form, matter itself is the principle of receiving, but form is the principle of acting. In simple substances, however, the essence itself is the principle of receiving, insofar as it is compared to esse as potency to act; but esse itself is the principle of acting, because each thing acts insofar as it is in act; not indeed that esse is the formal productive principle of its proper accidents, but because it is the condition of the essence itself insofar as it produces those accidents, for nothing acts unless it is in act. It is said, therefore, that even in separate substances and in the soul that by which a thing receives is one thing and that by which it acts is another, because one is the essence and the other is esse. And thus in other things there must be a composition of essence and esse, which cannot be found in God.

2. But a doubt still remains. For, even when the thing does not exist in act, its proper passion follows upon its essence, since the proposition in which the passion is predicated of the subject is of eternal truth. Therefore actual esse is not a condition of the essence insofar as it acts.

It is answered that, when the thing does not exist, the passion does not follow the essence in real esse but only in intelligible esse, from which it follows that a proposition in which a passion is predicated of its subject is always true.

To the second objection it can be answered that the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood of a distinction of reason, not of a real distinction. For what acts in itself does not act according to one reason and receive according to another: it acts insofar as it is in act, but is acted upon insofar as it is in potency. But because in composites a thing is in act by one thing and in potency by another really, therefore in them acting and receiving are reduced to two really distinct principles. In simple things, however, because by the same thing a thing is in essential act and in potency with respect to esse, inasmuch as the essence itself both is a certain act in itself and is potency with respect to esse, therefore the principle of producing its own accidents and the principle of receiving them are distinguished only by reason. Yet, because the essence itself must really be potency with respect to esse, just as it really is act in itself, it follows that everything which is the cause of its own accidents in itself must be composite, at least by the composition of esse and essence. Nor is it unfitting that the same thing in reality be the principle of producing and of receiving the same accident, when it is not a productive principle through a mediating action, but only through the natural resulting of one thing from another, as was shown above ⁵ on the mind of St. Thomas, Prima, q. lxxvii, a. 6, ad 3, provided that it have in some way the character of act and in some way the character of potency.

V. To the second doubt ⁶ it is said that neither the intellect nor the will acts and is acted upon by entirely the same thing, but by different things. For just as in bodily things matter is the principle of receiving, while form is the principle of acting, so proportionally in the intellect and in the will. In the intellect, indeed, that which causes intellection in act is the intellect informed by an intelligible species, and the intelligible species itself is its principle of causing; but the power itself is its principle of receiving. In the will, however, the will willing the end is that which causes the volition of those things that are toward the end, and the volition of the end is its principle of acting; but the power of the will itself is its principle of receiving.

It must be noted, however, that matter in bodily things stands in one relation to the receiving of the proper accidents of the composite, and in another the powers of intellect and will stand to receiving an act. For in the former, matter is the reason of receiving, yet such accidents are not received in matter alone, but in the composite. In the action of intellect and will, however, the very power is the reason of receiving in such a way that it alone receives: for intellection is received in the intellect alone, and volition in the will alone. The reason for the difference is that matter, since it is purely potential in an unqualified sense, is not immediately receptive of accidental form, but all accidents belong to the composite; whereas intellect and will, although they are passive powers, are nevertheless not pure potencies but a kind of act; therefore they can be the immediate and proper subjects of other accidents.

2. But this response, as far as the will is concerned, does not seem to satisfy fully. For although in willing those things that are directed to an end something may be assigned as the ratio of acting and something as receptive, yet in the very volition of the end itself nothing appears to be a ratio of acting distinct from the ratio of receiving; rather the will itself, in its bare simplicity, seems both to cause that act and to receive it.

To this doubt one can easily reply according to those who hold that the will is a partial agent of volition, and that the object apprehended by the intellect concurs with it at the same time as another partial cause. For it would be said that the will bare and alone is not the cause of the volition of an end, but rather the aggregate composed of the will and the end itself as apprehended by the intellect; whereas what receives that volition is the power of the will alone.

According to those, however, who say that the object does not concur actively in volition but only by way of end and form, it is more difficult to reply. For some say that for the volition of an end the will is moved by God, such that with respect to such a volition the will is merely passive. — But this does not seem true to me. Because to will names an immanent action in the agent: therefore it is necessary that that which wills be in some way both agent and recipient of the volition. And also because the will is not said to will except by an act elicited from itself: just as neither does the intellect understand except by an act produced from itself.

For which reason it seems to me, following the aforementioned opinion, that one must say: either that in the will there is some natural form which is for it the reason of naturally willing the end, just as in the intellect there is a natural habit of first principles; and thus the whole productive principle of volition is the will together with that form, while what receives is the will; and thus the will is said to be moved by God to volition of the end insofar as God has instilled in it the form by which it is naturally moved toward the end, just as He instilled in the possible intellect the habit of first principles; — or that God, in moving the will to volition of the end, is the principal agent and the agent by which, while the will itself is that by which God causes that volition; just as the generator is that which moves a heavy body, while the form of the heavy body is that by which it moves. Now, it is not unfitting that the same thing be active with respect to some act and receptive of it when it is not the principal agent but that by which the agent acts, standing on the side of that which is moved: for then the same thing can be the form through which the agent acts, insofar as in it is the power of the principal agent, and can be that by which the patient undergoes, insofar as it is a movable potency.

VI. Third. In God there is no potency. Therefore no accident. — The consequence is proved: because every subject is related to an accident as potency is related to the act giving accidental esse.

Fourth. God is not mutable. Therefore it does not befit him that of himself he can inhere and not inhere. Therefore in him there is no accident. — The first consequence is evident. — But the second is proved: because every accident is by its nature apt to inhere and not to inhere.

But a doubt arises: because a proper accident is not naturally suited to inhere and not to inhere.

It may be said that this argument does not prove that no accident is in God as accident divided against substance, but as distinguished against a proper attribute. The latter, however, is of such a nature as to belong and not to belong. — This is clear from the manner of speaking when he says, If God has something accidental as befitting him. For only those accidents which can be absent are said to befit accidentally, whereas proper attributes befit essentially. Nor is it unfitting that, among many arguments, some prove universally that no accident simply belongs to him, while others prove it only of the accident per accidens.

VII. Fifth. God is whatever is in himself. Therefore in himself there is no accident. — The consequence is evident, because a thing is not its own accident, since an accident is not of the essence of a thing. — The antecedent, however, is proved as follows. Whatever is in God is in him in the most noble way, because God is the cause of all things, and each thing is found more nobly in its cause than in its effect. But something belongs to a thing most perfectly when it is that very thing itself, since then it is one with it more perfectly than form is with matter, and than when something inheres in another accidentally. Therefore, and so on.

2. Concerning that proposition, "Each thing is found more noble in its cause than in its effect," a doubt is raised. For the nature of fire is not found more noble in the generating fire than in the generated, nor is human nature nobler in the generating man than in the generated man: since the most specific species is found equally in all its individuals; or at least it is not necessarily nobler in one than in another. Therefore, etc.

It is answered first ⁷, taking the proposition as universally true. And it is said first, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in many places ⁸, that this proposition holds universally true of the principal efficient cause, but not of the instrumental cause.

It is said second, that the nobility of what is in the cause and in the effect can be referred both to the perfection of the essence and nature in itself, and to the mode of being. If it is referred to the nature in itself, then it is not necessary that each thing be nobler in the principal cause than in the effect. For, as was argued, in things of the same most special species, the nature is not essentially more perfect in the cause than in the effect. — If it is referred to the mode of being, it can also be understood in two ways: namely, according as it is in the cause absolutely; and according as it is in the cause as the cause is. And the same distinction must be made on the side of the effect. If it is taken absolutely, it is not necessary that it be nobler in the cause than in the effect: for it can be in the cause and in the effect with an equal nobility of being, if the esse of the cause and the esse of the effect are considered absolutely. But if something is considered that is in the active cause virtually, according as it is in the cause, then it has a nobler being than in the effect as it is an effect. For in the agent cause it has the character of the producer; but in the effect it has the character of the produced. Now, it is nobler to produce than to be produced. Therefore it is nobler to be in the cause as the cause is, than to be in the effect as the effect is. And thus the proposition of Saint Thomas is to be understood, as is clear in De Malo, q. iv, a. 1, ad 15.

Hence there is no instance to the contrary. For although the nature of fire is not absolutely nobler in the fire that generates than in the fire generated, it nevertheless has a nobler mode of being in the fire that generates as generating than in the fire generated as generated. And the same must be said of humanity, and of other things that are predicated univocally of cause and effect.

This exposition, however, serves the proposed aim most of all. For since a thing, insofar as it is a cause, possesses a more noble mode, it is necessary that in God there be found the most noble mode that can befit a cause as cause. Now the most noble mode is for the effect to be in the cause as the very essence of the cause, so that the cause acts through its very essence. Therefore all things in God are the very essence of God, and nothing in Him is accidental.

3. It can be answered secondly that the proposition has truth both as regards essence and as regards its mode of being absolutely, but only in an equivocal cause. For the effect in an equivocal cause is nothing other than the very form of the equivocal cause; and the mode of being of the effect in the cause is nothing other than the mode of being of the cause. Now it is evident that the form and esse of an equivocal cause is nobler than the form and esse of the effect, since it contains the effect's perfection and something more perfect than it.

To this sense also the proposal of Saint Thomas is directed. For it is manifest that God is the equivocal cause of creatures, and not the univocal cause.

VIII. Sixth. Substance does not depend on accident, but rather the reverse. Therefore some substance can be found without accident. This seems especially fitting for the first substance, which is God. — The consequence is proved. Because what does not depend on something can at some time be found without it.

But concerning that proposition a doubt arises. For a substance does not depend on its own passion, and yet it cannot be found without it. Therefore not everything that does not depend on another can at some time exist without that other.

It is said that this proposition must be understood where the one does not follow upon the other by a natural consequence. For in those cases, although one does not depend on the other, yet because, once it is posited, the other naturally results from it, therefore in reality it cannot be found without it—as was argued concerning a subject and its proper passion: for a proper passion follows naturally upon the nature of the subject. But substance and accident are not so related according to the common ratio of substance and the common ratio of accident: for neither does substance depend on an accident, nor does an accident follow naturally upon the ratio of substance. Therefore some substance can be without an accident.

IX. Finally, the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Augustine in the book On the Trinity.

The error of the Saracens, to which Averroes refers in Metaphysics XII, commentary 39, is refuted on this basis: they posited certain intentions superadded to the divine essence. — Against this error it must be noted that Saint Thomas understands by "intentions" the forms. We call them intentions because they are separated from God's substance only by our intention and thought. But the Saracens held that these are also really distinct, and that they are accidents superadded to the divine essence.