Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

After Saint Thomas excluded passive potentiality from God, he consequently also excludes composition ¹. On this point, however, he does two things: for first he excludes composition universally; second, he descends to particular compositions, in chapter xx. On the first point he does two things: first, he excludes every composition from God; second, he draws a certain corollary, in the following chapter. I. As to the first, he proves that there is no composition in God. And he argues first as follows. In God there is no potency. Therefore there is no composition. The consequence is proved. Because where there is composition, there there is act and potency. For from a plurality a thing cannot become simply one unless one be act and the other potency; otherwise it would be one only by connection and aggregation, if both were act. And even then the parts themselves would be potency with respect to the union. The foundation of this argument will be explained below in the Second Book ², where there will be discussion of the plurality of forms. II. Second. God is the first being. Therefore he is not composite. The consequence is proved. Because what is composite is posterior to its components. Notice that the composite is compared to its component parts in some way as act to potency. Therefore, in the genus of formal cause, the whole is prior by nature to its parts; but in the genus of material cause, the parts are prior to the whole. On which account Saint Thomas says in the Third Book of the Sentences, dist. 11, q. 11, a. 1 ³, that the parts are prior to the whole originally, but conversely the whole is prior completely. Which is to say that in the order of generation and matter, by which one proceeds from potency to act, the parts are prior to the whole; but in the order of nature and form, from which the completion of a thing comes, the whole is prior to the parts. III. Third. If he were composite, he could not be. But this does not belong to God. The consequence is proved. Because every composite, as such, is dissoluble, although in some things there is something incompatible with dissolution. But this argument seems to destroy itself. For it will be said that, although from the fact that God is composite it follows that he could not be, nevertheless not to be is incompatible with him from another source, and he is a being that necessarily is. For clarity on this point, it must be known that every composite includes a plurality of really distinct things from which it is composed. But things that are really distinct, precisely as really distinct, are not unfitted to be able to be separated from one another, although sometimes from their own particular formal accounts it is incompatible that they be separated, because one has a necessary dependence on the other. It is therefore rightly said that what is composite is, by reason of composition, dissoluble: because composition includes a plurality of parts, to which, insofar as they are many and distinct, it belongs that one can be separated from another, whether both remain, or only one, or neither; and consequently that the whole can be dissolved and not be. But in God nothing of this sort can be found from which he could not be: since he is through himself first necessarily to be, from which he has it that in no way can he not be, neither from within nor from without.

IV. Fourth. It would have an efficient cause. And thus it would not be the first cause. — The consequence is proved. Because every composition needs a composer, since several things do not come together into one unless they are united by something. But a composite does not compose itself, since nothing is the cause of itself. Therefore there must be something else that composes it. Now such a thing is the efficient cause of the composite. Therefore, and so on.

V. Fifth ⁴. God is the noblest of beings. Therefore He is not composite. — The antecedent is evident, because He is the first cause. — The consequence is proved: in every genus something is the more noble the simpler it is; just as fire, which has no admixture of cold, is the noblest in the genus of hot things. What therefore stands at the summit of nobility among all beings stands at the summit of simplicity, and consequently is not composite.

Note concerning that proposition, In every genus, the nobler a thing is, the simpler it is: it holds true of those things that are placed in the genus per se and directly, but not universally of all things. For prime matter is not nobler than man, although it is simpler; nor is man simpler than matter because he is more perfect: for matter is not in the genus as something complete in species. But among the very species themselves, that one which is nobler is also simpler.

Note also that when it is said, "fire which has no admixture of the cold," this can have a twofold sense. First, so that the "which has no," etc., is restrictive of the term "fire," so that the sense is: Since some fire has an admixture of the cold, but some does not, that fire which does not have it is most perfect. And then it is probable, as was supposed, that this is true of fire in its sphere, namely that it has no degree of coldness at all, but has the highest degree of heat, at least in its uppermost part. — The second sense can be that it is declarative of the nature of fire, as if it belonged to the nature of fire to have no degree of coldness. And then it must be understood of fire in its proper matter, not of fire existing in another's matter, and of fire left to its own nature. For if we were speaking of fire insofar as it is altered by something cold, say by water, so as to convert it into water, it does not appear why coldness could not be mixed with its heat. Indeed, it seems necessary to posit this: since fire cannot be transmuted into water unless it is first disposed to the dispositions of water.

VI. But a doubt arises concerning this proposition: In any genus, something is the more noble the simpler it is. For it does not seem true either in genera or in species. In genera, indeed, because the higher a genus is, the simpler it is, inasmuch as it includes fewer things within its intelligible content. Yet it is not more perfect; rather, it is less perfect, because it is more potential, as being contractible through more differences, as is evident to one considering the order of the predicament of substance.

In species also, since stone is simpler than man—because it is constituted by the single difference of body, whereas man is constituted from many other differences, namely those of living thing and animal—and yet man is far nobler than stone. Similarly, the elements are simpler than animate mixed bodies, and yet animated things are more worthy than the elements.

It is confirmed by the words of Saint Thomas, Prima, q. III, a. 7, ad 2. For there he grants that among us composite things are better than simple ones.

VII. To these points it could briefly be said that Saint Thomas is speaking of simplicity as opposed to mixture with its contrary, as is clear from the words of the text. For that which is less mixed with its contrary is more perfect in its nature: just as whiteness is the more perfect the less it is mixed with blackness, and heat is the more perfect the less it has of coldness admixed in it. And thus "simpler" is taken to mean the same as "purer." Since, therefore, God is the most perfect in the genus of beings, it is necessary that he be the purest, as having nothing of non-being and potentiality. And consequently he has no composition.

VIII. Nevertheless, so that we may consider more deeply the order of simplicity and composition among things, it must first be known that there is a twofold simplicity: namely, corporeal simplicity; and formal, or actual, simplicity. That is said to be simple with wholly corporeal simplicity which is a body not composed of another body. And something is simpler insofar as it is composed of fewer other bodies: just as the elements are simpler than mixtures. — But that is said to be simple with wholly formal and actual simplicity which is entirely form and act. And something is simpler insofar as it is more formal and more actual, and has less of potentiality.

It must be known, secondly, for the greater clarity of this formal simplicity and of the composition opposed to it, that since the foundation of composition is act and potency—because from many things nothing becomes one simply unless one of them is act and the other potency—and since composition depends chiefly on potency, inasmuch as pure potency cannot be by itself: the more potentiality and the diversity of potency are preserved with respect to act, under one esse nonetheless, the more the ratio of composition is preserved. For composition imports the position of several things, namely act and potency, toward the esse of one thing. Therefore, where potentiality and distinction are more preserved together with unity of esse, there composition is more preserved. Now, in a composite, the distinction of potency and act, and potentiality, is preserved all the more, the less the potency is actualized by the form and the less the form predominates over matter; because then they make less of a unity, since the one is drawn less to the grade of the other. It follows, therefore, that where the form dominates matter less, that thing is more potential and more composite. From this it further follows that, where the form is more perfect and more predominant over matter, from that form and matter something less composite is made, and more one and more simple; because the form, the more it predominates, the more perfectly does it actualize matter and leave it less in potency. This is indeed evident if we run through the grades of forms informing matter of the same kind. For the forms of the elements, because they are totally immersed in matter, actualize it but little, while leaving it in potency to the act of the mixed thing, of the living thing, of the animal, and of the rational being; but the form of the mixed thing actualizes matter more, because it gives to it corporeal esse and the esse of a mixed thing, and leaves it less in potency, because not to the esse of a mixed thing as did the preceding form; but the form of the living thing actualizes still more, because it gives to it its own esse and that of the preceding forms, and leaves it less in potency; and so successively, the more perfect the form is, the less it leaves matter in potency, and consequently the composite is more one, and has less of potentiality in its essence. On account of which St. Thomas says in the Second book of this work, chapter 68, that from an intellectual substance and corporeal matter there results not less of a unity, but perhaps more, than from the form of fire and its matter; because the more the form conquers matter, the more one is made from it and matter.

Yet it must be noted that, although the more perfect and noble a thing is, the less real potentiality and diversity it has, nevertheless it has the more virtual plurality, since it contains unitedly and simply many perfections which in other things are distinct.

The proposition of Saint Thomas, therefore, that a thing is the more noble the more simple it is, must be understood of that formal simplicity, not of corporeal. For the more actual a thing is and the less it has of potentiality, the more noble it is. And thus that which is in the highest degree of nobility is also in the highest degree of simplicity, excluding from itself every diversity of potency and act.

IX. To the doubt ⁵ therefore it is said first, that here Saint Thomas is not making a comparison between the higher and the lower, but between those things which subsist per se in act.

It is said second, that the genus also, with respect to the very nature of the genus, taken formally in the manner of a nature and form abstracted from its species, is nobler and more perfect than its species, since it includes within itself all the perfection of animality unitedly and without distinction: just as whiteness abstracted from every subject contains, as such, every degree of whiteness. For then the genus is taken as an abstract form, not as unlimited matter. But if the genus be taken in the manner of a universal, namely as a potential whole containing its species in potency, thus it is more imperfect than the species, and is more composite by material composition, inasmuch as all its species are contained in it materially and potentially. It is said second, that stone is not simpler than man, nor element than mixed body, by formal simplicity. Rather, they are less simple: because they have more potentiality, since in them form is totally immersed in matter, leaving matter more in potency. When it is proved on the ground that they include fewer differences in their formal account, it is said that the consequence does not hold. For from the fact that they include fewer things in their account, it is argued that they contain fewer perfections virtually, not that they are more actual and more formal. In like manner, the plurality of differences in the account of something argues a plurality of perfections contained in it virtually and unitedly, not greater potentiality.

In confirmation it is said that Saint Thomas, in the First Part, where he is cited, is not speaking of formal simplicity and the potential composition opposed to it, which is what is intended in this place, but of corporeal composition. For among us, bodies that are composed of other bodies are better than those bodies, because they have more of act and perfection, since they are constituted by a nobler form.

X. Sixth. He would not be the first and highest good. — The consequence is proved. In every composite, the good that is the proper perfection of the whole is not of this or that part. This is clear by reason: because the parts are imperfect with respect to the whole. It is also clear by example: for the parts of a man are not a man, and the parts of the number six do not have the perfection of the number six, and the parts of a line do not have the perfection of measure that the line has. If, therefore, God were composite, he would not be purely that good which is proper to him: because in him there would be something to which it would not belong. And thus he would not be the first and highest good.

It must be noted here that the first and highest good must be the very essence of goodness itself: for if it were not goodness itself, it would have goodness received in something else, and consequently limited and participated, and thus would not be the first and highest good. Now an abstract form admits nothing foreign to itself along with itself, as is clear from Boethius, in the book On the Hebdomads ⁶: just as humanity signifies only those things by which man is man, and if it were separated from all individuals, as its abstract name signifies, it would have nothing else with itself, otherwise it would not be only that by which man is man. Therefore goodness, abstracted from everything receptive, has nothing that is not goodness itself. And if anything, besides its own goodness and perfection, has something to which its goodness does not belong, it is not goodness itself, but participates in goodness; and for this reason it is not the first and highest good. If, therefore, we were to posit anything in God to which the divine perfection proper to him does not belong, God would not be the first and highest good.

Seventh. Every multitude is preceded by unity. Therefore that which precedes all things must lack multitude, and consequently composition.