Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

As to the second point ¹, the following conclusion is set forth: It is necessary that divinely believed truths, which exceed human reason, be proposed to man. But before it is proved, an argument for the opposite is introduced, which some could bring forward ². For divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. Therefore it does not seem necessary that something be given to man above the capacity of his nature.

Then he proves the conclusion with four arguments. But it must be noted, with respect to the conclusion, that since the necessary for an end is said in two ways, according to Aristotle, V Metaphysics ³—namely, simply, and with respect to well-being—the conclusion must be understood of both. Hence the first argument proves it of what is necessary simply; the others, however, of what is necessary with respect to well-being.

I. The first argument, then, is this. By divine providence human beings are ordered toward a higher good than the frailty of our present human life can experience. Therefore we had to be called to something higher than what our reason can reach in this present life. — The antecedent will be proved below, in the third book. — The consequence is proved as follows. For no one tends by desire and striving toward anything unless it is previously known to him. Since, then, man strives by desire and effort toward that to which he is ordered by divine providence, it is necessary that he have prior knowledge of it.

This argument is first confirmed by a comparison of the Old and New Law. For since in the Christian religion spiritual and eternal goods are promised, many things are set forth in it that exceed human understanding; but in the Old Law, because temporal goods were promised, few things were proposed that would exceed human reason.

It is confirmed secondly from the laws of the philosophers. For the philosophers, wishing to lead men from the delights of sensible things to honorableness, showed that there are other goods preferable to sensible ones, in whose enjoyment those who devote themselves to the active or contemplative virtues are delighted with far greater sweetness.

2. On this point, it must be noted that "desire" is sometimes taken for the act of the sensitive or rational appetite tending toward something not yet possessed, and sometimes for any appetite and inclination whatsoever toward something, even if it follows upon a natural form. Therefore what is said in no one is moved by desire except toward something previously known is to be understood of desire as an elicited act of the appetite, not of an inclination following upon a natural form; because although such desire also follows upon some cognition, since the work of nature is the work of intelligence, as is said in Book II of the Physics ⁴, it does not nevertheless follow upon the cognition of the thing desiring naturally.

But this argument of St. Thomas seems not to conclude, for the opposite of the consequent seems to stand together with the antecedent. For something can be known by us naturally, and yet we shall not be able to attain it by our own power: just as, although someone may naturally know the nature of ruling, he will nevertheless not be able to be a ruler by his own powers.

It is answered that the point of the argument does not stand in this, that supernatural knowledge is necessary for us because we are ordered to an end which we cannot attain by our own power; but because we are ordered to an end which we can neither attain nor know by natural faculty, according to that of Isaiah 64 ⁵: "Eye has not seen, O God, apart from you, what you have prepared for those who wait for you." Thus the consequent does not stand opposed to the antecedent. For it is not the case together that the intellect is not raised to what is above its nature, and yet that man is ordered to what cannot be known naturally. For if these stood together, then something would be moved by desire and striving toward the unknown: for it would know the end neither naturally nor supernaturally.

3. For the first confirmation, it must first be noted, as is taught in Iª IIᵃᵉ, q. 107, a. 1, that the Old Law and the New are not distinguished as though they were ordered to different ends, the Old to temporal goods and the New to spiritual ones; but rather because, though they have the same end, namely that men be subjected to God, the New orders them more closely to this end, while the Old does so more remotely, and they are compared to one another as the imperfect to the perfect. For the Old Law, because it was given to the imperfect, who had not yet received grace, led men to the observance of the divine precepts by fear of punishments and the promise of temporal goods; whereas the New Law, which is given to the perfect, who have already received grace and faith through baptism, leads men to virtue from the very goodness of virtue itself, and especially of charity. Now, when it is said that the Christian religion promises spiritual goods, while the Old Law promises temporal ones, this is not to be understood as though the men of the Old Law held temporal goods as their end, while the men of the New Law hold spiritual ones; but because through temporal goods those men, being imperfect, were led to the love of God and to spiritual things; whereas we, possessing the perfection of grace, are moved to virtue, and especially to charity, from the very consideration of spiritual things in themselves.

It must be noted, second, that although the faith of the moderns and of the ancients is one, as Saint Thomas holds in Verit. q. xiv, a. 12, nevertheless men in the time of grace are held to believe explicitly more things than in the time of the written Law, as he says there in art. 11. Therefore what is said here, because many things are proposed to us above human sense, but few to the men of the Old Law, is to be understood explicitly: for implicitly the ancients believed all that we believe, as Saint Thomas wills in the place cited above ⁶.

4. For the second confirmation, it must first be noted, as is taught in II-II, q. 179 and 180, that some virtues belong to the contemplative life, such as the virtues that perfect the speculative intellect, of which wisdom is one: for the contemplative life has as its end the contemplation of truth. Others, however, belong to the active life, such as the moral virtues, which are ordered to action: for the end of the active life is exterior operation.

It must be noted, second, that although sensible delights are, with respect to us, more intense than spiritual ones—because sensible things are better known to us, and because such delights occur together with a bodily alteration, and because they are sought against bodily discomforts—spiritual delights are nevertheless greater in themselves, as is said in I-II, q. 31, a. 5, and in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 5, because spiritual perfection is nobler than bodily perfection and better suited to the rational nature, and for other reasons which Saint Thomas adduces in those places. Therefore he says here that those who devote themselves to the active or the contemplative life are delighted by the taste of spiritual things, because the delights which those experience who serve the contemplative life—which consists in the contemplation of truth—or indeed the active life, which is assigned to the exercise of the moral virtues, are far better simply and according to their own nature than any bodily and sensible pleasures whatsoever.

II. The second argument. We have a truer knowledge of God from the fact that we possess this truth through faith. Therefore this is useful to us. — The antecedent is proved. Then we truly have knowledge of God when we believe that esse itself is above everything we can think concerning it, since the divine nature exceeds man's natural faculty. But through the fact that certain things divine are proposed to man that exceed human reason, there is confirmed in us the conviction that God is something above all that we can think. Therefore, and so on.

It must be noted that, since we cannot see the divine essence as it is in itself, nor do we know God quidditatively; whatever predicates we attribute to him fall maximally short of the divine perfection, inasmuch as God is something more excellent. Hence one who supposed that there is in God only that perfection which can be investigated of him naturally would be deceived, wishing to equate the divine nature with a created intellect. But if he judged that God is more excellent than all that we know of him by natural investigation, he has a truer knowledge, approaching more nearly to his nature with his knowledge. For knowing this, the revelation of certain divine things helps us, which no one could ever have investigated by his own ingenuity.

III. The third reason. Human presumption, the mother of error, is thereby checked. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. For there are some who presume so much upon their own ingenuity that they think only what seems true to them is true of God, and that whatever does not seem so to them is false. This rashness is checked, however, when certain things are proposed by infallible truth which exceed their understanding.

Fourth argument. Much perfection is acquired by human reason from knowledge and faith, however slight, concerning such things. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved from the authority of Aristotle in Book X of the Ethics, where against Simonides he says that a man ought to draw himself toward the immortal and divine as far as he can; and in Book XI On Animals, that even a small perception of the higher substances is more loved and desired than all the cognition we possess of lower substances; and in Book II On the Heavens, that when questions about celestial bodies can be resolved by a small and topical solution, it happens that the hearer's joy is intense. For from these it is held that however imperfect the cognition of the noblest things may be, it confers the greatest perfection upon the soul.

IV. It must be noted that St. Thomas does not resolve the argument made to the contrary at the beginning of the chapter, but leaves it as resolved from what has been said. For the consequence is denied. Since human nature is ordered by divine providence to a supernatural end, therefore divine providence provided for it supernatural cognition, just as for the attainment of its natural end it provided natural principles.

V. Scotus, in question I of the Prologue of the Sentences, agrees with us on two points: first, that it is necessary for some knowledge to be handed down to us supernaturally; second, that the end to which human nature is ordered, namely God seen in His essence, is not naturally knowable by us in this present state. He disagrees, however, on this point: he holds that end to be natural, though to be attained supernaturally. Saint Thomas, on the other hand, in the first argument of this chapter and elsewhere ⁷, holds that man's ultimate end, which is God, is supernatural and to be acquired supernaturally.

Scotus proves his claim first by the authority of Augustine, Book I, On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 5, where he says: Therefore, to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men; but to have faith, just as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful. Therefore, to be able to have faith and charity belongs naturally to man. Hence also to be able to have the end to which faith and charity dispose him.

Second. Man naturally desires that end which you call supernatural. Therefore he is naturally ordered to it. And consequently it is a natural end.

2. But against this position of Scotus, insofar as it differs from Saint Thomas, the argument runs thus. If God were a natural end, that is, one toward which nature inclines, but to be acquired supernaturally, it would follow that nature inclines its subject toward something to which it would be impossible for it to be brought. This, however, seems false in all natures. And it also conflicts with reason: for then the natural appetite would be in vain in nature, since by no means could it be fulfilled through nature. Therefore, and so on.

3. But a doubt arises concerning this. For it seems that St. Thomas holds the same view as Scotus, in Boet. Trin., q. ult., a. ult., ad ult. ⁸ For there he says that, although man is inclined by nature toward his ultimate end, he cannot nevertheless attain it naturally, but only through grace.

It is answered that Scotus understands natural inclination and the natural end in one way, and Saint Thomas in another. For Scotus himself takes natural inclination for a merely natural inclination consequent upon nature and excluding cognition, which is not an elicited act, as is clear from him in Book IV, d. 49, q. 10. Likewise he speaks of the ultimate end materially, that is, of that in which the character of the ultimate end is found. Saint Thomas, however, by natural inclination understands not an inclination of nature opposed to the inclination that follows cognition, but an act elicited by the will which is natural and determinate with respect to the specification of the act, but not with respect to its exercise. Likewise he speaks of the ultimate end in general and under the common character of ultimate end and beatitude, as will be declared below. And the sense of his words is that if the ultimate end and beatitude are proposed to the will in common, the will indeed can elicit or not elicit an act concerning that object; but if it elicits an act concerning it, that act will be one of pursuit, and the will cannot flee such an object, although man cannot arrive at that good by his own power. Now it is not unfitting that man be inclined to something by an act of the will natural in the manner described, and yet be unable to attain it by his own power: because although natural power does not suffice for reaching it, it is nevertheless proposed to the will under the character of something appetible in every respect and having no defect of good, whence the will has it that it cannot reject it. But it is indeed unfitting that something be desired by an appetite which is only the inclination of nature, and yet man be unable to reach it by any natural power: because nature of itself has no inclination except within the limits of nature.

4. But Scotus's arguments do not compel. For when Augustine says that it is possible for faith to be of the nature of man, this is not said because there is in man a natural potency for faith and charity and the supernatural end, but because in the nature and substance of man there is an obediential potency for these things, and also a logical potency, which is non-repugnance. For it is not repugnant to the nature of man to have faith and charity, as it is to the nature of a stone. Indeed, to the nature of man there has been given a capacity for those things by which man may arrive at the supernatural end: as can be gathered from what is said in Verit. q. XIV, a. 10, ad 1. Hence Augustine's meaning is that in the nature of men there is a capacity and aptitude for faith and charity, which is not found in other material natures.

To the second, the antecedent is denied, if man is taken simply with respect to his natural endowments. For man, considered in his nature, does not naturally desire the vision of the divine essence as it is the highest good and ultimate end to which intellectual nature is ordered by divine providence — for this is how we are now speaking of the vision of the divine essence. But if man is taken as informed by divine revelation and by faith, such that his ultimate end and highest good is the clear and perfect vision of the divine essence, then he does desire it naturally, just as he desires the highest good in general. But then the consequence is denied, namely, Therefore it is natural, in the manner in which we are speaking here of the natural, that is, of that end which is proportioned to nature, and of which nature has a natural capacity, and which can be reached by nature's own powers; for this is how something is called natural among the philosophers, unless we wish to misuse words.